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Abstract
The spread of liberalisation across both developed and developing countries has 
become an increasingly important policy trend over the last thirty years. This thesis 
examines how liberalisation has occurred, at different speeds and in different ways, 
in the same sector across two different countries. It seeks to explain why, in the 
market for international students, liberalisation occurred to a greater extent in 
Britain than in France. This was despite the fact that both countries’ governments 
had espoused very similar policies towards international students from 1979 
onwards, promoting a reorientation of recruitment away from developing countries 
and towards developed and emerging economy countries, and encouraging higher 
education institutions (HEIs) to compete against each other for international 
students.
The thesis attempts to explain this cross-national difference in the extent of 
liberalisation through examining which actors pushed for liberalisation, and which 
factors conditioned their ability to do so. In this case, governments played the most 
important role in propagating liberalisation, and higher education institutions 
generally attempted to resist liberalisation, rather than promoting it. Governments’ 
ability to push forward liberalisation was constrained, however, by the extent of 
coordination of HEIs in sectoral associations, which enabled them to resist 
government proposals.
Whilst in some cases, French governments were able to create new institutions 
which encouraged a commodification of international students, they proved unable 
to create new institutions which incentivised HEIs to compete against each other 
for the recruitment of international students. In contrast, British governments 
managed to create new institutions which led to both the commodification of 
international students, and competition for their recruitment. The thesis thus also 
counsels a more nuanced approach to liberalisation, which recognises that it can 
consist in different elements (in this case, in both commodification and competition),
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rather than representing a uniform, and unified, process across countries and 
sectors.
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Introduction
1 The problematic
Theorists of comparative political economy have become increasingly concerned 
with explaining the mechanisms aiding the spread of economic liberalisation, which 
has become an important current within public policy. As Streeck and Thelen note, 
liberalisation is “[t]he dominant trend in advanced political economies”. Recent 
years have witnessed “the steady expansion of market relations in areas that under 
the postwar settlement of democratic capitalism were reserved to collective political 
decision-making” (Streeck and Thelen, 2005: 30).
This thesis examines how liberalisation has occurred, at different speeds and in 
different ways, in international students’ policy, a difficult case for recent theories of 
liberalisation to explain. It seeks to explain why, in the market for international 
students, liberalisation occurred to a greater extent in Britain than in France. This 
was despite the fact that both British and French governments had espoused very 
similar policies towards international students from 1979 onwards, promoting a 
reorientation of recruitment away from developing countries and towards 
developed and emerging economy countries, and encouraging higher education 
institutions (HEIs) to compete against each other for international students.
How can this cross-national difference in the extent of liberalisation be explained? 
The thesis attempts to do so through examining which actors pushed for 
liberalisation, and which factors conditioned their ability to institute it. In this case, 
governments played the most important role in propagating liberalisation, and HEIs 
generally attempted to resist liberalisation, rather than promoting it. Governments’ 
ability to push forward liberalisation was constrained, however, by the extent of 
coordination of HEIs in sectoral associations, which enabled them to resist 
government proposals.
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Liberalisation is here defined in behavioural terms, as the existence of competition 
between HEIs for international students, and of the commodification of international 
students (whereby international students are viewed as of immediate or indirect 
monetary value, rather than as important for their contribution to foreign policy 
goals, such as links with former colonies, or to international development). Whilst in 
some cases, French governments were able to create new institutions which 
encouraged a commodification of international students, they proved unable to 
create new institutions which incentivised HEIs to compete against each other for 
the recruitment of international students. In contrast, British governments managed 
to create new institutions which led to both the commodification of international 
students, and competition for their recruitment. The thesis thus also counsels a 
more nuanced approach to liberalisation, which recognises that it can consist in 
different elements (in this case, in both commodification and competition), rather 
than representing a uniform, and unified, process across countries and sectors.
These findings run counter to recent attempts by political economists to explain 
how the phenomenon of liberalisation occurs. They suggest that more research is 
required into the mechanisms of public sector liberalisation, and especially into the 
role of governments in promoting liberalisation, and of regulatees in resisting it.
2 Recent theories of liberalisation
Liberalisation constitutes a contested process for comparative political economists, 
with rival explanations of its development being expressed within different 
theoretical perspectives. This thesis constitutes a modest attempt to examine how 
liberalisation has proceeded in a ‘critical’ case.
One new, groundbreaking approach to explaining how liberalisation occurs is 
provided by Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen. Their recent book (Streeck 
and Thelen, 2005) purports to explain why liberalisation appears to be occurring 
more quickly than theories of comparative economic advantage, such as those 
motivating the ‘varieties of capitalism’ perspective, would suggest.
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Streeck and Thelen maintain that liberalisation’s “asymmetric” progress (compared 
with the apparent erosion of collective economic arrangements) can be explained 
by examining the reaction of economic actors (individual people, elites, firms or 
associations)1 to opportunities for competition. In particular, Streeck and Thelen 
suggest that liberalisation occurs when economic actors defect away from existing, 
collective institutions, towards market-based arrangements. For Streeck and 
Thelen, actors defect in this way because they have greater incentives to 
participate in the market compared with their incentives to participate in collective 
arrangements.2 Streeck and Thelen have suggested that their approach can be 
applied to explain the progress of liberalisation in both the private and public 
sectors. It is, hence, important to examine how liberalisation occurs in the public 
sector, and whether existing theories are adequate for this purpose.
3 The case study
The case of the liberalisation of international students’ policy in Britain and France 
constitutes a particularly difficult one for most recent analyses of liberalisation to 
explain. Both countries appeared remarkably similar at the start of the period in 
terms of their approach towards international students. Up to the late 1970s, 
international students’ policy in both countries was led by the perceived need to 
maintain links with their respective empires, and to aid economic development. In 
both countries, such international students were overwhelmingly educated in the 
public sector, in universities, polytechnics and colleges in Britain and in universities 
and public grandes 6coles in France. International students were not ‘recruited’ but 
‘accepted’, by a relatively small number of HEIs, mainly located in Paris and 
London. Governments in both countries started to alter their approach towards 
international students at almost exactly the same time, around 1979, and continued
1 Although Streeck and Thelen do not delimit their use of the term "actors”, the concept appears to cover these four types of 
actor given the examples of liberalising change which they describe (Streeck and Thelen, 2005).
2 As a result, Streeck and Thelen’s approach suggests that, contra many works within the ‘varieties of capitalism’ 
perspective, economies are inherently more likely to liberalise than to develop collective institutions. Consequently, following 
Streeck and Thelen's argument, collectivist (or coordinated) Varieties of capitalism’ may be unable to persist through time to 
the same extent as liberal Varieties of capitalism’.
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to promote both the commodification of international students and competition 
between HEIs for international students throughout the period. The thesis attempts 
to explain why, despite such similar starting-points, and such similar government 
strategies, a far greater extent of competition and commodification has occurred in 
Britain than in France in the area of international students’ policy.
4 The argument
In both Britain and France, governments have attempted to create institutions that 
would lead HEIs to compete against each other for international students, and to 
‘commodify’ international students, i.e. to view international students as valuable 
for their direct or indirect monetary worth, rather than as valuable for reasons of 
international development or foreign policy. The ability of governments to create 
such institutions rested on their roles as rule-makers. Governments’ legal and 
bureaucratic capacities, as the executive, provide them with a unique ability to 
create new, binding rules. Collections of rules defined by governments either 
facilitated liberalising behaviour, or militated against it, depending on the sets of 
constraints and incentives which they provided for regulatees.
Streeck and Thelen suggest that regulatees often promote liberalisation, by opting 
out of collective institutions in order to participate in market institutions instead. Yet, 
these HEI regulatees coordinated resistance to liberalisation (rather than 
individually promoting liberalisation by opting-in to the market) through their own 
collective organisations, HEI sectoral associations. Both British and French 
governments tried to liberalise, through creating liberalising institutions, but the 
greater extent of fragmentation and division between HEIs in Britain, compared 
with their better coordinated French counterparts, led to liberalisation occurring to a 
greater extent in Britain than in France. In France, the HEI regulatees were often 
able to force changes in the structure of such institutions while they were being 
created, and in their operation once they had been set up, by coordinating 
resistance through their sectoral associations. This occurred less frequently in 
Britain, where HEIs’ sectoral associations were often divided by factions.
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5 The operationalisation of liberalisation
The thesis examines governments’ role in liberalisation through investigating their 
ability to create institutions that set up particular incentives and constraints, which 
can lead to liberalisation. Overall, the research presented here suggests that 
liberalisation must be strictly defined and examined on a case-by-case basis if its 
progress is to be properly understood.
Streeck and Thelen have defined liberalisation as “an expansion of market 
relations... significantly beyond the limits (of) the organized capitalism of the 
postwar ‘mixed economy’” (Streeck and Thelen, 2005: 2). ‘Liberalisation’ is here 
defined as a type of behaviour: as the existence of competition and of the 
commodification of international students. Liberalisation is present where 
regulatees compete against each other, and/or treat international students as 
commodities. In contrast, liberalisation is absent where regulatees do not behave 
in this way; where, for example, they cooperate rather than compete with each 
other, and treat international students as important for foreign policy reasons (for 
example) rather than for commercial ones. A government is successful in instituting 
liberalisation where, after it has defined and implemented new rules (and thus, 
cumulatively, installed new institutions), actors compete against each other, and 
treat international students as commodities, where they did not before.
The two components of liberalisation are defined as follows. Competition between 
actors is defined as competition between HEIs for international students, with the 
goal of recruiting as many international students from target markets as is 
consistent with other existing institutional strategies. The commodification of 
international students is defined as the viewing of international students as of 
monetary value, either directly (through, for example, charging them fees), or 
indirectly (through, for example, viewing them as valuable for their likely future 
purchases/trade with France or Britain). This commodification contrasts with the
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traditional views of international students being valuable as a means of 
international development, or to maintain links with ex-colonies.
Liberalisation, therefore, has occurred when the regulatees switch towards 
competing amongst each other for international students, and when international 
students become commodified, with HEIs seeing them as useful for income 
purposes. Where liberalisation is broken down into separate processes, 
governments may be able to institute certain elements of liberalisation and not 
others. For example, in this case, French governments were on occasion able to 
successfully promote the commodification of international students, but they were 
generally unable to promote competition between HEIs. The thesis thus suggests 
the need for a more subtle analysis of liberalisation, which recognises that it can 
consist in different types of behaviour which may occur to greater or lesser extents.
6 The chapter structure
Each chapter examines a different type of institution across the two countries. Four 
such institutions are examined: promotional institutions (created to promote 
domestic higher education to potential international students), evaluation 
institutions (created to evaluate the quality of provision at different HEIs), financial 
institutions (created to fund higher education institutions), and visa institutions 
(created to regulate the presence of international students on the national territory). 
These were identified as the key institutions for the liberalisation of international 
students’ policy in both countries, following analysis of the available primary and 
secondary sources, and interviews in both countries with policy-makers, HEI 
representatives and other important individuals.
Each chapter first describes the existing institutional context, prior to the creation of 
the new institutions in each of these four areas. It is shown that in no case did pre­
existing institutions provide incentives for HEIs and other regulatees to compete 
against each other for international students, nor did it provide incentives to 
commodify international students. Each chapter than moves on to consider the
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strategies of successive governments and of HEIs towards the creation of the new 
institutions. It indicates how governments provided the impetus for the creation of 
all the new institutions. HEIs were on occasion opposed to the creation of the new 
institutions, or, attempted to change the new institutions such that they would not 
lead to a liberalisation of international students’ policy.
Having thus indicated the positions of both government and HEIs, and described 
the existing institutional context, each chapter describes how the process of 
institution-making progressed.
Firstly, the creation of each institution is examined, detailing how government and 
HEIs interacted during this process. Secondly, an analysis of the institutions’ 
operations is offered, noting how both government and HEIs attempted to control 
them. Finally, each chapter assesses the extent to which the new institutions led to 
liberalisation. It details whether the incentives and constraints which they set up 
induced HEIs to compete against each other for international students, and also, 
whether they induced HEIs and other sectoral actors to adopt a view of 
international students as commodities.
Chapter one details the theoretical framework. It examines existing theories of 
liberalisation, and in particular those from a ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach. 
Whilst these offer a useful corrective to overly-generalising ‘globalisation’ theories 
of convergence, they fail to explain the increasingly prevalent trend of liberalisation 
in all developed countries. Thelen and Streeck’s approach is examined, and is 
seen to constitute a genuine attempt to explain liberalisation. However, a number 
of problems with it are identified. Chapter one therefore emphasises the role of 
governments and the importance of intra-sectoral coordination in affecting the 
progress (or otherwise) of liberalisation. The chapter then explains why this case 
study has been chosen, giving the context (previous policies towards international 
students), and explaining how liberalisation can be seen as a sea-change 
compared with existing policies. Finally, the chapter provides a number of
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definitions for the terms used throughout the thesis, including “international 
students”, “liberalisation”, “institutions”, and “coordination”.
Chapter two details the institutional context for the processes of liberalisation 
examined here. First, it sets out existing policies towards international students in 
both countries before 1979. It shows that in both countries, international higher 
education policy was dominated by the concern to maintain links with former 
colonies and to promote international development. The chapter then provides 
some background on the nature of the higher education sector in each country. In 
particular, it details the manner in which degree-awarding status was conferred on 
HEIs in each country, how quality standards were controlled, and how HEIs were 
funded. Finally, the chapter analyses the strength of sectoral associations in each 
country. It indicates that French sectoral associations were stronger than their 
British counterparts, due to their lesser degree of factionalism.
Chapters three to ten analyse liberalising institutions in the field of promotion, 
evaluation, funding and visas, looking at the British and French cases in turn.
Chapter three examines attempts by British governments to create a new 
institution for the promotion of British higher education abroad, the Education 
Counselling Service (ECS). The ECS broke with the approaches of the existing 
organisations in the field of international higher education (the British Council, 
Interdepartmental Group of Officials, Round Table and Inter-University Council), all 
of which had focused on links with developing countries. Instead, the ECS led to a 
commodification of international students (through focusing on the recruitment of 
students from ‘target’, developed and emerging economy countries) and to 
competition between HEIs (as the ECS differentiated between HEIs in its delivery 
of services). The chapter indicates how the ECS was proposed not by HEIs 
themselves, but by the then government. HEIs were concerned that ‘their1 
approach to international higher education would be lost with the incorporation of 
the Inter-University Council into the British Council, and its eventual transformation
16
into the ECS. However, HEIs were split over their exact approach to the ECS, with 
only a few intermittently resigning, and then re-joining, the agency. Government 
thus dominated the creation of the new agency and its operations, especially the 
creation of the ‘EducationUK’ brand under the aegis of the ECS.
Chapter four examines the French counterpart of the ECS, EduFrance. It examines 
the existing organisations operating within the international higher education sector 
(the SFERE, CNOUS, Egide and ARIES), and describes how EduFrance adopted 
a very different approach from these previous bodies. The SFERE had focused on 
the promotion of French educational technology abroad, and the others had 
focused on building links with developing countries. EduFrance was created by the 
Ministries of Education and Foreign Affairs, with little reference to these existing 
organisations and with a different ethos and goals. Indeed, the new agency’s 
commercial approach led quickly to conflict with existing organisations over 
EduFrance’s commodification of international students (notably through its focus 
on the recruitment of students from developed and emerging economy countries, 
rather than from developing countries, and its charging of potential international 
students for its services). As with the ECS, the creation of EduFrance was driven 
by government. However, French HEIs did manage to get the then Director 
General of the agency removed and replaced, following coordinated resistance to 
his promotion of a liberalisation of international students’ policy.
These promotional institutions created by governments led to a commodification of 
international students in both countries. However, in France, HEIs were able to 
coordinate resistance to such commodification through their sectoral associations, 
leading to a change in leadership of the new promotional organisation EduFrance, 
with the removal of the original, pro-liberalisation, Director General. In contrast, the 
British ECS was able to divide between HEIs in its operations, which became more 
commodifying throughout the period, as a new brand for British higher education 
was introduced by the ECS with the support of the Prime Minister.
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Fig.1: The arguments made in chapters three and four: promotional institutions
Institutions Britain France
Previous institutional 
framework
Government-led
organisations
/rules
British Council; 
Interdepartmental Group 
of Officials; Round Table
SFERE;
CNOUS;
Egide
HEl-led organisations 
/rules
Inter-University Council ARIES
Government strategies Set up ECS EduFrance pushed 
personally by Ministers 
of Education + Foreign 
Affairs
HEIs’ strategies Concern over 
incorporation of IUC; 
heterogeneous 
responses to creation of 
ECS
Opposition to first 
Director results in his 
dismissal; concern over 
expansion of 
EduFrance’s role
Major issues during the operation of the new 
institution
New ‘brand’ created 
following Prime Minister’s 
initiative
Commercial approach 
adopted.
Conflict with existing 
organisations and 
attempts at coordination
Did the new institutions 
lead to liberalisation?
Did the new institutions 
lead to commodification?
Yes: Focus on 
recruitment of ‘well off 
students
Yes: Focus on 
recruitment of students 
from developed 
countries and also 
charging of international 
students for services
Did the new institutions 
lead to competition?
Yes: ECS differentiated 
between HEIs in delivery 
of its services
No
Chapter five analyses the creation of British evaluation organisations, and 
specifically, the adoption of an assessment-based approach to evaluation. 
Assessment facilitates competition between HEIs for international students, as it 
facilitates the production of ranked comparisons between HEIs which are 
accessible by such students. In contrast, other forms of evaluation, such as 
enhancement and accreditation, do not promote intra-sectoral competition in this 
way. Existing organisations in the field of higher education evaluation in Britain, 
such as the Council for National Academic Awards, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate, the 
Academic Audit Unit and External Examining system had used either accreditation 
or enhancement-based methods of evaluation, rather than assessment.
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The new Quality Assessment Units, the Higher Education Quality Council, and the 
Quality Assurance Agency (QAA) all adopted an assessment-based approach. 
These new organisations and their pro-assessment approach was promoted by 
government, which had been encouraging the use of assessment as a means of 
differentiating HEIs, for both competition and funding purposes, from the early 
1990s. HEIs were opposed to the adoption of an assessment-based system, but 
their resistance to this was fractured, mainly because the different factions within 
their sectoral associations disagreed over the costs and specificities of the existing 
evaluation systems. HEIs were particularly opposed to the extension of 
assessment to cover overseas collaborative provision (whereby the evaluation 
organisations travelled abroad to examine joint programmes between British HEIs 
and foreign HEIs) but to little effect. Where HEIs did achieve change in the 
evaluation system, this was generally on the basis of lobbying by a small group of 
powerful HEIs (such as the ‘Russell Group’ of research universities), and the 
resulting change was not always supported by all HEIs. The resulting evaluation 
institution facilitated liberalisation, through aiding the ranking of HEIs according to 
Quality Assessment Units’, Higher Education Quality Council and then QAA reports. 
The quantitative nature of the organisations’ reports helped to structure competition 
between HEIs, as had originally been governments’ professed intention when 
introducing the assessment-based evaluation system.
Chapter six considers the creation of a new French evaluation organisation, the 
Comite National d’Evaluation (CNE). Unlike the existing organisations covering 
French higher education, the CNE adopted an enhancement- (rather than 
accreditation-) based approach to evaluation. This was partly prompted by 
pressure from HEIs when the CNE was created in 1984. The chapter details how 
the new agency did not lead to an increase in competition between HEIs, as its 
reports were not produced in a fashion which aided ranking. Indeed, the CNE 
eschewed such an approach. Nor did the CNE’s activities lead to a 
commodification of international students. Although the number of international 
students per HEI was reported by the CNE, HEIs were not ranked on the basis of
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this, nor were the CNE’s reports used to inform funding decisions. This chapter 
shows how, whilst government was responsible for the initial creation of the CNE, 
HEIs were able, through coordinated action, to maintain its enhancement-based 
approach and avoid the use of evaluation for purposes of assessment (and 
ultimately, the cultivation of competition).
Neither of the new evaluation institutions had a perceptible impact on the degree of 
commodification of international students. In Britain, however, the assessment- 
based approach of the new organisations intensified competition between HEIs for 
international students. Although British HEIs had attempted to resist the 
introduction of assessment, they were unable to articulate an alternative through 
their sectoral associations. In contrast, French HEIs were able to collectively 
engage in both the creation and operations of the CNE, and thus prevented it from 
adopting an assessment-based approach (with the CNE performing enhancement- 
led evaluations instead).
Fig.2: The arguments made in chapters five and six: evaluation institutions
Institutions Britain France
Previous institutional 
framework
Government-led
organisations
/rules
CNAA and Her Majesty’s 
Inspectorate
Cour des Comptes 
and
IGAENR
HEI-led
organisations
/rules
Academic Audit Unit and 
External Examiners
CGE
Government strategies Create assessment- 
based system as means 
of differentiation for 
funding and/ or 
competition purposes
CNE created by Savary 
as a means of balancing 
HEIs’ autonomy
HEIs’ strategies Fractured resistance 
compromised by cost 
concerns and differential 
impact of assessment
Creation of CNE 
supported, to extent that 
it added to autonomy 
from government
Major issues during the operation of the new institution Extension of assessment 
to OCPs; universal visits 
renounced by Education 
Minister
Extension of evaluation 
to cover quadrennial 
contracts
Did the new institutions 
lead to liberalisation?
Did the new institutions 
lead to commodification?
Not significantly. No.
Did the new institutions 
lead to competition?
Yes: Assessment-based 
reports facilitated ranking 
which structured 
competition between 
HEIs
No: Reports were 
qualitative and resisted 
attempts at comparison
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Chapter seven examines the introduction of full-cost fees for international students 
studying at British HEIs from 1979 onwards. The funding methods used before the 
introduction of full-cost fees, both for the higher education system as a whole 
(unpredicated grants) and for international students in particular (the use of quotas 
and differential fees) did not lead either to competition between HEIs or to a 
commodification of international students.
In 1979, the then Conservative government proposed the new fees as a means to 
remove public subsidy for international students, and to induce HEIs to take an 
entrepreneurial approach to international student recruitment. HEIs attempted to 
resist the introduction of the new fees, but to little effect. HEIs were, similarly, 
unable to significantly affect the implementation of the new fees, and specifically, 
whether they were assessed on the basis of marginal or average cost, and how 
international students were defined for fee purposes. The new fees system led to a 
commodification of international students, as they encouraged HEIs to adopt a 
view of international students as useful for revenue rather than international 
development or foreign policy purposes. They also led to competition between 
HEIs in the recruitment of international students, with this competition resulting in 
an extensive differentiation of HEIs according to the revenue they earned from 
international students and the fees they charged them.
Chapter eight considers the introduction of the contractual funding system in 
France and its effects on policy towards international students. It finds that, as with 
the new British funding system, the contractual system enjoyed few precedents in 
the existing funding arrangements, with funding allocated according to factors such 
as the number of students and size of faculties, with no differential fees for 
international students, and with only limited existing use of contracts to structure 
the relationship between HEIs and government. The new contracts were promoted 
by Lionel Jospin as a personal project, which would allow him to start a new period 
as Minister with a bold policy proposal. The proposal was supported by HEIs, 
although only to the extent that it promoted autonomy from government and did not
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encourage competition between HEIs. The engagement of HEIs at the beginning of 
the process appears to have secured these two objectives. The new contractual 
system can be seen as leading to a commodification of international students, 
since it provided individual HEIs with extra funding where they had committed to 
increasing their recruitment of international students. However, it did not lead to an 
extension of competition between HEIs.
In Britain, the introduction of a new funding institution led to both an intensification 
of competition between HEIs, and an increased extent of commodification of 
international students. Although British HEIs attempted to prevent the introduction 
of the full-cost fees system, and to control its subsequent implementation, they 
were unable to collectively articulate an alternative approach through their sectoral 
associations. In contrast, French HEIs engaged in the definition of the new 
contractual funding system from the start and prevented the extension of 
competition between HEIs.
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Fig.3: The arguments made in chapters seven and eight: financial institutions
Institutions Britain France
Previous institutional 
framework
Government-led
organisations
/rules
Unpredicated grants; 
differential fees; quotas
Formula-based funding; 
no differential fees; 
limited existing use of 
contracts
HEI-led
organisations
/rules
None. None.
Government strategies Fees introduced to 
remove public subsidy 
and promote 
entrepreneurial approach 
amongst HEIs
Contracts promoted by 
Jospin as a means of 
marking his new role as 
Minister
HEIs’ strategies Attempts at resistance 
but little impact. Lack of 
coordination concerning 
parameters of the new 
system.
Attempt to ensure 
contracts led to 
increased autonomy 
from government, and 
avoided commercial 
approach
Major issues during the operation of the new 
institution
Pym Package; 
assessment of full cost; 
classification of students 
for fee purposes
Evaluation of contracts; 
non-fulfilment of 
contracts by
government; government 
control over the content 
of the contracts
Did the new institutions 
lead to liberalisation?
Did the new institutions 
lead to commodification?
Yes: Poorer students 
unable to afford high 
fees; students seen as of 
immediate value
Yes: Commitment to 
increase international 
student numbers 
rewarded with extra 
funding
Did the new institutions 
lead to competition?
Yes: Increasing market 
differentiation (although 
competition not just over 
price but other factors).
No.
Chapters nine and ten consider the development of new visa rules in Britain and 
France. Unlike the preceding chapters, these rules were not clustered in 
organisations, and so these chapters are structured slightly differently to the others.
The British chapter, chapter nine, examines the creation of new rules by the British 
government concerning international students’ visas. It first describes the existing 
institutional landscape, which was framed by the 1971 Immigration Act. It then 
details how governments first concentrated on the reduction of “overstaying” by 
international students following the completion of their course. HEIs resisted the 
links made by governments between international students and illegal immigrants. 
However, their response was compromised both by mutual suspicion among HEIs 
concerning the extent to which fellow HEIs upheld the rules, and through HEIs
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adopting different approaches to matters such as the use of immigration advisors. 
British governments also introduced new visa rules which facilitated the charging of 
international students, and which would improve the image of British higher 
education abroad, through avoiding high-profile examples of allegedly ‘unfair1 
treatment. British HEIs largely supported the last raft of rules, as they were felt to 
aid recruitment, but resisted the others. This chapter details the only case where 
British sectoral associations were able to coordinate resistance to liberalisation 
(against visa extension charges), without factions diluting the impact of this. 
However, the impact of this was reduced by the previous intra-sectoral conflicts 
referred to above, and by the fact that the HEIs’ campaign against the charges 
occurred too late to affect decision-making. All the new visa rules were both 
introduced and operated by government, and led overall to a commodification of 
international students, by promoting a view of them as of monetary value.
The final empirical chapter, chapter ten, considers French governments’ new rules 
concerning international students’ visas. These new rules were introduced within 
the context of a previously relatively permissive approach towards international 
students’ visas. The first attempt by government to change students’ visas rules 
involved the restriction of access to visas for students from developing countries. 
HEIs coordinated their resistance to this policy by refusing to implement some of its 
requirements, and it was eventually annulled.
However, in the succeeding period additional rules were introduced which had a 
commodifying impact on international students. A 1989 decree on the obtention of 
cartes de sdjour (permission to stay for a specified time) was introduced, and the 
lois Pasqua were passed, which reduced the ability of international students to stay 
in France if they had failed examinations. Both sets of rules were designed by 
governments to reduce the burden on the public purse from ‘overstaying’ by 
international students. A final set of rules were introduced from 1998-2000 which 
aimed to improve the image of French higher education overseas; the loi Reseda, 
the guichet unique (single office) policy and the grouped visa requests policy.
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HEIs largely supported the last set of rules, as, in common with their British 
counterparts, they saw these as improving recruitment, but opposed the other rules. 
French HEIs proved, generally, better able to coordinate campaigns against the 
other rules, due to the lack of intra-sectoral conflict which marred British HEIs’ 
approach to visa policy. Despite such coordination, however, HEIs were unable to 
prevent the implementation of the lois Pasqua, reflecting the fact that their impact 
was localised (which militated against a national campaign), and the power of 
central government to impose legislation, especially where HEIs were not involved 
in its implementation. Overall, the new French visa rules led to a commodification 
of international students, but did not have any perceptible impact on the extent of 
competition between HEIs.
In summary, whilst both British and French HEIs resisted the introduction of these 
new rules concerning international students’ visas, aside from the partial 
flexibilisation occurring from rule-changes to remove high-profile anomalies for 
promotional purposes, HEIs’ ability to change these differed. French HEIs were 
able to coordinate a campaign against some of the rules, which resulted in their 
annulment, although most other campaigns against the rules were relatively small- 
scale and localised. In contrast, British HEIs were generally (if not always) unable 
to mount a consistent front in debates on visa policy, due to their internal 
suspicions and differences over the implementation of existing rules.
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Fig.4: The arguments made in chapters nine and ten: visa institutions
Institutions Britain France
Previous institutional 
framework
Government-led
organisations
/rules
1971 immigration act; 
free administration; work 
permit restrictions.
Non-restrictive regime for 
students.
HEI-led
organisations
/rules
None. None.
Government strategies 1979 White Paper 
concentrated on control 
of illegal immigration
Imbert focused explicitly 
on reduction of students 
from developing 
countries
HEIs’ strategies HEIs attempted to break 
link between 
international students 
and illegal immigration, 
but response fractured
Imbert opposed during 
implementation through 
non-compliance; lesser 
degree of coordinated 
resistance to other 
degrees
Major issues during the operation of the new institution Attempt to restrict illegal 
immigration, charge 
admin fees and remove 
work restrictions, and aid 
recruitment of 
international students.
Amendments to Imbert; 
1989 law and to/s 
Pasqua; to/' Reseda, 
guichet uniques and 
grouped visa requests
Did the new institutions 
lead to liberalisation?
Did the new institutions 
lead to commodification?
Yes: See above; rules 
led to restriction of visas 
to those who would 
provide immediate 
monetary value, with 
exception of cases which 
could give British HE an 
'unfair* reputation
Yes: Against students 
from developing 
countries, restriction of 
overstaying, reduction in 
cases which could give 
French HE an 'unfair' 
reputation.
Did the new institutions 
lead to competition?
No No
The concluding chapter provides an overview of the arguments made in the thesis, 
and suggests further areas for examination. It concludes that whilst French 
governments were, on occasion, able to introduce new institutions which led to a 
commodification of international students, their ability to foment competition 
between HEIs for the recruitment of international students was limited. In contrast, 
British governments proved able to introduce new institutions which both led to a 
commodification of international students and to increased levels of competition 
between universities and colleges for such students (see Fig.5).
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Fig.5: The extent of liberalisation (commodification and competition) in Britain and 
France following the creation of new institutions
Commodification Competition
Institutions Britain France Britain France
Promotion Yes Yes Yes No
Evaluation No No Yes No
Financial Yes Yes Yes No
Visa Yes Yes No No
The conclusion notes that this differential picture of the extent of liberalisation 
contradicts many previous analyses which have depicted liberalisation as a uniform 
phenomenon. It also contradicts theories which have claimed that liberalisation 
occurs due to the actions of individual actors within collective institutions, who 
decide to defect into market institutions instead. Rather than liberalisation being 
promoted by those operating within existing institutions, the regulatees, instead the 
latter often resisted liberalisation through sectoral associations. Government, not 
regulatees, attempted to instil liberalisation, being able to do so through its ability to 
create new rules which cumulatively constituted new institutions. The conclusion 
underlines the importance for comparative political economy of examining the role 
of government in pushing forward liberalisation, and of investigating the role of 
regulatees in resisting this liberalisation.
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Ch.1 Liberalisation, coordination and international students
1 Existing theories of liberalisation 
1. a Liberalisation and the public sector
Public sector liberalisation has become an important policy trend. Such 
liberalisation, compared with its private sector counterpart, is under-theorised and 
under-explained. The methods which have been used to examine and theorise the 
liberalisation of the private sector have infrequently been used to help understand 
public sector liberalisation. In particular, as Pierson notes, “neither students of the 
welfare state nor students of political economy have considered the welfare state 
an integral part of national economies” (Pierson, 2001b: 5). In a recent work, 
Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen suggest that their analysis of liberalisation, 
and that of others working within their perspective, applies equally in sectors where 
governments have traditionally enjoyed extensive, and sometimes exclusive, rule- 
making authority (Streeck and Thelen, 2005: 5-6, 32; Hacker, 2005; Levy, 2005; 
Palier, 2005). Peter Hall and David Soskice have also maintained that their 
approach, which attempts to explain continuing differences between countries in 
the face of generalised moves towards liberalisation, can equally be applied to 
“social policy” (Hall and Soskice, 2001: 51).
1. b Convergence towards liberalisation?
Many works within the ‘globalisation’ field have suggested a uniform, and 
ineluctable, progression towards liberalisation across developed countries. ‘Strong’ 
globalisation theorists such as Kenichi Ohmae have described a worldwide spread 
of liberalisation, as of other economic policy trends, partly precipitated by the 
power of trans-national corporations to relocate to low-regulation economies 
(Ohmae, 1990). Similarly, Currie has suggested that ‘marketisation’ has proceeded 
in the higher education sector in a uniform fashion across developed countries 
(Currie, 1998).
1. c Varieties of capitalism
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In contrast, one of the most influential recent perspectives in comparative political 
economy, the ‘varieties of capitalism’ perspective, suggests that there has not been 
a convergence of economic institutions as might have been expected. Such 
institutional convergence has been prevented by the particularities of societal and 
economic institutional frameworks in different countries (Berger and Dore, 1996; 
Gourevitch, 1996: 241; Hall, 1999:147; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Iversen 1999a; 
Kitschelt et al., 1999; Zysman 1996b). This perspective suggests that certain types 
of economic behaviour are aided by the existence of coordinated industrial 
relationships, whilst others are hindered by this. Economies can, from this 
perspective, broadly be divided into types, for example, coordinated or ‘Rhenish’ 
economies, non-coordinated (or liberal, or ‘Anglo-Saxon’) market economies 
(Albert, 1993; Hall and Soskice, 2001), and, for some authors, statist (Schmidt, 
1996), and state-enhanced (Schmidt, 2001) economies.
Most importantly for the analysis of liberalisation, ‘varieties of capitalism’ theorists 
maintained that coordinated market economies (CMEs) need not necessarily 
converge onto the institutional pattern of liberal market economies (LMEs). CMEs 
continue to possess institutions which promote a coordinated response to 
economic challenges. Whilst there may recently have been a proliferation of 
institutions within CMEs which have given actors the incentives to engage in 
particular types of behaviour (such as the promotion of shareholder value rather 
than long-term growth, following moves away from managed capitalist institutions), 
‘varieties of capitalism’ theorists maintain that these institutional changes have not 
been significant enough to invalidate the distinction between CMEs and LMEs.
However, this perspective has failed to explain why CMEs have increasingly 
become characterised by market rather than coordinated methods of exchange. 
Empirical evidence appears to confound the notion that the institutional structures 
of CMEs can persist through time as those of LMEs have (Howell, 2003: 109).
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Some writers within the ‘varieties of capitalism’ perspective have acknowledged the 
fact that liberalisation appears to be occurring more quickly in CMEs, certainly 
when compared with the almost non-existent creation of collective arrangements in 
LMEs in recent years. Hence, Hall and Soskice maintained that it was ‘common 
knowledge’ that successful strategic (coordinated) interaction between economic 
actors entailed an asymmetry between LMEs and CMEs. The creation of the 
conditions for a coordinated market economy involves a long and slow process, 
whereby actors are drawn into collective arrangements. In contrast, Hall and 
Soskice claim that there are no “common knowledge” constraints on CMEs 
deregulating to become more like LMEs (Hall and Soskice, 2001: 63).
Hall and Soskice thus appear to accept that the erosion of coordination is 
inherently more likely than its creation and consolidation. However, as Pontusson 
notes, such ‘asymmetry’ appeared to have had little theoretical impact on ‘varieties 
of capitalism’ theories (Pontusson, 2005:172-3).3 ‘Varieties of capitalism’ theories 
thus appear unable to explain why convergence, in terms of CMEs liberalising to 
become more like LMEs, is occurring - if to a limited extent.
1. d Streeck and Thelen’s challenge to varieties of capitalism
Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen have offered a new theoretical analysis 
which appears to tackle the problems inherent in ‘varieties of capitalism”s attempts 
to explain creeping liberalisation (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). Their analysis 
considers why liberalisation is occurring in developed countries, and at a faster rate 
than predicted by theories that reject convergence, such as ‘varieties of capitalism’.
Streeck and Thelen’s approach draws on a variety of existing literature which has 
proposed a more detailed and long-term analysis of institutional change.4 Unlike 
works by these existing authors, however, Streeck and Thelen’s theory proposes a 
holistic explanation of institutional adaptation and change, rejecting claims that “the
3 See also Streeck, 2001: 36.
4 see, for example, Campbell, 2004: 33; Deutsch, 1961; Ertman, 1996; Goldstone, 1998; Heclo, 1974; Immergut, 1992;
Locke and Thelen, 1995: 360-1; Pierson, 2003:199; Skocpol, 1992; Steinmo, 1993; Stephens, 1979; Weir, 1992.
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processes responsible for the genesis of an institution” might be different from “the 
processes responsible for the reproduction of the institution”, as maintained by 
Pierson (Mahoney, 2000; Stinchcombe, 1968; Thelen, 2004: 26).5 Their approach 
emphasises the “dialectical manner in which institutional reproduction and change 
condition one another”, with change being sometimes “produced by the very 
behaviour an institution itself generates”, i.e., being endogenous to the institution 
(Streeck and Thelen, 2005:18).6 Apparently peripheral developments may have 
significant effects for the future of institutional structures.7 In addition, as Thelen 
has noted elsewhere, apparent stability may sometimes require “a major dose of 
institutional adaptation” to cope with changed circumstances (Thelen, 2003: 225).
Streeck and Thelen maintain that their model of incremental, endogenous change 
is particularly relevant to analysing the spread of liberalisation across countries and 
sectors. Hence, they claim that “an essential and defining characteristic of the 
ongoing worldwide liberalisation of advanced political economies is that it evolves 
in the form of gradual change that takes place within, and is conditioned and 
constrained by, the very same postwar institutions that it is reforming or even 
dissolving” (Streeck and Thelen, 2005: 4).
Gradual liberalisation is, for Streeck and Thelen, more likely than rapid 
liberalisation because of the differential incentives for coordination as compared 
with competition. Specifically, they claim that actors will more readily exit 
coordinated institutional arrangements than they will engage in the creation and 
maintenance of collective institutions. In particular circumstances, all “that may be 
needed for liberalization to progress” is for people to be given “a market alternative 
to an existing system based on collective solidarity, and then give free rein to the 
private insurance companies and their sales forces” (ibid.: 33). Liberalisation may,
5 In his claim that: “retrenchment is a distinctive and difficult political enterprise. It is in no sense a simple mirror image of 
welfare state expansion.... Retrenchment advocates must operate on a terrain that the welfare state itself has fundamentally 
transformed” (Pierson, 1994:1-2).
6 See also Jackson, 2005:250; and Seo and Creed 2002.
7 See also Orren and Skowronek, 1994; and Weir, 1992b.
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therefore, be “achievable by default: by letting things happen that are happening 
anyway” (ibid.).8
In contrast, the creation of collective institutions is more difficult. Whilst 
liberalisation “can often proceed without political mobilization, simply by 
encouraging or tolerating self-interested subversion of collective institutions from 
below, or by unleashing individual interests and the subversive intelligence of self- 
interested actors bent on maximizing their utilities”, “non-liberal” reforms “seem to 
require ‘political moments’ in which strong governments create and enforce rules 
that individual actors have to follow, even if they would on their own prefer not to 
do so” (ibid.: 33). Competition is thus, for Streeck and Thelen, more likely than 
coordination, which they maintain helps to explain the allegedly slow but inexorable 
progress of liberalising institutional change across industrial countries.
Streeck and Thelen explain the different ways in which liberalisation occurs by 
invoking five different mechanisms of “gradual yet transformative change” (ibid.:
33). Firstly, new institutional arrangements can be created through displacement. 
This occurs where “traditional arrangements are discredited or pushed to the side 
in favour of new institutions and associated behavioural logics”. Such new 
institutions may result from the “reactivation” or “rediscovery” of existing, if defunct, 
historical institutional examples, or alternatively from the example or invasion of 
institutions from other countries (ibid.: 20-1; Quack and Djelic, 2005: 276). 
Displacement can occur through foreign ‘invasion’, but not, it appears, through 
concerted action by governments.
Secondly, institutional change can occur through ‘layering’. This occurs where new 
institutions grow up alongside old ones, and gradually degrade existing institutional 
systems. This occurred when, for example, a parallel system of shareholder-led 
financial companies and banks grew up alongside cooperative capitalism in
8 See also Howell, 2003:109.
32
Germany, and where new institutional layers on the margins of French social policy 
institutions started to undermine existing systems (Deeg, 2005; Palier, 2005:140).9
A third mechanism of liberalising change for Streeck and Thelen comprises the 
‘drifting’ of institutions away from the relevant social context. Rather than old 
institutions being consciously removed, instead decisions can be made (or 
decisions can be avoided) to let them ‘drift’, which over time renders them 
increasingly redundant. Hence in the US healthcare sector, the inability of the 
existing institutional framework to adapt to new risks reduced its long-term viability, 
by encouraging the growth of private provision (Hacker, 2005:44; Streeck and 
Thelen, 2005: 24).
‘Conversion’ is also, Streeck and Thelen maintain, a mechanism of liberalising 
change. In this case, institutions can, formally, remain the same, whilst the actors 
operating within them change (Trampusch, 2005: 204; Thelen, 2004: 36); or, 
conversely, institutions can be turned to new tasks without any alterations to their 
structures (Levy, 2005: 104).
Finally, and related to institutional drift, old institutions may gradually become 
incoherent with their institutional context, as institutions dependent on new logics of 
action proliferate, and hence old organisations can lose long-term viability or 
become ‘exhausted’.
For Streeck and Thelen, none of the five mechanisms of change are purely 
exogenous; even displacement from foreign institutions requires a degree of 
support from actors involved in existing institutions. All processes of liberalising 
change thus require economic actors to defect from existing, collective institutions 
towards new, liberalising ones.
2 A critique of Streeck and Thelen’s analysis
9 See also Deeg, 2001, for a consideration of how such layering could be analysed by theories of path dependence.
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As a timely and prescient contribution to the debate, it is important to engage with 
Streeck and Thelen’s perspective on economic liberalisation. They have offered a 
thorough and interesting attempt to explain why existing theories of political 
economy have failed to explain contemporary developments, and especially why 
they cannot explain apparent convergence towards liberalisation across a variety 
of sectors and national settings. However, their analysis displays two significant 
lacunae.
2. a The role of governments in liberalisation
Firstly, it downplays the role of governments in pushing liberalisation. Overall, 
Streeck and Thelen maintain that the key factor promoting liberalisation is not the 
political will of governments or the ability of targets of liberalisation to resist new 
policies, but the logic of liberalising change, which proceeds mainly “only slowly”, 
through the mechanisms described above (Streeck and Thelen, 2005: 30).
It might appear that their “displacement” mechanism could encompass the 
imposition by governments of liberalising institutions. However, Streeck and Thelen 
maintain that displacement can only occur either “endogenously through the 
rediscovery or activation of previously suppressed or suspended possibilities” or 
through “invasion”, through the “importation and then cultivation by local actors of 
‘foreign’ institutions and practices” (ibid.: 21). Nationally-bound exogenous factors, 
such as pressure from governments, are ruled out by Streeck and Thelen as a 
means of creating liberalising institutions.
However, as Weiss has explained, governments “do not simply support 
accumulation in an undifferentiated way”, but “actively channel and mould 
economic activity into particular forms” (Weiss, 1988: 3), thus generalising 
“distinctive patterns of industrial ownership and organization that society-centered 
forces alone would very likely not have produced” (ibid.: 9). It was just such a 
creation of new institutional patterns by government which characterised the 
liberalisation of international students’ policy in both Britain and France.
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Government can play a key role in conceiving of and institutionalising change, 
which is often in the face of widespread resistance, rather than quiescent 
acceptance.
This inability to explain rapidly imposed liberalisation is evident in Streeck and 
Thelen’s analysis, and that of other writers working within their perspective, of the 
British Thatcher and Major governments’ successful and extensive liberalisation of 
public services from the early 1980s until the mid-1990s. Streeck and Thelen 
appear forced to accept that the Thatcherite reforms constitute a counter-example 
to the view that liberalisation constitutes a gradual and continuous process. In 
contrast, the Thatcherite period constituted an “occasional but short-lived episode 
[...] of turmoil”. Streeck and Thelen attempt to salvage their overall perspective by 
maintaining that the Thatcherite reforms were enabled by institutional continuity 
with an allegedly “rediscovered neoliberal model” (Streeck and Thelen, 2005: 30).10 
Yet, Thatcher’s actions in Britain offer a prime example where government acted to 
impose competition-based reform before other actors proposed this (Schmidt, 2002: 
21; 74-8). This again appears to contradict any view that liberalisation occurs in a 
continuous and gradual fashion, and that it is pushed by regulatees rather than by 
government.
Streeck and Thelen’s approach can also be challenged by works which have 
emphasised the continuing role of the state in liberalisation. Authors such as 
Schmidt have maintained that a ‘state-enhanced’ model of capitalism can still be 
differentiated from Rhenish and Anglo-Saxon models. Whilst successive French 
governments have begun to “dismantle state power and control”, “the state 
continues to exercise leadership, albeit in a more indirect and often supply-side 
way ... [including] through state support of industry in a more centralized and 
active way than in Germany”, and in a significantly more interventionist manner 
than Britain, which according to Schmidt has moved “even farther in a market
10 see also Crouch and Keune, 2005: 88; Hall, 1992; and Hay, 2001.
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capitalist direction from its original market capitalist starting point” in the early 
1980s (ibid.: 117).
Whilst economic liberalisation has certainly occurred in France, Schmidt maintains 
that relatively recent changes did “not seriously challenge the traditional 
relationship between government and business...” (Schmidt, 1996: 3). For example, 
French governments’ attempts to instill privatisation were tightly controlled and 
regulated by governments (ibid.: 52). Although the state may have retreated from 
some areas of activity, Schmidt maintains that it “continues to intervene, albeit in a 
more limited, supply-side way, through laws and incentives intended not only to 
make the economy more competitive but also to ‘moralize’ business and labour 
relations - even though as often as not its intervention has served only to further 
marketize those relationships” (Schmidt, 2002: 142). The continuing extensive 
involvement of governments in the direct and indirect control of the economy is, for 
Schmidt, sufficient grounds to differentiate the French politico-economic model, as 
‘state-enhanced capitalism’, from that of managed capitalism and of market 
capitalism (ibid.: 191).
Rather than governments possessing a limited role in liberalisation, with this 
process mainly being propelled by sectoral actors as Streeck and Thelen suggest, 
governments can play a very significant role in this area of economic policy. This is 
due to their ability, as the makers of rules, to design new institutions, which provide 
the incentives and constraints within which sectoral actors operate. In this way, 
governments’ rule-making can lead to changes in sectoral actors’ behaviour, either 
in favour of or against liberalisation (where sectoral actors are given incentives 
towards or constraints against competing with each other, and commodifying 
particular factors).
2. b The role of coordination amongst regulatees resisting liberalisation
Secondly, Streeck and Thelen’s analysis also fails to consider the importance of 
coordination amongst regulatees (who may resist regulation), as opposed to the
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role of competition between them. It fails to acknowledge the possibility of such 
resistance to liberalisation from regulatees, and the importance of coordination of 
this. Instead, Streeck and Thelen concentrate on regulatees’ possibilities of exit 
from existing collective institutions to new or revitalised liberalised institutions. Yet 
actors may not choose to defect in this way, but instead collectively attempt to 
prevent change.
Some work by Kathleen Thelen, along with Kume, has offered an interesting 
consideration of the role of collective associations in liberalising processes more 
generally, which could help fill this gap in Streeck and Thelen’s analysis (Thelen 
and Kume, 2005). However, Thelen and Kume’s analysis emphasises the role of 
coordinating institutions in promoting, rather than resisting, the liberalisation of 
collective bargaining. Thelen and Kume stress that coordination amongst actors 
can destabilise rather than shore up existing collective institutions. In a survey of 
labour market policies in Germany, Sweden and Japan, they maintain that 
intensified coordination between particular employers and particular labour 
organisations has undermined existing pan-sectoral arrangements rather than 
consolidated them.
As such, their analysis challenges much work within the ‘varieties of capitalism’ 
school which has generally described feedback in coordinative systems as positive 
and stabilising. Soskice noted earlier that the “case for improved coordination 
across business...is very strong in any long-term strategy of improving 
international competitiveness” (Soskice, 1990: 60), and much of the ‘varieties of 
capitalism’ perspective constitutes an attempt to offer a theoretical framework for 
this assertion (Hall and Soskice, 2001:45-50). Thelen and Kume’s analysis 
usefully counsels a more subtle approach to coordination, which recognises the 
possible deleterious effects of coordination on maintaining some types of collective 
arrangements.
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However, the coordination relevant to the liberalisation of international students’ 
policy concerns not coordination between HEIs and other bodies, but intra-sectoral 
coordination. Hence, it is important to look not only at the relationship between 
regulatees and external bodies, but also between regulatees themselves. Thelen 
and Kume claim that the continued viability of collective bargaining is “not really a 
question of labor’s successful defense of the system”. However, they have not 
considered the effects of intensified coordination within labour representative 
institutions, but only between labour and capital. The impact of coordination 
amongst regulatees has not, therefore, been extensively considered by Thelen and 
Kume, yet is shown by the analysis presented here to help explain comparative 
differences in the progress of liberalisation in this case.
Another author within the Streeck-Thelen perspective, Jonah Levy, has examined 
the impact of intra-sectoral coordination on liberalisation. However, he has 
maintained that the “state-led liberalization” that has occurred in France has been 
diluted by the inability of the state to cede powers to non- or quasi-state bodies, 
which, he claims, are insufficiently coordinated to receive them. According to Levy, 
regulatees “have little incentive to organize and bargain with each other if the state 
is calling all the shots” (Levy, 2005: 117,120, 122). Hence, for Levy, a lack of intra­
sectoral coordination has prevented liberalisation rather than aided it; implying that 
the presence of intra-sectoral coordination would have facilitated liberalisation.11
Levy’s argument has many similarities with corporatist arguments on the 
importance of incorporating collective associations in industrial adjustment.12 
These have attempted to specify how corporatist systems of interest intermediation 
have facilitated adjustment to change, through enabling the state to manipulate 
and indeed, to lower demands, within the context of a generalised sharing of the
11 See also Levy, 2000. In addition, see Culpepper’s claim that the French state’s inability to "build up the associations of 
civil society that allowed for non-market coordination in Germany” weakened its ability to adjust to new economic 
circumstances (Culpepper, 2004: 2).
12 See, for example, Harrison, 1985; lonescu, 1975; Manoi'lescu, 1936; Reader, 1985: 95; Rowthom and Glyn, 1991; and 
Shonfield, 1965.
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costs of adjustment. These costs are shared not only amongst producers and 
labour, but also with the state; as Atkinson and Coleman summarise, as “a 
distinctive policy network corporatism promises to deliver consensus on the goals 
and instruments of policy and to be a vehicle through which the state can share 
responsibility for implementation as well as policy direction” (Atkinson and 
Coleman, 1989: 23, 27).13 Levy’s analysis appears to draw on these analyses by 
emphasising the importance of coordinated institutions for government-led 
economic adjustment.14 However, as with many corporatist analyses, Levy’s 
analysis underestimates the importance of conflict between regulatees and 
government in explaining the progress or otherwise of public policies.15 
Coordination between regulatees can hinder the progress of industrial policy, 
where the implementation of such policy involves governments creating new, 
liberalising institutions.
Contra both Thelen and Kume, and Levy, this research indicates that coordination 
between regulatees has actually helped prevent liberalisation, rather than 
consolidated the chances of it being instituted.
3 The research question
The research question driving the analysis presented here concerns why 
liberalisation has occurred to a different extent in two countries, in the same sector, 
despite similar institutional starting points and government strategies. In both 
countries, before 1979 policies towards international students were largely driven 
by the perceived need to maintain links with former colonies, and by international 
development concerns. From 1979 onwards, governments in both countries 
promoted similar, new policies towards international students (the recruitment of
13 For a criticism of this argument, see Teulings and Harteg (Feulings and Hartog 1998:17). For other assessments of 
corporatism’s role in the economy, s e e : Baccaro, 2003; Berger, 1981; Bruno and Sachs, 1985:222; Cawson, 1985a; 
Cawson, 1985b; Elgie and Griggs, 2000:160; Grant, 1985; Harrison, 1984b; Jobert and Muller, 1987; Muller, 1992; Offe, 
1985; Panitch, 1979; and Schmitter, 1974: 93-4.
14 See also Levy, 1999.
15 One important exception to this claim is Claus Offe’s work, which has explicitly recognised the power imbalances inherent 
within corporatist arrangements, and the continuing importance of class conflict within corporatist regimes (Offe, 1985).
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more students from developed and emerging economy countries, as against 
students from developing countries), by attempting to set up similar institutions (in 
the field of promotion of domestic higher education abroad, the evaluation of HEIs, 
the funding of HEIs and the visa rules governing international students’ access to 
the national territory).
Yet, liberalisation of international students’ policy occurred to a greater degree in 
Britain than in France. British HEIs competed against each other to a greater 
extent for the recruitment of international students from developed and emerging 
economy countries, and international students were commodified (treated as useful 
for monetary rather than foreign policy or international development purposes) to a 
greater extent in Britain than in France. This thesis asks how this apparent 
anomaly can be explained.
The liberalisation of international students’ policy in Britain and France cannot be 
explained within Streeck and Thelen’s framework. It does not appear that 
liberalisation was caused by individual economic actors (HEIs) defecting towards 
the market. Furthermore, the new institutions created from 1979 which encouraged 
liberalisation did not draw on pre-existing institutional precedents, as Streeck and 
Thelen would suggest. It is necessary to search for new actors who could have 
pushed liberalisation, and also factors which might have held it back or 
compromised it.
4 The choice of this case study
This case study offers a hard case for existing analyses of liberalisation, both in 
terms of the sector chosen and the countries examined.
Firstly, as detailed above and in the introduction, this case offers an interesting 
example of eventual difference despite initial similarity. Britain and France offer a 
useful comparison because governments in both countries have attempted to 
institute similar liberalising institutions - governing promotion, evaluation, financial
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incentives, and visa delivery. In addition, both countries’ governments have had 
similar goals in international students’ policy, which has increasingly prioritised the 
development of competitive relationships between HEIs and the encouragement of 
international student flows from developed and emerging economy countries. 
France and Britain have traditionally been two of the most important ‘importers’ of 
international students worldwide, with 165, 437 international students attending 
French HEIs in 2002 and 227,273 in the United Kingdom that year (OECD, 2004: 
Table C3.7).16 Yet, liberalisation of international students’ policy has occurred to a 
greater extent in Britain than in France.
In addition, the case examined here is also important because it covers a part of 
the public sector which has traditionally been subject to extensive government 
control. Governments have “used instruments such as funding, regulation, planning 
sometimes and evaluation occasionally” to coordinate their higher education 
systems in both countries (Huisman etal., 2001: 4). In comparison with industries 
in the private sector the British higher education sector is still extensively controlled 
by governments, hence Tapper’s comment that the British system of higher 
education can be seen as “our last nationalised industry” (Tapper, 2005: 200). If 
Streeck and Thelen’s analysis of liberalisation can, indeed, be applied to the public 
sector, then higher education offers a hard example for their perspective to explain.
Thirdly, in addition to the British and French cases offering a useful combination of 
initial similarities and eventual differences, the two countries have also often been 
opposed to each other in comparative analyses of industrial policy. Many analyses 
have suggested that French governments would be better able to engineer change
16 It is not possible here to analyse exactly how the two countries have managed to recruit differing numbers of international 
students. As Williams notes, the precise relationship between policy and trends in enrolment is “not always easy to judge” 
(Williams, L., 1987:20, footnote), with a number of additional variables complicating attempts to adduce a direct causal chain 
(such as: the impact of linguistic factors; the economic and political situation obtaining in particular countries; and the 
exchange rate for the national currency). This thesis does not, therefore, attempt to assess whether Britain or France was 
‘better’ at recruiting international students. Instead, it attempts to describe how governments in each country attempted to 
liberalise policy towards international students, and how the coordination of regulatees led to them being able or unable to 
resist such liberalisation.
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in the public sector, given their greater apparent leverage through a ‘strong state’. 
In contrast, British governments would be expected to struggle to achieve wide- 
ranging change, given their relative lack of formal controls over the higher 
education sector, as with the rest of the state. Indeed, differences between Britain 
and France concerning the extent of state intervention has formed a staple of 
comparative public policy analyses dating from Andrew Shonfield’s comparison of 
the two countries in 1965 (Shonfield, 1965).17 For Shonfield, in “the history of 
capitalism Britain and France supply the convenience of sustained polarity”, with 
France subject to an “Statist tradition” contrasting with the British pattern of “arm’s 
length government” (ibid.: 71,171).18
As Schmidt notes, “on the surface”, the “state-centered approach....would appear 
to have been devised with France in mind”. Rather than the state being seen as 
merely one other element of a pluralist or corporatist interaction of interests, 
instead, the state “became an independent, autonomous agent” during the Fifth 
Republic (Schmidt, 1996: 38). The French state was able to dominate decision­
making to the extent that “peak organizations [in France were] more like pressured 
groups than pressure groups” (Hayward quoted in Page, 1985: 100). It was 
“capable of mobilizing public and private energies in the support of its own 
conception of the national interest to an impressive degree when compared with 
the situation in Britain” (Grant, 1995: 66).19
In contrast, the British state has traditionally been portrayed as weak and as 
exercising a limited role in industrial policy; a “spectator state”, with rather 
“tenuous” connections between governmental policy-makers and economic 
interests (ibid.: 80, 91 ).20 When the British state did attempt French-style “heroic” 
policymaking, its efforts were, Schmidt claims, generally doomed to failure. 
Governments adopted a “hands-off’ approach to business, generally restricting
17 See also Albert, 1991; Boyer, 1997; Touraine, 1969.
18 See also Hayward, 1973:152.
19 See also Coleman, 1989; Hayward, 1995; and Suleiman, 1987.
20 See also Hayward and Lorenz, 1990:65; and Zysman, 1983.
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their role to manipulation of macro-level economic variables (Schmidt, 2002:151- 
152).
Yet, apparently in contrast to these existing comparisons of British and French 
industrial policy, in the case of policies towards international students it was easier 
for British governments to create liberalising institutions than it was for French 
governments. This was due to the greater extent of coordination amongst French 
HEIs through their sectoral associations than their British counterparts.21
5 Definitions
It is necessary at this stage to define a number of concepts used throughout the 
thesis, before developing the argument presented above. The following section 
therefore operationalises the terms “liberalisation”, “institutions”, “coordination” and 
“international students”.
5. a The definition of liberalisation
Liberalisation is defined here as the existence of two types of behaviour amongst 
regulatees: competition and the commodification of international students. This 
definition of liberalisation fits within Streeck and Thelen’s minimalist definition of the 
term, as relating to an “expansion of market relations”... “significantly beyond the 
limits (of) the organized capitalism of the postwar ‘mixed economy’” (Streeck and 
Thelen, 2005: 2). It also coheres with their claim that liberalisation constitutes a
21 It should, however, also be noted that one of the main explanations for the allegedly continuing strength of government in 
France may be less applicable in the case examined here. It has been suggested that one of the routes through which the 
capacity of French governments has been retained, is through networks of elites in both the public and the private sector, 
which have connected business to government. The state’s “institutional leadership capacity” was enhanced through links 
between elites built up through the grandes 6coles system, and employed variously in business and in government (Schmidt 
2002:184-5). Hanckg has also claimed that these networks led, in France, to “the state, banks, and large firms [being] 
intertwined through a complex elite network” (Hanck6,2001: 313), which facilitated state control, at least concerning some 
economic matters, if not all. However, this focus on elite networks, whilst useful for analysing private sector liberalisation, 
may have limited applicability for the analysis of public sector liberalisation. Although the role of the grandes 6coles is pivotal 
in producing the elite networks in the first place, there is no coherent elite network linking the management of French HEIs 
(either universities or grandes 6coles) and the rest of the state. Whilst the elites produced through the grandes Gcoles 
system do indeed go on to important jobs in industry or in the bureaucracy, few of them stay in academia, and especially few 
of them go on to work in universities (as opposed to grandes dcoles).
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type of behaviour, which is either fostered or militated against by the institutional 
context. Liberalising institutions are those institutions which provide the incentives 
for liberalising behaviour (here, competition and commodification), and constraints 
against non-liberalising behaviour (cooperation and the viewing of international 
students as valuable for non-monetary purposes, i.e. international development). 
The definition of liberalisation used here is, finally, also consistent with the 
conceptions of liberalisation mentioned in Streeck and Thelen’s edited volume, 
which includes some detailed investigations of liberalisation within the public sector. 
However, through specifically defining liberalisation as constituting two, identifiable, 
types of behaviour, the thesis attempts to refine the concept of liberalisation and 
offer a more subtle analysis of how liberalisation occurs. The rest of this sub­
section details how ‘competition’ and ‘commodification’ are operationalised for the 
purposes of this thesis.
5. a. i Liberalisation as competition
‘Competition’ amongst HEIs is here restricted to competition for the recruitment of 
international students. “Competition” thus intimates the conflictual relationships 
resultant from different organisations attempting to reach a goal that they cannot all 
achieve in equal measure:22 in this case, different HEIs attempting to recruit as 
many international students from developed and emerging economy countries as 
was possible, consistent with other institutional imperatives.23
Competition amongst HEIs for students in general has always been a feature of 
both systems, albeit to a lesser extent in France. Hence, Veblen’s claim that it was 
“one of the unwritten, and commonly unspoken commonplaces lying at the root of 
modern academic policy that the various universities are competitors for the traffic 
of merchantable instruction in much the same fashion as rival establishments in the
22 To adapt Bok’s definition (Bok, 2003: 159).
23 Certainly, as Van der Wende et al. note, HEIs may need to cooperate in order to compete, through, for example, 
developing international promotional networks. However, this thesis is concerned with competition between HEIs at a 
national level, not an international one, and within this context, "cooperation and competition” cannot be seen as "two sides 
of the same coin”, as Van der Wende et al. suggest (Van der Wende et al., 2005: 202).
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retail trade compete for custom” (Veblen, 1918:139). More recently, Bok noted that 
universities “do compete vigorously with one another” for a variety of goals, which 
included the attraction of high-performing students (Bok, 2003:159).24 The extent 
of competition between HEIs for international students has not been so frequently 
analysed.
This thesis does not consider competition as a coordinating process, nor does it 
consider markets as coordinating institutions.25 Instead, it restricts the analysis of 
coordination by only analysing the degree of coordination provided by sectoral 
associations. It follows Hall and Soskice in delimiting market ‘coordination’ from 
what they termed “strategic coordination”, this involving “forms of strategic 
interaction supported by non-market institutions” (Hall and Soskice, 2001: 33). In 
this case, the non-market coordinating institutions comprise HEIs’ associations, 
their strength buttressed by non-competitive funding arrangements and common 
standards. HEIs’ associations may of course be in existence at the same time as 
HEIs compete against each other. However, on any particular issue dimension, 
coordination and competition are taken as opposite ends of a hierarchy of greater 
or lesser strategic coordination.
Therefore, rather than competition being seen as a type of coordination, this thesis 
places both concepts at the opposite ends of a spectrum of increasing 
cooperation.26
24 On the issue of the extent of competition between HEIs, see also Bargh etal., 1996:14 and Klein, 1979.
25 Some have maintained that competition can provide coordination, and that therefore, markets are coordinating institutions. 
Market coordination has previously been counterposed with state-imposed hierarchy and self-organisation by Jessop (who 
has developed a typology of “the anarchy of exchange [i.e. market forces], the hierarchy of command [i.e. imperative 
coordination by the state], and the ‘heterarchy’ of self-organisation [i.e. networks]” (Jessop, 1999: 351)), and with hierarchy 
and academic oligarchy by Burton Clark (who has defined three “ideal types of integration”; “state authority, which can be 
either political or bureaucratic; academic oligarchy, and the market” (Clark, 1983), as one of 'three modes’ of coordination. 
For more general claims that markets can constitute “non-interactive...modalities of coordination”, which could be 
functionally equivalent to interactive modalities, see Scharpf, 1978: 350; and for a discussion of the role of markets as 
coordinating institutions or otherwise, see: Alexander, 1995; Hall etal., 1977; Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997; and Litwak and 
Hylton, 1962.
26 This is in line with Walsh’s claim, that “[m]arket and organisation [can be] seen as being the ends of a continuum rather 
than the binary opposites” (Walsh, 1995:46).
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Fig. 6: The relationship between coordination and competition
little cooperation ...........  limited cooperation ++++++ extensive cooperation
competition *  coordination
5. a. ii Liberalisation as the commodification of international students
“Commodification” is here defined as a view of international students which 
restricts their value to its monetary worth; as “a commodity to be valued mainly for 
the income they generate”, as Williams described the international student body in 
Britain (Williams, 1987: 10).
Such “commodification” occurs either where the recruitment of international 
students is encouraged for the funds that can be immediately extracted from them; 
or, where it is encouraged for the funds that will eventually flow from their visit, 
where this is seen as leading to increased economic benefits for the host country.
International students can, therefore, be seen to be commodified where new 
charges have been imposed on them as a means of generating income for HEIs 
(as through tuition fees) or for other actors (such as the Home Office in the case of 
visa extension charges, or EduFrance in the case of the EduFrance pass)27.
International students can also be seen as commodified where they are valued not 
for foreign policy or international development reasons, but for their commercial 
worth. Such a new, commodified view of international students is evident in both 
Britain and France, where the recruitment of international students is increasingly a 
matter for industrial policy (where the state has the possibility of adopting selective 
measures to alter the structure of organisation to the long-term advantage of the
27 A pass for new international students which enabled them to access special services, on payment of a fee to EduFrance.
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economy).28 Policies towards international students can affect each country’s 
international market position within what had become a “major service industry” 
(Walker, 1997: 21). Within this perspective, higher education is viewed by 
governments as an important industry,29 with international students categorised as 
an “invisible export”, and international education “represented as an export 
industry” (O’Leary, 1990; Overseas Student Trust, 1992: 66).30 Such “financial 
considerations” have increasingly “overshadowed” international development and 
foreign policy considerations (Sherlock, 1988).
This restriction of the scope of ‘commodification’ to refer to the changed status of 
international students is more parsimonious than the more general, sometimes 
merely ‘metaphorical’, unqualified uses of the term by a number of authors (Walker, 
1997: 381 ).31 Commodification here is also distinct from the concept’s meaning as 
developed by Esping-Andersen (Esping-Andersen, 1990).32 Although such 
‘commodification’ can be linked with the expansion of markets (Pierson, 2001a: 
426), it has a specific meaning for Esping-Anderson referring to the extent to which 
workers can opt out of sublimating their labour value, which is not relevant here.
Nor does commodification here refer to the educational process itself,33 as used in 
perspectives which maintain that education has become itself a “saleable 
commodity” (Leonard and Morley, undated; Clare, 1987: 8S-6*. As Patel has noted, 
categorising education as a commodity entails a number of problems given that the 
‘consumption’ of education requires customers to take up residence in a new 
country, thus involving considerable income-costs, and, inevitably, the purchase of
28 This definition of industrial policy is drawn from Atkinson and Coleman’s definition (Atkinson and Coleman, 1989:60), 
which in turns drawns on Whiteley’s work (Whiteley, 1986:175-8). It is also consonant with that used by Kassim et al. (1996), 
Oatley (2004:110), and Reich (1992).
29 And sometimes as the most important export industry; see Reading University’s receipt of the Queen’s Award for Industry 
in 1989, for its recruitment of international students (Walker, 1997: 78). See also Williams and Evans (2005:90)
30 See also Warner and Palfreyman, 1999: x.
31 See, for example, Edwards, 1996:263; Frolich and Stensaker, 2005:46; Jameson, 1991; Miller, 2003; Schuller, 1992: 33; 
Walker, 2001; Welch, 1988; Whitfield, 1999; Willmott, 1995' and Winter, 1995.
32 see Room (2000) for a critique of such uses; see also Ebbinghaus and Manow, 2001: 8.
33 For claims that government policies have led to education being “marketed like any other commodity”, see Bacchus, 1987.
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goods in addition to the required primary good, in order to derive maximum benefit 
from the purchase (Patel, 1998).34
To summarise, liberalisation here is defined in a relatively restricted manner, as 
referring to the extension of market relations to encompass increased competition 
between HEIs, and the commodification of international students.
5. b The definition of coordination
As noted above, the examination of regulatees’ attempts at coordination is 
restricted to their sectoral associations. Specifically, the thesis examines the 
impact of the relative strength of French sectoral associations compared with their 
British counterparts. Although coordinated resistance through sectoral associations 
need not always lead to the withdrawal or alteration of government policies, in 
almost all the cases examined in this thesis it has had this effect. Such examples 
of coordinated resistance preventing the creation of liberalising institutions, or 
leading to changes in their operations, are generally confined to the French case, 
with comparatively few examples of British sectoral associations being able 
effectively to resist government policies.
Associations are defined as encompassing coordinating structures which are 
durable through time, and which have been created through repeated interactions 
between members. As Brown notes in relation to British higher education sectoral 
associations, in a comment which could equally be applied to their French 
counterparts, such organisations “were - and are - in effect trade associations, 
making representations and lobbying government on policies, disseminating advice 
and guidance to members, and delivering certain functions on their behalf...” 
(Brown, 2004: 11).
34 The restriction of ‘commodification’ to refer to international students only could be challenged by claiming that it is only 
after education has been commodified, i.e. become ‘saleable’, that international students have been able to purchase it, and 
thus could themselves become commodified. Whilst such an argument may have some purchase in relation to the British 
introduction of full-cost fees, it is less relevant to the French case, where HEIs were financially rewarded specifically for 
recruiting more international students. Nor does this perspective help explain changes in visa rules which have had a direct 
effect on the origins of international students, rather than on the nature of education.
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The associations examined here were identified by a process of induction, as the 
main encompassing organisations covering British and French HEIs. At the 
beginning of the period, in Britain these constituted the Committee of Directors of 
Polytechnics (CDP), and to a lesser extent, the Association of College Principals 
(ACP), representing the ‘public sector’ of higher education; and representing the 
university sector, the Committee of Vice Chancellors and Principals (CVCP). From 
1992 onwards, most of the public sector HEIs joined in with CVCP, which was 
renamed ‘UniversitiesUK’ in 2002, and a small number joined the Standing 
Committee on Principals (SCOP).
In France, the two associations examined are the Conference des Presidents 
d’Universife and the Conference des Grandes Ecoles. As with UniversitiesUK, not 
all HEIs are members of these associations, but, as in Britain, the vast majority of 
international students attend HEIs which are covered by one of these sectoral 
associations.35
The strength of sectoral associations is assessed by examining the extent of 
‘factions’ within each association. Such factional groupings were restricted to a 
sub-section of the higher education sector, compared with the associations 
examined here, which involved coordination across all HEIs in a certain category 
(universities/grandes dcoies; universities/public sector). Although factions might 
potentially be categorised as constituting coordinating associations, they can also 
be seen as reducing the strength of the relevant encompassing, sectoral 
association. As this thesis considers the coordination of policy across the entire 
higher education sector in each country, partial coordinating organisations are 
described as diluting sectoral associations’ authority and thus weakening the 
associations.
35 For example, in 1984-5, 90 out of 100 international students in France attended public universities (who were members of 
the CPU), and 7 out of 100 of them attended grandes 6coles (who were members of the CGE). Only 2-3 in 100 international 
students attended private university establishments (Weil, 1991:230) which may or may not have been members of the 
CPU/CGE.
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As detailed in chapter two, the extent of coordination of regulatees through British 
sectoral associations was much less than through French sectoral associations.
5. c The definition of institutions
“Institutions” are defined here according to North’s definition, as “the humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interactions”, and specifically the “rules that 
human beings devise” (North, 1990: 3-4).36 Such rules here are restricted to formal 
rules. A collection of rules, or even a single rule on its own, can constitute a 
liberalising institution if it provides regulatees with the incentives and constraints 
which lead to them competing amongst each other for international students, 
and/or adopting a commodified view of international students.
As North maintains, organisations can be distinguished from institutions through 
the latter’s greater scope and overall importance in defining the possibilities of 
action (North, 1990).37 For North, organisations are those (collective) actors who 
are governed by the rules which constitute institutions (ibid.: 4).
My analysis indicates that the institutional change required for liberalisation may 
not involve the incorporation or manipulation of existing institutions, but rather the
36 My definition of institutions according to North has some similarities with Streeck and Thelen’s description of institutions 
as “building-blocks of social order” (Streeck and Thelen, 2005: 9-10). However, it has adopted North’s more restrictive 
conceptualisation due to a number of potential problems with Streeck and Thelen’s definition. They maintain that, through 
differentiating institutions from patterns of behaviour, they allow “a gap between the institution as designed and the 
behaviour under it” (ibid.: 10). Certainly, failing to allow for such a gap could lead to accusations of vacuity in the definition of 
institutions (so for example, their definition laudably excludes claims such as “an institution consists in the patterns of 
behaviours which operate within it”). It appears that considering only formal, as opposed to informal, rules as institutions, as 
here, would also avoid such problems. However, Streeck and Thelen are keen to maintain that institutions must also be 
socially sanctioned, by a third party (to the regulatee and the ‘rule maker*), if they are to be classified as anything more than 
just interrelationships between individuals, or between collectivities. Streeck and Thelen do not appear to adequately explain 
who this ‘third’, societal, party is, leading to problems with their definition, hence my use of North’s definition instead of 
Streeck and Thelen’s.
37 See also Zysman, 1994:259.
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creation of entirely new ones with little existing institutional precedent.38 In 
particular, four new institutions were created in each country: new promotional, 
financial, evaluation, and visa systems. These institutions were identified in both 
countries following the use of an inductive strategy from the available evidence.39
This thesis examines institutional, rather than organisational, change. Hence, it 
examines a number of organisations which were more or less important in the 
creation of new institutions, but which should not be construed as institutions in 
their own right. For example, a new, liberalising institution for evaluation has been 
created in Britain. This new institution comprises the rules embodied in three 
organisational groupings; the funding councils’ Quality Assessment Units, the 
Higher Education Quality Council, and the Quality Assurance Agency. A variety of 
rules, embodied in the structure and activities of these organisations, led to a move 
away from inspection and enhancement, and towards assessment. The 
development of the new assessment-based evaluation institution thus occurred 
over a number of years and involved a number of organisations. The switch from 
evaluation being mainly based on inspection and enhancement, towards evaluation 
being mainly based on assessment, has led to an increased level of competition 
between HEIs, as the assessment-based rules provide HEIs with incentives to 
compete rather than to cooperate with each other.
In contrast, the French Comite National devaluation, although comprising only one 
organisation, can be seen as leading to the creation of a new institution, since the 
rules it embodied and put forward have had such a significant effect on structuring 
individual HEIs’ activities, that they have defined the French ‘evaluation system’. 
Overall, they have led to French evaluation of HEIs being based on enhancement 
rather than on any other approach. Similarly, both the British ECS and the French
38 Streeck and Thelen define institutions as “formalized rules that may be enforced by calling upon a third party”. I share 
their rejection of cultural elements as constituting institutions (Streeck and Thelen, 2005:10).
39 Hence, the research, to use Norman Blaikie’s terms, uses an ‘inductive strategy’ to answer 'whaf questions (what policy 
instruments exist and are relevant; what coordinative institutions exist and are relevant) as part of an overall deductive, 
theory-testing research design (Blaikie, 2000:122).
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EduFrance led to significant changes in the manner in which international students 
were viewed, in favour of a ‘commodification’ of international students.
It should also be noted that, as well as being embodied in organisations, the rules 
examined here can also ‘stand alone’, although the extent to which individual rules 
can constitute institutions depends on the extent of their effects on regulatees’ 
behaviour. In both Britain and France, governments created new rules governing 
international students’ visas in the late 1970s, which were sufficient to mark a 
significant change from the existing legislative framework. However, both 
governments also introduced a range of other rules following the initial change.
The combination of these rules over time produced a visa institution which was 
liberalising in its effects. In other cases, just one rule can be enough to significantly 
alter HEIs’ behaviour, through providing them (for example) with strong incentives 
to compete against each other in a situation where they previously did not compete. 
This occurred within the financial system in Britain, where the adoption of full-cost 
fees for international students immediately led to competition amongst HEIs.
5. d The definition of international students
Exactly how to describe students who have come to Britain or France from foreign 
countries has proved a contentious matter. As Humfrey maintains, those “who 
were in the 1970s described as foreign students were the overseas students of the 
1980s and the international student of the present decade” in Britain (Humfrey,
1999:154). Most French analyses, however, still use the term Gtudiants etrangers. 
Some interviewees were opposed to the term “international students”, seeing it as 
imprecise (such students are no more inherently ‘international’ than anyone else; it 
is their activities which are international). However, ‘international students’ appears 
to be the least offensive and most frequently used term in English-language 
discussions of such students, so it is adopted here.
Policies towards two categories of international students have not been extensively 
examined here. Firstly, scholarship policies have not been detailed in this thesis.
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The proportion of scholarship students to international students as a whole is 
limited in both countries, and, as Williams notes, scholarship programmes have 
failed to have any perceptible impact on the general trend away from students 
being recruited to western universities from developing countries (Williams, P., 
1981b: 30).
Secondly, this thesis has not examined in detail policies towards European 
students in each country. Such policies have been considered in great detail 
elsewhere (Corbett, 2005; Mangset, 2005; Ravinet, 2005). Most institutional 
parameters relating to European students’ mobility have consisted of EEC/EU rules, 
rather than rules defined by British and French governments in isolation. In addition, 
it is arguable whether there has been a liberalisation of EU students’ policy (given 
the continuation of at least the pretence of ‘equal exchange’), in comparison with 
the undoubted liberalisation of non-EU international students’ policy. Therefore, 
given these differences between the two policy areas, it was felt that analysing EU 
international students as well as non-EU international students would 
overcomplicate the analysis.
For the purposes of this thesis, “international students” are, therefore, defined as 
non-EU, non-scholarship-holding foreign students attending British and French 
HEIs.
6 Methodology
This research design driving the thesis is the analysis of a ‘hard’ or ‘critical’ case 
study, within the framework of historical institutionalism. This research design has 
led to the choice of documentary, interview and statistical analysis as research 
methods (Crotty, 1998: 3).
6.a The research design
The thesis has adopted a ‘hard’ case study research design, as a means of testing 
existing theories which have attempted to explain why liberalisation occurs. The
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case study was used here, as opposed to any other methodology, due to the fact 
that it facilitates a “more rounded, holistic, study than...any other [research] design” 
(Hakim, 1987: 61). In particular, the use of case studies allows the use of a variety 
of techniques of data collection and analysis, which can provide a thorough and 
detailed examination of a selected political phenomenon (Yin, 1984). As in this 
study, case studies have frequently been used for cross-national comparative 
analyses (Gospel and Littler, 1983; Heclo, 1974).
6.b The use of comparison
The thesis adopts a comparative method for the analysis of liberalisation 
(Przeworski and Teune, 1982; Ragin, 1987). Specifically, it has chosen two cases 
where the initial situation was similar (government liberalisation strategies) but 
where outcomes differed substantially (the extent of liberalisation). It has linked this 
difference in outcomes to one feature of the institutional context (the extent of 
coordination between HEIs). The existence of such similarities and dissimilarities 
allows a deeper understanding of how the process under consideration 
(liberalisation) has occurred.
The very existence of dissimilarity in the extent of liberalisation disproves the 
‘convergence thesis’, whilst the similarity of other factors which might otherwise 
have explained the progress of liberalisation suggests that a new theoretical 
approach is required. As noted throughout the thesis, HEIs did not defect from 
collective institutions towards the market, which Streeck and Thelen have 
maintained might explain liberalisation. The extent of coordination between 
regulatees emerged from analysis of the data gathered as an important factor 
which could help explain why liberalisation occurred to a greater extent in Britain 
than in France.
Of course, the mere fact that both countries’ governments professed similar goals 
at the start of the period, but that different outcomes resulted, need not in itself 
justify a comparison. In particular, it could be claimed that this comparison, as with
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any other, has failed to acknowledge additional differences between the nations 
than those isolated here, which could be of causal relevance.
However, as DeFelice notes, any comparison of two nations requires some degree 
of abstraction from national context; crucially, any contextual features not deemed 
to be of causal significance must be shown to be genuinely irrelevant, rather than 
merely appearing so (DeFelice, 1980).
Any research project must adopt a particular starting point for analysis, beyond 
which any additional causal factors are assumed rather than explained. The thesis 
has not, therefore, examined why British sectoral associations are weaker than 
their French counterparts. It has measured their relative strengths and weaknesses 
from the evidence presented in the data (in terms of the extent of internal 
factionalism), but has not attempted to explain why there were more, and more 
powerful, factions in Britain than in France, for example.
The thesis has identified one particular factor (the strength of sectoral associations) 
as significant in explaining the difference in outcomes between the two countries. 
This factor was discovered inductively from the evidence. In contrast, alternative 
factors which have previously been used to explain differences between British and 
French public policy fail to explain this case. For example, as noted above, many 
analyses of British and French industrial policy have maintained that French 
governments will be better able to engineer change through their greater control 
over the economy. Yet, the opposite occurred in this case. The fact that French 
university academics are employed by the government rather than by the 
universities themselves has also often been adduced as setting the French system 
apart from others. However, this feature had little impact on the ability of 
universities and colleges to coordinate their opposition, and during the political 
contestation concerning the new policies towards international students there was 
little reference to industrial relations issues.
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Nor can the differences between Britain and France be explained within the 
framework of traditional comparative politics. Firstly, partisan politics cannot 
explain the differential progress of liberalisation in this case. Both countries were 
governed by right-wing executives when the first reforms to international students’ 
policy occurred (in France, the government of Raymond Barre; in Britain, the 
government of Margaret Thatcher); and both by centre-left executives when the 
last reforms examined here occurred (in France, the government of Lionel Jospin; 
in Britain, the government of Tony Blair). In addition, opposition to changes to 
international students’ policy resulted in comparable degrees of student protest in 
both Britain and France, judging from press coverage throughout the period 
examined. It was, therefore, necessary to look for another explanatory variable 
which might explain the difference in outcomes; and this was discovered in the 
extent of sectoral coordination.
6.c The adoption of historical institutionalism
The thesis adopts a historical institutionalist approach, to the extent that it does not 
“depict [...] institutions primarily as static entities -  either structuring the rules of the 
game that help determine actors’ political behaviour, as in game theory and 
rational choice models, or setting the organizational roles and routines that set the 
limits of the political system, as in organizational theory”, but rather “takes 
institutions as historically evolving entities, the products of ongoing political 
processes and particular events” (Schmidt, 2002: 10).
It has attempted to explain how institutional rules have structured the context of 
political decision-making and -implementation (Weaver and Rockman, 1993). It 
follows Hall and Immergut in noting that institutional features (here, the strength of 
sectoral associations, reflecting the degree of coordination between HEIs) can 
affect the possibilities for change, as well as accounting for policy stability (Hall, 
1992; Immergut, 1992b). As with Immergut’s analysis, it identifies how an initial 
situation where the strategies of government and of sectoral actors were similar
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across countries, nevertheless led to very different outcomes cross-nationally 
(ibid).
As noted above, the thesis explicitly confines its definition of institutions to formal 
rules. These rules “structure the constraints and opportunities of decision-makers”. 
In this way, they “affect, but do not determine, how a policy sector operates” (John, 
1998: 43-4).40 As noted by Streeck and Thelen, the incorporation of informal 
elements into the definition of institutions can lead to vacuity, as institutions 
become identified with the behaviour that they lead to. It is therefore necessary to 
reduce the scope of institutions to their formal elements. However, this does not 
invalidate the fact that institutions can create conditions which make it more or less 
easy, or desirable, for regulatees to engage in certain types of behaviour. In the 
case examined here, institutions such as the full-cost fees regime in Britain led to 
an increased degree of competition between HEIs, through providing incentives in 
favour of HEIs engaging in competition against each other, and penalties against 
them not doing so.
By adopting a comparison between nation-states, the thesis uses historical 
institutionalism to its full capacity (ibid.: 65). This is because historical 
institutionalism aids the explanation of differences in behaviour across two or more 
countries (here, primarily the lack of competition between French HEIs compared 
with the British counterparts) through tracing such differences back to the 
institutional context of that behaviour (in this case, to the constraints and incentives 
which liberalising institutions provided in Britain, which were present to a lesser 
degree in France).
6.d The sources chosen and the methods used to analyse them
As noted above, the case study method allows the adoption of a variety of methods 
of data collection and analysis. In order to gain a rounded view of the process of 
liberalisation in this case, attempts were made to analyse all the relevant material
40 See also Freeman, 1985.
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which referred to the role of governments, HEIs, and other sectoral actors 
concerning international students’ policy, from 1979 to 2003.
The thesis is, therefore, based on an analysis of documentary sources 
(government documents, legislation, sectoral associations’ documents, press 
releases and press sources), interviews with over twenty representatives from the 
British and French higher education sectors, promotional agencies, evaluation 
agencies and government departments, and statistical analysis of funding levels 
and evaluation reports.
Legislative sources were derived from the BLPES government collection and the 
French National Archive. Documents from CVCP, CPU and the CGE were 
consulted at the British Library, Bodleian Library, Warwick Modern Records Centre, 
and the Bibliotheque Nationale de France. They were also obtained through 
personal communication, from the British Companies House, and from each 
association’s website. Press sources consulted include The Times, The Times 
Higher Education Supplement, and Le Monde for the period studied, and selected 
time-periods for diverse French-language publications accessed from Science Po’s 
press clippings service. Documents were also obtained from the Overseas Student 
Trust archive at the BLPES, the London Institute of Education, the Centre 
International d’Etudes Pddagogiques, Sevres, and the Centre for Documentation of 
the Comite National devaluation.
A full list of the twenty-seven interviewees is given at the beginning of the thesis.
As a number of interviewees asked for confidentiality I have complied with their 
wishes, and no quotes are attributed throughout the text. Fourteen interviews were 
conducted in Britain. These included interviews with employees from HEIs, from 
the ECS, from the British Council, from Trade Partners UK, from the Education and 
Training Export Group, from the Quality Assurance Agency and from UKCOSA. I 
also interviewed former employees from the British Council and the Overseas 
Student Trust. Thirteen interviews were conducted in France. These included
58
interviews with a number of employees from the various departments of the 
Ministry of Education’s Direction des relations internationales et a la cooperation 
(including from the American, Asian, African/Middle-East and European offices), 
from EduFrance, from the Conference des Presidents d’Universife, from the 
Socfefe frangaise d'exportation des ressources dducatives, from the Conference 
des Grandes Ecoles, and from a Parisian HEI. I also interviewed a former 
employee of ARIES.
Interviews were conducted in English and French, following a semi-structured 
format. Almost all interviews were recorded onto dictaphone and then transcribed 
into English; two interviewees preferred their comments not to be recorded, but 
extensive notes were taken during the interviews.
Both the interviews and the documentary sources were analysed using traditional 
methods of content analysis, in an attempt both to develop a narrative of what had 
occurred in each country, and also to identify which pressures had led to 
liberalisation (and to resistance to liberalisation) in each country.
Statistics for international student numbers and finance were obtained from the 
Universities Statistical Service, the Higher Education Statistics Agency, and the 
French Ministry of Education. Reports produced by the British and French higher 
education evaluation agencies were consulted via the web and through archives 
held at the Institute of Education in London and the Centre for Documentation of 
the Comite National devaluation. These sources were analysed statistically using 
the SPSS computer programme.
7 The argument of the thesis
7. a The role of governments
My analysis highlights the role of governments, as rule-makers, in promoting 
liberalisation. It contrasts the approach of governments with that of regulatees, 
those sectoral actors who operate within institutions created by governments. The
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regulatees in this instance are HEIs, who are subject to the rules defined by 
governments as rule-makers (or, alternatively, ‘institutional designers’ as posited 
by Streeck and Thelen (2005:14, 16)).
From the beginning of the period, governments in both countries displayed an 
increasing commitment to the liberalisation of international students’ policy, and 
created institutions in an attempt to instill competition between HEIs for 
international students, and to commodify international students.
Such an approach to international students was evident in both countries from the 
start of the period. Alice Saunier-Siete, then French Higher Education Minister, 
stated her criticism of what she called “universites dGpotoirs” (university ‘dumping 
grounds’) for international students in 1980, counselling what the Figaro described 
as “an end to solidarity with the most disinherited” (Le Matin, 1980; Le Figaro, 
1983). Her policy of ref us d’habilitation (refusal of state recognition of courses) was 
specifically aimed at reducing the numbers of international students from 
developing countries (Le Monde, 1980a; Le Nouvel Observateur, 1980; Le 
Quotidien de Paris, 1980). Similarly, British governments were keen to encourage 
universities to develop an “entrepreneurial approach” towards international 
students from 1979 onwards, particularly those who could access British higher 
education through the payment of fees (Her Majesty’s Government, 1980a: 7). In 
this way, they hoped to avoid the subsidy of international students by the British 
taxpayer, and reap such students’ “immediate value”, rather than encouraging 
traditional flows of students from developing countries (Her Majesty’s Government, 
1985a).
Support for such a liberalisation of international students’ policy has also pervaded 
governments’ discourse concerning international students in more recent years. 
Hence, Tony Blair stated in his Romanes Lecture at Oxford University in 1999 that 
“[ujniversities are wealth creators in their own right: in the value they add through 
their teaching at home; [and] in the revenue, commitment and goodwill for the UK
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they generate from overseas students, a market we need to exploit as ambitiously 
as possible” (Blair, 1999a).41 The previous focus on developing countries as the 
source of international students has been gradually abandoned, as “technical 
cooperation training” was withdrawn, and the number of education and training 
awards in Britain for nationals of developing countries was cut by four fifths over 
the ten years up to 2001 (Council for Education in the Commonwealth, 1999). HEIs 
were instead urged to refocus recruitment on students from emerging and 
developed economies.
Similarly, at the ‘First World Investment Conference’, the then French Prime 
Minister, Jean-Pierre Raffarin, claimed that “foreign students are the future elite 
and decision makers of tomorrow’s economic and industrial world. It’s an asset for 
our country to be able to train them. This is why France must become the 
European country of choice for foreign students” (Raffarin, 2003a). He later 
claimed that the policy of increasing the attractiveness of France would aid the 
French people to ‘profit from globalisation’ and the ‘wealth and investment’ it 
brought, and that this policy involved the ‘reception of foreign researchers, students 
and workers’ (Raffarin, 2003b). The need to attract more students from “emerging 
economies” who were “economically interesting” was increasingly described as a 
goal for the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of National Education (Egide, 1999b).
In contrast to their governments’ approach, British and French HEIs were critical of 
governments’ creation and operation of liberalising institutions with regards to 
international students. For example, French university presidents were concerned 
that government plans for international student recruitment, and especially the 
creation of the EduFrance agency, treated higher education as “merchandise” 
(Trupin, 2001: 37). Similarly, British HEIs were concerned about the effects of the 
new liberalising institutions, especially the introduction of new full-cost fees,42 and 
of charges in the visa delivery system.
41 For an opposing view, see Ashworth, 1998.
42 See pp. 199-202 of chapter seven.
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HEIs in both countries received considerable funding and direction from national 
government. Indeed, some might claim that French HEIs, in particular, formed part 
of the state, if not of the government. However, distinguishing between rule-makers 
and regulatees allows a clarification of the respective roles of HEIs and 
governments during the creation of institutions and the controlling of their 
operations. Governments can sometimes develop rule-based frameworks to 
regulate themselves, rather than external bodies (James, 2000: 327).43 However, 
even in these cases, it is still possible to distinguish those setting rules (possessing 
legal authority) from those subject to the rules (the regulated) (James, 2000: 328). 
As Streeck and Thelen themselves note, even where rule-makers and regulatees 
are identical, i.e. where an organisation is self-regulating, the “relations and 
interactions between the two [roles] are crucial for the content and the evolution of 
the regime [here synonymous with institution] as such” (Streeck and Thelen, 2005: 
13).
In this case, governments possessed the ultimate authority to impose binding legal 
measures on HEIs. This distinction between HEIs as regulatees and governments 
as rule-makers draws on existing literature on regulation which has investigated 
the relationship between the regulators and the regulated (Black, 1997). Zysman, 
for example, has noted how the state’s role “as the maker of rules” is a “crucial 
element” for the “institutional structure” (Zysman, 1994: 245).44 Governments’ roles 
as rule-makers have been crucial for the development of modern markets, a point 
which is equally applicable to the current case-study of liberalisation. In newly 
marketised areas, governments “define [...] the rules of competition” and the
43 See also Hood etal., 1998; 1999.
44 However, Zysman’s assessment of the state’s role in achieving institutional change is rather limited. He notes two 
mechanisms of development; the “sheer force of dramatic crisis”, and “mismatches between capacities and tasks”. Although 
he accepts that matching capacities to tasks may require “continuous political and technical adaptation”, he does not explain 
where the “tasks” are defined (Zysman, 1994:259). In this particular case, for example, the task has been set as increasing 
the recruitment by domestic HEIs of international students from developed and emerging economy countries. However, this 
task did not arise organically from existing institutional structures, but rather from conscious political choice on the part of 
government.
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possibilities of cooperation (Fligstein, 1992: 358-9). This thesis thus examines the 
interaction of HEIs as regulatees with governments as rule-makers.
The rules examined here constitute new institutions which were intended to aid the 
liberalisation of international students’ policy, through setting up new incentives 
and constraints. Each chapter examines how, firstly, the rules were implemented, 
and the importance of the coordination of resistance to the definition of the new 
institutional structure. It follows Schmidt in noting the ability of societal actors to 
change such institutional structures, during the process of implementation of rules, 
even in the presence of a traditionally ‘strong state’ (Schmidt, 1996: 40, 58). 
Secondly, it examines how the new institutions thus created affected subsequent 
institutional developments and, ultimately, the behaviour of regulatees (specifically, 
whether they induced competition and/or the commodification of international 
students).
7. b The importance of intra-sectora! coordination
The research presented here indicates that liberalisation does not derive from the 
exit of individual actors from collective arrangements, but rather from the imposition 
of new institutional structures. In this case, HEIs saw government policies 
promoting competition and new student flows as threatening established 
relationships, both between HEIs and with existing bodies of students.45 They did 
not, generally, attempt to defect from existing collective arrangements, in order to 
participate in liberalised markets for international students. Rather, HEIs in both 
countries attempted to coordinate common positions to prevent government 
attempts to institute liberalisation. Their success in preventing the creation of new, 
liberalising, institutions, and in affecting the way in which these subsequently 
operated, depended on the extent of such coordination. Coordination between 
French HEIs was strengthened by a stronger associational structure. Such
45 It thus parallels Hanckg’s analysis of processes of liberalisation in the French economy. Hanckg has noted that, where 
coordinated business interests have seen government policies as threatening their preferred path of industrial adjustment, 
they have been able to use their collective organisation to subvert state policies (Hanckg, 2002).
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coordination was less evident in the British case, and resulted ultimately in a 
weaker degree of resistance.
The most obvious and relevant indicator of coordination between regulatees is the 
existence or otherwise of sectoral associations, and the relative strength of these. 
Associations provide regulatees with a means to “cooperate with one another” 
through providing the “capacity for deliberation”. Such associations “encourage the 
relevant actors to engage in collective discussion and to reach agreements with 
each other” (Hall and Soskice, 2001:11). They can also “enhance the capacity of 
actors in the political economy for strategic action when faced with new or 
unfamiliar challenges” (ibid.: 12). Associations, as “supportive institutions”, can aid 
regulatees to “share information, improve [...] their ability to make credible 
commitments, and alter [...] their expectations about what others will do” (ibid: 46). 
The weakness or strength of associations will affect their ability to perform these 
functions. Hence, for example, when associations fail to encompass all actors, their 
ability to mount effective resistance to external demands weakens (ibid.: 64-5).
Associations provide a number of benefits to participating organisations: the 
organisation and enforcement of cooperative behaviour amongst members, the 
mobilisation of and/or influence on public policy in the interests of members, and 
the provision of opportunities for organisations to exchange information 
(Hollingsworth eta!., 1994b: 7). Associations have been examined by a number of 
theorists for their coordinating properties. For example, as Schmidt has noted, the 
extent of coordination amongst employers’ associations can have a significant 
effect upon the “direction of reform” in different economies (Schmidt, 2002: 127). 
For Streeck and Schmitter, ‘association’ refers to all organisations which are 
“formed among specific categories of actors in identical, similar, or adjacent market 
positions that define and promote public (or categorical) goods”. Such associations 
are able to organise and enforce cooperative behaviour amongst members, 
engage in collective contracts with other institutions, and influence public policy to 
their own and their members’ advantage (Hollingsworth etal., 1994b: 7). This is
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echoed in Hollingsworth et a/.’s contention that associations are often able, through 
collective action, to affect public policy (Hollingsworth etal., 1994a: 7). Culpepper 
has illustrated the effects of coordination through business associations on training 
systems, wage coordination and corporate collaboration, with such activities 
involving information circulation, deliberation, monitoring, and sanctioning 
(Culpepper, 2001: 279). Grief et al. have described the role of an early form of 
association, the guild, in providing “the leadership and the information transmission 
mechanisms required for coordinated action” (Grief et al., 1994: 755). Finally, 
Hollingsworth has summarised the coordinating functions provided by associations 
for their members as including “gathering information about product markets, 
advertising products, conducting research, aggregating and articulating member 
interests, establishing codes of fair competition, developing industry standards [and] 
sharing information about production costs and industry output” (Hollingsworth, 
1991: 40).46
The analysis presented here follows these authors in emphasising the importance 
of sectoral associations for the analysis of economic policy. Specifically, it 
contrasts the relative impact of the French sectoral associations, which enjoyed a 
relatively low level of internal factions, with the lesser impact of the British sectoral 
associations, which suffered from a greater number of internal factions.
8 Conclusion
Overall, the thesis indicates that governments were the key actors, in both 
countries, in attempting to create new institutions which would give HEIs the 
incentives to compete against each other for international students from developed 
and emerging economy countries, and to give HEIs and other sectoral actors the 
incentives to commodify international students. Despite their common attempts, 
however, British governments were more successful both at creating liberalising 
institutions in the first place, and at controlling their operation. The thesis suggests 
that the reason for the greater success of the British government can be explained
46 Galambos has detailed the development of a ‘policy shaping’ role amongst such organisations (Galambos, 1966: 292).
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by analysing the activities of HEIs. Specifically, French HEIs enjoyed relatively 
strong sectoral associations. These allowed HEIs a greater role in defining both the 
characteristics of institutions while they were first being created, but also in 
controlling the parameters within which the institutions subsequently operated. In 
contrast, there was a lesser degree of coordination between HEIs in Britain through 
their sectoral associations, due to the greater extent of intra-sectional factionalism. 
As a result, HEIs were less able to engage with government when it was creating 
institutions, and less able to prevent the new institutions, and their operations, from 
creating the incentives and constraints necessary for a liberalisation of international 
students’ policy. These findings contradict recent theories of liberalisation, which 
have downplayed the role of government and of resistance to liberalisation 
amongst regulatees.
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Ch.2 The institutional context
1 Introduction
This chapter attempts three tasks. Firstly, it introduces the regulatees (HEIs) and 
the institutional framework within which they operate (the British and French higher 
education sectors). It indicates that, in both countries, central government has 
dominated the formal institutional framework, through its ability to make rules which 
constrain regulatees’ behaviour. The chapter details the formal characteristics of 
the higher education sector in each country, including the manner in which HEIs 
were provided with official recognition as universities, colleges, or grandes 6coles\ 
how the quality of HEIs’ provision was controlled; and how HEIs were funded. It 
indicates that both countries’ higher education systems were subject to an 
extensive degree of government control, making the liberalisation of policies 
towards international students a ‘hard case’ for existing theories of liberalisation to 
explain.
Secondly, the chapter shows that intra-sectoral coordination, through sectoral 
associations, was stronger in France than in Britain, due to a lesser degree of 
factionalism. This gave HEIs in France a greater capacity to resist liberalising 
initiatives than their British counterparts.
Finally, the chapter provides the starting point for the changes examined in the rest 
of the thesis which have occurred since 1979. In both countries, up to the late 
1970s policies towards international students were dominated by foreign policy 
concerns (whether these were linked to imperialism or to international 
development), and HEIs did not compete against each other extensively for the 
recruitment of international students. The chapter underlines the fact that the 
liberalisation of policy towards international students occurred only after 1979, with 
the attempted introduction of new, liberalising institutions by governments in both 
countries.
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2 The British and French higher education sectors
In both countries, higher education has been extensively driven by governments, 
which have dominated the definition of educational standards and the funding of 
HEIs. This section offers a brief summary of the main characteristics of the British 
and French higher education sectors, as the formal framework for the rest of the 
analysis.
2. a Britain
As in France, in Britain university status can only be obtained following 
governmental approval (by Royal Charter).47 Rather than HEIs’ degree quality 
being assessed ex ante, as in France, it is assessed ex post, by the QAA; and 
research quality is also assessed ex post, through the ‘Research Assessment 
Exercise’ (Brown, 2004: 11)48 The only cases where ex ante control of quality has 
occurred, is where professional associations, as in medicine and engineering, have 
accredited courses (Neave, 1994).
Compared with French HEIs, British HEIs are required to derive a much larger 
proportion of their funding from private sources. However, very few universities and 
higher education colleges do not receive any public funding.49 As Figure 7 
indicates, around two thirds of funding for British universities and colleges is still 
derived from central government.50
47 The relative ease of obtaining such status has differed over the years, being easier in the early 1990s following the 
abolition of the so-called ‘binary line’ between the public sector and university-based higher education in 1992, and in 1998, 
becoming more difficult following attempts by the Department for Education and Science to restrict access, which has 
significantly reduced the rate of conversions towards university status (Brown, 2004:144-5).
48 See also HEFCE/SHEFC/HEFCW/Department for Employment and Learning, 2003.
49 With one notable, if isolated, example being the private University of Buckingham (Seldon, 1980: 316).
50 It should be noted that these OECD figures include funding for further education colleges, which often derive a larger 
proportion of their resources from the private sector than HEIs.
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Fig.7 The relative proportions of public and private funding in tertiary education
Year
Public
funding
Private
funding
Private funding: of which 
subsidised by public funding
France 1995 84.3% 15.7% 2.6%
Britain 1995 63.9% 36.1% 16.0%
France 2000 85.7% 14.3% 2.3%
Britain 2000 67.7% 32.3% 4.6%
Source: OECD, 2003: Table B3.1
Until 1972-77, universities were funded through a stable, “unselective” flow of 
unpredicated quinquennial funding grants, disbursed through the University Grants 
Committee (the UGC, later renamed the UFC, Universities Funding Council) 
(Merrison, 1980: 287). These grants were based roughly on the planned numbers 
of students for each university, “which in turn was based to some extent on the 
capacity of institutions’ buildings” (Cave etal., 1995: 93; Trow, 1996: 3).51 In the 
mid-1970s, however, the UGC’s provision of capital funding diminished (Kogan and 
Hanney, 2000: 148; Moore, 1987), and a triennial funding system was established. 
By the end of the 1970s the idea that HEIs should be allocated block funds only, 
rather than resources being hypothecated, was increasingly questioned by policy­
makers (Kogan and Hanney, 2000: 85).
This reached its apogee in 1989-90, when the (renamed) UFC attempted to 
establish a “full-blown internal market” in the higher education sector. This required 
universities to bid against each other for funded student places, with the 
expectation that they would under-bid the official guideline figures. The attempt 
failed however, as universities found out others’ bid figures and engaged in cartel­
like behaviour (Bargh et al., 1996: 17; Cave et a/., 1995; Kogan and Hanney, 2000: 
92). Whilst HEIs did not, thus, engage in price competition with each other, they 
did compete with each other when attempting to attract domestic students, since
51 See also Reynolds, 1984: 95; and Scott, 1980: 308, concerning the role of the UGC in the university system.
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any addition to the number of students at an HEI would lead to it gaining additional 
funding (ibid.: 76). This competition for numbers was prevented with the 
introduction of a system of planning of student numbers known as the MASN 
(Maximum Aggregate Student Number), which set quotas for student numbers 
(Bargh etal., 1996:17).52 Although local funding councils (‘local education 
authorities’ (LEAs)) did pay universities for the education of individual students, 
and hence universities benefited from recruiting a certain number of students, they 
did not benefit from exceeding their overall quota (Cave et al., 1995: 91).
Overall, therefore, British governments have possessed a significant amount of 
influence in the domestic higher education sector. Central government controls the 
allocation of degree-awarding status, and its agencies (such as the QAA) control 
the quality of education offered. Although universities and colleges also attract 
private funding, to a greater extent than their French counterparts, they still receive 
a significant proportion of their funds from central government. As described above, 
government has controlled the methods in which this funding has been delivered in 
a variety of ways.
2.b France
As in Britain, French governments control the attribution of university status. The loi 
Faure of 1968 introduced, for the first time, a legislative framework for universities, 
as opposed to faculties, which was compounded in 1984 by the loi Savarys 
emphasis on the creation of coherent universities rather than collections of 
faculties.
Although French governments lack a priori power over all grandes dcoles (in 
contrast to their control over universities), their control over the most prestigious 
grandes 6coles is extensive, particularly over those which come under the aegis of 
the Minister of Education (as opposed to ‘consulaire’ grandes 6co/es, those 
connected with local Chambers of Commerce). As Deer notes, the “original
52 See also National Committee of Enquiry into Higher Education, 1997: Summary, 11.
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purpose of the grandes 6coles system was to serve the interests and needs of the 
state machinery through the rational selection and vocational training of its 
administrative, political, technical, academic and, ultimately, social elite” (Deer, 
2005: 37). From a pedagogical system designed specifically to inculcate “service 
public” in future top French civil servants, grandes 6coles such as the £cole 
Nationale d’Administration have begun to admit growing numbers of international 
students, and to widen their curricula significantly (Maus, 1997: 74). These 
changes have mainly been due to changing government attitudes towards the role 
of the grandes 6coles.
French governments’ control over the quality of degrees is also extensive. French 
universities, and state-funded grandes 6co/es, must acquire Ministry approval 
before entering into joint programmes with foreign HEIs (interviews with DRIC 
employees). The award of national qualifications is governed by an 'accreditation' 
procedure drawn up and administered by commissions of specialists and a 
directorate of the Ministry for Higher Education (Bertrand, 1994: 58).53 Such ex 
post evaluation as occurs, is organised by the CNE (see chapter six). 
Governments’ ex ante control applies not only to university degrees, but also to all 
degrees delivered in grandes Gcoles which are recognised by the state. As Neave 
puts it, French governments “formally underwrote the quality of ...degrees which, if 
they might vary in reality, were theoretically deemed to be of a similar standard”. 
This “setting of ‘standards’ through accreditation in [a] system of higher education 
adhering to ‘national’ diplomas” reflected a “relationship between [the] state and 
higher education” whereby the Ministry was in control (Neave, 1994: 118).
The proportion of French public funding for HEIs is greater than in Britain, both 
concerning public universities and public (and even some private) grandes 6coles
53 Although individual HEIs have been allowed, from the loi Faure onwards, to develop their own degrees, this did not 
coincide with any abolition of state degrees. As a result, as Musselin notes, “very little in the way of university-specific 
degrees were developed” (Musselin, 2004:42), as HEIs were unwilling to lose the stamp of quality conferred by state 
approval. For most of the period studied, HEIs frequently ceded decisions concerning degree structures and institutional 
plans to the Education Ministry (ibid.: 38), rather than taking such decisions themselves.
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(see Figure 1 above). Universities are almost entirely publicly funded and teaching 
posts are directly distributed by the state, with many university teachers being 
classified as civil servants (Musselin, 2004: 44, 47). The French university funding 
system is mainly formula-based.54 The current system is based ultimately upon the 
loi Faure, which devolved greater powers to individual HEIs, but which maintained 
an overall focus on central government as the most significant funder of higher 
education (ibid: 34, 42). In recent years, as noted in chapter eight, a proportion of 
universities’ budgets has been allocated through the contractual system. The 
legality of universities’ budgets is regulated by chancellors representing the 
Ministry of Education in each educational district (Decker, 1998: 220-2).
Overall, therefore, French governments are extensively involved in regulating and 
funding universities and many grandes 6coles. The Ministry of Education exercises 
ex ante control over the content of degrees, and has continued its role as the main 
source of funding for the universities and for many grandes 6coles.
To summarise, both French and British higher education systems are subject to 
cleavages, between universities, (ex-) polytechnics and colleges in Britain, and 
universities and grandes Gcoies in France. Nonetheless, in both countries, the 
attribution of degree-awarding powers, the control of quality and the funding of 
higher education are all dominated by central government. In particular, 
governments’ abilities to set rules governing standards and the allocation of 
resources have been particularly important in both higher education sectors. This 
peculiar characteristic of the British and French higher education sectors, as part of 
the public sector, makes the liberalisation of international students’ policy 
particularly difficult to explain using existing theories, which have generally 
downplayed the role of governments in encouraging liberalisation.
54 Until 1993 the government utilised what was referred to as the uGaracesn-model, which incorporated measures of the 
number of square-metres per HEI, contact hours, and complementary hours. In 1993 that model was replaced by the “San 
Remo” (systeme analythique de reparation des moyens) model based on student numbers, which was subsequently applied 
to determining funding levels for the public grandes 6coles as well (Martin and Verdaguer, 1999). Universities also receive 
substantial grants intended to cover the costs of maintaining buildings and grounds.
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3 Sectoral associations in Britain and France
This section explains why French sectoral associations can be described as 
stronger than their British counterparts. Although a number of different sectoral 
associations existed in both British and French higher education sectors, the extent 
to which these were subject to international factionalism was much more marked in 
Britain. Internal factions prevented British HEIs from coordinating resistance to 
liberalisation through their sectoral associations. In contrast, the more unified 
French sectoral associations were able to play a more influential role in preventing 
the introduction of liberalising institutions, and in controlling the operations of new 
institutions. Although even well-coordinated campaigns by HEIs were not always 
sufficient to block government proposals,55 overall they significantly conditioned 
governments’ capacities to liberalise policies towards international students. As a 
result, French universities and grandes Gcoles were better able to prevent 
liberalisation in this area than were British universities and colleges.
3.a Britain
British HEIs’ sectoral associations were initially divided into those representing the 
polytechnics and colleges (the ‘public sector’) and those representing the 
universities, prior to the abolition of the binary line in 1992.56 The two 
representative bodies for the public sector, the Committee of Directors of 
Polytechnics (CDP) and Association of College Principals (ACP) initially came 
under the aegis of the Council of Local Education Authorities, before responsibility 
for the public higher education sector was transferred in 1981 to the new National 
Advisory Body for Public Sector Higher Education (NAB). From 1992 onwards a 
number of former colleges and polytechnics obtained university status and joined 
the CVCP. Some others formed the Standing Conference of Principals (SCOP), 
which as at 2003 had 34 non-university HEI members in England (and three 
associate members from the private sector).
55 See limited examples of this in chapters nine and ten.
56 First proposed in the ‘Higher Education: A New Framework’ White Paper of 1991 (Department for Education and Science, 
1991).
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SCOP’s activities concerning international students have not been extensively 
examined for the purposes of this thesis. This is for two reasons. Firstly, the 
numbers of students generally, and international students in particular, attending 
SCOP member institutions is very low compared with that of the CVCP as a 
whole.57 Secondly, where SCOP has attempted to influence policy towards 
international students, this has generally been in alliance with the CVCP/ 
UniversitiesUK.58 The following section therefore refers only to the CVCP and CDP, 
which were merged in the early 1990s and which became UniversitiesUK in 2001.
The CVCP has been a registered company from the mid-1990s onwards, after 
being founded as an association in 1918. It is supported through subscription by its 
member institutions. The members of CVCP elect a Chairman, two Vice-Chairmen 
and a Treasurer for two years. The CVCP is directed by an Executive Committee, 
which carries out most of its operations, a Council, which meets seven times a year, 
sector groups and sub-groups,59 and plenary meetings (the ‘Main Committee’). On 
occasion decision-making has also been delegated to the leadership.60 The ‘Main 
Committee’, the whole body of Vice-Chancellors and Principals, has a relatively 
limited role compared with that of all university presidents in the French CPU. 
Overall, the ‘main committee’ meets only four times a year (CVCP, 1997b), aside 
from at an annual conference at which all HEIs are represented (CVCP, 2001:19). 
As noted above, the CVCP altered its name to UniversitiesUK in 2001.61
57 31 out of SCOP’s 34 institutions in 2003 accounted for just 4.7% of the income received by the higher education sector as 
a whole (Watson, 2003:16). In addition, almost all SCOP member institutions “show lower participation by international 
students than other groupings” within UniversitiesUK (ibid.).
58 See, for example, UKCOSA/British Council/Universities UK/SCOP, 2004.
59 Such as the General Purposes Committee and then the Longer Term Strategy Steering Group (LTSSG) (CVCP, 1995:16; 
1996:11; 1998:27; Howell, 1993; Tapper and Salter, 1997:119).
60 Occasionally, the leadership of the CVCP has been given the ability to speak for member institutions on contentious 
issues. This was, however, generally limited to cases where policy was developing quickly and an immediate response was 
required. Hence, in 1979, the Main Committee recommended that the “Chairman and the Secretary General should have full 
authority to make immediate public comment on any issues requiring it”, in the context of major changes to the British higher 
education system being mooted by the then government (CVCP, 1979: Item 3).
61 The name change was intended to reflect the “changing focus of the organisation" (CVCP, 2001:1), with the former title 
being perceived as old-fashioned and inappropriate. The CVCP had already attempted to alter its public identity through the
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The CDP, which originally coexisted with the CVCP, was established in April 1970, 
when twenty out of the proposed thirty polytechnics were first officially recognised 
by the Ministry of Education. The sectoral association had its own secretariat from 
October 1972. The CDP was to provide a forum for the discussion of matters of 
common interest and to contribute to the evolution of policy for the future 
development of polytechnics. Following negotiations between February and 
September 1992, the organisation was formally disbanded in 1993 with the end of 
the binary division between universities and polytechnics. At this point, most 
members of the CDP joined the CVCP, and the organisations effectively merged.
In the years approaching the merger, the CVCP and CDP increasingly worked 
together on matters of common concern.62 In the early years of its existence, 
however, the CDP was keen to develop a distinct identity from the CVCP, and to 
define a separate role for the polytechnics within the British higher education 
system.63 There were a number of informal groupings within the CDP’s ranks. 
These loosely fell in to the categorisation of types of polytechnics which had been 
described by the then Minister of Education Tony Crosland in 1972; polytechnics 
which: tried to “behave like universities” by concentrating their main efforts on the 
provision of a wide range of undergraduate and postgraduate courses; which 
concentrated upon meeting regional needs in technical subjects and had not 
widened their provision to include the arts, humanities and social sciences; and 
which concentrated upon realising the polytechnic ideal of collaborating with local 
industry and commerce to provide a wide range of distinctive courses (Crosland, 
1972).
development of a “new corporate identity framework” in 1996. It was hoped that this would improve communication with 
members (CVCP, 1997a: 26), who would henceforth perceive the universities’ sectoral association as a more coherent, 
unified association.
62 For example, in 1992 they produced a joint code on the “management of higher degrees undertaken by overseas 
students” (CVCP/CDP, 1992). See also CVCP/CDP/SCOP, 1991.
63 See Bethel, 1979.
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Despite the merger of the CDP and CVCP in 1993, the division between the former 
public sector HEIs and universities, which some had thought would be eroded by 
the ending of the binary line, continued. Hence, the CDP was effectively renewed 
as the ‘Coalition of Modern Universities’ (CMU) in 1995, and has become one of 
the main factions within the CVCP. Recently renamed the Campaign for 
Mainstream Universities, the CMU continues to represent many (but not all) of 
those former polytechnics who had formerly been members of the CDP before 
amalgamation with the CVCP. Much of the CMU’s lobbying has concentrated on 
opposition to the concentration of resource and the emphasis of the role of 
universities in teaching and learning (Tapper and Salter, 1997:127-8). As at 2003, 
the CMU consisted of 34 institutions in England, Scotland and Wales (Watson, 
2003: 16).
A number of other groups have also begun to form within the CVCP from amongst 
its original constituency of universities. These factions have diluted the strength of 
the CVCP/UniversitiesUK and constitute the main reason why it has lacked the 
strength of the French sectoral associations.
Two such factions have aimed to emphasise their extensive research focus, the 
Russell Group of elite universities and the 94 Group (research-intensive 
universities without a medical school). As at 2003, the Russell Group was 
composed of nineteen universities (Watson, 2003:16). It has promoted the 
concentration of research capacity in a small number of elite universities (Tapper 
and Salter, 1997:127; Tooley, 2001). It has also been seen as promoting the 
introduction of top-up fees, although its membership is actually divided on this 
question, with some opposed to the new fees whilst others support charging for the 
full economic cost (Theisens, 2003: 39). The 1994 Group consisted of 17 
institutions in England and Scotland in 2003. Its membership overlapped slightly 
with that of the Russell Group, with two members adhering to both (Watson, 2003: 
16).
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Finally, another group, which commentators have described as ‘non-aligned’, could 
be seen as “at least as internally coherent as the [other groups] recognised” above, 
according to some indicators (ibid.: 2). This ‘non-aligned’ category includes both 
pre- and post-1992 universities, and as at 2003, composed 38 HEIs (ibid.: 16).
Some have maintained that this fracturing of the CVCP is at least partly due to 
former polytechnics having joined the association, rather than staying with their 
existing representative body. For example, Brown maintains that “UniversitiesUK in 
its present form is capable of representing institutions’ interests only to a limited 
degree”, when new HEIs are also taken into account (Brown, 2004: 160). UUK 
could only effectively represent all British HEIs if it “recognize[d] and celebrate[d] 
the plurality of institutions and interests, something UniversitiesUK in its present 
form clearly cannot” (ibid: 170). Brown further maintains that the older universities 
were less “ready to act in a corporate fashion or to respond positively to the need 
for collective agencies, particularly if it meant some curtailment in their own 
freedom of institutional action”, compared with polytechnic directors, who 
“accepted that there were certain purposes for which they needed to act 
collectively” (ibid.: 45).64 Certainly, as early as 1980, Sir Alec Merrison, then the 
chairman of the CVCP, stated that the CVCP was already a “terribly unwieldy 
body”, when considering whether the polytechnics might join the CVCP if they were 
to become universities (Merrison, 1980: 292).
However, divisions between the various parts of the British higher education 
system were evident even before the ending of the binary line. In particular, there 
was a long-running war of words between the CDP and SCOP in the early 1980s, 
with the SCOP claiming that the CDP was proposing to government that SCOP 
member colleges should be closed (O’Leary, 1980c; THES, 1980i). As noted 
above, the CDP was also subject to internal divisions between different types of 
polytechnics. Claims that the CVCP has lacked “inter-university cooperation” and
64 It has, indeed, recently been claimed that UniversitiesUK has recognised its inability to represent all British universities, 
given the diversity of groupings which have formed within its ranks (Whitby, 2006).
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“leadership” (Dainton, 1980: 301) reflect long-running divisions between British 
universities and higher education colleges, which have on occasion coalesced into 
more or less formal factions.
It has been suggested that, as a result of such fracturing, it has been difficult for 
the CVCP to arrive at common positions (Kogan and Hanney, 2000: 212). Court 
has claimed that the “unofficial interest groups [formed] of old universities” have 
“reified” the stratification of status of the British higher education sector (Court, 
1998:119). Maurice and David Kogan have noted the proclivity of high-profile vice- 
chancellors to forward their own HEIs’ interests what they describe as a “narrow” 
way, and to make little attempt to “protect the weaker institutions”. As a result, they 
state that governments have found it easier to implement their policies as these 
were “not resisted by those with the status and prestige to put up effective 
opposition” (Kogan and Kogan, 1983: 117). The CVCP’s approach was essentially, 
for the Kogans, that of managing change rather than challenging it (Kogan and 
Kogan, 1983: 150). Similarly, Peston and Ford have detected “little unity” in the 
British higher education sector, with major divisions existing between “prestige” 
universities and those in other parts of the higher education sector (Peston and 
Ford, 1981: 396).
Overall, therefore, British sectoral associations, from the CVCP and CDP to 
UniversitiesUK, have suffered from the development of a number of politically- 
influential internal factions. This internal disunity has diluted their ability to mount 
effective resistance to government attempts to liberalise international students’ 
policy.
3.b France
In comparison with the British case, French HEIs do not suffer particularly from the 
development of factions within their sectoral associations. Two such associations 
perform most coordination of French HEIs’ interests and activities; the Conference 
des Presidents d’Universife and the Conference des Grandes Ecoles.
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In addition to these two organisations, the Conference des Directeurs d’lUFM 
(CDIUFM) groups together the directors of the thirty-one directors of University 
Institutes for Teacher Training (as at 2006), and the Conference des Directeurs 
d’lzcoles et Formations d’lngGnieurs (CDEFI) groups together the 128 public 
engineering schools coming under the aegis of the Ministry of Education. The 
following analysis mainly concentrates on the involvement of the CPU and the 
CGE in decision-making concerning the liberalisation of international students’ 
policy. This is for three reasons; because the number of international students at 
HEIs outwith the CGE and CPU were comparatively small; because the CDIUFM 
and CDEFI tended to work together with the CGE and CPU in the definition of their 
policies towards international students;65 and because a number of members of the 
CDEFI were also members of the CGE.
The Conference des Presidents d’Universite (CPU) was created by decree in 
February 1971 (Gouvernement de France, 1971), and its structure was given 
statutory recognition in January 1984. The impetus for the development of the CPU 
came from the then Minister for Higher Education, following extensive 
reorganisation of the state higher education sector in 1968 after the loi Faure 
(Kaiser, 2001). The /o/gave university presidents a much greater role in managing 
the new, multi-faculty universities. The CPU has, since then, been formally 
presided over by the Minister of Higher Education, although it often meets in the 
absence of its President, with the three Vice-Presidents discharging most routine 
organisational responsibilities. Despite promptings from the Ministry of Education, 
the Vice-Presidents have remained acting vice-presidents of universities, rather 
than leaving CPU responsibilities until after retirement (as with many of their British 
counterparts in the CVCP/UniversitiesUK) (Allegre, 2000).
Similarly to the CVCP’s central administration, the CPU’s office coordinates the 
association’s activities, but it has a more limited independent decision-making role
65 As with the definition of their policies more generally, where, for example, the CDEFI and CGE have produced a joint 
response to the Bologna process and have worked together on issues such as social inclusion and the recruitment of women 
students.
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compared with the CVCP. As with the CVCP’s sub-groups and sector groups, the 
CPU utilises sectoral commissions, of which there are six with permanent status, to 
draw up issues for debate in the plenary sessions. The entire Conference meets 
very frequently, on the third Thursday of every month, whilst the Permanent 
Commission meets on the first Thursday of every month. The frequent plenary 
meetings are attended by many presidents out of the CPU’s 102 members, and 
cover a range of issues. There is thus a greater degree of formal interaction 
between HEIs in the CPU than is the case with the CVCP. Most importantly, there 
are no separatist factions within the CPU which have attempted to articulate their 
own strategy to government or the media in opposition to that being propagated by 
the sectoral association.
The Conference des Grandes Ecoles was also created in the 1970s; in 1973, 
under the 1901 law (Conference des Grandes Ecoles, 1973: art.1). From its twelve 
initial members, membership has grown to 219 of which 175 members are 
directors of French grandes dcoles (the rest comprise associate or correspondence 
members). The plenary of the CGE elects its President, who is the director of a 
member HEI. Unlike in the case of the CVCP, the President of the CGE is not 
allocated any individual decision-making power, even within parameters set by the 
organisation itself (ibid.: art.11).
The President of the CGE is aided in his/her activities by an office composed of 
eight to twelve members elected by the Administrative Commission, and is 
supported by the Delegation Generate. The Administrative Commission is 
composed of forty directors of grandes ecoles, of varying types, management and 
regions, with members of the twelve founding grandes dcoles attending as of right, 
although they can and often do delegate their mandate to another grande dcole for 
two years (ibid.: art.9). The other members of the Administrative Commission are 
elected for a two year period of office by the general assembly of the CGE. The 
Commission defines the general direction of CGE policy and takes important 
decisions, sitting at least four times a year. Most of the work of the CGE is
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undertaken in its commissions and working groups. These include teachers as well 
as the directors of HEIs. The composition of the groups, and their remits, are 
decided by the Administrative Commission (ibid.: art.4). In addition, the CGE has 
recently promoted the creation of regional conferences, which have been 
conceived as ‘think tanks’ for the national Conference in its development of 
complex policies (Cadix, 2002).
As with the CPU, the CGE’s general assembly possesses a considerable amount 
of power. The General Assembly is composed of all the active members, who each 
possess a vote, alongside the non-active members, who can attend and speak but 
do not possess any ultimate decision-making power (Conference des Grandes 
Ecoles, 1973: art.8).
Unlike in Britain, there are very few factions within either the CGE or the CPU. 
Some ‘networks’ of HEIs have been grouped together as grandes dcoles (for 
instance, the ENSAM: Izcole Nationale SupGrieure d’Arts et Metiers, which includes 
eight HEIs), to offer a particular type of education (such as the F6d6ration Gay- 
Lussac, comprising seventeen grandes Gcoles, or the Universifes de Technologies 
comprising three universities), or as regional networks (as with that between the 
presidents of twelve HEIs from the Rhone-Alpes region (Le Monde, 1990b)). 
However, unlike in the British case, such groups have not developed into distinct 
lobbying factions within their respective sectoral associations. The sectoral 
associations have been able to develop unified positions even concerning sensitive 
matters. For example, in 1995 the CPU offered to act as a go-between for students 
and the government, following extensive student protests. Despite widespread 
debate over the legitimacy or otherwise of the protests, the CPU was able to take 
unilateral action in offering itself as an arbiter (Le Monde, 1995c; 1995b).66
To summarise, in contrast with the British HEIs’ sectoral associations, the French 
university and grandes ecoles sectoral associations (the Conference des
66 The CPU’s involvement did not, ultimately, help resolve the conflict, however (Le Monde, 1995a).
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Presidents d’Universite, and the Conference des Grandes Ecoles) are relatively 
strong, albeit bifurcated between the two organisations, and also between, to a 
lesser extent, the CDIUFM and the CDEFI. Whilst in Britain a number of factions 
have formed which have divided the membership of the CVCP (such as the 
Russell Group, 94 Group and Campaign for Mainstream Universities), no such 
associations have formed in France. As a result, French HEIs have, generally, 
been better able to coordinate resistance against liberalisation through their 
sectoral associations than their British counterparts.
4 Previous policies towards international students
This section reviews existing policies towards international students. It indicates 
that, prior to 1979, these were focused on the maintenance of traditional 
international ties and the encouragement of international development, rather than 
on the monetary benefits which could accrue from recruiting international students 
from developed and emerging economy countries. Before 1979, therefore, policies 
towards international students in Britain and France did not lead to the 
commodification of these students. In addition, before 1979, HEIs were not 
required to compete against each other extensively for the recruitment of 
international students.
Some have maintained that international student policies, before 1979, constituted 
a prime example of disinterested cultural policy. For Poujol, a civil servant at the 
French Ministry of Education, the very term student “exchange” was inappropriate, 
as it suggested that “cultural” reasons for international student flows were 
outweighed by “economic and financial” ones. The reception of international 
students in France, he maintained, involved the offering of “a gift without reciprocity 
or hope of even indirect benefit” (Poujol, 1965: 237).
Despite Poujol’s claim, however, international student policy up to 1979 was driven 
by a number of very ‘interested’ motives. Historians have noted the impact of 
colonialism in particular on international student flows to both countries. Some
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have claimed ‘altruistic’ motives for British universities’ acceptance of students 
from the former colonies. Hence, Sherlock maintains, for example, that the flow of 
students to the West allowed an assuaging of the post-colonial conscience.67 Even 
by the time of the publication of a major report on higher education in Britain, the 
Robbins report in 1963, international student policies were still often conceived in 
terms of substitution, whereby British universities could provide students from 
developing countries, and especially from previous colonies, with an education 
which they could not access at home (Robbins, 1963).68
Others have detected more directly political motives underlying governments’ 
decisions to allow international students to attend domestic HEIs, noting that most 
international students admitted to British universities were “hand-picked aspirants 
to a place in the local order of government” (Niven, 1988). As Braithwaite notes, 
“the problems of colonial administration within a liberal imperial framework were 
such that the creation of an educated African class, able and willing to profit from 
higher education, was almost a necessity” (Braithwaite, 2001: xviii). In the West 
Indies, the sending of ‘promising’ students to the metropolis was viewed “as a 
means of furthering the development of the colony along sound lines” (ibid.: 1). 
Similarly, French governments and diplomats attempted to lure international 
students from African and, latterly, South American countries in order to maintain 
political ties with these continents (Poujol, 1965: 245).
The linkage between international student flows and the maintenance of ties with 
the ex-colonies was symbolised by the administrative arrangements governing
67 Sherlock claimed that British universities’ acceptance of Commonwealth students in particular allowed them to "assist the 
process of development in those countries to which Britain was indebted after centuries of colonialism” (Sherlock, 1988). 
Given the continuing paucity of higher education facilities in most developing countries, subsidisation continues to be a 
powerful motive for many developing country students to seek entry to western HEIs, although their relative ability to gain 
acceptance has become more difficult over recent years. This is in contrast with the relative ease for students from 
developed countries which operate numerus clausus regimes (in disciplines such as medicine) to gain access to HEIs in 
neighbouring countries which do not (Smith etal., 1981:124).
68 Robbins’ claim that the numbers of international students would decline as domestic institutions expanded has, of course, 
been thoroughly contradicted in recent decades, both in terms of the continuing growth in numbers of international students 
in both countries, but also in terms of the lack of growth of indigenous HEIs in developing countries (Williams, P., 1981b: 26).
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scholarships and student placements in each country up to the late 1970s. In 
Britain, Welfare and Student Departments were created in the Colonial Office, to 
aid international students with any problems they incurred whilst in Britain 
(Braithwaite, 2001: 1-2, 99; Livingstone, 1960: 147-8; Wallace, 1981: 121; White, 
1965). Indeed, in the immediate postwar period, all international students in Britain 
were required to register through the Colonial Office, which then assigned them to 
different universities.69 The eventual shedding of the Colonial Office’s roles in 
international students’ policy to the Victoria League70 and British Council 
(Braithwaite, 2001: 100) allowed the link between international students’ policy and 
national cultural policy to be maintained. Similarly, in France, the Direction 
Generale des Affaires Culturelles et Techniques, located in the Foreign Ministry, 
eventually alongside the Department de Cooperation, handled the bulk of the 
administration of international students’ applications, and was responsible for 
providing information to prospective students (Poujol, 1965: 239).71 This emphasis 
on the (ex-)colonial aspects of international student policy was maintained until 
very recently. Hence, the predominance of students from the previous French 
colonies as a percentage of international students in France actually increased 
between 1964 and 1976 (Smith etal., 1981: 196).
In addition to these general features, recent studies have uncovered a number of 
direct links between policies towards international students and foreign policy­
making. Braithwaite maintains that international students’ fears of surveillance by 
the Colonial Office were mainly fictional, as “[ejven with the worst will in the world, 
it would have been impossible for the Colonial Office to have taken such a dossier 
of all the students and their activities” (Braithwaite, 2001:106). Nonetheless, 
historians such as Michael Lee have provided evidence that policies towards
69 In only a very limited number of cases, individual students managed to bypass such arrangements and obtain admittance 
in individual universities themselves. Such cases aroused suspicions with regards to the Colonial Office’s impartiality 
between different students (Braithwaite, 2001: 98-9).
70 A charity promoting “friendship” amongst the peoples of the Commonwealth.
71 See also Klineberg and Ben-Brika, 1972.
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international students were used to forward British imperial and post-imperial 
foreign policy strategies (Lee, 1998).72
Most analyses of international students’ policy written between the 1950s and the 
late 1970s have, therefore, linked the subsidy of international students with foreign 
policy; either as a means of maintaining colonial or ex-colonial links, or, later, in 
promoting the national political interest abroad.73 International students’ policy, to 
the extent that it was conceived as a discrete policy area,74 was, up to 1979, 
generally conceived in terms of British and French imperial, and then foreign policy, 
interests.
As noted above, up to 1979, HEIs were not required to compete for the recruitment 
of international students in either country. Rather than international students being 
recruited to British and French HEIs, they were “accepted” (Humfrey, 1999: 8; 
Kinnell, 1990:13). Prospective students did not choose between competing HEIs, 
but, rather, had their choice extensively made for them by the colonial and foreign 
affairs administrations. In addition, most international students in both countries 
were concentrated in a small number of HEIs; in Britain, in London University in 
particular, and Oxford and Cambridge to a lesser extent; and in France, in the
72 These studies are echoed in a number of studies in the US, which have indicated extensive links between international 
students’ policies and covert foreign policy from as early as 1967 (Kotek, 1996; see also Paget, 2003).
73 It should be noted, however, that international students’ experience of higher education in both Britain and France did not 
always lead to them developing a positive image of either country, and may indeed have harmed relations with the ex­
colonies (or at least, have aided political processes towards decolonisation). As Braithwaite notes, the extreme racial 
discrimination suffered by numerous black international students studying at British universities may have led to their higher 
education weakening rather than cementing their ties with Britain once they returned home (Braithwaite, 2001:1), and a 
similar point is made with respect to African students based at Parisian universities by Klineberg and Ben Brika (Klineberg 
and Ben Brika, 1972). In addition, Williams notes that the temptation to consider post-war international students’ policy 
merely in terms of “cultural imperialism” ignores the fact that “many of the ideas about national independence were learned 
in the lecture rooms of the LSE” (Williams, G., 1987:10; but see Blackstone and Hadley, 1979:473-4 for the reaction of the 
LSE management to political activism by international students). Furthermore, international students were not always keen to 
immediately return home and fulfill the roles expected of them by British and French policymakers (as suggested by the 
Political and Economic Planning report (Political and Economic Planning, 1955; see also Braithwaite, 2001:3)). Many 
preferred to stay in Britain or France amongst the extensive ex-colonial diasporas which had developed in London and Paris.
74 Chandler maintains that international students were not considered as a distinct policy ‘problem’ until the early 1970s 
(Chandler, 1989).
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universities of the Paris area (Braithwaite, 2001: 70; Humfrey, 1999: 8; Klineberg 
and Ben Brika, 1972). Rather than constituting “clients paying for services”, 
international students were in a “relationship...of dependency”, “which evoked 
paternalistic responses from the host nation” (Kinnell, 1988; Elsey and Kinnell, 
1990: 3).75
5 Prospective
The rest of this thesis constitutes an attempt to explain how policies concerning 
international students altered rapidly from those described above, in a relatively 
short space of time. The change away from the traditional approach towards 
international students, in favour of a liberalisation of international students’ policy, 
has been remarkable in both countries. Figures 8 to 11 illustrate the extensive 
alterations in the complexion of international student flows into both Britain and 
France. While the number of international students has grown in both countries 
(Figures 8 and 10), that of international students from Africa has dropped 
precipitously in Britain, and to a lesser extent in France, compared with students 
from other continents (Figures 9 and 11).76
75 It should not, however, be assumed that the bulk of such international students were of a low social status. Most 
international students were recruited from a social elite, even when they originally came from developing countries. Indeed, 
“some of the poorest students [came] from the richest countries and vice-versa (Williams, P., 1981c: 232; see also Blaug and 
Woodhall, 1981:259). The liberalisation of international students’ policy examined here may have led to a proportionate 
increase in the numbers of the very poorest students, compared with their richer counterparts, from developing countries 
attending British and French HEIs. This is due to the greater concentration of government scholarships in both countries on 
the poorest students from poor countries (Williams, L., 1987: 24), in comparison with the previous, more generally 
permissive, arrangements.
76 It should be noted that the French figures are calculated on a different basis from the British graphs, as the children of 
immigrants are counted as international students even if they have lived in France for all their lives. This helps to explain the 
apparent increase in numbers of African students in France represented in Figure 9, which would not be counted as such 
using British conventions.
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Fig.8: The number of international students in French HEIs, 1980-1 to 2001-2
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Source: Data from « Repartition des ytudiants de nationality Strangle inscrits dans les universes France 
entiere », 1971-2 to 2001-2, Delegation aux relations internationales et e la cooperation, Ministry of Education
(personal communication)
Fig.9: The number of international students in French HEIs from particular 
geographical regions, 1980-1 to 2001-2
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Source: Data from « Repartition des ytudiants de nationality ytrangyre inscrits dans les universitys France 
entiere », 1971-2 to 2001-2, Delegation aux relations internationales et e la cooperation, Ministry of Education 
(personal communication) NB : The Ministry’s categories for geographical areas were used for Europe, Africa 
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Fig.10: The number of international students in British HEIs, 1980-1 to 2001-2
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Fig. 11: The number of international students in British HEIs from particular 
geographical regions, 1980-1 to 2001-2
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Source: figures are calculated from the Higher Education Statistical Agency statistics and the Universities 
Statistical Record. NB: “Africa” constitutes Nigeria, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Tanzania, Ghana, Malawi, 
Uganda, Sudan, South Africa, Libya, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Botswana and Egypt. “Asia” constitutes Malaysia, 
Hong Kong, Singapore, India, Sri Lanka, Mauritius, Brunei, Bangladesh, Japan, Thailand, China, Indonesia, 
South Korea and Taiwan. “Americas” constitutes the USA, Venezuela, Mexico, Canada and Brazil. The “Middle 
East” constitutes Iran, Iraq, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the Lebanon, Oman and 
Israel. “Europe" is as given in the HESA and USR “Europe" category.
88
As Figures 8 to 11 show, and as Barnett and Wu note, African countries have 
increasingly been displaced by students from developed and emerging economy 
countries (Barnett and Wu, 1995: 359-61). This thesis seeks to examine how such 
an extensive commodification of international students occurred, if to a greater 
extent in Britain than in France; and how HEIs in Britain, rather than in France, 
came to compete extensively against each other for the recruitment of international 
students from developed and emerging economy countries.
6 Conclusion
This contextual chapter has examined three elements of the background to the 
development of liberalising institutions concerning international students: the 
institutional parameters of the higher education system, the extent of coordination 
through sectoral associations of the regulatees, HEIs, and traditional policies 
towards the recruitment of international students. It has indicated that both 
countries’ higher education systems exhibited an extensive degree of government 
control over degree-awarding status, the quality of courses, and funding. It has 
also detailed how French sectoral associations can be described as stronger than 
their British counterparts, due to the greater extent of factionalism in Britain. Finally, 
the chapter has detailed how, in both countries, governments historically viewed 
the subsidisation of international students as a means of maintaining ties with 
former colonies, and furthering international development, and did not attempt to 
encourage competition between HEIs for the recruitment of international students. 
As the rest of the thesis indicates, governments in both countries quickly changed 
their approach from 1979 onwards, attempting to impose institutions which would 
lead to a liberalisation of international students’ policy.
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Chapter 3: Promotional institutions in Britain
1 Introduction
The creation of new promotional institutions for British and French higher education 
has been highly significant for the liberalisation of international students’ policy. 
These new institutions have promoted a further commodification of international 
students, through focusing their recruitment efforts on developed and emerging 
economy countries. In both Britain and France, such promotional agencies 
replaced agencies previously run by HEIs, which had been based on educational 
cooperation with developing countries. Both the British ECS and French 
EduFrance included HEIs as members within their structures, although British HEIs 
were less able to coordinate resistance to liberalisation in this context, due to the 
relative weakness of their sectoral associations, compared with their French 
counterparts.
This chapter examines the creation of the Education Counselling Service (ECS) in 
1984, which marked a striking departure from the existing institutional infrastructure 
for the promotion of international higher education. Whilst previous British 
organisations operating in international higher education had all linked international 
students’ policy with foreign policy and international development concerns, the 
ECS was explicitly created by central government as a means of increasing the 
recruitment of well-off students, which could provide extra income for HEIs. The 
operations of the ECS reflected this commercial orientation, especially its 
development of a ‘brand’, EducationUK. The ECS was seen as important in 
improving British higher education’s position in an “increasingly competitive” 
international marketplace (Education Counselling Service, 1999). Although HEIs 
themselves would be encouraged to develop their own marketing systems, the 
ECS led “the professional development of the international student recruitment 
business”, latterly within the context of the new EducationUK brand (Barnes, 1999: 
16).
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Overall, the ECS can be seen as leading to a liberalisation of international 
students’ policy in two ways. Firstly, it promoted a view of international students as 
commodities, especially through its focus on well-off international students rather 
than on students from developing countries (who had provided the focus for the 
previous organisations examined here). Secondly, the ECS promoted competition 
between HEIs, by dividing between HEIs in its operations (through, for example, 
offering some but not all HEIs access to its promotional fairs and access to its 
offices for overseas collaborative provision).
HEIs were initially divided concerning the creation of the ECS. Many had opposed 
the absorption of their own organisation, the Inter-University Council (IUC), into the 
British Council. The IUC had fostered cooperation between British HEIs and 
African universities. Some HEI representatives even threatened non-participation 
in aid programmes if the IUC were closed. However, once the IUC had been 
incorporated within the British Council, and eventually within the new ECS, HEIs 
were unable to have a significant effect on its operations. Many complained about 
the ECS’ approach, which some perceived as overly focused on traditional 
universities in London and the South East. However, such complaints resulted in 
very little coordinated action, and the higher education sectoral associations failed 
to represent a united position in discussions concerning the ECS’ activities.
2 The pre-existing situation
The institutional structure prior to the creation of the ECS was composed of
organisations led by HEIs (the Inter-University Council (IUC)) and those led by
government (the Inter-Departmental Group of Officials (IDG), Round Table, and the
British Council). Rather than leading to a competitive, commodifying approach to
international student recruitment, the existing institutional structure promoted
coordination between HEIs and a view of international students as important for
foreign policy reasons, for maintaining links with former colonies, or for
international development purposes, rather than as of immediate or indirect
monetary value.
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2. a HEI-led organisations: the Inter-University Council
As in France, British HEIs created a specific organisation to manage their 
international relations. Unlike French HEIs, however, the British universities’ 
sectoral association, the CVCP, created the IUC relatively early in its history, in 
1946. The IUC was created as a representative body which would help manage 
British HEIs’ African links (Maxwell, 1980). The IUC itself did not provide services, 
as the ECS was to. Instead, it acted as a coordinating organisation, facilitating 
enduring relationships between foreign and domestic academics and HEIs (Boyle, 
1980). Crucially, the lUC’s activities were focused on the developing countries of 
the ex-colonies. The lUC’s main emphasis was, therefore, on developing long-term 
links with universities in Africa and the rest of the developing world. It did not 
attempt to build such links with developed countries.77
The lUC’s creation did not lead to a liberalisation of international students’ policy.
It neither promoted the commodification of international student flows, nor induced 
competition between HEIs for international students, with its activities restricted to 
bilateral relationships between British and African academics and HEIs.
In 1981, the IUC was incorporated into the British Council (Inter-University Council 
for Higher Education Overseas, 1946-1981), a process which is examined below.
2.b Government-led organisations 
2.b.i The British Council
The British Council is the British government’s agency for cultural relations. It had 
been associated with the reception of international students since this function was 
devolved to it by the Colonial Office in the 1960s (see Introduction). The British 
Council provided a number of facilities for international students, from meeting new
77 This focus on developing countries was reflected in the fact that most of the lUC’s relatively restricted amounts of funding 
came from the then Overseas Development Administration (ODA) (with, for example, £2,500 being allocated in 1978-9), 
although HEIs also made ad hoc contributions to specific programmes (Pliatzky, 1980:152). Despite this funding mechanism, 
the IUC was significantly insulated from government control, and its grants from the ODA were not hypothecated.
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arrivals at the airport and organising transport to HEIs, to organising 
accommodation (initially often with host families), and providing ‘British life’ 
induction courses (Livingstone, 1960:150). The Council was supported in these 
functions by other bodies such as the Victoria League and, in London, the London 
Conference on Overseas Students and its component committees (ibid.: 151). As 
HEIs developed such functions in-house, the Council gradually withdrew from such 
detailed involvement in international students’ services. Nonetheless, it remained 
responsible until the mid-1990s for a number of international student centres in 
various British cities (ibid: 149; Buchanan, 1999: para.134-5). The British Council 
also published various pamphlets and books for potential international students, 
which it continues to produce up to this day.78
Traditionally the British Council had been treated as separate from the rest of 
government. Intended to serve the national interest, its internal management was 
insulated from the usual procedures of government control soon after its creation, 
apparently in order to prevent partisan interference (Donaldson, 1984). However, 
the Council’s overall funding levels were tightly controlled by central government. 
Changes to financial resources constituted the main lever of control by 
governments over the British Council, with budget cuts being used as a means to 
alter the Council’s focus and activities.
The British Council did not encourage a liberalising approach to international 
student recruitment. International students were treated by the Council as 
important for foreign policy or international development purposes, rather than as 
of immediate or indirect monetary value. This approach continued even as 
attempts were being made to set up the ECS, which explicitly adopted a view of 
international students as valuable for monetary purposes (hence, as commodities). 
The British Council retained a significant role in the use of higher education for 
international development purposes, even after the creation of the ECS. From April
78 For some recent examples, see the British Council’s “Studying and living in the United Kingdom” series (British Council, 
1997; British Council, 1998; British Council, 1999b).
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1981 onwards, with its absorption of TETOC (the Technical Education and Training 
Overseas Corporation), the British Council administered those elements of 
international higher education policy which concerned developing countries 
(Overseas Development Administration, 1982: 20). The British Council performed a 
variety of advisory and executive roles in the aid programme under the tutelage of 
the then ODA (Overseas Development Administration, 1984:17). The Council 
continues this role up to the present day, with its Higher Education Links scheme 
under the tutelage of the Department for International Development (Marsden, 
1999). Such international development work received little support from the 
Department of Education or the Foreign Office. For example, HEI staff were not 
paid for work within the Higher Education Links scheme, which constituted only a 
small (if allegedly “powerful”) part of Britain’s overall aid effort (ibid.).
Overall, therefore, the British Council’s effect on international students’ policy was 
to reinforce the existing view of such students as important for foreign policy 
purposes and for international development, rather than as constituting important 
units of revenue.
2.b.ii The Inter-Departmental Group of Officials and the Round Table
Another governmental body concerned with policies towards international students 
was the Inter-Departmental Group of Officials (IDG). Created in 1983,79 the IDG 
was intended to improve coordination of policy within Government (Overseas 
Student Trust, 1987: 2). The IDG kept the government’s various scholarship 
schemes under review. It was chaired jointly by the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office (FCO) and the Department of Education and Science (DES), and also 
included officials from the Overseas Development Administration (ODA), and 
individual representatives from the British Council, Treasury, Home Office, 
Department of Trade and Industry, and the regional departments (Clarke, 1987:
100; Cultural Relations Department, FCO, 1987: 73). The IDG provided the only
79 There is some disagreement over the exact date of inauguration of the IDG. Clarke, for example, has maintained that the 
IDG was established in 1980. It appears most likely that the IDG may have operated as an informal grouping before 1983, at 
which point it was given formal status (Clarke, 1987:100).
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official contact between the British Council and the Department for Education and 
Science, a relationship which had become more significant following the lack of 
communication between these bodies during the decision to charge full-cost fees 
to international students examined in chapter seven (Clarke, 1987:100).
The so-called ‘Round Table’ was created as a complement to the IDG. The Round 
Table allowed for informal discussions between representatives from central 
government and from non-governmental organisations (Overseas Student Trust, 
1987: 2). The Round Table only met occasionally; just three meetings were held 
between 1983 and 1987 (Cultural Relations Department, FCO, 1987: 73). It had no 
formal relationship with the IDG, although they were seen as complementing each 
other, and no role in service provision (Hartley, 1987: 96).
As with the British Council, the deliberations of the IDG and Round Table 
embodied a view of international higher education as important not for immediate 
commercial purposes, but rather for maintaining links with the ex-colonies, for more 
general foreign policy purposes, and for international development.
3 Government strategies
The ECS was created as a result of two decisions by government. The first was to 
follow the recommendations of the Pliatsky review, which had proposed the 
abolition of a number of organisations working in the international development 
field, including the IUC. The second was to follow civil servants’ suggestions to 
create an ECS out of the British Council’s Higher Education Division, following the 
full-cost fees decision. This section reviews these two processes and the role of 
government within them.
The Pliatsky review was commissioned by the then government, to examine the full 
range of ‘British quangos’. It proposed the abolition of a number of these, and
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recommended that the IUC be absorbed into the British Council.80 The review 
maintained that the lUC’s initial task of supporting the creation of universities in the 
emergent Commonwealth countries had mainly been accomplished, and that the 
lUC’s then activities were beginning to impinge on those of the British Council 
(Overseas Development Administration, 1982: 20-1; Pliatzky, 1980: 77). As a 
former British Council employee maintained, the incorporation of the IUC was 
presented as “a sweeping up, a sort of making tidy” (interview with former British 
Council employee). The lUC’s original budget from the ODA was maintained when 
it was subsumed under the British Council.
However, despite descriptions of the move as a technocratic matter of ‘tidying up’ 
institutional loose ends, the incorporation of the IUC into the British Council was 
opposed by HEIs, as well as by the staff of the IUC. Richard Griffiths, a former 
director of the IUC (from 1970-80), stressed his opposition to the move (The 
Times, 1985). A number of HEIs’ representatives were also critical of the change. 
For example, the Vice-Chancellor of Leeds University maintained that the 
“remarkable effectiveness of the IUC has in no small way depended on its 
insulation from direct government control”, which existed despite the fact that it was 
significantly funded by government (Boyle, 1980). He was particularly concerned 
about the effects of the incorporation of the IUC on relationships with “overseas 
academics” who might be “sensitiv[e]...to British Government control” (ibid.).
Once subsumed under the British Council, representatives of the polytechnic 
sector were added to the IUC, which was renamed the Inter-University and 
Polytechnic Council (IUPC). In 1982, as noted above, the Technical Education and 
Training Overseas Corporation (TETOC) had also been incorporated into the 
British Council. A ‘Higher Education Division’ was then created to amalgamate the 
IUPC and the TETOC into a “recognizable unit” which could “coordinate and
80 It has also been claimed that the reorganisation of the IUC had been proposed in the Swann and Berill reports (see THES, 
1979b).
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execute programmes of work hitherto the responsibility of the British Council and 
the inter-university council” (Humphrey, 1999: 10).
The ECS was, then, created in 1984, under the aegis of this new Higher Education 
Division within the British Council. Rather than the idea for the ECS coming from 
individual HEIs, however, it was civil servants within the British Council who first 
proposed the new organisation should be created.81
The British Council civil servants suggested the idea of an ECS to the IUPC soon 
after its incorporation into the Council (interview with former British Council 
employees). However, the ECS’ role was to differ significantly from that of the 
university-controlled IUC. As the ECS’ name suggests, it was intended to offer 
potential international students from developed and emerging economy countries 
advice and information on higher education opportunities in the UK, whilst aiding 
British HEIs to promote themselves to these students (THES, 2000c: 17; 1993a: 
10).
The civil servants suggested that, given the recent changes to funding for 
international students, the new organisation could allow HEIs to recoup some of 
the income they had lost when government stopped subsidising international 
students. With the advent of full-cost fees, the civil servants suggested to HEIs that 
the ECS would provide them with a “shop window” to attract more international 
students, which might help plug the gaps left by cuts in government funding. In 
addition, the ECS would move beyond the existing work of the IUC, promoting 
British higher education beyond Africa and the ex-colonies to people “who weren’t 
going to get any government scholarships ...but who were wealthy” (interview with
81 It should be noted that the Overseas Student Trust also claims responsibility for first coming up with the idea of the ECS 
“during the pre-Pym Package campaign” (Overseas Student Trust, 1987: 38), and a private consultant, James Platt, had also 
suggested the creation of a marketing unit to promote British higher education courses abroad in his report 'Education for the 
World' (O’Leary, 1980b). Regardless of the provenance of the original idea, however, it was British Council civil servants who 
first suggested the idea to HEIs and asked for financial support for it from the Foreign Office.
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former British Council employee). It would require minimal additional funding, since 
it could capitalise on the existing global network of British Council offices.
As a former British Council employee maintained, “it took a certain amount of 
proselytising” before the idea of an ECS was accepted by HEIs and other sectoral 
actors. Before the ECS could commence operations, the British Council had to 
secure sufficient financial support through subscriptions from HEIs to cover the 
costs of the operation (Humphrey, 1999:14). The provision of ring-fenced, 
“matching” funds by the FCO, to equal HEIs’ contributions, was seen by some 
interviewees as key to securing the consent of HEIs (interview with British Council 
employee). This funding was provided from the Pym Package, which re-allocated 
funding from the FCO and ODA to programmes for international students, following 
the full-cost fees decision (Walker, 1997: 92). This new funding programme 
allocated £100,000 to the ECS as a ‘pump-priming’ grant (Cultural Relations 
Department, FCO, 1987: 76).
The British Council also hoped to garner HEIs’ support for the initiative through 
setting up three pilot projects in important areas for international student 
recruitment, which would have demonstrable results for UK HEIs’ recruitment 
programmes: Malaysia, Singapore and Hong Kong. The decision to begin the 
projects was taken in April 1984, with the hope that British HEIs would experience 
increased applications from the target countries in time for entry in autumn 1985 
(Humphrey, 1999:10). The pilot projects were to be “market-oriented”, and 
designed “to meet the needs of both British and overseas clients” (ibid.).
As with the creation of EduFrance, the creation of the ECS occurred within the 
context of an increase in the overall number of agencies operating in public policy 
(Ling, 2002: 618). However, there were few agencies which shared the ECS’ 
unique structure of membership and form of managerial oversight. The one 
‘promotional’ agency whose structure and goals could be seen as analoguous to
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those of the ECS, British Trade International, was created after the latter rather 
than offering a precedent for it.82
As with its creation, the parameters within which the ECS operated were driven by 
government. This is particularly clear in the case of the ‘branding’ of British higher 
education. Rather than the branding operation building on HEIs’ own, existing, 
efforts, the new brand model reflected the concerns of government to further 
develop the profile of British higher education overseas. Overall, therefore, the 
British government was pivotal in the creation and institutional design of the ECS.
4 HEIs’ strategies
Just as some British HEIs were opposed to the incorporation of the IUC into the 
British Council, a number were also sceptical about the British Council’s proposals 
to create the ECS. The major Scottish research universities tentatively supported 
the proposal, as did most of the Russell Group, the faction of the CVCP which 
represented the old research universities. However, Oxford and Cambridge 
strongly opposed the new plan, feeling that it would not sufficiently improve their 
existing promotional efforts (interview with former British Council employee).
Most importantly, the creation of the new agency reflected a move away from the 
lUC’s stress on Africa. Some HEIs were concerned that this change in focus would 
have a deleterious effect on existing links between British HEIs and those in 
developing countries. A number of Vice-Chancellors who were members of the IUC
82 British Trade International was established in May 1999, and was intended to federate the DTI and FCO’s efforts at 
export promotion. It was established following the Wilson review, which proposed the establishment of an organisation with 
"internal coherence and external clarity of identity and purpose, underpinned by strong branding" (Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, 1999). Although the majority of members of the BTI board are from the private sector, it is chaired 
alternately by a DTI and an FCO minister, and includes representatives of the devolved administrations. As with the ECS,
BTI was re-branded, although in this case relatively soon after its initial launch. Two other points of contrast with the ECS are 
notable. Firstly, BTI’s funding was provided entirely by the FCO and DTI, rather than relying on a partnership between 
government and those served by the agency, as in the case of ECS. Secondly, both BTI and the TradePartnersUK brand 
were created significantly later than was the ECS and its EducationUK brand, which at the time constituted institutionally 
novel devices in British public administration (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2000). It is not, therefore, the case that the ECS 
could have been modelled on BTI (Interview with Trade Partners UK employee), although the reverse may be (at least 
partially) the case.
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threatened to “withdraw cooperation with the government on overseas aid projects” 
unless the IUC was retained as a separate organisation from the British Council 
(albeit as a “unit attached to the British Council”) (O’Leary, 1980e). Ultimately, 
however, the Vice-Chancellors did not carry out their threat. Although in theory the 
IUC could have resisted any attempt at closure due to its status as a limited 
company, it was heavily reliant on state funding and the use of government 
services overseas, and was unable to operate without these (ibid.).
The creation of the ECS marked a move away from the lUC’s stress on 
educational cooperation. The ECS’ general relationship to HEIs was defined, as 
with EduFrance, by universities’ and colleges’ membership of the agency. This 
relationship was described by a British Council interviewee as a “matching 
partnership”. The Foreign Office was required to ringfence the ECS grant within its 
grant to the British Council (Interview with British Council employee), whilst 
affiliation fees from HEIs provided the rest of the agency’s funding.
The CVCP, the universities’ sectoral association, did not play a major role in 
defining the ECS’ approach. The extent of competition between the ECS and 
British HEIs was more limited than between EduFrance and French HEIs.
However, the ECS was able to effectively divide between HEIs, by offering some 
(and not others) the use of its offices and special promotional services. This 
occurred without any coherent opposition from the universities’ sectoral 
association. Such criticism as did occur was limited in scope and had little effect, 
being generally expressed only by a small number of HEIs leaving the ECS, rather 
than being mediated through the sectoral association.83 Oxford and Cambridge in 
particular “have now and then elected to go their own way outside ECS” 
(Humphrey, 1999:117). In comparison with HEIs’ extensive control of the IUC, 
their ability to affect the ECS’ institutional design and operations was limited.
83 Although the membership of the ECS has stayed relatively stable; in 1989 all but two universities, all polytechnics and 
some colleges of higher education and central institutions participated in the scheme (Walker, 1997: 92), whilst in 1999,286  
members paid annual subscriptions of between £6000 and £18000 per year.
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5 How the ECS operated in practice 
5.a The ECS’ structure
The ECS’ Director is appointed by the British Council, on the advice of the ECS’ 
Board (Humphrey, 1999: 146). The Board comprises a mixture of HEI and British 
Council representatives.84 By 1987, “virtually all universities and polytechnics in 
Britain” had joined the ECS (Cultural Relations Department, FCO, 1987: 76), 
although as noted above, particular HEIs slipped in and out of membership, 
especially Oxford and Cambridge universities. The ECS soon became self- 
sufficient, being funded entirely out of HEI subscriptions (Overseas Student Trust, 
1987: 38).
Since its inception, the ECS has been led by British Council staff, with the ultimate 
political responsibility for the agency resting with the Ministers for Education and 
Foreign Affairs. The development of the EducationUK brand was, however, 
especially associated with the leadership of the Prime Minister. The EducationUK 
brand constituted an attempt to coordinate all HEIs’ and ECS’ promotional activity 
towards international students under a generic name (EducationUK), slogan (“Be 
the best you can be”) and corporate image. The EducationUK brand was created 
under the aegis of the “Prime Minister’s Initiative” (PMI). The PMI constituted an 
attempt to coordinate HEIs, their sectoral associations, and specialist groups such 
as UKCOSA (the HEIs’ organisation working on international students issues) with 
the ECS and the various departments with an interest in international students’ 
policy (the Home Office (and its visa agency, UKVisas), the Department of 
Education and Skills, and the Department for Trade and Industry). The PMI 
followed an inter-departmental review of international students’ policy conducted by 
the Cabinet Office, which was made public in June 1999. The review report 
maintained that there was a lack of coordination between the various British 
organisations working on international student matters, including the ECS,
84 The ECS’ board comprises: three elected members from HEIs; two elected members from Further Education institutions; 
one elected member from the private and schools sector; two vice-chancellors who have been nominated by the CVCP (now 
UniversitiesUK); three senior British Council staff; and the Director of the ECS, who acts as the secretary (Humphrey, 1999; 
145).
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proposed the creation of new coordinating structures, and encouraged the creation 
of the new, encompassing brand.
5.b The EducationUK brand
5.b.i The role of the Prime Minister
The bearing of the PMI on visa procedures is discussed in chapter nine. It is 
important to note here that the PMI’s emphasis on branding was explicitly linked 
with Blair’s leadership. The British Council officially maintained that the PMI had 
been prompted by the Prime Minister’s encounter with the Mayor of Shanghai, who 
was a former Chevening Scholar. This led, allegedly, to Blair’s public recognition of 
the importance of international students (British Council, 1999a: para.44). In 
addition, the Brand report which followed the launch of the PMI linked the new 
policy towards international students explicitly with Tony Blair, claiming that:
“For ‘tomorrow’s world citizens’, Blair's Britain is a positive step-change .... 
They see a move towards a more outward-looking modern-minded country 
with a desire to be involved with the world. Evidence of this would be a 
newly positive attitude to Europe, a feeling that Britain is once again open 
for business and the public focus on, in Tony Blair's words: 'Education, 
Education, Education'. This provides an unmissable opportunity to redress 
the negatives in their minds” (Education Counselling Service, 1999).
The PMI was announced in June 1999 at the London School of Economics. 
Alongside the branding exercise and new coordinating structures, the PMI involved 
setting a target for an increase in the UK’s market share for international students 
to twenty-five percent by 2005. This was described as leading to an extra 
£500million in export earnings per year (ibid.: Introduction).
The Chair of the British Council, Helena Kennedy, maintained that the 
EducationUKbrand would allow “British universities and colleges to market 
themselves professionally with an image and standards of service which reflect our 
high standards.” It was recognised that the branding operation would be
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challenging given the “diversity of the UK education (sic.) and the courses on 
offer”. Nonetheless, it was hoped that it would “attract potential students who have 
the means to seek an international education and the ability to benefit from the 
quality and opportunities offered by UK institutions” (Her Majesty’s Government, 
1999a).
The EducationUK operation to “brand British education as the first for quality and 
choice” was funded for its first three years of operation by £5million from 
government, coming from six government departments, which represented the full 
recurrent costs of the programme (Ratcliffe, 1999: 46). Twenty “priority markets” 
were identified which received £3.7 million in ECS grants in 1999-2000 and 
received “strategic planning support, policy guidance, performance monitoring and, 
where necessary, intervention” from ECS. Student recruitment events in “target 
markets” were also supported financially, at a rate of around £1 million a year, by 
the Department for Trade and Industry. The British Council maintained that whilst 
sufficient funding could probably be found within existing budgets to maintain the 
branding exercise for the following two years, it was necessary for longer-term 
funding to be secured “if the strategy is to succeed and the UK is to remain a major 
player in the international student market” (British Council, 1999a). In 2001-2 
additional funding was indeed provided by government to sustain the initiative 
(Foreign Affairs Committee, 2002). This extra support from government for the 
ECS coincided with a reduction in funding for the British Council’s services for 
international students, which was reduced from the mid-1990s onwards.85
In 2000, the ECS’s Director, Allan Barnes, set out the agency’s mission. The ECS 
was to aim to become “the world's leading national education and training
85 In particular, the British Council’s regional offices, which had formerly provided a number of facilities for international 
students, were reduced in number and resources, with a 23% reduction in staff from 1996-7 to 2000 (Wyatt, 2000). Whilst 
some of the British Council’s previous operations were maintained through “implants in universities and other institutions”, 
these were at a “much reduced level” compared to the previous system (Buchanan, 1999: para. 134-5). Attempts to further 
rationalise the existing system were made through the “Welcome to the UK” programme, following a “time immediately after 
the cuts when [the British Council] had to reconcile and reorganise when there was some concern about the quality of 
services" (ibid.: para. 140).
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marketing organisation”, through implementing its “core values” of “pioneering 
professional standards for the international student recruitment business”, and a 
“creative, dynamic and flexible” approach focused “on the needs of the market and 
member institutions”, with “professional[ism] and consistency] in all activity” 
(Barnes, 1999).
The ECS’ roles included the provision of information on studying in the UK to 
potential international students, through British Council offices and the ECS 
website; the provision of counselling to individual potential students at particular 
British Council offices; the organisation of a British presence at educational fairs; 
and the provision of information to HEIs on market opportunities and trends 
(Foreign Affairs Committee, 1998; Marsden, 1999; Targett, 1998a).
5.b.ii The EducationUK brand and commercialisation
The EducationUK brand was developed from research undertaken by ECS when it 
was commissioned by the UK Government to examine “the relative attractiveness 
and the actual and perceived costs of studying in the UK compared with other 
developed anglophone countries” (Wicks, 2000). Financial support for the creation 
of the brand was provided by the Departments for Education and Employment and 
Trade and Industry; the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, and the three devolved administrations (Education Counselling Service,
1999).
The adoption of this new brand involved the use of private-sector methods of 
marketing. During the development of the brand, the ECS coordinated the work of 
four private agencies which had been commissioned to undertake research and to 
evaluate possible approaches: MORI, a polling company; LD&A, a US-based 
business consultancy; Shandwick, PR consultants; and the advertising group, 
McCann Erickson Manchester. The brand was developed from research amongst 
potential international students. A summary of this research, presented in the 
report “Branding British Education”, was discussed with British Council officers and
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educational sector representatives in May 1999 (ibid.). According to the research, 
British higher education was seen as insufficiently “cutting edge”, as lacking in 
innovation, not always competitively priced, and out-dated.
A second set of proposals were then discussed with another group of potential 
international students. These discussions informed the drafting of a final strategy. 
The brand was finally launched at the end of 1999, with marketing campaigns 
using the brand operating from January 2000 at the British Council’s 110 offices 
(ibid.). The brand was defined using the advertising group McCann-Erickson’s 
“proprietary brand planning tool” of the “Brand Footprint”, which was intended to 
capture the brand’s “impression in a consumer landscape”. The new “desired 
brand footprint” involved British higher education being seen as “meaning” “[a] 
dynamic tradition”, “[t]he new world class”, “[b]eing the best I can be”, “being” 
“Responsive”, being “[wjelcoming”, and “[a]live with possibilities”. The brand was 
also to be “sold” through McCann-Erickson’s “selling strategy”, which constituted “a 
discipline that is single-mindedly focused on generating brand building ideas that 
create marketplace dominance” (ibid.).
Concomitantly, the ECS urged HEIs to adopt a more professional marketing 
approach. This was reflected in its commissioning of the “Gilligan report”, a report 
on the marketing of British higher education. This advocated that HEIs should 
adopting private sector methods of marketing, following an “authoritative 
benchmarking” on the marketing of British education (Gilligan, 2000: Sect.5.0; 
Barnes, 2000: 3). Colin Gilligan, a professor of marketing, advocated a number of 
changes to HEIs’ current practices. He maintained that HEIs were, amongst other 
failings, not sufficiently focusing “the marketing spend and marketing activity upon 
key markets”, being “Relatively unambitious” in their “recruitment targets”, not 
sufficiently “understanding...the potential of current and future markets”, and not 
sufficiently segmenting or targeting specific markets (Gilligan, 2000: 6). He also 
criticised the ECS itself for lacking “detailed or strategic marketing expertise” (ibid.: 
7). The ECS adopted a number of Gilligan’s recommendations, and proposed that
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HEIs should view “the international student base as a core element of the 
institution’s marketing effort”, commit “to the professional training and development 
of international marketing and recruitment staff’, and “[c]arefully segment[...] and 
select[...] markets for active promotion that are appropriate to the institution’s 
products and aspirations”. The ECS was also engaging, according to its Director 
Allan Barnes, in a “[d]etailed study of possible applications of modern e-business 
relationship marketing techniques” (Barnes, 2000:12).
Currently, the ECS manages the EducationUK brand on behalf of the Departments 
of Education and Skills and of Foreign Affairs. The ECS’ role in this area has 
appeared to be relatively popular politically, with an Early Day Motion on the 
subject in 1999 attracting forty-four signatures from all parties except the 
Conservatives (Fitzsimons, 1999).
6 To what extent did the ECS lead to a liberalisation of international students’ 
policy?
As with EduFrance, the ECS was created as a means of reorientating policy 
towards international students in a liberalising direction. Similarly to EduFrance, 
this is most evident from the agency’s impact on increasing the commodification of 
international students. Unlike EduFrance, however, the ECS can also be seen as 
leading to liberalisation through its encouragement of competition between HEIs for 
international students.
6.a Commodification
The ECS can be seen as promoting the commodification of international students 
through targeting its promotional programmes on students from developed and 
emerging economy countries (rather than on developing countries), and through 
urging HEIs to recruit international students for their monetary value rather than for 
purposes of international development or for foreign policy reasons.
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Particular countries were picked out for special marketing campaigns by the ECS 
on the basis of their perceived importance to the UK (Trend, 2001). The students 
recruited by the ECS were seen as likely to constitute the “future elite” in target 
countries, acting as “movers and shakers when they return to their own country” 
after a British higher education (Education Counselling Service, 1999). This focus 
on targeting students on the basis of their perceived future benefits to the UK is 
evident in the ECS’ focus on south-east Asia, and in its increased educational links 
with China (at least during the early years of its operations), compared with its lack 
of any focus on developing countries (Pickard, 2000; Wyatt, 2001).
In addition to itself promoting the commodification of international students, the 
ECS also urged HEIs to adopt a similar position. Firstly, it suggested that HEIs 
should change their courses in order to attract international students from “target 
markets”. Hence, both Colin Gilligan and Allan Barnes advocated that HEIs change 
their degree courses to improve marketing possibilities.86 Currently, Gilligan 
claimed, “[f]ew courses” were “tailored to the specific needs of target markets 
overseas”, whereas a “cost-benefit” analysis of “students from different target 
markets” would indicate the advantages of a “more strategic approach to market 
development” (Gilligan, 2000: 6-8). A “shift” was required from the “product focused 
ethos that dominates institutions currently” to “a far stronger customer focused and 
market oriented approach” (ibid.: 7). This was echoed in Barnes’ comment that 
HEIs should seek to “ensure a degree of differentiation in the product offer”, 
through offering “[attractive and innovative programmes with high added value that 
meet the market need” (Barnes, 2000: 13-4).87
Secondly, the ECS offered HEIs advice on how they could improve their share of 
important international student markets. For instance, in the mid-1990s the ECS
86 See Klein, 1979: 307, for an acute prediction of the likelihood of this type of activity following increased competition 
between HEIs for students.
87 It also reflected the Brand Report’s contention that the concept of “quality education” had become “tired”, and should be 
redefined in the British case to “include quality of student experience, facilities, welcome and liveability as well as education 
per se”.
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advocated that HEIs discount their fee levels in some geographical areas; and in 
1998 it proposed that HEIs create special arrangements to aid students hit by the 
South East Asian currency crisis (Authers, 1995; Targett, 1998c).
6.b Competition
The ECS did not significantly compete with individual HEIs in the provision of 
services. Unlike EduFrance, it did not provide generic products to potential 
international students.88 The ECS did, however, effectively divide between HEIs in 
its promotional activities. It has not followed the practice of commercial recruiting 
agencies (which in some countries have broken the British Council’s monopoly on 
educational counselling services and which advocate particular universities to 
potential students for a fee).89 However, in practice one can discern differentiation 
between HEIs on grounds of perceived quality. The Russell Group of old research 
universities has been the main beneficiary of this differentiation.
Hence, for instance, the ECS’ Dubai office is used by Strathclyde University as the 
focal point for delivery of the latter’s MBA, although the ECS still purports to offer 
“even-handed advice” on other providers’ MBAs; it offered its offices “for the use of 
the better UK universities” following the imposition of a strict registration process by 
the Hong Kong authorities, including allowing British Council staff to “help with 
registrations or examinations”; and it allowed Oxford University to use its offices for 
holding the examinations required by its distance learning programmes (THES, 
1996c: 7; Financial Times, 1996b: 15; Targett, 1998b).
88 This contrasts with the activities of the British Council (the ECS' parent body), which did often involve competition against 
British HEIs, especially concerning attempts to win multinational or European educational contracts. Some interviewees felt 
this led to “a potential conflict” between the British Council’s “public service functions for its grant in aid, and in [the British 
Council’s] commercial revenue functions where indeed in some areas, it might be actually competing against the institutions 
that it’s helping" (interview with Trade Partners UK employee; see also Financial Times, 1996a). Throughout the 1980s and 
1990s a number of large educational businesses became critical of the fact that the British Council appeared to benefit from 
a ‘quasi-official’ status which they lacked. In some cases, these businesses were almost as large as the British Council, and 
resented what they felt was an unequal playing field. Whilst the British Council was “removed from government,...at the 
same time on certain matters" it was “an important arm of government” (interview with HEI employee). Such concerns have 
led the Council to alter its operations; in the 1980s the Council formally separated the income from the expenditure elements 
of its budget, in order to demonstrate that its commercial activities were not being cross-subsidised by government funding.
89 As in Israel (THES, 1996b: 8).
108
The ECS has also, on occasion, decided to limit those institutions attending its 
educational fairs in order to prevent perceptions of ‘over-eager’ promotion, as at an 
education fair in Cyprus (THES, 1999d: 12).90 Finally, in some cases the ECS has 
required HEIs to opt-in to promotional schemes through paying extra fees. For 
example, membership of the ECS’ Japan Club enables HEIs to participate in 
special missions for around £2500 per year above the ECS subscription.91 The 
development of such differentiated programmes has occurred despite the fact that 
the ECS formally committed, during the development of the EducationUK brand, to 
working with all members and even non-members of ECS, in order to promote 
British higher education (Financial Times, 1996a).
More recently, the ECS has ceased to work with only one HEI in any particular 
country, in order to show its “even-handedness”. Whilst it continues to advise HEIs 
to collaborate where otherwise they might risk ‘swamping’ the market and thus 
wasting their own resources, the ECS has no ability to alter the “strategic 
marketing judgement[s]” arrived at by individual HEIs, even where the ECS feels 
that these might damage ‘UK Pic’ as a whole (interview with British Council 
employee).
However, the Gilligan report advocated that the ECS should again attempt to 
differentiate between HEIs in the provision of its services. It should work “far more 
closely with member institutions in order to understand in much greater detail their 
capabilities and expectations of individual markets” such that it could introduce “a 
segmented approach in [its] relationship with member institutions with the service 
level and fees reflecting this” (Education Counselling Service, 2000: Section 3.2). 
This has paralleled calls from a number of ECS outposts which have promoted the
90 Special guidelines had already been introduced, to ensure that only British HEIs could participate in such exhibitions, and 
to govern HEIs’ conduct during the exhibitions (with sanctions applied if Codes of Conduct were broken). Participants were 
expected to “behave in a professional manner, consistent with the integrity and dignity of their institutions” (Humphrey, 1999: 
61).
91 The additional fees are necessary, according to the ECS, due to the extra costs of operating in Japan (Walker, 1997: 256).
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development of “pilot schemes along the lines of placement agencies” (Walker, 
1997: 256).92
In contrast with EduFrance, the ECS has, therefore, differentiated the services it 
has provided to different HEIs in the past, and may well do so increasingly in the 
future if the Gilligan recommendations are implemented.
Such a differentiated approach has not, however, led to extensive coordinated 
action by HEIs. Criticism of the ECS by British HEIs has generally concerned its 
emphasis, rather than its general approach. Hence, the Brand report reflected 
comments from HEI staff, who felt that the ECS should place greater emphasis on 
British HEIs’ value for money and high quality teaching, and should devote greater 
efforts to overseas visits by HEI staff rather than organising exhibitions (Education 
Counselling Service, 1999: sect.16). There was little criticism by HEIs of the ECS’ 
leadership in comparison with the situation in France, despite the similar 
prominence of figures also working in or originally from the private sector such as 
Colin Gilligan and Allan Barnes in the agency’s management (Education 
Counselling Service, 2000: Appx.1, p. 18).
Where British HEIs did significantly oppose the ECS’ activities, this opposition was 
not coordinated through the universities’ sectoral association, but was expressed 
through universities opting out of the ECS’ membership, particularly Oxford and 
Cambridge. Aside from this, although numerous HEIs have criticised the ECS for 
its focus on particular universities to the detriment of others (and to Higher 
Education colleges), this has resulted in little change to the ECS’ activities. The 
Brand report, the report which launched the EducationUK label, noted that some 
institutions in Scotland and Wales felt that the ECS was overly focused on English 
HEIs, and sometimes even only on those HEIs based in London and South-East 
England (Education Counselling Service, 1999). The ECS has also been criticised
92 At the time of writing it is not exactly clear how and whether any restructuring of the ECS will occur (interviews with HEI 
representatives).
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by some elements of the HE sector for focusing its efforts on large, prestigious 
HEIs to the detriment of the newer universities (Williams and Evans, 2005: 86). A 
number of HEIs felt that the ECS was attempting to be “all things to all people”. 
However, despite the British Council’s attempts to “bring [HEIs] together” (Kelly,
2000), the lack of formal coordination between HEIs has resulted in an 
individualised relationship between HEIs and the ECS, which has prevented HEIs’ 
sectoral associations from being able to engage with the ECS as representative 
interlocutors for the sector.
7 Conclusion
This chapter has examined how the ECS agency created a new promotional 
infrastructure for British higher education overseas. The ECS did not continue 
existing institutional patterns, which had promoted cooperation between HEIs, and 
a view of international students as useful for international development and foreign 
policy purposes. Rather, the ECS’ creation and operations provided HEIs with 
incentives to commodify international students (through a concentration on 
students from developed and emerging economy countries) and to compete 
against each other for the recruitment of such students. The ECS was not created 
by HEIs but by civil servants within the British Council. HEIs were opposed to the 
incorporation of their existing organisation, the Inter-University Council, into the 
British Council. The lUC’s emphasis on links with developing countries was not 
adopted by the new ECS.
Throughout the period examined, the higher education sector has been divided 
over both whether the agency’s creation was a welcome development, and over 
the way in which the agency has carried out its promotional functions, especially 
where these have involved certain HEIs being favoured over others.
Overall, this chapter indicates that, at least in the field of international student 
recruitment, the creation of liberalising institutions did not proceed as Streeck and
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Thelen would have predicted. The example of the ECS instead exposes 
importance of the role of government and of intra-sectoral coordination.
Chapter 4: Promotional institutions in France
1 Introduction
As in Britain, the creation of a new agency by government to promote French 
higher education overseas has had a significant impact on the extent of 
commodification of international students, although it has had a lesser impact on 
the degree of competition between HEIs for the recruitment of such students.
Rather than arising out of HEIs’ own efforts at promotion, EduFrance was created 
in 1998 by government with minimal HEI involvement, as a joint project of the 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Education. Indeed, the creation of EduFrance 
occurred only two years after the effective abolition of the HEIs’ own agency for 
international higher education, ARIES, following a withdrawal of government 
funding. HEIs had attempted to resist the closure of ARIES, but, as with the 
incorporation of the IUC into the British Council, they were unable to prevent this 
occurring due to the agency’s reliance on government funding.
In addition to ARIES, three other organisations, the SFERE, CNOUS and Egide 
were all also active in the field of international higher education before 1998. 
However, EduFrance adopted a significantly different approach from all four 
organisations. In particular, it adopted a view of international students as 
economically valuable, which led to clashes with the existing organisations which 
had generally viewed international students as important for foreign policy or 
international development reasons, or which, in the case of the SFERE, had 
generally worked in the area of educational technology only.
Overall, EduFrance led to a liberalisation of international students’ policy, as it 
explicitly adopted, and propagated, a view of international students as commodities. 
It both charged international students for its services, and also attempted to 
reorient the promotion of French higher education abroad to developed and 
emerging economy countries. HEIs resisted this new, liberalising approach to
113
international students’ policy. Collectively, working within the Conference des 
Presidents d’Universite (CPU), French HEIs were able to force a change in the 
management of EduFrance, when its original head, Frangois Blamont, who had 
extensively promoted a liberalisation of international students’ policy, was removed. 
However, they were unable to alter its re-orientation of French higher education 
promotion towards countries which had greater economic, as opposed to colonial, 
links with France.
2 The pre-existing situation
A number of organisations existed prior to the creation of EduFrance in 1998, 
within the field of international higher education. These included ARIES, which was 
created and managed by HEIs, and the Sociefe Francaise pour /’Exportation des 
Ressources Educatives (SFERE), Centre National des CEuvres Universitaires et 
Scolaire (CNOUS) and Egide, which were created and managed by government. 
The activities of ARIES, the CNOUS and Egide did not lead to HEIs competing 
against each other for international students, nor did they lead to sectoral actors 
viewing international students as commodities. While the SFERE adopted a much 
more commercial approach, it had little contact with HEIs and mainly worked on 
the promotion of educational technology.
2.a HEI-led organisations: ARIES
The only previous organisation in international higher education not to have 
operated directly under the Education Ministry was the ARIES agency. Rather than 
constituting a basis for the development of EduFrance, ARIES performed a 
significantly different function, and was formally separate from government. ARIES 
was not designed to promote a liberalisation of international students’ policy.
Rather than providing HEIs with incentives to compete against each other, or to 
commodify international students, the organisation encouraged coordination 
amongst HEIs, within the framework of a development-based approach to 
cooperation in international higher education. Due to the removal of government
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funding, however, ARIES was forced to close two years before the creation of 
EduFrance.
ARIES pursued a significantly different approach to EduFrance. EduFrance was 
described, in comparison with ARIES, as taking “the politically supportable part of 
the [international higher education] agenda”, i.e. as concentrating on the promotion 
of French higher education to potential international students, but failing to 
encompass ARIES’ other work, such as facilitating staff exchange and other forms 
of higher education internationalisation which did not involve liberalisation 
(interview with former British Council employee; interview with former ARIES 
employee). Whilst ARIES was involved in developing long-term links with 
universities and colleges abroad, including links with academics from developing 
countries, EduFrance concentrated on developing concerted promotional 
campaigns which targeted well-off potential international students living in different 
geographical areas.93
ARIES was formed out of one of the Commissions of the Conference des 
Presidents d’Universite, that concerning Exterior Relations (the ‘COREX’). From 
1990 onwards, COREX had organised an annual meeting of universities’ 
international relations staff. The new meetings coincided with the inclusion of 
international issues in the funding contracts struck between universities and 
government, which had raised the profile of international students within 
universities’ strategies (Interview with CPU employee and with former ARIES 
employee). After two years, it was decided that if COREX’s annual meetings were 
to be used to develop policy concerning international students, it would need to 
hive off its operational activities to another body. ARIES was thus intended to deal
93 Indeed, EduFrance was initially criticised for a ‘short-term’ approach towards the promotion of French higher education to 
particular geographical regions. Hence, for example, some ambassadors were critical of EduFrance for inconsistency, with 
the French ambassador for India reported as stating that “the number of Indian students in France has doubled in two years, 
mostly thanks to EduFrance, but the agency hasn’t done anything this year (2001). It needs work for five or six years, 
otherwise the initial investment is lost” (Davidenkoff, 2001). In contrast, ARIES’ early activities have been described as 
attempts to build up long-term cooperation between the French higher education sector and that of other (both developed 
and developing) countries.
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with the ‘operational’ aspects of international higher education on behalf of French 
HEIs (interview with CPU employee; Le Monde, 1992b).
Additional support for the creation of ARIES in 1992 came from the Conference 
des Grandes Ecoles (CGE), many of whose members also became involved in the 
new agency. The CGE also contributed significant funding.
The then Education Ministry was also supportive of the new agency, although 
central government lacked any formal control over ARIES. Jack Lang as Education 
Minister pronounced himself “very much in favour of ARIES” (interview with former 
ARIES employee) and his ministry contributed to the running costs of its four to five 
staff. Additional staff were seconded to ARIES on an ad hoc basis from HEIs. The 
organisation developed a range of publicity materials for French higher education, 
attempted to improve French HEIs’ ability to win European and multinational 
educational contracts, and acted as a peak association for French HEIs’ 
international staff.
Under Lang, the Education Ministry provided the new agency with a non­
hypothecated grant. In December 1995, however, the governmental portion of its 
funding was removed by Frangois Fillon, then the new Minister for Higher 
Education following the right’s victory in legislative elections in 1993. Interviewees 
claimed that this may have been linked to the fact that the agency was an 
association according to the 1901 law, with its leadership personally financial 
viable for any losses. ARIES had attempted to change its organisational framework 
in a more formal and transparent direction, and from 1994 had proposed that it 
should become a groupement d’inferet public (GIP) or similar. GIPs were semi- 
autonomous agencies mainly used as a means of coordinating universities with 
research groups, and EduFrance was given GIP status when it was created. 
However, interviewees claimed that the Ministry filibustered these attempts to 
place the agency on a more solid organisational and legal footing. The withdrawal
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of government funding in the face of considerable staff and operational costs, led 
to the agency having to cease operations.
2.b Government-led organisations 
2.b.i The SFERE
The only existing explicitly promotional body for French educational services was 
the SFERE. This organisation was created in 1984 by Alain Savary, then Minister 
of National Education, as a private company which would promote French 
educational technology abroad. It has continued to operate throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s. Although some of its work has involved international students, this has 
generally centred around organising special training programmes for groups 
chosen by foreign governments, rather than promoting French HEIs to potential 
international students without any governmental intermediary, as is EduFrance’s 
role. The SFERE’s role was mainly confined to the promotion of French 
educational technologies rather than that of French higher education as a whole. 
The organisation has had only very limited links with EduFrance from its inception 
(interview with SFERE employee).
2.b.ii The CNOUS and Egide
Two other organisations have been active in providing services for international 
students (as opposed to promoting French higher education abroad); the CNOUS 
and Egide.
The CNOUS was created as a public establishment in 1955, with the task of 
improving students’ living and working conditions. Managed by the Ministry of 
Education, the CNOUS operated regional outposts called the CROUS. In this role, 
the CNOUS was involved in providing services for international students provided 
with state bursaries from around 130 countries.
Egide was created in 1960 by the Minister for Cooperation as the Association pour 
ies stages et I'accueil des techniciens d'Outre-mer. As its role expanded from a
117
focus on Africa to cover the European Community as well, and it came under the 
control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the body was renamed the Centre 
International des Stages (CIS). In 1980 the CIS became the CIES, with the 
inclusion of students in its programmes following merger with the Office de 
cooperation et d’accueil universitaire (OCAU). Its role was further increased in 
1998, when it merged with the Agence pour I'accueil des personnalitds dtrangeres, 
an agency which organised transport and accommodation for guests of the central 
government.
Neither the CNOUS nor Egide shared EduFrance’s liberalising emphasis. Both 
agencies lacked any explicit role in the promotion of French higher education to 
potential international students, and both had mostly confined their activities to 
scholarship students. Indeed, both came to see themselves as competitors with 
EduFrance at an operational and political level (interview with EduFrance 
employee). As detailed below, EduFrance was obliged to demarcate itself from 
both agencies as they increasing came to resent its attempts to control French 
policy towards international students. EduFrance did not constitute a natural 
outgrowth of either existing organisation, and its commercial approach clashed with 
the more traditional approach of CNOUS and Egide.
3 Government strategies
EduFrance was created in 1998 and became operational from the start of 1999. It 
was a joint project between the then Minister of Education, Claude Allegre and the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hubert Vedrine. Both the Education and Foreign Affairs 
ministries had been attempting to improve France’s presence at international 
higher education events, sometimes in conjunction with the Conference des 
Presidents d’Universite, the universities’ sectoral association, from the mid-1990s 
(Bloche, 2000: Sect.2; interview with DRIC employee). The new agency was 
intended to further improve France’s position in the “international higher education 
market” (Davidenkoff, 2000a). EduFrance was to promote French higher education
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to potential international students, to advertise French educational technology, and 
to improve the French share of international higher education contracts.
As noted above, EduFrance did not grow out of existing organisations. In 
particular, it was not created on the basis of HEIs’ existing promotional efforts. In 
comparison with the HEIs’ ARIES, “an association of people”, EduFrance was “an 
organisation created by the minister of international affairs and the ministry of 
education, so it was quite an official governmental-type agency” which had a 
membership not of “people [i.e. of individuals] but institutions [i.e. HEIs]” (interview 
with HEI employee). Both in its institutional design, and its operations, EduFrance 
differed significantly from ARIES. EduFrance was, instead, explicitly created as a 
joint project between the Ministers of Education and Foreign Affairs. In particular, 
the then Minister of Education, Claude Allegre played a pivotal role. Allegre had a 
strong interest in international higher education (Davidenkoff, 2000b) and was 
concerned to quickly demonstrate the “crucial importance which the new 
Government place[d] on the matter of international students” (Gerard, 1998).
EduFrance’s liberalising operations were mainly led by government. It was funded 
jointly by the two ministries (Bloche, 2002: 1B2b) with the agency’s budget 
amounting to 8.6million euro in 2003 (EduFrance, 2003). The Foreign Affairs 
Ministry also provided EduFrance with access to staff in the cultural and 
cooperation sections of French embassies (Estrosi, 2001). Over the years since 
EduFrance’s inception, the number of international students attending French HEIs 
has increased considerably, although the agency did not meet Allegre’s target to 
double the numbers in four years (L’AEF, 2000).
Aside from the government’s financial influence on the agency, perhaps the most 
significant indicator of government control over EduFrance was the appointment of 
its first director, Fran?ois Blamont, who was a strong supporter of the liberalisation
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of international students’ policy.94 Blamont was concerned to develop EduFrance’s 
commercial operations which, through charging prospective international students 
fees, and through targeting students from developed and emerging economy 
countries, intensified the commodification of international students. The change in 
EduFrance’s directorship after four years resulted from coordinated political activity 
by HEIs to change EduFrance’s orientation away from its previously liberalising 
approach.
Overall, EduFrance’s creation and its subsequent operations were subject to a 
significant degree of direction from the French government, rather than the 
organisation being led by HEIs themselves.95 As early as 2000, both Allegre and 
Vedrine maintained that their creation of EduFrance, along with other initiatives, 
had allowed France to “meet the challenge” of the international market in Higher 
Education (Allegre and Vedrine, 2000). Certainly, by 2001, EduFrance was 
credited by both its managing director (Rotman, 2001) and the Minister of Foreign
94 Blamont’s appointment appears to have proved controversial even within government; his previous business dealings had 
twice attracted interest by the Inspector of Finances, and his appointment allegedly resulted in conflict between the Ministry 
of Finance on one side, and the Ministers of Education and Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister on the other (Delberghe, 
1999; Renaud and Thoraval, 1999).
95 It might be questioned whether EduFrance was genuinely under the control of government, given the fact that a prime 
ministerial agency, the Superior Council for the French Language, had been highly critical of EduFrance’s activities but failed 
to achieve any change in these. The Superior Council for the French Language was created to ensure the implementation of 
the 1994 law on the use of the French language, and was presided over by the Prime Minister (Conseil Sup6rieur de la 
Langue Frangaise, 1999). By 2000 the Council was cautioning EduFrance against promoting courses offered in English, 
which would “marginalise international students, create distortions in degree structures and offer international students unfair 
advantages” (Conseil Supgrieur de la Langue Frangaise, 2001). By 2001-2, EduFrance offered 23 (non-language) degrees 
in its catalogue which were taught entirely in English (Deforno, 2002: 34); thus, the comments of the Council appear to have 
had little effect. However, it should not be surmised from this that the government as a whole lacked control over 
EduFrance’s operations. EduFrance’s approach to the use of English was consistent with the approach of the government, 
at least as expressed by the then Minister for National Education, Claude Allggre. Allggre had claimed even before the 
creation of EduFrance that “the French must cease considering English like a foreign language” (Allggre, 1997), and that 
English “had become a commodity...which should be taught....from nursery” (le Figaro, 1997). EduFrance’s activities were 
thus coherent with the overall approach of the then Education Ministry, if not with particular elements of the executive, on 
some dimensions.
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Affairs (Bourg-Broc, 2001) as having achieved a significant increase in 
international student numbers since its inception.96
4 HEIs’ strategies and coordination
HEIs were rather sceptical concerning the creation of EduFrance. The withdrawal 
of funding for ARIES had reduced HEIs’ trust in government when it came to 
policies in international higher education (interview with HEI employee). Such 
suspicion was heightened by the fact that the first figurehead for the new 
organisation, Frangois Blamont, had a notorious reputation for his business 
dealings, and explicitly promoted the commodification of international students.
Interviewees maintained that pressure from HEIs, with the backing of the CPU, had 
led to Blamont not being re-employed as the head of EduFrance after its first four- 
year period, with the position instead being taken up by the less controversial (and 
more academic) figure of Thierry Audric (interview with CPU employee). Although 
Blamont’s removal coincided with a review of the agency (all groupements d’interet 
publique were reviewed after their first four years of operation), it does not appear 
that Blamont had hoped to retire at this point (interview with HEI employee).
HEIs were also “circumspect” concerning EduFrance’s scope of action. They were 
particularly concerned about EduFrance’s provision of services to international 
students, due to the fees required to access these. A report by the former 
academic Albert Prevos report articulated this concern, and was supported by 
many members of the CPU (Prevos, 1999). Prevos, then the National Education 
Inspector, suggested that decision-making on the subject of international students
96 It is interesting that such a marked process of commodification was accompanied by significant attempts by government 
to disown the process, on occasion, despite the fact that it had originally promoted it. Hence, the Minister of Education 
maintained in 1998 that “in the great global education competition, France must make its voice heard: rather than jump into 
the market, we must promote public service, which is a better guarantee of education than any private system” (Gerard, 
1998). Similarly, in 2000 the Minister of Education again insisted that “[tjhis is not to do with selling in its normal sense, but of 
regrouping the forces of our educational system to promote it, against a liberal offensive which is worrying us” (reported in 
Guibert, 2000). This conflict between rhetoric and the concrete activities of engagement in the world higher education market 
was noted by the newspaper Liberation, which summarised the government’s position as that between postcolonial and 
neoliberal mauvaise foi, mediated by negative references to the influence of the United States (Liberation, 2000a).
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should be devolved wherever possible to individual HEIs. Similarly, the 
parliamentarian Alain Claeys reported HEIs’ concerns that the new agency might 
prevent them from “exporting] their offer of education abroad”. HEIs, Claeys 
maintained, were resisting EduFrance’s attempts to “become a new operator”, 
through itself offering international students services (Claeys, 2000). HEIs were 
concerned that they would be ultimately penalised for “playing the game” and 
cooperating with EduFrance (Claeys, 2001a). In 2000, Claeys described 
universities’ suspicion of EduFrance as so serious as to potentially lead to them 
“turning away” from the agency, and renouncing their membership (Claeys, 2000).
This contrasted with EduFrance’s then position, as articulated by Blamont, that 
“today, experts maintain that universities should rely on professional organisations 
[for the reception of international students] who understand what “welcome” and 
“service” mean, so that teachers can remain teachers and universities can remain 
preoccupied with diffusing knowledge”, rather than following Prevos’ “idealist” 
suggestions (I'AEF, 2001b).
Once under its new leadership, EduFrance appeared less concerned to centralise 
services for international students under its own brand. In 2000, Bernard Raoult, 
the new President of EduFrance, drew together a team of academics, former 
university presidents and former directors of grandes dcoles to advise EduFrance, 
stressing that the “coordination of know-how of our HEIs” was an indispensable 
condition for EduFrance’s success (Unknown author, 2000a). Henceforth, 
EduFrance limited its provision of generic services. The HEIs’ campaign against 
Frangois Blamont thus does appear to have led to a reduction in the 
commodification of international students, through a reduction in EduFrance’s 
provisions of these charging services for prospective international students.
5 Establishment of the new institution
EduFrance’s structure was defined by its status as a groupement d’interet public 
(‘GIP’), a new organisational form recognised by the French government, which
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allowed public sector organisations to work with private sector ones. The agency 
enjoyed a membership of both universities and grandes dcoles, with the Foreign 
Affairs and Education ministries also represented on its governing board. By March 
2001, EduFrance had 145 HEI members, of which 68 were universities and 77 
were grandes 6coles (Bourg-Broc, 2001).
The use of GIPs was initially confined to regional research partnerships, where 
universities or grandes Gcoles collaborated with other public bodies (Conseil d'Etat, 
Section du rapport et des etudes, 1997; Muzellec and Nguyen, 1993). GIPs were 
seen as a method of encouraging partnership between the state and outside 
bodies through a cooperative organisation (Cauville, 1999). The law of 1982 which 
created GIPs in research and technological development stipulated that the French 
government had to periodically review each GIP in order to decide whether its GIP 
status should be renewed (Gouvernement de France, 1982: Ch.2, sect.2, art.21).
Aside from its frequent use as the organisational framework for 'Poles 
Universitaires Europeennes’ (associations of HEIs in particular regions), as noted 
above the use of GIPs was mainly restricted to networks of research institutes until 
relatively recently. Most such GIPs had a relatively low political profile, being used 
only to further the operational coordination of regionally-based research 
programmes. As a result, such GIPs excited relatively little comment in the press 
and media.97 In contrast, the fact that EduFrance’s creation as a GIP allowed it 
some operational independence, and enabled it to engage in commercial 
operations, was highlighted as a significant change in the field of international 
students’ policy. In the past, most attempts to promote French Higher Education 
abroad had been non-commercial, and were coordinated explicitly through the 
Foreign Affairs and/or Education Ministries, often with the support of the HEIs’ 
sectoral associations. EduFrance marked a change from this previous approach.
97 For an uncommon exception, see Le Monde, 1991b.
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The structure of EduFrance, as a GIP, allowed the government much more control 
than would have been possible over ARIES. ARIES’ structure as an association loi 
1901 was highly informal; as an interviewee noted, “you can organise an 
Association very easily, you need a President, a Vice-President, a treasurer, and 
it’s finished, you [need only] go to the Prefecture and lay down the statutes” 
(interview with former ARIES employee). EduFrance’s more formal structure as a 
groupement d’interet public has allowed much greater control by the executive, as 
the GIP’s status must be renewed every four years, allowing for an extensive 
assessment of its performance to date. The status of EduFrance as a GIP also 
allowed the government to formally participate in the choice of officers of the GIP, a 
key role evident from the political disagreements arising from the initial choice of 
Director General, Frangois Blamont.
More broadly, EduFrance was created during a period of expansion in the use of 
agencies (as well as of GIPs as a subset of agencies) in France from the mid- 
1990s onwards (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000: 230), as part of a general process of 
d&concentration (Mordacq, 2001: 2). However, the EduFrance agency was the only 
agency of many proposed by the then Education Minister which has survived.98The 
use of agencies with an arms-length relationship to the state formed part of a wide- 
ranging administrative “modernisation” programme by the French Prime Minister 
which was initiated in June 1998 (Gouvernement de France, 2005). The 
programme pluriannuel de modernisation classified EduFrance as one, novel, 
element of a reform agenda promoting decentralisation and functional autonomy 
(Gouvernement de France, 2001a, 2001b).
6 The operation of EduFrance
6.a EduFrance’s approach to higher education promotion
EduFrance had a variety of operational roles. Firstly, it acted as a “point of entry 
into the French education system” (Auffray, 1999) for potential international
98 For example, Allggre also proposed that agencies should be set up to deal with competitive civil service exams and staff 
recruitment (Cole, 2001: 711), but these proposals did not result in significant institutional change.
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students. It thus provided information and advice on the French higher education 
system and the practicalities of staying in France (Cova, 2001; Lengagne, 2001) to 
interested individuals. This involved a number of initiatives: the production of a 
catalogue of different courses, which individual HEIs could use to advertise 
themselves; the creation of a website promoting French universities and grandes 
6coles\ and presence at various ‘trade fairs’ for international higher education 
(Deprez, 1999b; Le Monde, 2000a). The agency also developed a number of 
‘Espaces EduFrance’ in different countries, which offered a “tailored portal” into 
EduFrance’s services for different nationalities. These were often operated in 
conjunction with embassies (as in Hong-Kong, Taiwan, Venezuela and Colombia), 
or with Alliances frangaises (as in Brazil, Mexico and China) (Deprez, 1999b).
Secondly, as examined in more detail in the section below concerning EduFrance 
and the commodification of international students, EduFrance developed a range 
of services for which prospective international students were charged. These 
included the ‘EduFrance Pass’ and the provision of a range of summer schools, 
both in France and overseas.
EduFrance’s activities were comparable to those of other agencies operating along 
commercial lines," and were modelled on the existing practices of France’s “anglo- 
saxon competitors”.100 As with the British Education Counselling Service (if to a 
lesser extent), EduFrance attempted to “brand” (labelliser) the French higher 
educational offer, and to develop awareness of this brand (Johsua, 2002),101 in 
conjunction with French HEIs and other public and private operators (Deprez, 
1999e).
Francois Blamont, the first Director of EduFrance, was particularly concerned to 
promote the involvement of private agencies and HEIs in international student
99 As was claimed by Australian Education International, in its assessment of the role of EduFrance (French Embassy in 
Australia, 2002).
100 As claimed by the then Minister of Education (Gilbert, 1999).
101 See also Le Monde, 2000a.
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recruitment. Hence, for example, he maintained that the “enemies of EduFrance 
are those professors who think that the provision of education must be 100% 
public”, with “the ‘franco-frangais’ debate about the public and private sector” being 
“old fashioned” and irrelevant (Johsua, 2002). Blamont maintained that the 
existence of private schools in France, delivering degrees, suggested the 
inevitability of progress towards a commercial approach to international student 
recruitment, where degrees could be explicitly “sold” (Boulange, undated). As he 
claimed, the objective of EduFrance, at least under his Directorship, was to “sell 
French universities like one would sell champagne and perfume” (Les Echos, 
1999). In order to facilitate this, EduFrance developed a number of services which 
potential international students could pay for, which are examined in the next 
section.
In addition to promoting French higher education to potential international students, 
EduFrance also developed a role in the promotion of French educational 
technology, with a special sub-group being set up to coordinate this under the 
guidance of a vice-president from the Chambre de Commerce et d'lndustrie de 
Paris (Deprez, 1999a). In addition, the agency acted as a ‘broker’ for HEIs to 
respond to international contract offers, as with the contract between the 
universities of the Cote d’Ivoire and the University of the Mediterranean (Marseille). 
EduFrance also, on occasion, acted to coordinate all its members in relation to 
international organisations, as with the World Bank’s partnership agreement with 
the 165 universities and grandes 6coles which were members of EduFrance, to 
offer training to its officers, journalists and/or academics from developing countries 
(Liberation, 2000b). Despite this, EduFrance’s work as a “federating axis” for 
French HEIs was criticised by the government in 2001 for failing to “convert [...] 
operators to the new methodological exigencies of international action by 
consortium” (Gouvernement de France, 2001b).
Finally, in addition to the services it provided directly to potential international 
students and to HEIs individually and collectively, EduFrance also acted to
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promote change in HEIs’ approach to international student recruitment. Hence for 
example, it attempted to help HEIs develop their international activities in the 
framework of their quadrennial contracts.102 EduFrance offered to provide guidance 
for HEIs on how to internationalise their curriculum, how to welcome and support 
international students, how to send French students abroad, how to arrange the 
co-supervision of theses with foreign HEIs, and how to respond to international 
projects (Blamont, reported in Cauville, 1999). It also encouraged HEIs to create 
Vice-Presidents charged with international affairs and with the recruitment of 
international students (Les Echos, 1998). Overall, the government saw 
EduFrance’s role as “contributing, through a dynamic and incentivising action 
towards HEIs, the improvement of [the French] system of recruitment and follow-up 
in comparison with [France’s] foreign partners” (Gilbert, 1999).
6.b EduFrance and other organisations working in international higher 
education
Some of the existing organisations operating in the field of international higher 
education resented EduFrance’s commercial approach to international student 
recruitment. EduFrance’s introduction of “welcome fees” for international students, 
in particular, created some tensions, as the reception of new international students 
(albeit on a non-charging basis) was “exactly” the traditional “work of Egide and the 
CNOUS” (interview with EduFrance employee). This led to the conclusion of an 
agreement between EduFrance and existing bodies in July 1999, which maintained 
that “EduFrance cannot have a monopoly over overseas presence”, and that a 
contractual basis would be sought for relations between the organisations (Egide, 
1999a). EduFrance was also required to sign a contract with Egide which provided 
for an explicit division of responsibilities concerning the provision of services to 
Chinese students. Egide had traditionally managed the processing of such 
students, and EduFrance contracted out the recruitment and administration of 
Chinese bursary students to Egide (Egide, 2000).
102 See chapter seven for a discussion of the role of the quadrennial contracts in promoting liberalisation of international 
student recruitment.
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In 2001, an attempt was made to better coordinate EduFrance’s operations with 
the other organisations operating in the field, including the CNOUS and Egide. A 
new National Council on the Recruitment of International Students was established 
in 2001, following the publication of a report on international students by the 
academic Elie Cohen. This new body was created to improve the coordination of 
EduFrance’s activities with HEIs and government as well as with other agencies in 
international higher education (Cohen, 2001). It included representatives of the 
relevant ministries, of EduFrance, of the HEIS’ sectoral associations, and of the 
existing agencies such as the CNOUS and Egide.103 The new Committee on 
Foreign Students added another layer of decision-making above EduFrance.104
Overall, EduFrance supplemented rather than supplanted the existing institutional 
framework in international higher education, and it differed significantly from 
existing organisations both in its institutional design and its operations. It adopted a 
view of international students as commodities, both through charging prospective 
international students for the services it offered, and through promoting a 
reorientation of international student recruitment towards developed and emerging 
economy countries, and away from the traditional catchment countries of the 
developing world. This approach clashed with that of agencies such as Egide and
103 The National Council for the Recruitment of International Students included eight representatives of the ministries (of 
which four represented the minister of higher education, and four represented the minister of foreign affairs); any other 
interested ministers who had been invited; eight members representing HEIs (of which four represented the CPU, one 
represented the CGE, two represented the Conference des directeurs des 6coles et formations d'ing6nieurs, and one 
represented the Directors of IUFM); three representatives of those organisations involved in the management of the 
recruitment of international students (one of these represented the EduFrance agency, one the CNOUS and one Egide); and 
fifteen otherwise qualified people. These members were in position for four years. The president of the Council was 
appointed by joint decision of the Higher Education and Foreign Affairs ministries, and EduFrance provided the secretariat of 
the Council (Gouvernement de France, 2002).
104 It was suggested by interviewees that yet another additional layer of decision-making might be added on to EduFrance 
in the near future, with Thierry Audric, the new Director General of EduFrance, being commissioned to examine whether 
EduFrance, Egide and the CNOUS could be federated together for the start of the next GIP term. This new agency would 
significantly expand EduFrance’s role to cover the management of international students, including scholarship students 
(interview with EduFrance employee).
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the CNOUS, that had prioritised the development of links between France and 
developing countries, and especially African countries.
This lack of coordination between the agency’s objectives and existing initiatives 
was noted in a number of reports on the French approach to international 
promotion (Claeys, 1999; Hugon and Winter, 2002). Yet, such reports failed to 
highlight the most important cause of disjuncture between EduFrance and other 
organisations. Conflict between EduFrance and existing organisations occurred 
because of EduFrance’s commercial approach to international student recruitment, 
compared with the other organisations’ approaches which were based on a view of 
international students as important for foreign policy or international development. 
Hence, the Cohen report referred to above rather delicately states that the “plurality 
of organisations which intervene in the administrative and logistical elements of 
recruiting foreign students” should be preserved as it “constitutes a factor of gentle 
competition and of dynamism and not a structural cause of redundancies and 
dysfunctions”, even although it “imposes a greater effort of coordination between 
organisms and clarification over the respective fields of intervention of the various 
actors involved carrying out missions of general interest” (Cohen, 2001). Such 
missions were, however, being conducted with reference to very different goals. 
This becomes evident from a survey of the extent to which EduFrance promoted a 
commodification of international students.
7 EduFrance and the liberalisation of international students’ policy
7.a Commodification
The fact that EduFrance’s creation was explicitly linked to a commodification of 
international students was recognised by one of its creators, Claude Allegre.
Allegre maintained that the agency’s role in bringing more international students to 
France was part of a larger movement towards the commodification of “intellectual 
grey matter”:
“We suddenly realise that this intellectual grey matter carries with it the same 
consequences as every primary material: commerce, money, power, temptation to
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monopoly, In brief what transforms every object- whether or not it is an intellectual 
object- into a commodity. It is in the same spirit that we search to improve the 
international profile of our intellectual profile: the creation of the EduFrance agency 
to bring more international students...” (Allegre, 1999).
This view of EduFrance was shared by one of the Education Ministry civil servants 
interviewed, who maintained that EduFrance “is an agency with a commercial goal”, 
which explained the fact that “the African public are not targeted by EduFrance”.
The goal of EduFrance was thus “to search for the rich and very good students, 
and to make them come here. It is a policy which one absolutely cannot use in 
Africa” (interview with DRIC employee).
EduFrance promoted the liberalisation of international students’ policy, to the 
extent that it facilitated a view of international students as commodities. It 
particularly focused on new, commercially lucrative international student flows, and 
on the charging of potential international students for specific services. The 
creation of EduFrance has been cited, alongside other changes, as underlining the 
priority given to the training of foreign elites in France (Estrosi, 2001; Perrut, 2001). 
EduFrance put into practice governmental plans developed as early as 1993 to re­
focus international student recruitment on particular developed and emerging 
economies seen as key growth markets for French high-end products, particularly 
in South-East Asia and Latin America (Raymond, 1994). The geographical zones 
prioritised by EduFrance were reported by Blamont, apparently in order of 
preference, as “western, central and oriental Europe, south and south-east Asia as 
well as Japan, much of Latin America, that is to say Mexico, Chile and the 
Mercosur countries, a ‘common market’ grouping together Argentina, Paraguay, 
Uruguay and Brazil, and finally, South Africa and other African countries, in 
particular those with Mediterranean coasts” (Blamont reported in Cauville, 1999).
EduFrance also attempted to develop commercial relationships with potential 
international students. This involved a variety of measures (Les Echos, 1999).
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Perhaps most importantly, EduFrance developed a system of individualised 
services for potential international students. EduFrance’s services for potential 
international students were initially offered as part of a “welcome package”, for 
which separate fees were payable (Cauville, 1999; Les Echos, 1999; Unknown 
author, 2000). Potential students could choose a minimal package, which included 
help from the airport, tickets for travel to the HEI and a night in Paris if timetables 
required it, and the designation of a “partner” (parrain) for each student, in the city 
where they would be staying. They could add additional services “3 la carte”, which 
included access to housing, to social cover, language training, cultural trips and 
educational tutoring (Deprez, 1999b). EduFrance thus attempted to present itself 
as the “guichet unique”, the all-encompassing point of contact, for international 
students (Blamont reported in Cauville, 1999), rather than this role being performed 
by HEIs themselves.
By 2001, 1086 students had used (and paid for) such services (rising from 359 
students at the end of 2000) (Gouvernement de France, 2001b). Such services 
generally involved the payment of around 5000 francs per student as “welcome 
fees”. These fees, through encouraging “solvent students” to attend French HEIs, 
were described as having “a global effect on the French economy” (Le Monde, 
1999).
From 2001 onwards, EduFrance’s services for potential international students were 
consolidated under the “EduFrance Pass” (Deforno, 2002). This was produced in 
conjunction with the Office of University Tourism, and allowed reductions on 
cultural and language holidays; access via the CNOUS to all 480 university 
restaurants, for 14,90 francs; and access to the ISIC international student card. It 
was intended that the EduFrance Pass would be extended into a “veritable 
electronic wallet”, with simplified access onto urban and national transport through 
the Paris metro and French railways. The then Director of EduFrance, Frangois 
Blamont, hoped that the new services would enable the agency to “‘clothe’ the 
courses proposed [by HEIs] by selling, key in hand, the services which allow one to
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live well in France” (Unknown author, 2000b). Blamont suggested that there were a 
range of other potential commercial opportunities for EduFrance to explore, given 
the existence of “considerable markets” in educational CDROMs and distance 
learning, and the possibilities of creating new universities and professional schools 
(Guibert, 2000).
Another service operated by EduFrance which enabled the charging of 
international students, and thus their commodification, was the provision of 
summer schools in France. These were designed “to allow a first personalised 
contact with students who would like to engage in French higher education” 
(Unknown author, 2000a). They were developed both in France and in other 
countries, with the first summer schools outside France occurring in Australia in 
2001. These summer schools were later adapted into longer-term training 
programmes (French Embassy in Australia, 2002). However, although these 
courses were intended as a means to the agency becoming financially self- 
sufficient by 2002, they were not an unmitigated success. The first specialised 
training programmes attracted only 75 candidates (out of the 8,000 hoped for) (Les 
Echos, 1999).
The development of such services was intended to enable EduFrance to become 
self-sufficient. It was hoped that 80% of EduFrance’s income would come from the 
sale of educational materials, and 20% from the sale of expertise for international 
projects, with HEIs being refunded the surplus revenue when EduFrance “won a 
project”, minus the agency’s commission of 8% (Guibert, 2000). A target was set 
for the agency to raise 50 million francs by the year 2000 through new international 
students’ purchase of the EduFrance Pass and of other services (Deforno, 2002). 
More substantially, Cecile Deer has maintained that EduFrance’s development of 
chargeable services enabled the government to “recover part of the extra cost 
incurred by the acceptance of foreign students into the French system” (Deer,
2000: 323). However, as noted above, since the employment of Thierry Audric as 
the new Director General or EduFrance, the agency has begun to scale back its
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commercial services for international students, thus halting the trajectory towards 
commodification begun by Francois Blamont.
8 Conclusion
To conclude, Claude Allegre’s comment that the EduFrance organisation was 
inextricably linked with commodification appears to have been confirmed by this 
examination of its creation and operations. Rather than continuing the stress on 
international students as a means of maintaining links with the ex-colonies and with 
developing countries (as did ARIES, Egide and the CNOUS), EduFrance adopted 
a view of international students as of both immediate and indirect monetary value. 
This can be seen as similar to the SFERE’s approach to educational technology 
promotion, but as the SFERE had few operational links with EduFrance, and had a 
very limited role in the promotion of French higher education to potential 
international students, it would be inappropriate to view the new agency as merely 
a recreation of the SFERE in a new setting. EduFrance was the first agency 
operating in the French higher education sector to attempt explicitly to boost the 
recruitment of international students into French HEIs from developed and 
emerging economy countries, rather than to try to build and consolidate links with 
developing countries.
The creation of EduFrance reflected the strong political commitment, by both the 
then Education and Foreign Affairs Ministers, to a liberalised approach to 
international student recruitment. This was further indicated by the Ministers’ 
appointment of EduFrance’s first, pro-liberalisation, director general. HEIs 
attempted to resist EduFrance’s commodifying approach through putting pressure 
on this first Director General, and it appears that their coordinated lobbying was 
responsible for the adoption of a new head for the agency. Although this appears 
to have led to EduFrance scaling down its commercial operations, it has not altered 
the focus on international student recruitment under the agency, which has 
remained focused on developed and emerging economy countries.
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Chapter 5: Evaluation institutions in Britain
1 Introduction
Evaluation has been defined as the generation of feedback (Ruddock, 1981: 9) and 
the creation of data “so that worthwhile judgments can be made” (Kogan, 1990: 
244). The evaluation of individual HEIs has been seen as an important element of 
international students’ policy in both Britain and France. There is a general 
perception amongst policy-makers that a visible and transparent process of 
evaluation gives domestic higher education a comparative advantage in the 
international HE ‘market’, allowing HEIs to “sell themselves as the ‘quality 
option’ ”.105 Other nations, such as Australia, have attempted to copy countries like 
Britain and France by moving to introduce a new evaluation framework, thus 
signalling “to the community and the rest of the world that the quality of the higher 
education system is assured...” (Kemp, 1999).
However, the evaluation of HEIs has proceeded in very different ways in Britain 
and France, which have had differing implications for international students’ policy. 
Rather than evaluation playing a functionally equivalent role in each case,106 two 
distinct methods of evaluation were adopted (assessment in Britain, and 
enhancement in France), which in the British case created the incentives for HEIs 
to compete against each other for the recruitment of international students, and in 
the French case did not.107 By measuring HEIs’ performance along particular 
criteria, assessment allows the comparative ranking of HEIs, which can be used by 
students (both international and domestic) to help them choose between 
universities and colleges. In contrast, enhancement does not explicitly compare 
HEIs against external criteria, but evaluates the extent to which HEIs have been 
able to fulfill their own priorities. Reports from enhancement are not publicised as a
105 As has been argued concerning the effect of the QAA on British HEIs (THES, 1999i).
106 As has been claimed in many comparative analyses of evaluation, such as those under the aegis of the European 
Network of Quality Assurance agencies, such as HSmaiSinen etal., 2001; see also Toulemonde, 2001:100.
107 Indirectly the provision of reports which could be used to ‘rank’ HEIs may also have led to a view of international 
students as customers, thus furthering their commodification, the second element of liberalisation considered in this thesis; 
but there is less evidence of this as a direct consequence of the new institutions within the sources examined here.
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resource for students to help them choose between HEIs, and thus do not aid the 
growth of competition within the higher education sector.
This chapter examines the creation of a new, assessment-based evaluation 
institution in Britain, in the face of opposition from HEIs, who instead lobbied for the 
adoption of enhancement-based evaluation. The institution of an assessment- 
based approach to evaluation facilitated the liberalisation of international students’ 
policy in Britain, as it increased competition between HEIs through aiding their 
comparative ranking.108
The new, assessment-based evaluation institution comprised, initially, the Quality 
Assessment Units and the Higher Education Quality Council, and was eventually 
consolidated with the creation of the Quality Assurance Agency (QAA).109 The 
adoption of assessment-based evaluation differed significantly from existing 
organisations’ approaches, which had either used evaluation as a means of quality 
enhancement (as with the HEIs’ Academic Audit Unit and External Examining 
System), or as a means of accreditation (as with Her Majesty’s Inspectorate and 
the Council for National Academic Awards (CNAA)).110
The adoption of this assessment-based approach, as promoted by successive 
British governments, facilitated the growth of competition between HEIs for
108 Some have maintained that evaluation is still ‘pre-professional’ rather than being fully institutionalised (Pollitt, 1996: 221; 
Toulemonde, 1995). That is clearly not the case in higher education, where two distinct evaluation institutions have 
developed in Britain and France, especially from the mid-1980s onwards.
109 Although the Quality Assessments Units, Higher Education Quality Council, Academic Audit Unit and Her Majesty’s 
Inspectorate were often abbreviated to ‘QAUs’, ‘HEQC’, ’AAU’ and ‘HMI’ respectively, the author has not done so here, in 
order to aid comprehension by avoiding an abbreviation overload.
110 Such arrangements were distinct from those governing the accreditation of courses. As in France, the government, 
rather than the QAA, is ultimately responsible for accrediting HEIs, which then automatically confers accreditation on courses. 
University and degree-awarding status are conferred either through Royal Charter or an Act of Parliament. Although the QAA 
is required to report to the privy council or, in the Scottish case, the Scottish executive, before HEIs are deemed suitable to 
upgrade to University or degree awarding status, the ultimate decision remains with government (QAA, 1999a; QAA, 1999b; 
QAA, 2002d). Previous to the ending of the binary line, such activities were undertaken by the CNAA in consultation with the 
Her Majesty’s Inspectorate. The Higher Education Quality Council had also played a role in advising the Department of 
Education and Science on whether colleges should be allocated university status. This involved deciding on twenty-three 
applications for a change of status from various university and higher education colleges (Brown, 2004: 70).
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international students. An enhancement-based approach does not encourage 
competition in this way, as its findings are intended for the HEIs evaluated only, 
and not for the consumption of potential students.
There is, therefore, a “basic difference between...ratings-oriented processes that 
seek to measure and report comparative quality [assessment], and...self-based 
processes that seek improvement and a betterment of the system [enhancement]” 
(Kells, 1992: 92). The use of assessment-based evaluation can lead to increased 
competition between regulatees, whilst enhancement-based systems are more 
likely to lead to collaboration between HEIs than to competition.111 Assessment- 
based evaluation facilitates liberalisation to a greater degree than does 
enhancement-based evaluation, primarily since it allows product differentiation on 
grounds of quality and/or status (Brennan and Shah, 2000: 15-6).
To the extent that the two types of evaluation can be described as leading to 
accountability (assessment) and improvement (enhancement), Middlehurst 
maintains that there is no necessary connection between them; “they may each 
serve a range of different purposes and interests, some of which are likely to be in 
conflict with each other...” (Middlehurst, 1997).112 Although both assessment and 
enhancement are types of evaluation, there is thus a fundamental difference 
between them which can have a significant impact on the extent of liberalisation 
within the higher education sector.
In the case of Britain, assessment-based evaluation facilitated the liberalisation of 
international students’ policy. The use of assessment, rather than enhancement, as 
a means of evaluation provided HEIs with the incentives to engage in competition 
against each other. This was because assessment-based evaluation led to the 
ranking of HEIs across particular quality criteria. The reports produced by British 
evaluation organisations allowed comparative ranking of British HEIs. This ranking
111 For similar distinctions between two types of evaluation, see Pollitt, 1987; Scriven, 1991:20; and Scriven 1967.
112 See also Kells, 1992; Middlehurst and Woodhouse, 1995; Vroeijenstijn, 1995.
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was publicised to potential international, and domestic, students as a means of 
discriminating between HEIs. As the chapter indicates, the adoption of an 
assessment-based evaluation system was mainly led by government, as a means 
of promoting competition between HEIs for students (and, initially, for funding). The 
fractured British higher education sector was unable to resist this development, 
with its sectoral associations often divided over which approach to take in the face 
of government proposals.
All British HEIs’ sectoral associations were against the use of assessment. In 1986, 
a report (the ‘Reynolds Report’) was produced by the CVCP, the universities’ 
sectoral association, concerning its approach to evaluation. This report claimed 
that “to make the statement This system is better than that one’ requires an explicit 
and exclusive determination of the purposes of higher education and a universally- 
applied blueprint of entry criteria, of teaching and assessment processes, and of 
classification procedures” which would be to adopt an unacceptably “extreme 
position” (Academic Standards Group, 1986: 3). Similarly, the then chair of the 
CVCP, Sir Alec Merrison, had agreed in 1980 that hierarchical ranking was ‘wrong’ 
due to its effects on the inter-relationships between HEIs.113
Yet, British HEIs and their sectoral associations failed to take control of the 
evaluation agenda and prevent the use of assessment. With the creation of the 
Quality Assessment Units, Higher Education Quality Council and then the QAA, 
HEIs became subject to an assessment-based regime which facilitated 
comparative ranking and thus intra-sectoral competition. While HEIs were formally 
involved in the Quality Assessment Units, Higher Education Quality Council and 
QAA as members of these organisations, the extent to which they were able to 
prevent them from promoting increased competition between HEIs was limited.
This chapter examines the existing organisations in the field of higher education 
evaluation, government approaches to evaluation, HEIs’ approaches, the creation
113 See Peston, 1980: 292.
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and operation of the new assessment-based evaluation organisations, and the 
extent to which they led to a liberalisation of international students’ policy. The 
chapter makes reference, where relevant, to QAA institutional audits produced 
between April 1997 (when the agency was created) until December 2003 (see 
figs. 12 and 13. pp.170-1).114
2 The pre-existing situation
Two types of evaluation organisation operated before the creation of the Higher 
Education Quality Council (Higher Education Quality Council) and Quality 
Assessment Units.115 Firstly, some evaluation organisations were directly 
controlled by the British government, and used for the evaluation of HEIs in what 
was then known as the ‘public sector’; the Committee for National Academic 
Awards (CNAA), and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate. Secondly, some evaluation 
organisations were controlled by the CVCP, the universities’ sectoral association, 
which evaluated universities; the system of external examiners, and the Academic 
Audit Unit.116
114 Unfortunately it has not been possible to conduct a comparative analysis of the Quality Assessment Units’ and Higher 
Education Quality Council’s institutional reports, as I have undertaken with those of the QAA, due to problems with the 
availability of and access to the older institutions’ publications. However, it has been possible to access, and to analyse, all 
QAA institutional audits from April 1997 to December 2003. Overall, 227 QAA reports were analysed, which comprised 
reports both on HEIs (143) and on HEIs’ individual Overseas Collaborative Provision arrangements (84). Clusters of 
comments from the reports were coded and assessed for their frequency across the period as a whole. Analysis was aided 
by a discussion of how to compare reports across time with Dr Peter Cairns from the QAA. Comparison of the reports 
concentrated on their assessment of international students’ matters, and of OCPs. It should be noted, however, that my 
findings are not identical to those produced within the QAA, which used quantitative database searches rather than 
quantitative and qualitative content analysis as employed here.
115 There appears to be some ambiguity concerning the exact term for these units, as Salter and Tapper describe HEFCE’s 
evaluation unit as the Quality Assessment Committee (QAC) (Salter and Tapper, 2000: 77).
116 One other, increasingly prevalent form of evaluation in operation in British higher education was that undertaken by 
private peer accreditation schemes such as EQUIS (the European Quality Improvement System, run by the European 
Foundation for Management Development) and AMBA (the Association of MBAs, set up by former MBA graduates). 
Certainly, to the extent that these schemes adopted an assessment-based approach, with the provision of information to 
prospective students as their main goal, it could be argued that they constituted liberalising institutions. Other regulatory 
organisations such as Investors in People were also used by different HEIs as a means of marketing themselves (Brennan 
and Shah, 2000: 75). However, these private systems were only instituted after the publication of the 1991 White Paper 
which led to the creation of the Quality Assessment Units and Higher Education Quality Council. They could not, therefore, 
be seen as institutional precedents for the new, liberalising, evaluation institutions, the Quality Assessment Units, Higher 
Education Quality Council and the QAA.
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The existing institutional landscape did not encourage the liberalisation of 
international students’ policy. Previous evaluation organisations were not tasked 
with assessing HEIs, which would have facilitated competition between them (as 
promoted by the new organisations, the Quality Assessment Units, Higher 
Education Quality Council and QAA). Nor did the existing evaluation organisations 
lead to a commodification of international students. Instead, existing evaluation 
organisations either required compliance with basic standards, in the case of 
government-led organisations, or were based on enhancement, in the case of HEI- 
led organisations. These two systems of evaluation, based on 
accreditation/inspection and enhancement, enabled HEIs to identify areas for 
quality improvements, but did not publicise HEIs’ failings or successes to potential 
students. The previous institutional system did not facilitate comparative ranking, 
and thus did not facilitate competition between HEIs.
2.a Government-led evaluation organisations 
2.a.i The CNAA
The Council for National Academic Awards (CNAA) was established in 1964, 
following the recommendations of the Robbins Report, a wide-ranging review of 
British higher education (Robbins, 1963: 254). The CNAA was designed to ensure 
“that artificial differences of status among the [non-university] institutions should be 
eliminated” (ibid.: 266).117 It has been described by Harris as a “guardian of 
academic standards in the non-university sector” (Harris, 1990), and by Silver as a 
“national network for quality assurance” (Silver, 1990).118
The CNAA’s regulation of polytechnics, and the rest of what was then known as 
the ‘public sector’ of higher education, initially consisted in relatively detailed and 
intensive course reviews (Merrison, 1980: 288; THES, 1979j). The CNAA’s role 
became more important as prestigious universities such as the University of
117 See also O’Leary, 1980f.
118 See also Moodie, 1991.
139
London and Bradford University began to withdraw from their previous role in 
assuring the quality of degrees offered by certain colleges of higher education 
(THES, 1979o). In the late 1970s, the CNAA lessened the extent to which it 
examined courses, settling instead into a pattern of periodic reviews of HEIs, 
conducted in a “non-inquisitorial” manner (Jobbins, 1979). This regulation was 
coupled with control by the CNAA over HEIs’ abilities to award degrees. Once, 
however, HEIs had obtained “accredited status”, the extent to which the CNAA 
subjected them to detailed examination diminished (Brown, 2004: 30). This was 
particularly the case with the “stronger polytechnics” (Cave et a/., 1995:111). 
Therefore, although the CNAA’s accreditation system required aspiring HEIs to 
demonstrate that they had fulfilled certain criteria, it did not submit HEIs, once 
accredited, to continuing assessment. Overall, the CNAA aimed at the 
achievement of minimum standards, rather than at producing information for 
potential students to enable them to discriminate between HEIs.
2.a.ii Her Majesty’s Inspectorate
Her Majesty’s Inspectorate also examined educational provision in the public 
sector of tertiary education, along the same lines as its reviews of primary and 
secondary education (ibid.). This involved both a formal inspection process at 
either HEI or subject level, and the provision of information and advice to HEIs 
(Brown, 2004: 37). Decisions concerning the accreditation of tertiary education 
courses as new higher education courses were largely made by the CNAA with 
additional advice from the Her Majesty’s Inspectorate.
Neither the CNAA nor the Her Majesty’s Inspectorate publicised the information 
resulting from their site visits. Indeed, both organisations are best described as 
performing accreditation or inspection. They were more concerned to guarantee 
basic standards than to provide information to the public, such that a choice could 
be made between competing HEIs. Evaluation by the CNAA and Her Majesty’s 
Inspectorate can thus be separated from attempts to instill greater competition 
between HEIs.
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2.b HEI-led evaluation institutions: external examiners and the Academic 
Audit Unit
Unlike the non-university sector, universities were not subject to any formal 
evaluation regime119 until 1984, when tne CVCP, the universities’ sectoral 
association, codified the external examining system, which it followed in 1989 with 
the creation of the Academic Audit Unit. Neither external examiners nor the 
Academic Audit Unit published institutional reports. Instead, both evaluation 
organisations were aimed at the enhancement of quality rather than its public 
assessment.
The system of external examiners can be traced back to the involvement of Oxford 
University examiners in Durham University’s examination process in the 1880s. 
The system remained relatively informal until the CVCP issued a code of practice 
for external examining at undergraduate and masters levels in 1984.Through a 
circulation of academics between different degree programmes, the system aimed 
to ensure some comparability of degree standards across the sector (Silver and 
Silver, 1986: 15). Although the system has been criticised as inefficient,120 it has 
continued in similar form over the last 120 years.
The other evaluation organisation created by the CVCP, the Academic Audit Unit, 
started operations in 1990 (Cave eta!., 1995: 110). The creation of the Unit 
appears to have been prompted by concerns that a lack of action by HEIs could 
result in governmental regulation (Coopers and Lybrand, 1993: 2; Neave, 1994: 
126). Indeed, a number of Ministers and Secretaries of State had “remarked upon” 
the “absence of...regulation of the universities’ core activity” (Brown, 2004: 35). Up 
to 1990, the CVCP had embarked on a number of studies of different types of 
evaluation. In 1983, it created an Academic Standards Group (ASG), which
119 Aside from in certain professional areas including Teacher Training (see Neave, 1994).
120 The Higher Education Quality Council considered recommending its abolition, due to its allegedly inefficient use of 
resources (Brown, 2004:66).
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reported in 1986, offering universities ‘points of reference’ for self-comparison 
(CVCP, 1986).
In 1988 the CVCP inquired into the extent to which universities had implemented 
the recommendations in the earlier report by the ASG. Although most universities 
had adopted most of the ASG’s recommendations, the Department of Education 
and Science continued to voice concern publicly over the higher education sector’s 
lack of public accountability, unmitigated by a robust system of evaluation. As a 
result the ASG was re-established in 1988 and recommended the creation of an 
Academic Audit Unit in 1989, to scrutinise HEIs’ quality control systems. The Unit 
commenced operations the following year (Brown, 2004: 36). By creating the 
Academic Audit Unit, universities attempted to prevent government attempts to 
assess HEIs through creating their own, enhancement-based, evaluation 
organisation.
The Academic Audit Unit’s approach rested entirely on HEIs’ own priorities being 
used as the reference for quality standards. Rather than the Academic Audit Unit 
developing an overall ranking, therefore, it offered HEIs “points for commendation” 
and “points for further consideration”, when attempting to fulfill their own priorities 
(ibid.: 51). As a matter of policy, no overall judgement was offered (CVCP, 1992), 
which would have offered a basis for comparison between HEIs, and thus 
facilitated competition between them.
Both the system of external examining and the Academic Audit Unit adopted an 
enhancement-led approach to evaluation. Most significantly, neither the external 
examiners nor the Academic Audit Unit anticipated an external audience for their 
reports, which were intended for the consumption of the HEI concerned only. 
Indeed, external examiners’ reports were largely confidential. While international 
student matters were on occasion mentioned in their reports, comments on this 
were not presented in a rankable form, nor, indeed, were they accessible to 
audiences outside HEIs.
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The role of universities in creating and then controlling the operations of both the 
external examining system and the Academic Audit Unit was far greater than the 
universities’ role with respect to the new organisations, the Higher Education 
Quality Council, Quality Assessment Units and QAA.
Neither the CVCP-led external examining system nor the Academic Audit Unit 
prompted an increase in competition between HEIs, nor did their activities lead to a 
commodification of international students. None of the four existing organisations 
(the CNAA, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate, external examining system and Academic 
Audit Unit) could thus be deemed to have promoted the liberalisation of 
international students’ policy.
3 Government strategies
From the early 1990s, governments began to publicly call for an assessment- 
based evaluation system to replace the existing system based on 
accreditation/inspection for non-university HEIs and enhancement for universities. 
Governments argued that an assessment-based system would allow comparative 
assessment (ranking) of HEIs, both aiding funding decisions and enforcing 
competition amongst HEIs for students. More “arrangements [were] needed to 
assess the quality of what is actually provided and these assessments should 
continue to inform the funding decisions of the Funding Councils” (Department for 
Education and Science, 1991: 28-9).
3.a The 1991 White Paper and the adoption of assessment
The first attempt by government to institute an assessment-based scheme was 
reported in a White Paper in 1991 (Department for Education and Science, 1991). 
The White Paper’s proposals eventually led to the creation of the Higher Education 
Quality Council and the Quality Assessment Units.121 The White Paper also
121 In addition to proposing the creation of a new, statutory, quality assurance regime, the White Paper was also highly 
significant for proposing the abolition of the binary line between universities and the public sector of higher education.
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proposed the creation of new funding councils, within which the Quality 
Assessment Units would be based, which were to replace the Universities’ Funding 
Council and Polytechnics’ Funding Council created in 1988 (Salter and Tapper, 
2000: 74).
The then government proposed the creation of the Quality Assessment Units as a 
means of ensuring that expansion was cost effective, which it felt could only occur 
if there were greater competition for funds and students, which would be facilitated 
by a common quality assurance regime for teaching (Department for Education 
and Science, 1991).
This new regime would involve audit of HEIs’ quality control systems by a new 
agency, the Higher Education Quality Council, which would be formally owned by 
the HEIs’ sectoral associations: the universities’ sectoral association (the CVCP), 
the Committee of Directors of Polytechnics, and the Standing Conference of 
Principals. Following its creation in 1992, the Higher Education Quality Council 
adopted an assessment-based approach to evaluation, albeit for only one segment 
of its evaluations (overseas collaborative provision).
The White Paper also proposed that the new Higher Education funding councils122 
should be required to assess the quality of courses as well as allocating funding to 
individual HEIs. This quality assessment role was to be performed by new 
organisations in each funding council, the Quality Assessment Units.
The Quality Assessment Units explicitly utilised an assessment-based 
methodology. The Polytechnics and Colleges Funding Council’s Quality 
Assessment Unit was created in May 1991, with the Universities Funding Council 
setting up its Unit soon after (Brown, 2004:10). The Quality Assessment Units’ 
approach to evaluation, from their creation until 1995, was detailed in HEFCE 
circular 3/93. Under the circular, HEIs were required to classify their own provision
122 Which were formally created under The 1992 Further and Higher Education Act (Her Majesty’s Government, 1992).
144
as ‘excellent’ or ‘satisfactory’. The Quality Assessment Units would then visit those 
HEIs claiming excellence, those HEIs where provision was expected to be 
unsatisfactory, and a sample of HEIs which had claimed their provision was 
satisfactory. Around half of the self-assessments submitted to the Quality 
Assessment Units were followed up by an evaluation visit (Brown, 2004: 73-5). The 
system thus rested initially on self-assessment by HEIs, backed up by inspection 
by the Quality Assessment Units, and was entitled “Teaching Quality Assessment” 
(Salter and Tapper, 2000: 78).
The Quality Assessment Units and Higher Education Quality Council were seen as 
operating acceptably by government until the mid-1990s. This is shown by the 
confirmation by the then Minister for Higher Education, Alan Howarth MP, in Spring 
1992 that the Government did not intend to take up reserve powers proposed in 
the 1991 White Paper which would have facilitated the creation of a more powerful 
external assessment body (Brown, 2004: 43). However, in the mid-1990s, the then 
Secretary of State for Education, Gillian Shephard, began to push for a new, 
consolidated organisation which would make the evaluation process more 
transparent and which could promote competition more effectively. This political 
pressure resulted in the creation of the QAA, examined in section five of this 
chapter. As Brown notes, the decision in 1997 to create the QAA, amounted “to the 
invocation of the reserve power” (ibid.: 48, footnote 2).
3.b The Quality Assessment Units and Higher Education Quality Council, and 
competition between HEIs
Initially, assessment was used to differentiate between HEIs to facilitate 
competition between them for government funding. In 1992, the then Secretary of 
State for Education, John Patten, reiterated the requirement that assessment by 
the Quality Assessment Units should facilitate a differentiation between HEIs’ 
funding levels, when he sent an initial letter of guidance to the funding council for 
higher education (Department for Education and Science, 1992). The parameters 
according to which the assessment system was to operate were outlined in a
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HEFCE circular in 1993. This circular introduced a classificatory scheme of 
excellent, satisfactory and unsatisfactory provision (HEFCE, 1993: 4), which 
facilitated the ranking of different departments.
Government then proposed assessment as a means to facilitate competition 
between HEIs for students. Hence, in 1994, the Secretary of State again stressed 
that assessment should be used to differentiate HEIs. However, rather than 
implying that assessment was necessary to inform funding decisions, he instead 
maintained that assessment should lead to “effective and accessible public 
information on the quality of education” (HEFCE, 1994: 7, paragraph 23). 
Henceforth, less emphasis was placed on assessment as a means of allocating 
differential levels of funding, and more emphasis was placed on assessment as a 
means of fostering competition between HEIs for students.
The rationale for differentiation had, thus, changed (from informing government 
decisions to reward ‘excellent’ providers with extra student places, and thus extra 
funds, to enabling students to choose between different HEIs). The Quality 
Assessment Units’ “emphasis on being able to discriminate between providers, 
[was] now primarily to inform the ‘market’” for students, both international and 
domestic, following such government prompting (Brown, 2004: 77).
The new assessment-based evaluation system was changed again in 1995, 
following a critical report, released in late 1993, commissioned from the Institute of 
Education, which had noted problems with the reliability of the assessments when 
compared across HEIs (ibid.: 77). The report’s recommendations of a change in 
the Quality Assessment Units’ schedules, towards a system of universal (rather 
than selective) visiting and to a more complex assessment scheme, were quickly 
implemented. The resulting scheme (in England and Scotland123) employed 
quantitative indicators for the first time, across six ‘core’ aspects of provision.
123 The Welsh funding council did not move to a more numerical scale, but maintained the classifications of excellent, 
satisfactory and unsatisfactory (Brown, 2004: 99).
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Brown maintains that these changes directly “stemmed from [the] requirement of 
discrimination between providers”, i.e. HEIs (ibid.: 78). The new system facilitated 
the reorientation of assessment towards facilitating competition between HEIs for 
students (ibid: 73),124 through enabling the quantitative ranking of HEIs.
By the mid-1990s, however, as noted above, central government had begun to 
explore plans for a unified evaluation organisation. The process of creation of the 
new QAA is examined in section five of this chapter.
4 HEIs’ strategies and coordination
The engagement of British HEIs in policy-making concerning the creation of the 
new liberalising evaluation organisations indicates the fractured and uncoordinated 
nature of the British higher education sector. The Quality Assessment Units, Higher 
Education Quality Council and QAA treated HEIs as merely one part of the 
audience for their reports, with groups such as potential students being seen as 
much more important (ibid: 330). Although HEIs and their staff have been heavily 
involved in implementing the new procedures, Brennan has maintained that “their 
status has been rather that of the ‘hired help’ of the agency rather than the leaders 
and definers of the process” (Brennan, 2002). Certainly, HEIs’ influence on the 
Higher Education Quality Council, Quality Assessment Units and QAA has been 
limited compared with that of successive governments.
4.a HEIs and the Academic Audit Unit
The CVCP, the universities’ sectoral association, engaged in attempts to control 
the quality agenda itself from the mid-1980s. As noted above, it created its own 
agency, the Academic Audit Unit, in 1989 following extensive discussions within its 
Academic Standards Group from 1983 onwards. The Academic Audit Unit was 
partly conceived as a means of preventing central government control over quality 
evaluation.
124 The link with funding was maintained, however, in Scotland; but problems of consistency were, Brown maintains, less 
widespread given the greater validity of results (inspection could be carried out across most HEIs by the same group of 
people).
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The Academic Audit Unit’s operations were based on an audit methodology which 
utilised HEIs’ own quality control systems, rather than attempting to create quality 
criteria itself, and used these as a basis for assessment. The CVCP also released 
two Codes of Practice to its members concerning international students, before the 
creation of the new organisations: “The management of higher degrees undertaken 
by overseas students” (1992) and “International students in the UK: CVCP code of 
practice” (1995) (Bruch and Barty, 1998: 23).
4.b HEIs and the 1991 White Paper
The positions of different HEIs concerning the creation of the Higher Education 
Quality Council and Quality Assessment Units varied considerably. Most HEIs 
were opposed to assessment being adopted as the dominant approach to the 
evaluation of British higher education. However, the CVCP prioritised lobbying 
against those other provisions in the draft legislation that would have facilitated 
direct intervention by the Secretary of State in individual HEIs, rather than lobbying 
against assessment as such. Although successful in having the former provisions 
rescinded, the CVCP was unable to prevent the passing of the new provisions 
concerning assessment (Brown, 2004: 41).
Particular groups within the CVCP did, however, attempt to launch a stronger 
lobbying effort against the measures. The Committee of Directors of Polytechnics 
(CDP) negotiated with the CVCP and SCOP, the higher education colleges’ 
sectoral association, to present a united front against an increase in the scope of 
assessment. The sectoral associations maintained that quality assurance should 
include the monitoring of HEIs’ own quality systems, within an enhancement-based 
approach (ibid.: 42). They hoped that any new body would be overseen by a 
steering committee with HEI representatives in the majority. The CVCP, CDP and 
SCOP also agreed to promote a “pluralistic assessment of quality in higher 
education” (CVCP/CDP/SCOP, 1991: para 5.vi).
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Even within CDP, however, there was disagreement over which approach to take. 
Some CDP members hoped that the new evaluation system might allow them to 
demonstrate their superior teaching compared with the old universities. Others, 
however, maintained that the old universities would come out above CDP 
members in any ranking, due to the former’s greater resources (Brown, 2004: 41), 
and that this would give old universities an advantage in the market for students, 
both international and domestic. As Brown notes, whilst some HEIs could accept 
assessment, if it “was modified to allow for a greater degree of internal 
involvement”, others greatly favoured a more audit-based approach (ibid.: 106).
The number of delays and disagreements during the creation of the CVCP’s 
Academic Audit Unit were seen as militating against the CVCP further developing 
its own evaluation capacity (ibid. : 45) as a substitute for the development of a 
government-led organisation.
4.c HEIs and the Higher Education Quality Council
The creation of the Higher Education Quality Council indicated the failure of the 
CVCP to maintain control over the evaluation of its members. The CVCP’s own 
evaluation organisation, the Academic Audit Unit, was assimilated into the Higher 
Education Quality Council soon after its creation (De Groof et al., 1998: 122) in 
1992. The Academic Audit Unit had opposed many elements of the Higher 
Education Quality Council’s approach.125 All HEIs had to join the Higher Education 
Quality Council, on pain of reduced funding from the funding councils.
Initially, the Higher Education Quality Council’s operations were extensively 
debated with the higher education sector. Its set of Guidelines on Quality 
Assurance, released in 1994, were, for example, drawn up by a working party 
chaired by Dr Ann Wright, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Sunderland (Brown, 
2004: 63). Similarly, HEIs’ requests for the Higher Education Quality Council to
125 For one view of the reasons for the lack of coordination between the Academic Audit Unit and Higher Education Quality 
Council, see Brown (Brown, 2004:48).
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place its ‘points for further consideration’ in institutional reports in order of 
importance, successfully led to changes in the Higher Education Quality Council’s 
operations.
4.c.i HEIs and the Higher Education Quality Council’s audit of overseas 
collaborative provision
The Higher Education Quality Council’s approach to overseas collaborative 
provision, in contrast, involved an explicit breach with the CVCP. Numerous British 
HEIs had begun to cooperate with foreign higher education providers as a means 
of increasing their recruitment of fee-paying international students. However, 
concerns had been raised about the quality of education offered at these new 
educational establishments. The Secretary of State for Higher Education had made 
some representations concerning overseas collaborative provision following a visit 
to Malaysia and Singapore in January 1994. In April 1995, the then Secretary of 
State asked the Higher Education Quality Council to place more emphasis on the 
‘broad comparability’ of standards between HEIs (ibid.: 50). The Higher Education 
Quality Council quickly decided that it should be able to evaluate overseas 
collaborative provision, through visiting joint programmes and judging their 
standards against sets of quality criteria. The Higher Education Quality Council’s 
attempt to increase its role in this area encountered significant resistance from the 
higher education sector (ibid.: 58), which was only overcome through invoking 
government approval.
Some figures in CVCP were ‘opposed root and branch to overseas collaborative 
provision audits’. Roger Brown, the then head of Higher Education Quality Council, 
reports that the proposal to undertake audits of overseas collaborative provision 
ran into considerable resistance from the CVCP, and especially from its then Chair, 
Professor (now Sir) Gareth Roberts, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Sheffield.
To overcome this resistance, the Higher Education Quality Council consulted a 
number of different governmental departments, all of which supported the Higher
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Education Quality Council line apart from the DES, whose caution was belied by 
the Education Minister already having proposed such an approach in public 
speeches. Brown maintains that following these consultations, he “was therefore 
able to inform the CVCP of the overall Whitehall view, and this enabled them [the 
HEIs] to change their attitude” (ibid.: 58). Although the Higher Education Quality 
Council was notionally run by HEIs, its adoption of assessment followed 
government pressure.126 HEIs were forced to accept the Higher Education Quality 
Council’s proposal to extend audit to overseas locations, despite the opposition of 
their sectoral associations.
The Higher Education Quality Council initially adopted a standards-based 
approach involving judgments of ‘excellent’, ‘satisfactory’ or ‘unsatisfactory’, on the 
basis of HEIs’ own quality assurance machinery. From 1996 onwards, however, 
the system was changed to incorporate universal visits to HEIs and classification 
via numerical grades (ibid.: 46), similar to those adopted by the Quality 
Assessment Units.
The Higher Education Quality Council’s audits of overseas collaborative 
partnerships were based on the ‘Notes of Guidance for the Audit of Collaborative 
Provision’ (Higher Education Quality Council, 1995e) and ’Some Questions and 
Answers for Participants in Higher Education Quality Council Collaborative Audit
126 The Higher Education Quality Council’s assessments of OCPs were based on a Code of Practice for Overseas 
Collaborative Provision in Higher Education, drawn up by the Higher Education Quality Council in 1995, with a second 
edition appearing in 1996. The Higher Education Quality Council Code was prepared following a ‘fact finding tour" involving 
the Higher Education Quality Council and a steering group including seven Vice-Chancellors. The Code was approved by 
Higher Education Quality Council’s Board, which was seen by Higher Education Quality Council as representative of the 
higher education sector. The Higher Education Quality Council also expanded its role to examine HEIs’ promotional material. 
Again, this appears to have been prompted not by HEIs themselves but by the Department for Education and Science 
(Brown, 2004: 55), although as it had less effect on promoting competition between HEIs it is not examined here. It should 
also be noted that the Higher Education Quality Council had received a ‘valedictory dispatch’ from the CNAA in 1993, which 
had also recommended the regulation of off-campus provision, especially franchising. The CNAA had previously been 
involved in advising the Hong Kong authority whether courses in non-university institutions there 'attained and continued to 
attain an academic level at least comparable to that of courses approved by the CNAA in the United Kingdom’ (Silver,1990: 
198). However, the Higher Education Quality Council does not appear to have proposed its OCP audit series until after 
prompting by central government, despite the CNAA’s letter.
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Visits’ (Higher Education Quality Council, 1995f). Between April and June 1996 
audit teams visited twenty overseas partners in Greece, Hong Kong, Malaysia, 
Singapore and Spain; and the following year, audit teams were engaged in ten 
countries to examine British HEIs’ partnership programmes. ‘Learning from 
Collaborative Audit: An interim report’, published in April 1995, set out the findings 
of the first fourteen collaborative audits (Brown, 2004: 57-9).
The Higher Education Quality Council’s reports were published and often had a 
significant impact on the commercial fortunes of different HEIs. One particularly 
prominent example of this is the closure by the Swansea Institute of all of its 
overseas collaborative programmes, following a very critical report by the Higher 
Education Quality Council in 1996 (QAA, 2002b). As Brown notes, the “decision to 
extend audit to overseas collaborative programmes... and to publish the resultant 
reports required considerable courage on Higher Education Quality Council’s part 
[because i]t did not endear the Council to some members of CVCP” (Brown, 2004: 
59-60). Aside from the CVCP’s objection to the Higher Education Quality Council 
being able to expand its operations overseas, which it saw as an illegitimate 
extension of its authority, HEIs also objected to the fact that the quality criteria 
used for the Higher Education Quality Council’s overseas collaborative provision 
assessments were developed by the organisation itself, rather than the Higher 
Education Quality Council adopting HEIs’ own criteria.
The new QAA, created soon after, adopted the Higher Education Quality Council’s 
assessment-based approach towards the audit of overseas collaborative provision, 
and also continued the Quality Assessment Units’ assessment of HEIs in Britain.
5 The QAA
5.a Government and HEI strategies towards the QAA
In 1994, Gillian Shephard, the then Secretary of State for Education, announced a 
review of possible approaches to evaluation, including a consolidation of the 
activities of the Higher Education Quality Council and Academic Audit Unit into one
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organisation. The review was to be carried out by the Chief Executive of HEFCE, 
one of the funding councils (Brown, 2004:104). At this stage, the CVCP presented 
its own view on how a new system should operate. The CVCP’s prototype largely 
rested on the Academic Audit Unit model, and adopted its enhancement-led 
approach. Whilst Gillian Shephard accepted some of the CVCP’s proposals, she 
nonetheless maintained that “in respect of assessment at least, [she] could not 
contemplate a system which relied mainly on self-regulation” (ibid.: 110).
The CVCP was included in a joint planning group, with HEFCE, in an attempt to 
define the parameters for the new organisation (ibid.: 110). However, HEIs’ 
attempts to retain enhancement as the main method of evaluation had little effect 
on the eventual design of the QAA.
In theory, HEIs could have significantly altered the role of the QAA towards a more 
enhancement-based, rather than assessment-based, approach in the period 
leading up to its establishment. However, the Chief Executive of the CVCP was 
concerned that if the proposed QAA undertook institution-wide review, this could 
lead to an illegitimate expansion of its role. As such an expansion would involve 
the QAA undertaking enhancement work, the CVCP’s Chief Executive opposed 
this being included under the QAA’s remit (ibid.: 114). This was despite the fact 
that the CVCP had originally proposed that the new agency be given a wide remit 
in quality enhancement (as opposed to assessment) (ibid.: 108). However, rather 
than the QAA’s lack of involvement in enhancement allowing HEIs a greater role, it 
effectively led to an abandonment of enhancement as a means of evaluation, with 
assessment being the only type of evaluation being actively undertaken.
Further attempts by the CVCP to increase HEIs’ influence over the QAA, such as 
its request to be able to send observers to the QAA’s board, were refused. In 
contrast, positive responses were received to requests from other bodies such as 
the National Union of Students (ibid.: 154).
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The creation of the QAA indicated the inability of British HEIs to coordinate a 
strong position on quality assurance in the face of government demands for 
increased competition between HEIs. The QAA was eventually accepted by HEIs 
as a ‘least worst’ option given the threat of government intervention. Many HEIs felt 
that the QAA had led to a diminution of institutional autonomy, as its reports were 
designed for potential students rather than for HEIs themselves. Some 
interviewees from the QAA itself questioned this view, pointing out that QAA 
evaluations were undertaken by academics not bureaucrats, and noting that the 
QAA did consult with HEIs on some matters, as when it created regulatory 
guidelines such as the ‘Code of Practice’ (see pp.158-9). However, most 
interviewees from HEIs claimed that the QAA did restrict their autonomy, and 
certainly promoted competition between HEIs for new students, both from abroad 
and from domestic constituencies.
One of the main reasons for a lack of coordinated resistance to the creation of the 
QAA, as an assessment-based organisation, was the existence of conflicting 
objectives within the CVCP. The costs of undergoing both assessment and 
enhancement-based evaluation were beginning to prove prohibitive for some HEIs. 
When it appeared that government would not abandon its commitment to 
assessment, some HEIs began to lobby for the removal of enhancement simply 
because of the costs of running the two systems in parallel.
As a result, the CVCP found it difficult to argue for a continuation of enhancement 
alongside assessment. Even though many of its members opposed assessment as 
the sole method of evaluation, in the short term it appeared most expedient to 
reduce the overall quality burden on HEIs (Amaral, 1998: 131). The CVCP had 
thus started to lobby for a single quality system from 1993, despite its formal 
opposition to assessment (Brown, 2004: 1, 44). Government proposals for a single 
system released in 1995, mainly focused on assessment, were rejected by the 
CVCP, but it became increasingly difficult for the CVCP to reject a single system as 
the costs of the parallel systems were subject to extensive criticism by its members.
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There were also different views within the British higher education sector 
concerning the advantages or otherwise of an assessment-based system. Some 
elements within the CDP, the former polytechnics’ sectoral association which 
became a faction within the CVCP with the abolition of the binary line, maintained 
that HEIs should have taken the lead in establishing an assessment-based system, 
but one which they themselves controlled. However, the experience of the CVCP in 
setting up the Academic Audit Unit, which had caused considerable disagreements 
over approach within the sectoral association, meant that this approach was not 
seen as a realistic possibility. Whilst some older universities maintained that the 
quality of their intake was the best guarantee of general standards, ex-polytechnics 
had a greater experience of, and willingness to undergo, formal control of quality 
from external sources (ibid.: 45).
Finally, the CVCP’s ability to criticise assessment and the creation of the QAA was 
also undermined by the differential impact of the assessment system. All 
assessments by the Quality Assessment Units had consistently given the old 
universities better scores than the new universities and higher education colleges 
(ibid.: 76-7). ‘Excellent’ quality was concentrated in the relatively more prosperous 
HEIs, with only 2% of assessments in the 20% of HEIs with the lowest resource 
levels leading to judgments of Excellent (ibid.: 94-5).
5.b The Creation of the new QAA
The QAA was incorporated in March 1997 and took over the functions of the 
Higher Education Quality Council in August 1997. Those staff within the English 
and Welsh Funding Councils who had operated the Quality Assessment Units were 
also transferred into the QAA in October 1997 (ibid.: 101).
Whilst the QAA was being set up, the report of the Dearing Committee Inquiry 
concerning the British Higher Education system was released (National Committee 
of Enquiry into Higher Education, 1997). Dearing’s recommendations only fleetingly
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covered policies towards international students. The Dearing Committee did, 
however, propose extensive changes to the new quality assurance framework.
This mainly had the effect of compounding Shephard’s emphasis on standards, by 
proposing the institution of a new quality ‘infrastructure’. This infrastructure was 
composed of precepts and guidance, resting on quality standards (Brown, 2004:1). 
The Dearing recommendations further consolidated an assessment-based model 
of evaluation, especially concerning overseas collaborative provision.
The political impetus for the agency’s creation came from government, and the 
agency’s emphasis on assessment rather than enhancement derived from the 
same source. As Brown maintained, the QAA, unlike the Higher Education Quality 
Council, derived the majority of its board members from outside the higher 
education sector, and as a result could not be viewed as “the sector’s own body” 
(ibid.: 169, footnote). Successive British governments thus dominated the process 
of creation of first the Quality Assessment Units and Higher Education Quality 
Council, and then the QAA. As Brown states, in so doing, governments 
consistently “attempted to move the regulation of higher education in the 
competitive market direction by improving the quantity and quality of information for 
students” (ibid.: 23). This approach fostered the development of competition 
between HEIs, according to their QAA assessments. It also differed significantly 
from the enhancement-based approach proposed by British HEIs.
5.c The QAA’s operations
Whilst formally the QAA was required to report to HEIs, most parameters within 
which it operated were set by government. Firstly, the head of the QAA, appointed 
by government, was, at least initially, from outside the higher education sector. The 
first Chief Executive, John Randall, had been Head of Professional Services at the 
Law Society (ibid.: 116). Randall was a strong supporter of increased assessment 
as opposed to other methods of evaluation, concerned to increase the power of 
what he saw as the “consumers” of higher education (i.e., prospective students), as 
against the “providers” (HEIs) (Randall, 2001). The fact that he was appointed
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rather than a member of the Academic Audit Unit or another supporter of 
enhancement-based evaluation indicated the government’s commitment to 
assessment above other forms of evaluation.
It was under Randall’s leadership that the first assessment-based evaluations were 
undertaken. Two processes of evaluation were to be undertaken; “subject review” 
(similar to the Quality Assessment Units’ Teaching Quality Assessment 
programme) and the audit of institutional quality assurance systems (similar to the 
Higher Education Quality Council’s approach in Britain) (Salter and Tapper, 2000: 
81).
In 1998 the QAA introduced a new rule, whereby those HEIs which had reported 
low scores, with three or more grade twos, had to report back to the QAA and 
explain how they would make improvements (QAA, 1997b). Brown describes this 
development as lacking any previous consultation with HEIs, and “almost certainly 
in response to Departmental prompting” (Brown, 2004: 78).
However, in March 2001, such graded assessments at subject level were 
abolished, after David Blunkett, the then Education Minister, dramatically 
announced a complete change in the QAA’s approach (ibid.: 98). Blunkett 
announced a reduction by 40% in the amount of external review activity, with 
universal visiting abandoned, and with no departments being visited two years in a 
row which had achieved three scores of three and three scores of four (‘good 
scores’), apart from a small sample for benchmarking purposes. As noted above, 
this change appears to have resulted from the lobbying of a small number of elite 
universities (ibid.: 131-2).127
127 A number of additional factors may also have fed in to Blunkett’s change in policy. It was closely preceded by a report by 
PA Consulting, published in August 2000 (PA Consulting, 2000), which maintained that assessment was proving excessively 
costly for the higher education sector. In addition, some economists from the University of Warwick had written an article in 
the Guardian newspaper criticising the existing system, which gained a high profile (Harrison etal., 2001).
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HEFCE was required to consult with the QAA and HEIs on a new system with a 
reduced level of visiting. In July 2001, in its response to Blunkett’s announcement, 
HEFCE announced that external subject reviews would continue, if on a less 
frequent basis, and that assessment should move overall to an evaluation of entire 
HEIs (rather than of individual departments).
The rapid changes in approach counseled by the government and then by HEFCE 
led to the resignation of John Randall as chief executive and considerable 
disruption to the QAA’s proceedings (O’Leary, 2001). It was not until 2003 that the 
new audit system was brought in, with institutional review and subject review 
continuing in parallel in the interim period (Brown, 2004: 122, 126). The new 
system was, the QAA maintained, based upon “lightness of touch” and “differential 
intensity of scrutiny” (ibid.: 127-8). However, the new method still utilised 
assessment rather than enhancement-based methods. Concomitantly, it made no 
attempt to engage in enhancement.128
5.d The QAA and international students
The publication by the QAA of information concerning the treatment of international 
students, as well as concerning the general quality of education provided, made 
their reports particularly important as a means of differentiating between HEIs for 
the purposes of competition for international students.
The main development concerning the QAA’s consideration of international 
students in domestic institutions was the creation of the Code of practice for the 
assurance of academic quality and standards in higher education (the Code), 
published by the QAA in response to the Dearing report of 1997, between 1999 
and 2001 (Humfrey, 1999: 42).
128 Instead, efforts to improve educational quality through evaluation were devolved to a new body, the Institute of Teaching 
and Learning (later renamed the Higher Education Academy), which was to disseminate best practice and aid institutional 
development (Whitby, 2006).
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In January 1999, Section 1 of the Code was published, concerning postgraduate 
research programmes. This section singled out the needs of international students 
in interviews and language matters. Section 10 of the Code, on recruitment and 
admissions, published in September 2001, required HEIs to consider their 
procedures for international students’ applications.
The numbers of international students at individual universities and colleges were 
generally detailed by HEIs in their submissions to the QAA, although these were 
very infrequently compared with the national average. The QAA often commented 
in its institutional reports on the numbers of international students attending 
different HEIs. For instance, the large international student population at the 
University of Manchester Institute of Science and Technology (amounting to almost 
a quarter of all its students) was described as resulting from a commendable effort 
on the part of the HEI to cater for their needs.129 The high number of international 
students at the University of Wales College of Medicine, however, was criticised as 
“the prevalence of particular cultural mores amongst specific groups within 
teaching situations” could “inhibit” learning opportunities (QAA, 1999c). The QAA 
also advised HEIs on the creation of new degrees for international students.
Hence, it counselled Henley Management College, concerning its ‘DBA’, to “take 
into account national guidance concerning the quality assurance of research 
degree level education” (QAA, 1998a: 109).
A small number of HEIs were criticised in QAA reports near the end of the period 
for failing to sufficiently coordinate international activities with other institutional 
actions. Furthermore, in a number of reports the QAA commented favourably on 
the services available to international students, but in others it claimed that 
changes should be made to improve or create such services. Hence, the University 
of Paisley was counselled to ensure that it enhanced “support services for 
international students as their numbers increase” (QAA, 2002a: 109); and St
129 In contrast, the coherence or otherwise of HEIs’ international policies with the rest of their strategies was not frequently 
noted by the CNE (QAA, 2003a).
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Andrews University was urged to take care that international students’ services 
should not be oriented too exclusively towards its large proportion of North 
American students (QAA, 1999d: 62).
5.e The QAA and overseas audits
The Higher Education Quality Council Code concerning overseas collaborative 
provision was adopted with minor changes by the QAA in July 1999, as the Code 
of Practice Section 2: Collaborative Provision. This was soon followed by 
recommendations by the National Audit Office concerning overseas collaborative 
provision, following the discovery of extensive irregularities in the overseas 
operations of the Southampton Institute (SHEFC, 1999), and by the 
recommendations of the Public Accounts Committee following revelations 
concerning the Swansea Institute of Higher Education (Public Accounts 
Committee, 1997).
The HEFCE, following these reports, set out a series of further “guiding principles” 
for collaborative activity (Fender, 1999). These re-emphasised the Dearing 
Committee’s recommendation that all overseas collaborative programmes should 
have been evaluated by the QAA by January 2001, with reference to the QAA 
Code, but added a number of other financial and management requirements. In 
particular, it was stated that collaborative “activity with overseas partners should 
come within a published institutional policy for international education”, and that it 
should also be possible to “illustrate a clear connection with the institution’s plans 
for the recruitment of overseas students to study in the UK”. Overseas 
collaborative programmes were required to be “self-financing” rather than involving 
the use of public monies from the funding councils. Finally, HEFCE’s guiding 
principles stated that degree certificates should record the location of the delivery 
of the course and the language of instruction. Such guidelines and codes were 
officially for advice only. However, the QAA also made clear that in certain HEIs, its 
guidance was to be seen as good practice. The QAA’s role in defining this
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guidance was often resented by HEIs, as the example of the debate over the 
content of degree transcripts (detailed above) indicates.
The QAA undertook an extensive programme of overseas audits, following the 
Code and HEFCE guidelines. These tended to centre upon HEIs operating in 
particular geographical areas, such as the UAE, Oman and Bahrain, audited in 
October 1997, India (in October 1997), Israel (in Spring 1998), Malaysia (in Spring 
1999), China (in Spring 2001), Egypt and Cyprus (from August 1999 to March 
2001), and Denmark, Germany and Switzerland (Spring and early Summer 2002). 
HEIs were required to write a commentary on their activities, taking into account 
the successive codes’ requirements, and then particular HEIs were chosen for 
audit.
The QAA’s audits of overseas collaborative provision continued on broadly the 
same lines as under the Higher Education Quality Council (Brown, 2004:145). The 
QAA’s approach, as that of the Higher Education Quality Council, was driven by 
objectives drawn from the financial sphere, such as ensuring compliance with legal 
requirements and brand maintenance.130 Hence, the QAA was especially 
concerned to regulate HEIs’ financial and legal arrangements, through counselling 
the need for more formal relationships between HEIs and their overseas 
partners,131 and for the coherence of HEIs’ overseas collaborative programmes 
with their overall missions.132 It also attempted to advise HEIs on commercial 
strategy, often through counselling against expansion, as in the case of Thames
130 As Michael Power has suggested, the growth of audit outside its original, strictly financial, sphere takes with it a 
presumption of potential risk of moral hazard by an agent, against a principal’s wishes, and thus explicitly embodies a notion 
of external control, rather than formative development (Power, 1997).
131 This was especially the case at the beginning of the QAA’s OCP evaluation programme, where all OCPs examined were 
advised to change their quality assurance arrangements, mainly through increasing their oversight of overseas partners. The 
less critical injunction to continue to develop quality assurance procedures fluctuated, as did the QAA’s reporting of action 
taken since the last audit, and of the extent of coordination across international activities by HEIs.
132 Hence, the University of Warwick was praised for its links with a South African HEI, these being coherent with its stated 
intention to improve access to higher education for non-traditional students (QAA, 1999g), but Liverpool John Moores 
University was asked whether its “recently augmented International Strategy” required a consideration of “the impact of these 
developments on its well-established mission to widen participation” (QAA, 1999e).
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Valley University, where the QAA criticised both the envisaged scale of expansion 
and the countries this was aimed towards (QAA, 1998b).
5.f HEIs and the QAA
The creation of the QAA has been described as leading to a more direct form of 
governmental control of HEI funding and management. Despite its part funding by 
HEIs, the QAA’s role is often perceived as ex post control, rather than as part of an 
iterative process of auto-evaluation (Morley, 2003). Salter and Tapper have gone 
so far as to describe the QAA as a “pliable instrument of ministerial will” (Salter and 
Tapper, 2000: 84), with the creation of the QAA leading to the “collective 
responsibility of the academic community” being “defined and implemented by a 
body it does not control: a significant loss of power by the academic profession” 
(ibid.: 78).
At least under its initial head, John Randall, the QAA did not pursue a collaborative 
approach with its member HEIs. This was despite the fact that the QAA lacked any 
sanction against HEIs that it found wanting aside from the publication of critical 
reports.133
Reflecting the barriers to coordination detailed above, HEIs’ responses to the new, 
assessment-based evaluation system were often organised by individual factions 
rather than by the CVCP as a whole. The CVCP had little impact on the QAA’s 
structure and operations. Only the elite HEIs, from the Russell Group faction of the 
CVCP, were able to affect the QAA’s approach. For example, lobbying by the Vice- 
Chancellors of Oxford University and the London School of Economics appeared to 
have prompted the reduction in assessment of previous high-scorers, which 
formed a surprise announcement by David Blunkett, then Minister of Education, in 
1998 (Department for Education and Skills, 2001). These Vice-Chancellors argued 
that the government’s refusal to introduce top-up fees had resulted in a shortage of
133 It should be noted that the arrangements in Scotland and Wales differed slightly from those operating in England. For a 
review of these arrangements see Brown, 2004:98-99,136.
162
revenue for traditional universities, which necessitated a reduction in the costs of 
assessment (Brown, 2004:131). Rather than shifting the QAA away from an 
assessment-based approach, the elite universities’ lobbying led to a reduction in 
the burden of assessment for their members only (as consistently high scorers in 
assessments), rather than achieving change for the higher education sector as a 
whole.
As another example, in 1998 the thirty-four universities of the Russell and 94 
Groups declared the QAA’s proposals on benchmarking and external examiners to 
be unworkable. Finally, Oxford, Cambridge, Edinburgh and Glasgow universities 
rejected QAA requests for institutional audits in 1998 (Russell Group and 94 
Group, 1998; Salter and Tapper, 2000: 81; Tysome, 1998a).
Additional change to the institutional framework, as with the creation of the Better 
Regulation Review Group, a group set up to reduce the regulatory burden of 
assessment on HEIs, arose not from lobbying by the CVCP, but rather from outwith 
government, when recommendations from the Cabinet Office’s Better Regulation 
Task Force134 were implemented (Better Regulation Task Force, 2002; Brown, 
2004: 136-7).
Overall, the only campaign to achieve any change in the QAA’s operations was 
that organised by the Russell Group. The CVCP failed to articulate any coherent 
approach towards evaluation in opposition to the QAA’s assessments.
5.g HEIs and the QAA’s audit of overseas collaborative provision
As with the initial creation of the QAA, HEIs were split over a number of features of 
the new evaluation framework, especially as these referred to audits of overseas
134 The Better Regulation Task Force, recently renamed the Better Regulation Executive, was a unit within the Cabinet 
Office which examined different types of government regulation and recommended ways of reducing it. Not all proposals to 
change the evaluation system from outside the Higher Education sector were as successful as those from the BRTF, 
however. A suggestion from the National Audit Office, that the kite mark be adopted by the QAA in order to prevent quality 
‘scandals’, does not seen to have been seriously considered (Tysome, 1998b).
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collaborative provision. The ultimate decisions over controversial matters- such as 
whether or not including the place of study on the degree certificate, should 
become a precept of the Code, the quality criteria used for assessments- were 
made by the QAA acting as arbiter between different HEIs’ preferences, rather 
than through negotiation with the HEIs’ sectoral association.
A number of British HEIs did not require mention of the place and language of 
study on their degree certificates, and used this fact as part of their marketing 
campaigns. Others felt that this action was illegitimate and misleading. As the 
rector of Middlesex University noted in his reply to a QAA report, “within British 
higher education there [was] a singular lack of unanimity on the question whether 
relevant award certificates should refer to the language of instruction and/or 
assessment” (QAA, 1998d).
The QAA was able to impose a rather uncomfortable compromise on HEIs, 
requiring them to follow the precepts on disclosure of location to the letter, rather 
than, as in other cases, being able to implement the QAA’s ‘principle’ as they saw 
fit, given guidance from the ‘precepts’.135 There was some confusion over the exact 
import of the Code’s phrasing on this matter. As another QAA report noted, the 
failure to include such information on the certificate (placing it instead on the 
transcript), while “not inconsistent with the letter of QAA’s Code, [may not be] 
keeping with its spirit, and [may not assist] third parties” (QAA, 2003c).
Overall, therefore, HEIs were unable to prevent the introduction of an assessment- 
based approach to evaluation. Although all the HEIs’ sectoral associations were 
opposed to the introduction of the new system, their inability to organise 
collectively (rather than by faction) prevented them from presenting a united front in 
the face of government support for assessment.
135 Eventually a compromise was reached that certificates should state the availability of a transcript which would contain 
information of the language of instruction, but even this was rejected by some HEIs.
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6 The new organisations and the liberalisation of international students’ 
policy
Overall, the liberalising operations of the Quality Assessment Units, Higher 
Education Quality Council and QAA have created an evaluation system which is 
focused on “comparative quality judgements [and] differential funding”, with “less 
focus on collaborative efforts to cause program improvement that in other systems” 
(Kells, 1992: 129). The development of this assessment-based system is one 
element of a general programme of evaluations of “academic and teaching 
performance” in British higher education which, as Schmidt notes, have facilitated 
the introduction of competition (Schmidt, 2002: 78). The Quality Assessment Units, 
Higher Education Quality Council and QAA facilitated the liberalisation of 
international students’ policy through providing HEIs with the constraints and 
incentives to compete with each other for better scores, both overall and 
specifically concerning international students’ issues. They were one element of 
the regulatory context which helped provide “a foundation for a freer higher 
education market (Stoddart, 2004: x-xi).
The use of assessment, with its encouragement of the ranking of HEIs, was 
frequently noted by policymakers as key to promoting British higher education 
overseas. Quality assessment was increasingly described as a means of 
maintaining “UK Pic’s” reputation, within an international higher education market 
which was “tolerant, but...not infinitely forgiving” (Humfrey, 1999: 44). In 1995, the 
then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Further and Higher Education 
maintained that “...a dissatisfied customer can do immeasurable harm, and 
reputations- once lost- are extremely hard to win back” (Walker, 1997: 256). The 
Under-Secretary maintained that this provided a justification for extensive quality 
regulation. Similarly, a British Council representative promoted quality assessment 
as a means of maintaining British market share; “[j]ust as an airline would never 
skimp on safety- not if it wanted to stay in business- so a university should never 
skimp on quality”, the parallel being that both ‘industries’ needed to prioritise
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consumer satisfaction.136 As indicated below, the reports produced by the 
organisations frequently referred to matters which were of concern to potential 
international students, and enabled them to differentiate between HEIs.
The Quality Assessment Units’ assessments, which the Units publicised, were 
explicitly linked to the attraction of international students to British HEIs, and to 
increasing competition between HEIs for such students. Initially, some HEI 
representatives maintained that the inclusion of an ‘unsatisfactory’ category in 
classifications might damage Britain’s ability to attract international students.137 
Others, however, were keen to note the potential “marketing opportunity” 
represented by the new evaluation system (Watson, 1995: 330). Regardless of the 
exact impact of the new system on the recruitment of international students, 
decision-makers had promoted the new system as a means of increasing 
competition between HEIs and of facilitating access to information for prospective 
students.
Similarly, the Higher Education Quality Council’s audits of overseas 
collaborative provision, and those of the QAA which followed them, indicated an 
emphasis on evaluation as a guarantor of the quality of British higher education. 
The Higher Education Quality Council’s, and then the QAA’s, audits of HEIs’ 
overseas collaborative programmes emphasised brand maintenance, cross-site 
quality control and the formalising of potentially litigious “partnership” 
arrangements138. These criteria were designed with a view to maintain the image of 
British higher education abroad, through publication of the reports, and thus can be 
viewed as a part of the promotion of British higher education.
136 James Kennedy of the British Council speaking at a Thames Valley Council for Student Affairs training workshop at 
Rhodes House Oxford in May 1988, reported in Walker, 1997: 89.
137 This approach was put forward by Dr (now Sir) Clive Booth, Vice-Chancellor of Oxford Brookes University, in a speech 
after the opening of Hong Kong’s British Education Exhibition in early 1994 (reported in Watson, 1995).
138 Issues of the incidence of liability were more pronounced where responsibility for a course was split between different 
HEIs, as in the case of overseas collaborative provision, especially where two different national legal systems were involved.
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Finally, the QAA’s assessments have also consistently reflected Patten’s focus on 
the provision of information in order to enable product differentiation. As with the 
Quality Assessment Units’ reports, the fact that the QAA publicised its findings was 
often seen as a means of aiding recruitment, both domestically and overseas, and 
facilitating competition between HEIs. The institutional reports were described as 
“a source of reliable and independent information for potential students and their 
advisers” (Sizer, 1993: 80), a “valuable resource for students” (Clark, 1998: 2-3) 
and a “unique set of information which is made freely available to” prospective 
students, amongst others (Williams, 2002). HEIs themselves were “quick to react 
to the marketing potential of high ratings” (Watson, 1995: 335).
Brown has maintained that the QAA’s approach, using external monitoring of 
compliance with benchmarks, differed “profoundly]” from that of the Higher 
Education Quality Council. Certainly, the QAA’s extension of this type of audit to 
British-based programmes did mark a change in British evaluation of higher 
education (Brown, 2004: 69). However, the fact that both the Higher Education 
Quality Council and the QAA used assessment as a means of evaluation (albeit 
only concerning overseas collaborative partnerships in the case of the Higher 
Education Quality Council) must not be overlooked. All methods of evaluation 
undertaken by the QAA, with their emphasis on assessment, facilitated a 
liberalisation of international students’ policy. This reflected, rather than 
contradicted, much of the activities of the Quality Assessment Units and of the 
Higher Education Quality Council. The new method did not result in a significant 
diminution of the burden of assessment (ibid. : 127-8). Governments’ approach to 
evaluation had, from 1991 onwards, been consistently focused on adopting 
assessment as the main means of evaluation, as a way of fostering competition 
between HEIs for international students. The creation of the QAA was merely the 
latest stage in this development.
Some authors, such as Simeon Underwood, have however highlighted the findings 
of the consultants Segal Quince Wicksteed, which suggested that far from QAA
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reports constituting the main source of information about HEIs for prospective 
students, very few people saw the reports as the “single most important source of 
information about quality”, compared with “the institutions themselves, league 
tables and schools careers advisers”. However, as Underwood also notes, league 
tables, prospectuses and institutional websites have often made extensive 
reference to QAA findings. In addition, the QAA website has consistently received 
over 12,000 hits per week, “including many from overseas” (Underwood, 2000: 87). 
Overall, the new evaluation institution has been described as leading to a greater 
“accountability of higher education”, to potential students as to other audiences 
(Salter and Tapper, 1994: xi).
The three organisations’ reports were explicitly presented as an aid to international 
students when deciding which HEIs to attend. Hence, as Humfrey notes, “British 
Council Offices overseas make available on request copies of the most recent 
Research Assessment Exercise and the Teaching Quality Assessment”. These 
coexisted with “[o]ther ratings, such as those of the Times and the Financial Times”, 
which were “frequently widely read” (Humfrey, 1999: 79). Such ratings prepared by 
broadsheets were extensively based on the assessments of individual HEIs 
provided by the organisations examined here (Underwood, 2000).
7 Conclusion
In summary, it can be concluded that governments’ original focus on assessment- 
based evaluation won out decisively over HEIs’ preferences for a greater use of 
enhancement-based evaluation. The new organisations (the Quality Assessment 
Units, Higher Education Quality Council and QAA) did not continue the approach of 
the enhancement-based Academic Audit Unit and External Examining system, nor 
that of the accreditation-based Her Majesty’s Inspectorate and CNAA. Instead, 
each adopted an assessment-based approach (albeit only with regard to 
evaluations of overseas collaborative provision in the case of the Higher Education 
Quality Council).
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HEIs had attempted to prevent government control over evaluation, and the 
adoption of an assessment-based approach, with their creation of the Academic 
Audit Unit. However, they were unable to prevent the incorporation of the 
Academic Audit Unit into the Higher Education Quality Council. Despite its formal 
ownership by HEIs, the Higher Education Quality Council was able to impose an 
assessment-based evaluation model for overseas collaborative programmes, 
through invoking government support in the face of resistance from the CVCP. 
When central government began to promote an assessment-based system, 
located in a single organisation (the QAA), HEIs were unable to effectively resist 
the removal of enhancement and imposition of assessment. Not only did the 
various factions within the CVCP have different views towards assessment (with 
some standing to benefit from increased assessment, whilst others would stand to 
lose out), the continuation of two systems of evaluation (if enhancement was 
retained) was seen as too expensive for HEIs to bear. The QAA was thus largely 
created in the face of resistance by HEIs. Nor were HEIs able to control the new 
agency’s operations. Where change was achieved by HEIs, this was by a small 
group of elite universities, and did not result in a turn away from assessment as the 
exclusive method of evaluation.
The new organisations, from the Quality Assessment Units and Higher Education 
Quality Council to the QAA, all promoted a liberalisation of international students’ 
policy. Their reports facilitated the ranking of British HEIs against each other, which 
enabled potential international students to choose between competing universities 
and colleges. This approach to evaluation, as a means of promoting intra-sectoral 
competition, differed substantially from that originally proposed by the HEIs’ 
sectoral associations.
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Fig. 12: QAA Institutional audit reports: the frequency of comments
on international student issues, per report per year
97 98 99 00 01 02 03
OCPs noted 2= 100% 3= 18.75% 1=5.26% 8= 34.78% 8= 40% 8= 34.78% 8= 20%
Withdrawal 
from OCPs 
since last audit
1=4.35% 3=15% 3= 13.04% 1=2.5%
University
expanding
OCPs
1=6.25% 1=4.35% 1=5% 3= 13.04% 2= 5%
Audit vs OCP 
expansion
1=5.26%
Criticism of 
OCP quality
2= 100% 3= 18.75% 1=4.35% 5= 25% 2= 8.7% 2= 5%
Improvement in 
OCP quality 
required
3= 13.04% 2= 10% 2= 8.7% 5= 12.5%
Praise of action 
since last audit
1=4.35% 2= 10% 2= 8.7% 4= 10%
Praise of 
coordination of 
international 
activities
1=5% 1=4.35%
Good IS 
arrangements
2= 12.5% 4=21.05% 2= 8.7% 2= 10% 3= 13.04% 1=2.5%
Inadequate IS 
arrangements
2= 10.53% 2= 10% 3= 13.04% 1=2.5%
Certification 
accords with 
HEQC/QAA 
code
2= 5%
Certification 
does not 
accord with 
HEQC/QAA 
code
1=4.35% 1=5%
IS strategy 
accords with 
HEI’s overall 
strategy
1=4.35%
IS strategy not 
in line with 
overall strategy
1=5.26% 1=4.35%
Number of 
reports
2 16 19 23 20 23 40
Source: Data was obtained from the institutional reports available on the QAA 
website, from April 1997 to December 2003.
I.S.: international student
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Fig. 13: QAA Overseas Collaborative Provision Audits: the frequency of
comments on international student issues, per report per year
97 98 99 00 01 02 03
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1=6.25% 3=
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quality
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3= 25% 3=
33.33%
4=
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3=
33.33%
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UK
1 = 12.5% 3=
18.75%
1=5.88% 1=8.33% 2=
22.22%
Degree 
standards not 
equivalent to 
UK
1= 12.5% 1=6.25% 2=
11.76%
1=8.33% 1 = 
11.11%
Care required 
before OCP 
expansion
1= 12.5% 2= 12.5% 4=
23.53%
Problems with 
assessment
1=6.25% 2=
15.38%
2=
22.22%
Reference to 
the QAA/HEQC 
code
1=8.33% 1 = 
11.11%
3=
23.07%
1 = 
11.11%
QAA/HEQC 
code compliant
1= 6.25% 2=
11.76%
1=8.33% 2=
22.22%
2=
15.38%
6=
66.66%
Reference to
QAA/HEQC
code
concerning
certification
1= 12.5% 1=6.25% 2=
11.76%
1 = 
11.11%
2=
22.22%
Scheduled
approval
followed
changes
1 = 
11.11%
More oversight 
needed
3= 37.5% 4= 25% 9=
52.94%
3= 25% 3=
33.33%
4=
30.77%
3=
33.33%
Praise of action 
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audit
2=
11.76%
1=7.69%
More formalised 
relationship with 
partner required
3=
18.75%
1=5.88% 3= 25% 3=
23.07%
Number of 
Reports
8 16 17 12 9 13 9
Source: Data was obtained from the overseas collaborative provision reports 
available on the QAA website, from April 1997 to December 2003.
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Chapter 6: Evaluation institutions in France
1 Introduction
The evaluation organisation examined here, the Comite National de Evaluation 
des tztablissements Public d caractere scientifique, culturel et professionnel (CNE), 
was created in 1984.139 The CNE’s creation marked a break with existing methods 
of evaluation in the French higher education sector. Previous evaluation 
organisations (the Cour des Comptes, Inspection Gdndrale de I1Administration de 
l'6ducation nationale et de la recherche (IGAENR) and the Conference des 
Grandes Ecoles, had all adopted an accreditation-based approach to evaluation. 
They had only evaluated HEIs on the basis of certain basic criteria, rather than 
explicitly comparing them against each other (assessment) or using their 
evaluations to aid HEis to improve their fulfillment of their own objectives 
(enhancement).
During the creation of the CNE, French HEis, working through their sectoral 
associations, collectively put forward a view of evaluation as enhancement-based. 
Although the creation of the new evaluation agency was mainly pushed forward by 
the then Education Minister as a means of balancing HEis’ autonomy, the agency 
retained the HEis’ focus on quality enhancement. Throughout the period examined, 
HEis continued to play a role in defining the parameters of operation of the CNE, 
through, for example, involvement in the definition of quality indicators. The 
influence of HEis on the CNE was mediated through their sectoral associations.
The CNE refused to rank HEis, and its institutional reports were not produced with 
this outcome in mind. As a result, the CNE did not contribute to a liberalisation of 
international students’ policy, as it did not lead HEis to compete against each other. 
Indeed, an interviewee specifically noted that the CNE’s reticence concerning the 
ranking of HEis had helped prevent the liberalisation of international student policy,
139 As the CNE’s approach defined the sector’s overall use of evaluation, it is warranted to describe the CNE’s rules as 
themselves constituting an (enhancement-based) institution.
172
as HEis could not differentiate themselves from the rest of the French higher 
education sector on the basis of their quality scores, as in Britain (Interview with 
SFERE employee). The chapter also reviews whether the CNE could be seen as 
having commodified international students. Although a small number of HEis were 
advised to reorient their recruitment policies towards developed and emerging 
economy countries, rather than developing countries, others (albeit a smaller 
number) were also advised to build up links with developing countries, to the extent 
that the CNE did not lead to a significant commodification of international students.
This chapter examines the existing organisations operating in the evaluation of 
French higher education, before considering the strategies of central government 
and of HEis concerning the creation of the CNE. It then details how the CNE 
operated, before examining whether it could be legitimately be described as 
leading to liberalisation. Where relevant, the chapter refers to an analysis of the 
CNE’s institutional reports produced between 1986 and 2003.140
2 The pre-existing situation
Three different organisations can be identified which possessed an evaluating 
function before the creation of the CNE; the Courdes Comptes; the IGAENR; and 
the CGE’s accreditation system (Merindol, 1994: 40). All the organisations adopted 
an accreditation-based approach, resting on the assurance of basic standards 
rather than the assessment of comparative quality which could have encouraged 
the development of competition between HEis.141
140 117 CNE reports were examined, which constituted all institutional reports available in the CNE’s Centre de 
Documentation and on the CNE’s internet site, up to summer 2003.
141 Two additional types of organisations also operated in parallel with the CNE; the Observatoire des Couts and private 
accreditation agencies. The Observatoire was created in 1991 as an aid to HEis’ attempts to control costs, and a means of 
increasing the transparency of resource allocation in higher education. The Observatoire also carried out audits of HEis, 
albeit with the help of HEis themselves (Bomarel and L6vy, 1994: 69). Private accreditation schemes included international 
peer systems such as the EQUIS group of engineering schools or the AMBA scheme for business education (see p.138 
footnote 116). Thus far their coverage is still patchy (Halimi, 1996: 97). For example, no programme evaluates all MBAs 
delivered in France (dos Santos, 2002:100). In both cases, however, these organisations were only created after the CNE. 
Both the Observatoire des CoQts and private evaluation agencies therefore cannot be seen as providing institutional 
precedents for the CNE.
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2.a Government-led evaluation organisations
Both the Courdes Comptes and the IGAENR focused explicitly on the use by HEIs 
of public monies. Neither organisation had any specific focus on HEIs’ policies 
towards international students. They both worked on a mainly ad hoc basis (ibid. : 
40), as and when inspection was felt to be necessary.
2.a.i The Cour des Comptes
The Courdes Comptes was created in 1807 to control the expenditure of what 
were then royal monies. Since then, the Cour3s responsibilities have been 
extended such that it audits all the modern state’s public spending and its 
management of resources. The Courdes Comptes was responsible for auditing 
HEIs’ resources and management (Bertrand, 1994: 58), as part of its overall 
assessment of the use of public finances across the French public administration.
In particular, the Courdes Comptes was required to produce annual reports 
concerning HEIs’ use of public funds. Such reports were not, however, made 
publicly available (Neave, 1988: 8).
2.a.ii The IGAENR
The IGAENR was created in 1965, with the mission of monitoring higher as well as 
primary and secondary education, and research, under the direct oversight of the 
Minister of Education. The IGAENR was required to ensure the probity and efficacy 
of financial as well as institutional management, through an examination of 
“conformity and management control”. The IGAENR was often commissioned by 
the government to look into severe management problems in particular HEIs. As a 
result, its reports tended to be critical, concentrating on the “shadowy areas in 
colleges and universities” (Le Monde, 1993a was c).
The IGAENR, in contrast with the CNE, was “viewed as an instrument of control 
and ‘policing’ (flicage)" with HEIs “not liking it if the IGAENR’s reports are done 
well” (Demichel, 2000). The IGAENR’s staff were explicitly described as
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“inspectors”, rather than as evaluators (Claeys, 2002). Overall, therefore, the 
IGAENR’s operations, as with those of the Courdes Comptes, were mainly 
confined to inspection rather than evaluation. Rather than encouraging competition 
between HEIs for international students, or aiding HEIs to improve the quality of 
their courses, they examined HEIs’ adherence to basic managerial and financial 
standards.
2.b HEI-led evaluation organisations: accreditation by the CGE
In a number of cases, the only accreditation received by some private HEIs 
consisted in the peer accreditation conferred by being admitted to the Conference 
des Grandes Ecoles (Le Monde, 2002). The CGE required applicants to 
demonstrate conformity to a number of basic standards before they would be 
considered for admission, which was controlled by the grandes Gcoles already 
admitted into the CGE. Just as HEIs were not ranked within the CGE, with all 
possessing an equal role at a formal level,142 so the CGE did not rank applicants 
when they were admitted into its association.
3 Government strategies
The CNE was created under the Higher Education Guideline Law (popularly known 
as the Loi Savary), which was promulgated in 1985 (Cazenave, 1990; De Groof et 
al, 1998: 123; Staropoli, 1987). The new evaluation agency was one of the least 
controversial aspects of this new law.143 The law’s prohibition on access 
restrictions drew protests from right-wing students and from law faculties, with 
some newspapers describing the scale of the protests in spring 1983 as “May '68 
in reverse” (reported in Bernard and Lepagnot-Leca, 2002: 233).
The CNE appears to have been largely created in isolation from the rest of the law. 
This perhaps explains the appointment of the mathematician and Parti socialiste
142 With the one exception of the fact that the founding members had permanent rather than rotating positions in some 
decision-making structures, although in practice they often devolved these to non-founding members.
143 The law’s proposals relating to the prohibition of selection caused wide-scale protests and counter-protests by right-wing 
and left-wing students.
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supporter Laurent Schwartz as president of the CNE by Jean-Pierre Chevenement, 
the then Minister of National Education, in 1985 (Vanlerberghe, 2002). This was 
despite Schwartz’ documented criticism of the law as a whole in 1983, at the head 
of the 'quality de la science’ movement opposed to the law.144
However, whilst university presidents and other commentators may have viewed 
the CNE in isolation from the rest of the loi Savary, Savary himself saw the creation 
of the CNE as an integral part of the new legislation, forming an important 
counterweight to the increased institutional autonomy which it provided. In 
particular, it would balance the impact of the new contractual system, which Savary 
saw as aiding HEIs to develop their own institutional policies (Savary, 1983: 2407) 
(but which in effect had a minor impact on HEIs’, as against faculties’, strategic 
capacities; see p.233). In particular, Savary maintained that the new evaluation 
committee would prevent “autonomy [from] leading to nepotism and mediocrity” 
(Bernard and Lepagnot-Leca, 2002: 232). Hence, it was claimed that the CNE 
would “prevent the possibility of having centres of excellence and of mediocrity in 
the same HEI, without any ‘relationship of solidarity’ between them”. For Savary, 
“just as coherence need not signify uniformity, autonomy does not exclude that the 
public sector should play its role fully” (Savary, 1983: 1346, 1352). The proposed 
new agency was criticised by deputies from the right as alternately leading to an 
extension of government control over HEIs,145 or lacking sufficient powers (Bourg- 
Broc, 1983: 2407).
Various actors have claimed responsibility for inclusion of the creation of the CNE 
in the law. Rene Remond has maintained that the CNE was developed from the 
CPU’s proposal for an independent evaluation organisation. This organisation was 
to “articulat[e] between the autonomy of HEIs and the responsibilities of public 
power and aid[...] institution's own efforts” (Remond, 2002: 309). However, the
144 Schwartz had signed the Appeal of the fifty-five to President Mitterand, criticising the law. See Bernard and Lepagnot- 
Leca, 2002: 235.
145 Raymond Barre, an RPR deputy, even described the CNE as leading to “polysynodie” (Barre, 1983:1379), the 
bureaucratic and time-consuming eighteenth-century decision-making regime instituted by Philippe d’Orl6ans.
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proposal for such a body was one of many made by the CPU, which had often led 
to little action on the part of government. If the CNE was modeled directly on the 
CPU’s proposal, it had taken ten years for this proposal to be recognised by 
government. Similarly, both Jean-Louis Beffa (Beffa, 2000) and Roger-Gerard 
Schwartzenberg (later Minister for Research) also both claimed responsibility for 
creating the CNE (Schwartzenberg, 2000).
Regardless of who may have first suggested the creation of an independent 
evaluation body, it was Alain Savary as Education Minister who urged the inclusion 
of the matter in the draft of the loi Savary, when it was being prepared by Georges 
Dupuis (a professor of public law at the University de Paris i) (Bernard and 
Lepagnot-Leca, 2002: 228). Savary also appears to have been the first actor to 
articulate the view that the CNE was necessary as a check on HEIs’ increased 
autonomy resulting from the new law (ibid.: 236).
4 HEIs’ strategies
HEIs’ criticism of the creation of the CNE was muted by the fact that the new 
agency was consistently presented as a necessary corollary of increased 
autonomy by Alain Savary.146 In addition, the CPU and CGE were able to 
contribute to the detailed elaboration of the CNE’s structures and role, through the 
negotiations held between Alain Savary and the higher education sector over the 
loi Savary. These negotiations allowed the CGE and CPU to propose modifications 
to the proposed evaluation agency, which appear to have been taken on board by 
Savary. In particular, they allowed HEIs to restrict the new organisation’s role to 
enhancement rather than assessment.
HEIs contributed to the new ioi in three ways. Firstly, they responded to a 
questionnaire sent out to all HEIs’ presidents. Secondly, a number of 
representatives from HEIs met with Savary privately during the drafting of the loi,
146 This claim has been repeated by successive Education Ministers; see, for example, Jack Lang’s claim that his 
government hoped “to refound university autonomy...[through] developing evaluation and in particular that of courses, 
through a good use of the competencies of the CNE” (Lang, 2000).
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including representatives of the CPU and CGE. Finally, HEIs also fed in to the 
reports on the loi drafted by the Commission des Affaires Culturelles, Familiales, 
and Sociales. Some HEI representatives had formed a lobbying group, “Qualitd de 
la Science”, against the main thrust of the proposals in the loi Savary. However, 
even this group did not oppose the creation of the CNE, but supported it. Their only 
challenge to the proposals for the CNE in the loi was to ask for it to review HEIs 
every five years, rather than annually as was originally proposed. When the loi was 
passed through Parliament, Savary struck a compromise with the group of 
“periodic” reviews, which would occur more frequently than every five years, but 
less frequently than annually (Savary, 1983: 2407).
Once the CNE’s role had been defined as enhancement - as aiding HEIs to fulfil 
their own priorities - the creation of the new organisation was supported by the 
HEIs’ sectoral associations. The CNE was seen as a way for universities and 
grandes dcoles to buttress their own credibility and legitimacy, in a context of 
increased institutional autonomy (Bertrand, 1994: 56). This can be contrasted with 
the higher education sectoral associations’ extensive criticism of much of the rest 
of the proposed loi Savary (Bernard and Lepagnot-Leca, 2002: 230).
The linkages made between the new agency and the promotion of increased 
autonomy for HEIs from government was also important in explaining HEIs’ (muted) 
support for the CNE. Evaluation has been described by the CNE as “above all 
destined for the evaluated establishment and its leadership” (Vie Universitaire, 
1998). The CNE was to analyse all “the actions and means put in place by 
establishments in the framework of their scientific and educational policies” 
(Gouvernement de France, 1985). The CNE was not, ostensibly, to provide 
information for potential international and/or domestic students but rather to aid on­
going processes of institutional improvement.
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As Bertrand maintains, the CNE was seen as “part of the move towards greater 
autonomy for each institution” (Bertrand, 1994: 57).147 The then Vice-President of 
the CNE maintained that any extension of its powers beyond the ability to “note, to 
suggest and to recommend” would lead to “distrust”, which would “distort” the 
information thus garnered from HEIs, and prevent the agency from properly
uncovering “the facts,... detecting] discrepancies and try[ing] to understand their
significance and consequences”.148 HEIs appear to have accepted this 
enhancement-based approach, while they have remained hostile to assessment- 
based evaluation.
5 The establishment of the CNE
The CNE was founded relatively early, both in French public policy terms and when 
compared to other evaluation institutions for higher education across Europe.149 
However, whilst the CNE was, from the perspective of other uses of evaluation in 
France, a novel institutional form, the extent to which it could be characterised as 
‘liberalising’ was limited. In particular, the CNE’s enhancement-led approach 
militated against it being used as a means to compare HEIs and thus to facilitate 
competition between them.
The agency’s mission was defined as the evaluation of scientific, cultural and 
professional institutions (thus including research institutions as well as universities 
and the grandes dcoles under the tutelage of the Minister of Education) 
(Gouvernement de France, 1984: Art.65). The CNE would be able to recommend 
measures to improve the functioning of HEIs as well as the effectiveness of their 
teaching and research, especially with respect to courses, student welfare and
147 Whilst such a view seems to suggest that evaluation complemented autonomy, less mention has been made of how this 
might be the case. Leduc, for example, maintains that “[evaluation of higher education institutions is a logical corollary of 
their autonomy” (Leduc, 1994:61), but it is difficult to specify how the two concepts could be necessarily (as opposed to 
empirically) related.
148 Gabriel Richet, Vice-President of the CNE, reported in Kells, 1992:223.
149 This contradicts claims that evaluation is not heavily institutionalised in “the areas of education, teaching, institutional 
and management organisation” within higher education compared with in research, as maintained by Ab6cassis (Ab6cassis, 
1994: 31).
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other student affairs (ibid). In July 1989, the CNE became an independent 
administrative authority, which gave the agency financial and, to an extent, 
operational autonomy (Gouvernement de France, 1989b: Art.27).
Even before 1989, the CNE enjoyed a relatively autonomous role from the rest of 
the administration, certainly in comparison to the Courdes Comptes and the 
IGAENR. For example, the CNE has described the fact that it reports directly to the 
President rather than to the Ministry of Education as one element of its autonomy 
from government (CNE, undated).150 The awarding of independent administrative 
authority status to the agency buttressed such autonomy. Independent 
administrative authorities are characterised by their lack of subordination to 
government, despite formally constituting part of the bureaucracy. In particular, 
independent administrative authorities are guaranteed independence from 
government. The CNE’s status as an independent administrative authority marked 
a rupture with existing modes of organisation within the higher education sector. 
Although the category of independent administrative authority was first used in 
1978, only thirteen bodies have been specifically classified as independent 
administrative authorities by legislators (Migaud, 2001). Although a larger number 
of independent administrative authorities have been created informally, out of the 
thirty such organisations none, apart from the CNE, have been created within the 
higher education sector, or in the education sector more broadly. The CNE thus 
differed significantly from other public sector organisations involved in the 
assessment of HEIs, both in its role and its institutional design.
6 How the CNE operated in practice
The CNE’s seventeen members were chosen by the Minister of Education, but 
were mainly drawn from a list drawn up by the Conseil national de I'enseignement 
supdrieuret de la recherche (CNESER), a consultative body including 
representatives of HEIs, students and education trade unions. The CNE also
150 See also Harman’s description of the CNE as autonomous (Harman, 1998); and Neave’s claim that the fact that the 
CNE reports directly to the president was of “considerabl[e] important[ce]” (Neave, 1988:14).
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included four people chosen for their qualifications in the field of evaluation, a 
member of the Conseil d’Etat and of the Cour des Comptes. Between its creation 
in 1985151 up to 1997, the CNE evaluated all the universities of France, and has 
since evaluated a number of engineering schools, and, more recently, teacher 
training colleges (IUFM) (Claeys, 2002).
HEIs’ involvement in the definition of the CNE’s operations can be seen as mainly 
linked to attempts to maintain its enhancement-based approach. Coordinated and 
sustained support by the CPU and CGE appears to have been successful in 
preventing the development of a more assessment-led system, at least within the 
CNE if not within government as a whole (see p. 186 footnote 155).
The first universities to be assessed by the CNE, in 1986, volunteered to be 
evaluated by the new committee. A number appear to have been motivated by the 
CNE’s claim that its visits would facilitate internal processes of self-evaluation (Le 
Monde, 1986). The CNE’s focus on aiding HEIs’ own evaluation, with little 
emphasis on producing information for public consumption, was maintained 
throughout its operations, partly due to pressure from the HEIs’ sectoral 
associations. University presidents played an important role in the creation of the 
indicators which guided evaluations, which, as Bertrand, a former member of the 
CPU maintains, differed from the usual conception of “'performance indicators', 
since they [were] intended simply to 'indicate', and because the Committee 
considers that an evaluation of teaching and research has to be a qualitative 
judgment ('peer appraisal')” (Bertrand, 1994: 57).
The CPU’s role in the elaboration of indicators was maintained throughout the 
period examined (Denis, 2001). Indeed, an attempt by government to impose a 
new set of indicators appears to have been unsuccessful. In 1990, Lionel Jospin 
asked Michel Crozier, a sociologist, to “reflect on the choice of quantitative and 
qualitative indicators which could measure the educational performance of
151 The CNE did not, however, produce any institutional reports until 1986.
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university establishments” (Crozier, 1990: 9; see also Le Monde, 1990d and 
Massicotte, 1995). Crozier recognised that rather than being a neutral procedure, 
as it may have appeared, the creation of indicators required tackling existing 
patterns of power (Crozier, 1990: 9). The problem was not the putting into place of 
“indicators which were perfect on a technical level, but rather of removing any 
obstacles to their introduction” (ibid.). Rather than creating indicators, Crozier 
instead elaborated a policy of evaluation, and “reflected on the necessary 
measures to make sure that its implementation was truly effective” (ibid. AO). The 
definition of indicators was thus retained as a matter for the CNE, in consultation 
with HEIs.
6.a The CNE’s definition of its role
The CNE’s first framework for institutional evaluations, published in October 1986, 
required systems of “international cooperation”, including policies towards 
international students, to be described by the heads of HEIs in their initial 
submissions to the CNE before the formal evaluation process began (CNE, 1986a: 
4). The CNE then created a working group on the methodology of evaluation with 
the universities’ sectoral association, the CPU (CNE, 1988a: 4). The group 
proposed a number of “rubriques” to guide evaluation, under which specific 
indicators were classified. The number of international students and researchers 
was classified as “indispensable information for an evaluation” (CNE, 1988b), and 
as an indicator within the context of the universities’ policies. These indicators were 
apparently accepted by the HEIs themselves (CNE, 1988c). However, the 
indicators were not referenced to benchmarks, nor were particular scores on any 
indicator associated with a more or less positive assessment of the HEI concerned. 
As a result, the indicators were not used as a means to rank HEIs and thus could 
not be used to facilitate competition.
Despite the change in the CNE’s status to an independent administrative authority, 
accompanied by a declaration by the Minister of Education that its role should 
increase in December 1988, no changes were made at this point to the evaluation
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criteria (CNE, 1989b: 1). The CNE’s approach continued to be guided by the 
indicators described above (Le Monde, 1989d). In 1993, however, the CNE’s 
approach changed, following the introduction of the four yearly contracts between 
HEIs and the state to deliver a proportion of institutional funding (see chapter 
eight). This new policy was described by the CNE as leading to a “strong need for 
self-evaluation” (CNE, 1993) which required less time-specific indicators. In 
January 1995, the CNE published a new set of guidelines, which this time included 
the numbers of international students only as necessary information for evaluations 
(CNE, 1995b: 2), not as indicators.
6.b The CNE and quadrennial contracts
The largest change to the CNE’s criteria occurred in 2000, when the evaluation 
time-table was altered to actually coincide with the four yearly funding contract 
cycle. The extension of evaluation of the contracts was seen as adding to the 
credibility of the contractual process (Claeys, 2001b). The CNE’s calendar was 
coordinated with that of the contractual funding system from 2001 onwards (Claeys, 
2002). The CNE made efforts to indicate that this change was technical rather than 
substantial; the “contractual aspect” was to be only one of the many evaluated by 
the CNE (CNE, 2000a: 2). Nonetheless, the new timetable significantly increased 
the salience of the evaluation process.
The coordination of the CNE’s calendar with the contractual calendar appears to 
indicate the importance of government proposals for the CNE’s operations. By 
2000, the Ministry of Education was publicly suggesting that a process of 
evaluation should be introduced to assess the fulfillment of the contracts (Migaud, 
2000b). The Ministry itself, it was claimed, did not “have the necessary means of 
evaluation to do so” (Claeys, 2000a). This followed a report from the Mission 
devaluation et de contrdle, which had criticised existing procedures (Claeys, 2002).
However, the CNE maintained that the decision to integrate its evaluations with the 
contractual process had been taken by the CNE itself rather than by the Minister of
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Education (CNE, 2003c). It noted that whilst involvement in the contractual system 
might require it to work with the Minister, the IGAENR or the Courdes Comptes, “it 
acts within a methodological framework which has been freely chosen, with experts 
who have been freely appointed and produces its reports in complete freedom viz. 
the authorities and institutions”. The CNE maintained that it would “not itself 
participate in the contractual process”, but only evaluate the fulfillment of the 
contracts (ibid.). It thus distinguished its evaluative role from that of control, as 
rather than verifying “conformity to an established rule”, the CNE evaluations 
involved a “notion of value” or worth, thus requiring “appreciation and judgement” 
(ibid.). The CNE’s institutional reports have been described as enabling HEIs to 
prepare their own agendas for the contractual negotiations (Abecassis, 1994: 31). 
Such evaluations were explicitly not “punitive”, nor did they involve “compar[ison] 
and competition] between institutions” (ibid.: 33).
To the extent that the CNE’s evaluation procedures did attempt to measure 
performance rather than merely illustrate it, this was done against the indicators 
presented in annexes to the HEIs’ contracts (Claeys, 2002). These indicators had 
been defined by the HEIs themselves, in conjunction with government (see chapter 
eight). As with the initial creation of the CNE, this expansion of the agency’s role 
was described as necessary given the extension of institutional autonomy 
produced by the contractual system (Denis, 2001).
According to an interviewee from the universities’ sectoral association, following 
the change to the CNE’s schedule, institutional reports could, in theory, lead to 
government action if an HEI showed itself as having failed to comply with the 
contract (interview with CPU employee). However, this does not appear to have 
occurred up to the time of writing.
Most of the burden of evaluating the contracts was actually placed on the IGAENR 
rather than the CNE. The CNE’s procedures were seen by government as “slow”, 
and as very much “centred on pedagogical issues” (Demichel, 2000), which were
184
not necessarily as high priority for the Ministry as were management-based issues. 
In contrast, it was hoped that the IGAENR’s evaluations would allow HEIs to 
“benefit from its expertise on those matters concerned with the management of 
HEIs” (Migaud, 2000a).
6.c Limited government control over the CNE: funding and nominations
The extent to which governments were able to control the operations of the CNE 
was limited. Claude Allegre’s complained that, because the CNE reported to the 
President of the Republic, the Ministry of Education only had “one link to it: we [the 
Ministry] pay for it!” (Allegre, 2000).
Nonetheless, the provision of government funding for the CNE did constitute one 
area where the Ministry of Education was able to exert significant influence on the 
agency’s operations. Between 1994 and 1996, the CNE’s funding was reduced by 
14.3%. This was seen as directly preventing a more thorough analysis of the 
contracts during institutional evaluations, and as reducing the calibre of personnel 
which the organisation could employ.
In 2000, coinciding with the government’s new stress on evaluation of the contracts, 
the CNE’s budget was restored to its 1994 level. Indeed, the two factors were 
explicitly linked by Alain Claeys, when he maintained that “the coordination of the 
evaluation of the contractual policy between HEIs and the state has been achieved 
thanks to an increase in the resources of the CNE” (Claeys, 2000b). The budget 
was increased again in 2001 (Claeys, 2002).
It has also, finally, been suggested that the Ministry of Education’s power to 
nominate the president of the CNE allowed it to achieve change in the agency’s 
operations (Lang, 2001).152 This choice was, however, only from a short-list drawn
152 It should be noted that some other changes proposed by the Education Ministry do not, however, appear to have been 
instituted. This was the case with Claude Alegre’s suggestion of a move towards the US system of small visiting committees, 
including parliamentarians, being used instead of the CNE’s system (Allggre, 2000); and Roger-G6rard Schwartzenberg’s 
suggestion (as Minister of Research) that the CNE should be merged with the CNER, the evaluation committee for research
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up by the CNESER (see p. 180). Overall, HEIs continued to play a significant role in 
the agency, often through the medium of their sectoral associations.153
7 To what extent did the new institution lead to a liberalisation of 
international students’ policy?
Unlike the new British evaluation organisations, the CNE’s activities did not 
encourage competition between HEIs for the recruitment of international students. 
Nor did they lead to any significant commodification of such students.
7.a Did the CNE promote competition between HEIs?
As would be expected given the CNE’s enhancement-based approach, its reports 
were intended mainly for the use of the HEIs concerned. The CNE did, on 
occasion, produce amalgamated results which attempted to provide an overall 
picture of French HEIs; hence, in 1992, it published the conclusions of its reports 
on seventy-five HEIs (Le Monde, 1992a).154 However, sources other than the 
CNE’s reports were used when the press attempted to rank different HEIs against 
each other (such as students’ assessment of teaching quality and facilities (Le 
Monde, 1992d)).155
(I’Office parlementaire devaluation des choix scientifiques et technologiques, undated). However, as these ideas appear to 
have only been mentioned once in parliamentary debate, they may have been personal suggestions of each minister, rather 
than constituting policy formulated through the Ministry and enjoying wider support within government.
153 I have found little evidence that HEIs saw the CNE as an instantiation of "centralized government power” (Kells, 1992: 
123).
154 The CNE also attempted to publicise a new initiative involving the regional assessment of HEIs, as when it conducted a 
joint evaluation of the HEIs of Aix-Marseille. The press conference held following the evaluation was supported by the three 
university presidents concerned (Claeys, 2002). In a limited number of cases, the press attempted to draw critical 
conclusions from the CNEs’ evaluations, as with Le Monde’s coverage of the CNE's Report on Paris III university (Le Monde, 
1992e) and on Lille-lll university (Le Monde, 1990a). However, these universities were not compared against any national 
average, or against other universities, in the CNE's reports, nor were they assessed quantitatively, and so were not ‘ranked’ 
in any way.
155 Unlike the CNE, French governments, specifically the Ministry of Education, have been willing to assess HEIs, in the 
face of opposition from HEIs. The rankings derived from these assessments facilitated competition between French HEIs, as 
in Britain. However, they were not produced by the CNE but by the Ministry. Such an approach has not been supported by 
HEIs. Claude AII6gre noted that the University of Evry went on strike following the internet publication of twelve indices, with 
the University scoring last in one of these (AII6gre, 2000). The indices were not based on data from the CNE (which was not 
in a form that would facilitate comparison), but rather from data provided by the Ministry itself.
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The CNE explicitly avoided an assessment-based approach which could have 
facilitated ranking between HEIs, and thus promoted competition. As the 
government’s own review of evaluation in higher education maintained, “...if 
evaluation sought to give prominence to detailed results, the teams would be” 
engaged on a “suicidal” path which would defeat the original purpose of the CNE’s 
institutional evaluations (Crozier, 1995: 20).
The CNE was explicitly debarred from ranking HEIs on the basis of quality 
assessments, or even from explicitly comparing universities and grandes 6coles. 
The evaluation agency itself maintained that such a process would be impossible, 
given the diversity of French HEIs and their various activities. Whilst the agency did 
not rule out a “comparative evaluation” of “departments within a single discipline”, 
the only “ranking” which was suggested was a “grouping into major categories”, 
apparently not on a quantitative basis (Leduc, 1994: 66). It indicated that the 
“evaluation of higher education is above all a qualitative matter; this is why it does 
not think it is possible to have recourse exclusively to performance indicators" or to 
other quantitative approaches (Jacobs, 2001: 49).
Rather than its reports facilitating comparison between HEIs for the purposes of 
differentiation by prospective students, the reports were designed to aid HEIs 
themselves. Hence, the CNE’s remit was “less to set benchmarks of a quantitative 
nature than to provide a qualitative assessment which will enable universities to 
check and where necessary to refine their institutional strategies and objectives” 
(Neave, 1994: 122). As a result, it allowed individual HEIs “to assume a substantial 
degree of latitude and initiative in determining [their] own developmental profile” 
(ibid.: 122). Overall, the CNE’s approach led to a “strengthening of] central 
institutional authority...as the results of individual assessments are mediated 
through the whole institution’s context of assessment” (Brennan and Shah, 2000b: 
344).
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Hence, unlike the QAA, the CNE offered HEIs advice on strategies which they 
could take to enlarge their recruitment of international students. For example, a 
faculty of the University de la Reunion was urged to choose between “stagnating” 
or opening to the rest of the region (CNE, 1989a: 51), and its efforts to do so were 
praised in a later evaluation (CNE, 2002: 87). Similarly, the University of Reims 
was urged to increase student exchanges (CNE, 1999b: 41). Other HEIs were 
praised for their efforts to increase international student recruitment, as with INSA 
Toulouse’s special programmes for international students (CNE, 2001:18). A 
limited number of HEIs were urged to cooperate with other HEIs, as a means of 
facilitating their attempts at internationalisation.
The QAA had only suggested particular strategies to HEIs concerning ways to 
reduce their financial or legal liability in overseas collaborative programmes. 
Although the CNE reported the existence of a large number of overseas 
collaborative programmes managed by the HEIs it examined, it was only critical of 
one such overseas collaborative programme, that of the Universite de 
Perpignan.156 Interviewees suggested that this university’s lack of quality control 
constituted a relatively extreme case. Uniquely, the French embassy had been 
required to force the University to disclose to employers the location of study of its 
former students, after the University had refused to do so itself.157 Overall, 
therefore, whilst the CNE did offer HEIs advice on how to develop their own 
recruitment of international students, this advice was focused on HEIs’ own 
strategies rather than on more generic financial or legal standards.
7.b Did the CNE encourage the commodification of international students?
156 The University was rebuked for a “disequilibrium” between its metropolitan and delocalised faculties, and for an apparent 
“numerical inferiority complex’’ which had induced it to augment the number of students at its delocalised antennae without 
consideration of the consequences. Whilst claiming that the “market” in OCPs was a reality and that the University of 
Perpignan was admirably attempting to engage in this, the CNE affirmed that the “degrees dispensed still have the label of a 
national French degree; the quality of teaching, the control of information and its supervision, the local providers, the 
recruitment of staff, all required an extreme rigour and the organisation of regular missions of a significant duration” by the 
University (CNE, 2003b: 20, 29,42).
157 An interviewee from the DRIC also claimed that this policy may have lapsed with the end of Jack Lang’s period in office.
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Although a number of the CNE’s reports did mention the numbers of international 
students attending particular HEIs,158 none attempted to analyse comparatively the 
services provided for international students in a way that could be used by potential 
students to differentiate between them. Only eleven out of the 117 institutional 
reports examined counselled HEIs to target particular countries as part of their 
recruitment strategies. Although attention was drawn by the CNE to the allegedly 
large numbers of African students attending a number of HEIs in nine reports, in 
two of its reports the CNE suggested that a small number of HEIs’ intakes were 
overly oriented towards European and/or North American students, directly going 
against the general tenor of government policy and against the commodification of 
international students. Overall, therefore, the extent to which the CNE’s reports 
could be described as promoting a commodification of international students was 
limited.
8 Conclusion
The creation of the CNE and its subsequent operations did not lead to a 
liberalisation of international students’ policy. This was particularly clear from its 
reticence to adopt quantitative indicators which could have been used to rank HEIs, 
which prevented its reports being used as a means to facilitate competition in the 
higher education sector. The extent to which its operations could be described as 
leading to a commodification of international students was also limited. Whilst the
158 Not all institutional reports mentioned international students; in three institutional reports they were not mentioned at all 
(CNE, 1996a; 1996b; 1996c), and in another, the only time when international students were mentioned was to note that 
there were none on a particular programme, with no accompanying commentary (CNE, 1999a: 49). The extent to which 
international student numbers were detailed by the CNE appeared to peak in the mid- to late 1990s before diminishing to 
around two thirds of reports mentioning this by 2003. A number of HEIs were criticised by the CNE for a lack of sufficient 
information concerning the numbers of international students (CNE, 1991 a; 2003a; 2003b), but not for the particular policies 
they had taken towards such students. The extent to which the numbers of such students were noted as either above or 
below average by the CNE also fluctuated over the period. Indeed, the CNE appeared to take a rather contradictory 
approach to international student numbers at times. In some reports it claimed that low international student numbers in 
relation to French student numbers indicated the operation of a strong degree of selectivity, rather than a lack of international 
attractiveness (CNE, 1991b: 139). In other reports, high numbers of international students, especially in doctoral 
programmes, were taken to suggest that insufficient efforts were being made to attract French students (CNE, 1995a). Even 
where very low international student numbers were noted, the CNE did not always recommend measures to improve the 
situation (CNE, 1992).
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QAA’s reports had a similarly limited impact on the commodification of international 
students, the publication of its more quantitative and comparative reports, and their 
availability to international students, allowed them to be used as a means of 
increasing competition between HEIs for the recruitment of international students.
The different approaches taken in the two evaluation systems can be explained by 
reference to the engagement of HEIs in defining the parameters of the new 
organisations, which itself depended on the extent of their coordination in sectoral 
associations. French HEIs, through the CPU as well as individually, played an 
important part in the definition of the CNE’s terms of reference, and its subsequent 
activities, from the first consultations over the loi Savary onwards. They were able 
to present a coordinated position against the use of assessment by the CNE. The 
CPU and CGE continued to support the CNE and to participate in the definition of 
its indicators and other matters. This contrasts with British HEIs’ fractured 
response in the face of assessment being adopted by the QAUs, HEQC (for OCP 
audits) and QAA. In contrast with the coordinated engagement of French HEIs, this 
lack of coordinated resistance amongst British HEIs persisted despite the 
opposition of many HEIs to the assessment-based approach of the QAA towards 
institutional evaluations.
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Fig. 14: CNE Institutional Evaluations: The Frequency of Comments concerning international Student Issues, per report per 
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Chapter 7: Financial institutions in Britain
1 Introduction
The introduction of full-cost fees for international students in 1979 marked a 
significant break with existing methods of higher education funding in Britain. 
Unlike the existing overall funding systems, it involved the predication of funds 
on international student numbers; and unlike existing attempts to control the 
extent of state expenditure on international students (differential fees and 
quotas), it had a substantial impact on both international students’ flows and 
on HEIs themselves. Most importantly, it gave HEIs an incentive to recruit 
more fee-paying international students.
The decision to institute the full-cost fees was made exclusively by the 
Department of Education and Science. The new fees were seen by the 
Department as a means of ending the public subsidy of international students, 
and of promoting entrepreneurialism amongst HEIs, through competition for 
the recruitment of international students. Although the full-cost fees decision 
was opposed by HEIs, they were unable to prevent the introduction of the new 
system, nor to alter the way in which it was operated (for example, to 
persuade central government to adopt an average rather than marginal cost 
figure, or to maintain high minimum fee levels). Different groups of HEIs had 
differing views over the appropriate parameters for the new system, which 
were not reconciled within their sectoral associations, and which diluted the 
impact of HEIs’ lobbying of government against the fees. The new full-cost 
fees system led to a liberalisation of international students’ policy, as it both 
commodified international students (giving them an immediate monetary value 
for HEIs to recruit), and gave HEIs incentives to compete against each other 
for the recruitment of full-fee paying students.
2 The pre-existing situation
None of the existing funding systems gave HEIs incentives to compete for 
international students, nor to treat international students as a commodity. Up 
to the mid-1960s, international students were linked to HEIs’ funding only to 
the extent that they were included in the calculation of student numbers which
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helped inform HEIs’ overall grants. From 1967, however, international 
students were required to pay differential fees, and in 1977 a quota system 
was introduced to control the numbers of international students. The following 
section reviews the existing institutional landscape, both in terms of the 
overall funding system for HEIs, and the specific arrangements for 
international students.
2.a The General funding system: unpredicated grants
Before 1979, government funding of HEIs consisted in unpredicated grants. 
The Universities Grants Council (UGC), and then, from 1989, the Universities 
Funding Council (UFC), which included representatives of HEIs and of central 
government, were used to decide on the exact distribution of these grants to 
universities. Initially, a number of polytechnics and higher education colleges 
were funded through Local Education Authorities (LEAs). In 1981, the LEAs’ 
provision of funding was centralised, with the creation of the National Advisory 
Board for Public Sector Higher Education, and in 1989, the NAB’s functions 
were transferred to the Polytechnics and Colleges Funding Council (PCFC). 
As a result, non-university polytechnics and colleges were now funded in a 
similar way to the universities, through unpredicated grants distributed by the 
funding councils.159
Rather than resting on incentives, as later used by the full-cost fees system, 
the existing funding system for HEIs was based on bureaucratic, formula- 
based criteria which had enabled a relatively stable flow of funds from 
government to HEIs from year to year.
2.b The limited introduction of differential fees
A system of differential fees for international students operated from 1967 
until 1979. This, limited, differential fee system did not have a significant 
impact on international student flows. Nor did it offer sufficient incentive to 
induce competitive behaviour between HEIs, or change the approach of HEIs 
towards viewing international students as commodities.
159 See Kogan and Hanney, 2000 and Moore, 1987 for surveys of higher education funding before1979.
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Until 1967, all costs for international students in British HEIs were covered by 
central government. The Robbins Committee, a wide-ranging review of British 
higher education published in the mid-1960s, had advised against differential 
fees for international and domestic students. However, it had noted the 
existence of a subsidy for international students, which it estimated at £9 
million for the 20,000 international students attending British HEIs at that time. 
The Committee counselled a more “rational” approach to fee calculation for 
both international and domestic students, proposing the introduction of an 
increased fee for both home and international students, with no differential. It 
also recommended that a fund be created to help needy international students 
(Williams, 1981b: 33-4).
The Robbins report viewed international students as useful for foreign policy 
and international development purposes, rather than seeing them as 
possessing a direct or indirect monetary value. The report stated:
“In our judgement this expenditure [on international students’ fees] 
is well justified. It is a form of foreign aid that has a definite objective 
and yields a tangible return in benefit to the recipients and in 
general goodwill. It is however an open question whether the aid is 
best given by subsidising fees; and it is a further question to what 
extent Parliaments of the future will permit it to grow without limit” 
(Robbins, 1963: Para. 175).
Three years later, the then Secretary of State for Education and Science, 
Anthony Crosland, introduced differential fees for international students, to 
apply from the academic year 1967-8. The fee for 1967-8 was set at three and 
a half times the nominal British student’s fee (Walker, 1997: 53); £250 in 
higher and advanced further education compared with £70 for home students 
(Williams, 1981b: 35). Between 1967 and 1980, the level of the differential fee 
was increased six times.160
160 Dr Rhodes Boyson, DES, quoted in Foreign Affairs Committee (Overseas Development Sub-Committee), 1980: 
117.
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The number of prospective international students applying to undertake a first 
degree in a British HEI through the university-run Universities Central Council 
on Admissions (UCCA)161 system fell from a record number of 9643 for 
1967162 to a low point of 7068 in 1969. Applications did not fully recover their 
1967 level until 1972 (Williams, 1981b: 35). However, half of the decline in 
numbers in 1967-8 was a result of a legal reinterpretation of the concept 
‘normal country of residence’, which shifted students previously defined to be 
overseas into the category of home students (Blaug, 1981: 52 footnote). In 
addition, inflation and a weak pound resulted in a real fall in the cost of fees 
payable by international students (Elsey and Kinnell, 1990: 2; Williams, 
1981a: 7), with the fee of £250 set in 1966 actually higher in constant money 
terms than the international undergraduate fee level in 1979-80 before full- 
cost fees were introduced (Williams, 1981b: 35). Attending a British HEI was, 
therefore, relatively cheap for international students, even given the 
requirement to pay differential fees (Cultural Relations Department, FCO, 
1987: 70).
Increases in international students’ differential fees were sometimes quite 
large in proportional terms: in 1977-8, the fee doubled for postgraduates and 
was increased by 50% for undergraduates. However, the fees charged to 
international students still constituted a relatively small element of the costs of 
their education, and the macroeconomic factors mentioned above further 
reduced the relative costs of the fees. The low level of the fees is, perhaps, 
reflected in the fact that even proportionately large increases (in the still 
minimal differential fees) had little effect on the overall numbers of 
international students, which increased from 31,000 in 1967-8 to 86,000 ten 
years later.163
The differential fee system was intended as a short-term expedient, rather 
than a fundamental alteration in policies towards international students. The 
then government stated that it hoped to be able to remove the differential
161 Renamed the Universities and Colleges Admissions Service in 1994.
162 Applications for entry had mostly been lodged before the announcement of higher fees in December 1966.
163 Mark Carlisle, Minister for Education and Science, quoted in Foreign Affairs Committee, 1979:194.
195
altogether, when the economic climate permitted (Williams, 1981b: 36).164 The 
fees were seen as a method of quickly improving the public finances, rather 
than a means of introducing entrepreneurialism into the higher education 
sector. They did not lead to extensive competition between HEIs, as the 
differential fee levels were too low for the recruitment of extra international 
students to be financially rewarding.
2.c The use of quotas
In 1977, the then Government abandoned attempts to regulate demand from 
international students through differential fees levels. Instead, it required HEIs 
to limit their numbers of international students to their levels two years earlier. 
A number of HEIs failed to heed this advice, generally the more established 
universities (Foreign Affairs Committee, 1979: 72). As the per capita funding 
system was not altered in line with the new policy, HEIs which had obeyed the 
government policy were effectively penalised (Education, Science and Arts 
Committee, 1980b: 153-4). Quota-breaking HEIs were not punished for 
recruiting extra international students, but were rewarded with extra funds. In 
effect, quota breaking HEIs were able to take “an independent stand on fee 
levels”, and even to refuse to “differentiate between categories of students”, 
as did Bradford University (THES, 19791). Clearly, the quota system did not 
give HEIs incentives to compete against each other for international students, 
nor to treat international students as commodities. Indeed, given the 
widespread incidence of ‘quota breaking’, the new system had negligible 
overall impact.
By 1978, the UGC, the universities’ funding council, was publicly expressing 
its doubt about the possibility of numerical limitation, and advocating a 
‘rational basis of contribution’ from international students (Universities Grants 
Committee, 1978). The Labour Government then switched back to supporting 
a limited increase in international student fees, at least to the extent that this 
policy was included by Shirley Williams, the then Minister of Education, in her 
‘thirteen points’, a memo indicating possible cost-cutting ventures drawn up
164 See also comments by Christopher Price, then a Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Education, 
concerning the introduction of the fees (Price, 1979).
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after a meeting with the UGC and CVCP (Kogan and Hanney, 2000: 146-7). 
However, neither the previous Labour government, the UGC nor the CVCP 
were in favour of international students being charged the full cost of their 
courses, and all three organisations opposed the policy when it was 
introduced by the incoming Conservative government in 1979.165
3 Government strategies
In 1981, the British government removed all subsidies for international 
students, and required HEIs to charge them for the ‘full costs’ of their tuition. 
This provided HEIs with incentives to compete against each other for 
international students, and to view international students as commodities. The 
full-cost fees system, like any incentives-based institution, relied “on tangible 
payoffs...to induce compliance” (Schneider and Ingram, 1990: 515). HEIs 
could receive additional funds from international students themselves, 
especially once the determination of fee pricing was entirely left to individual 
HEIs from 1993 onwards.
The decision to introduce full-cost fees for international students was made by 
one part of the then government (the Department for Education), with no 
consultation with HEIs. In November 1979, the Government’s Expenditure 
Plans for 1980-2 announced that new “overseas students or their sponsors 
will be expected in future to meet the full cost of their tuition” (Her Majesty’s 
Government, 1979a: 6). The government officially eschewed previous 
justifications for subsidising international students such as their merit for 
foreign policy or for international development.166
Rhodes Boyson, then a Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Education 
and Science, made this clear when he stated that:
165 I have found little evidence for Walker’s claim that Williams' decision constituted a “turning point in overseas 
student... policy”, especially compared with the far more wide-ranging actions of the subsequent government, and 
the fact that Williams' policy had little perceptible impact on international student numbers (Walker, 1997: 53). 
Commentators from this period more frequently suggested that international students should be more extensively 
subsidised by the state, rather than the reverse (see, for example, Klein, 1979: 310-1).
166 These arguments were particularly strongly articulated by British diplomats, some of whom broke precedent to 
appear in front of Select Committees considering the full-cost fees decision (O’Leary, 1980d; THES, 1979c).
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“All the groans [concerning the introduction of full-cost fees for 
international students] have come from the university lobbies and 
not from the general populace. Two out of five overseas students 
are from Iran and Nigeria. We do not seem to have gained much 
advantage from Iran, nor from Nigeria, who nationalised our oil 
without paying for it. If that is investment, it seems to be the worst 
we have ever made. The British universities are funded by the 
British rate and taxpayer, not from outer space” (THES, 1979m).
Henceforth, there was an increasing “pressure on higher education institutions 
to recruit (as opposed to receive) international students” (Walker, 1997: 72). 
The Government maintained that the decision was justified by the level of 
savings to public expenditure expected from introducing full-cost fees.167 
Government, rather than HEIs, also recognised that the new fees system 
would lead to a commodification of international students, and publicised its 
support for such an approach. The possibility of HEIs acting entrepreneurial^ 
towards international students was a significant element in the government’s 
decision to introduce the fees. Hence, Sir James Hamilton, then the 
Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Department of Education and Science, 
having noted the apparently strong demand for British higher education, 
claimed that the LSE was preparing to use its “very good saleable 
asset....and go out and sell it”. According to Hamilton, there was “a market 
economy in operation here”, with some HEIs “going to be able to charge 
higher fees because they are attractive” (Education, Science and Arts 
Committee, 1980a, paras.742, 779 and 789). Again, the then government 
noted in its reply to an Education, Science and Arts Select Committee report 
that a policy “of encouraging institutions to behave in an entrepreneurial 
manner in generating income from overseas students should be given greater
167 It should be noted that there was some ambiguity over the exact magnitude of these savings. Baroness Young, 
the then Minister of State at the Department of Education and Science, had claimed £130 million would be saved 
whilst in the House of Commons the Government had claimed the saving would be closer to £100 million. Mark 
Carlisle, then the Secretary of State for Education and Science, claimed that the £130 million was a rounding-up of 
the £127.5 million expected to be saved in 1978/9 , and another DES representative claimed that the £100 million 
referred to a 'steady state’ saving following an initial reduction of international student numbers in the three years 
taken after the decision (Education, Science and Arts Committee, 1980a: 297, para.720. See also Education,
Science and Arts Committee, 1979: viii, para. 17).
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emphasis” (Her Majesty’s Government, 1980a: 6). The government also noted 
that the UGC’s “guidelines recommended to universities, which set only 
minimum fees, gave them some scope for an entrepreneurial approach and 
there is evidence that several are taking advantage of this” (ibid.:6-7).168 
Government was thus instrumental in pushing the view that HEIs should use 
the full-cost fees system to adopt an entrepreneurial approach to international 
student recruitment, thus viewing international students as valuable for 
monetary purposes, and ultimately leading to their commodification.
Government also defined the parameters of the new system by setting 
minimum rather than maximum fee amounts. By 1981-2, the average fee level 
per student was varying by up to £600 over the amount recommended by the 
funding council, the UGC, for students who had started in that year, and by 
£1,100 for those students who had started their courses the previous year 
(Committee of Public Accounts, 1982: 41). If government had set a higher 
minimum fee for international students’ education, less price differentiation 
downwards would have occurred.
4 HEIs’ strategies and coordination
Most HEIs were critical of the predicted effects of the fees on their existing 
international student intake, and all HEI sectoral associations opposed it,169 
with the then Chairman of the CVCP maintaining that universities were 
“unanimous” in opposing the plans (Education, Science and Arts Committee, 
1980c: 92). As Williams notes, a “good part of the opposition to the overseas 
student policy came from Vice-Chancellors and principals who could not see 
how their institutions were to remain solvent when faced with a withdrawal of 
part of their grants” (Williams, 1981c: 225). Although high-profile academics, 
such as Randolph Quirk, then Vice-Chancellor of London University,
168 See also Kinnell, 1990:13.
169 For evidence of the sectoral associations’ opposition to the full-cost fees proposal, see their memoranda to the 
Education, Science and Arts Committee; the CVCP (universities’ sectoral association) memorandum (Education, 
Science and Arts Committee, 1980c: 80); the Association of Principals of Colleges’ memorandum (ibid.] 105); and the 
CDP’s (Committee of Directors of Polytechnics) memorandum (ibid.: 134-5); and also comments from Dr Bethel, then 
chairman of the CDP, reported to the Committee (ibid.: 127).
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continued to make their opposition to the full-cost fees well known,170 as did 
many HEI representatives throughout the early 1980s (Walker, 1997: 53),
HEIs were unable to get the measure rescinded.
There appears to have been some disagreement over whether the CVCP was 
against the proposal in principle, or merely in detail. Sir Alec Merrison, the 
then chair of the CVCP, admitted that he did not “think that the actual aim [of 
reducing international students’ numbers] is a disaster” (Merrison, 1980: 286). 
Indeed, Merrison appeared to agree that the resource implications of the 
overseas fee decision could be absorbed by other sources of funding, such as 
the extra funds proposed in a review of engineering education (the Finniston 
report) (Peston, 1980: 292). However, the widespread perception of the 
CVCP was that it had failed to engage in any strategic analysis of the problem, 
and to coordinate an alternative position. Certainly, on occasion Merrison also 
suggested that the CVCP was merely reacting to government proposals, 
rather than developing its own, as in his comment that the CVCP was 
“throwing up a great stone wall to what the Government is doing” (Merrison, 
1980). Hence, the CVCP was criticised for an un-“statesmanlike response”, 
which merely “defend[ed] established practice (Gardner, 1980), and for 
proving unable to “give leadership (other than that of saying that things are 
very well as they are, thank you) in a matter in which they running should 
have been made by them” (Tolley, 1980: 302).
Eventually, the CVCP did propose two alternative strategies which, however, 
appear to have had little impact. Firstly, the CVCP supported and arranged a 
support scheme for outstanding overseas student research postgraduates. 
Perhaps due to the hasty introduction of the scheme, it did not prove a 
success, at least initially, and concerned a very small proportion of 
postgraduates compared to the numbers affected by the full-cost fees policy 
(THES, 1980e). Secondly, the CVCP followed the example of the Association 
of University Teachers, one of the higher education trade unions, and drew up 
a report on the full benefits accruing to the British economy and its society
170 Quirk described the decision as “a disaster resulting in a deterioration in relations with friendly countries” (Cited 
in Williams, 1990).
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from international students (THES, 19791). Again, this report appears to have 
had little effect on government policy.
The Committee of Directors of Polytechnics (CDP), for its part, also called for 
a scholarship scheme to be created from the profits of the full-cost fees 
(THES, 1979g). The CDP was criticised for articulating an overly moderate 
position in relation to the introduction of the fees (THES, 19791), although, as 
its then chair, David Bethel, maintained, this was as a result of trying to 
articulate an alternative, and realistic, position. Bethel was concerned to 
situate the full-cost fees proposal within the context of existing cuts to higher 
education funding, claiming that a longer-term perspective was needed on the 
part of government (ibid.).
The heterogeneous nature of the HEI sectoral association memberships 
made it difficult for HEIs’ sectoral associations to mobilise against the decision, 
despite the opposition of HEIs to the proposal.
As a representative of the Association of Principals of Colleges noted, it was 
“not easy to get a consensus of opinion from 6 to 700 institutions operating at 
different levels with different numbers of overseas students ranging from nil to 
many hundreds”. As a result, he said, HEIs had tended to work “individually” 
on the full-cost fees decision.171 The number of international students even 
just amongst pre-1992 HEIs ranged from three in 1980 at St David’s College 
Lampeter (HESA statistics) to 75% of intake for the same year at the London 
School of Hygiene and Tropical Science (National Union of Students, 1980: 
189, para.25).
HEIs adopted a variety of responses to the full-cost fees policy, despite their 
sectoral associations’ attempts to articulate a coordinated position. Hence, 
although Manchester University attempted to subvert the new fees, by giving 
international students an extended deadline for payment (THES, 19791), its 
action was not extensively supported by other HEIs. There was a certain
171 Evidence from Mr Farnsworth from the Association of Principals of Colleges, Foreign Affairs Committee, 1979: 
105.
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amount of intra-sectoral conflict concerning the consequences of the new fees, 
with the Vice-Chancellor of London University being particularly keen to 
criticise polytechnics, who he claimed were “benefiting unfairly out of fees” 
(THES, 1979h),172 and to warn that universities of lesser prestige than his own 
might reduce the standards of their admissions in order to gain more fee 
revenue (David, 1979). Differences over the merits of the fees even existed 
within the same HEI. Hence, although supported by its governors (THES, 
1979f), an occupation at North London Polytechnic by international students 
against the fees was criticised by its Director (O’Leary, 1979) and eventually 
dispersed by police (THES, 1979k). Sheffield University also took action 
against their students protesting against the measure; whilst the acting Vice- 
Chancellor of Lancaster University actually took part in an occupation of his 
own senate chamber, against the fees (ibid).
As discussed below, the lack of coordination between HEIs was even more 
pronounced concerning the institutional parameters of the fees policy. HEIs 
differed over the question whether the minimum fee level should or should not 
be abandoned, as well as what amount of additional fees should be charged 
over and above the minimum level.
5 Establishment of new institutions
Although full-cost fees for international students were heavily criticised by 
HEIs the government refused to rescind its decision. Hence, for example, the 
Foreign Affairs Select Committee proposed that international students from 
the Commonwealth should be charged the same fees as European students, 
but this was rejected by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). The 
FCO claimed that the let-out for European students from full-cost fees, 
compared with other international students, was justified by the reciprocal 
exchanges of British students attending European HEIs (Her Majesty’s 
Government, 1985b: 7), and that it was therefore impractical and unfair to 
subsidise Commonwealth students in the same way. The idea that student 
exchanges between Britain and the rest of Europe are conducted on a
172 A  rather surprising statement given the subsequent precipitous decline in the numbers of international students 
at polytechnics, and then ex-polytechnics, compared with those at traditional universities (see p.211).
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reciprocal basis has become increasingly untenable as British students have 
become proportionally less mobile (Corbett and Footit, 2001). Rather than 
leading to attempts to extend the subsidy for European students to non- 
European international students, perceptions of the imbalance were at one 
point adduced by civil servants as warranting the introduction of differential 
fees for European students.173
Over the next three years, the public subsidy to HEIs was gradually withdrawn 
in respect of their international students, as were quota restrictions on the 
numbers of international students. Almost immediately afterwards, Malaysia 
began a ‘Buy British Last’ campaign in an attempt to change Government 
policy,174 but this had little effect. From September-October 1980, the 
implementation of the full-cost fees policy began, with no qualifications.175 A 
minimum fee level was set by government (which was higher for non­
university HEIs in England and Wales), at different levels for laboratory and 
classroom-based subjects.
Initially, most HEIs suffered a cut in total funding as a result of the full-cost 
fees decision. As Kogan and Hanney note, the reduction in recurrent grant for
173 This proposal was, however, quickly disowned by the Minister, Baroness Blackstone. See minutes of evidence 
for, and recommendation 108 of, the House of Lords' Select Committee report on Student Mobility in the European 
Community (House of Lords’ Select Committee on Europe, 1998).
174 A title chosen to parody the Buy British First catchphrase of the time (Walker, 1997:62).
175 There is some ambiguity over the exact origins of the full-cost fees decision. When Mark Carlisle, the then 
Secretary of State for Education and Science, was asked whether the fact that the Junior Education and Science 
Minister Rhodes Boyson had called the decision a “financial" decision implied that it has been proposed by the 
Treasury, he replied in the negative. Carlisle claimed that he had meant “financial decision” to indicate a decision 
“taken in the context of looking at public expenditure....a collective decision taken in the context of a collective 
Cabinet decision in which each Department is represented” (Mark Carlisle quoted in Education, Science and Arts 
Committee, 1980a: 295, para.710). However, an interviewee claimed that a Treasury civil servant made clear during 
a meeting held by the Overseas Student Trust in 1978 that she had drawn up the plans for introducing full-cost fees 
(interview with former Overseas Student Trust employee). This appears corroborated by claims of a lack of inter­
departmental consultation before the full-cost fees decision, especially with the Foreign Office. The Government 
refused to reveal the details of its discussions leading up to the decision on grounds of ministerial confidentiality and 
responsibility, after these were requested by the Education, Science and Arts Select Committee (Her Majesty's 
Government, 1980b: 4). The Select Committee then suggested that this reticence breached recommendations of the 
Procedure Committee concerning the provision of information to Select Committees (Education, Science and Arts 
Committee, 1980e: 1-2), but to little effect. I have found no evidence for Walker’s claim that the “key players” during 
the full-cost fees decision “were the Treasury and the Cabinet” in opposition to the DES and the FCO (Walker, 1997: 
59).
203
international student fees and the 1981 funding cuts resulted in a loss of 
about 13-15% of individual universities’ income over the three years up to 
1984 (Kogan and Hanney, 2000: 86). Nonetheless, whilst in 1979-80 the fee 
payments for 13,122 people were £11.088 million, by 1981-2 the fees 
received for 12,417 people were £18.687 million (Foreign Affairs Committee 
(Overseas Development Sub-Committee), 1983c). By 1983-4 the income from 
full-cost fee paying international students amounted to £90.3 million for the 
university sector as a whole (UKCOSA, 1986: 145, para.9). By 1985, the 
Central Statistical Office’s UK Balance of Payments book showed a return to 
UK HEIs of £250 million from international students’ fees (Limerick, 1987).
It has been claimed that the impact of the decision was slightly diluted by the 
introduction of the so-called ‘Pym Package’ of Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office scholarships for international students.176 However, all of the funds for 
the package were re-allocated from existing international development and 
foreign policy funds, and as a result, as the Overseas Student Trust noted, the 
Pym Package contained “very little ‘new money’” (Overseas Student Trust, 
1987: 2).
In addition, the funds provided through the Pym Package and through other 
scholarship schemes are minor compared to those from full-cost tuition fees 
for international students. By 1997, the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and 
Principals estimated that scholarship support for international students 
amounted to around £115 million (Back etal., 1997: 4). Johnes has calculated 
that the higher education sector as a whole received £1257.8 million in fee 
revenue from international students in 2003-4, after scholarship funding and 
other costs had been subtracted (Johnes, 2004: 10).177
176 The Package was introduced in February 1983 following extensive lobbying by the Overseas Students’ Trust and 
other interested parties, such as Lord Deedes, the editor of the Daily Telegraph (interview with former Overseas 
Student Trust employee). The new measure was described by interviewees as an attempt by the FCO to mitigate the 
consequences of the Department of Education’s original full-cost fees decision. This £46 million package was 
composed of £21 million reallocated support from the Overseas Development Agency and £25 from the contingency 
reserve (Foreign Affairs Committee (Overseas Development Sub-Committee), 1983c).
177 See also British Council, Universities UK and IDP Education Australia, 2004.
204
6 How the full-cost fees system operated in practice
It was not until 1993-4 that the government stopped setting minimum fees for 
international students (Back et al., 1997), and allowed HEIs complete freedom 
in this area. Until this point, government continued to dominate the manner in 
which the full-cost fees system was implemented. Its influence was 
particularly marked concerning three issues; the determination of the ‘full cost’ 
of an international student; the imposition of a ‘minimum’ fee; and the 
classification of international students for fee purposes. Although HEIs were 
generally opposed to central government’s position on these matters, they 
were unable to mount coherent opposition to it through their sectoral 
associations.
6.a ‘Full cost’ as ‘average cost’
The decision to set the fees for international students at the average, rather 
than marginal, cost of their education was taken by government, and opposed 
by HEIs.
Mark Carlisle, the then Secretary of State for Education and Science, claimed 
that when only ten to twelve per cent of the student population was involved, 
the “only fair basis is unit costing rather than marginal costing”, but accepted 
that this might result in the UGC having to decide to close some courses 
(Education, Science and Arts Committee, 1980a: para.744). The ‘cost’ of 
educating an international student was initially specified not by individual HEIs, 
but by the Universities Grants Committee (the UFC from 1988), the 
Polytechnics and Colleges Funding Councils, and, before 1989, the Council of 
Local Education Authorities, the bodies which managed the distribution of 
funds to the higher education sector (all of which were replaced from 1992 by 
the Higher Education Funding Councils for England, Wales and Scotland).
A number of representatives from HEIs claimed that some of their courses 
were only viable due to the attendance of international students.178 Charging 
international students the average cost for their studies did not reflect the true
178 This was the case, for example, for the industrial knitting course at Leicester Polytechnic (Education, Science 
and Arts Committee, 1980c: 127-8).
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cost to the HEI of hosting the student, which could be considerably less due to 
economies of scale. Despite this opposition, HEIs were unable to charge fees 
which reflected marginal costs until the total deregulation of international 
students’ fees in 1993.
6.b The use of ‘minimum fees’
As previously noted the fee was set as a minimum; HEIs were allowed to 
charge international students more but not less than this average cost figure.
The figure was initially based on the “true costs” of courses in arts, science 
and medicine at the “cheapest” HEIs. However, in 1980 the exact basis of fee 
calculations was changed, from reflecting the level of their studies at 
university, to the subject of study (arts, sciences or medicine). By 1981-2, the 
average fee level per student was varying by up to £600 over the UGC- 
recommended amount, for students who had started in that year, and by 
£1,100 for those students who had started their courses the previous year 
(Committee of Public Accounts, 1982: 41).
As a result of the ‘low’ minimum charge, HEIs charging the minimum fee were 
unlikely to recoup all the costs arising from educating their international 
students (ibid.: 7). The UGC actually counselled HEIs not to use the minima 
as recommended fee levels, since if all HEIs charged the minimum fee, this 
would significantly reduce the amount of funds entering higher education and 
threaten the viability of many HEIs (Universities Grants Committee, 1981).
The Department of Education and Science threatened HEIs which undercut 
the minimum fee with the withdrawal of their exemption from the Race 
Relations Act 1976. This threat was rather paradoxical, as the Act was 
intended to prevent discrimination between persons of different races when 
accessing services (the original exemption had been introduced in 1967 to 
enable the charging of differential fees) (Crequer, 1980a).
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Despite the UGC’s advice, the vast majority of HEIs charged their 
international students the minimum fees; £2000 for arts, £3000 for science 
and £5000 for medicine and allied subjects- the minimum fees.179
From 1983 onwards, a number of HEIs argued for the abolition of the 
minimum fee, claiming that this was holding them back from attracting more 
international students. Peter Williams from the Institute of Education noted 
that the appropriateness of the minimum fee differed according to the specific 
situation of the HEI, and that hence a more flexible fee-pricing regime was 
required (Foreign Affairs Committee (Overseas Development Sub-Committee), 
1983b (was c): 42, para. 127). In some cases, HEIs were effectively “making a 
profit” on international student fees due to low marginal costs, whilst others 
were making a loss due to high marginal costs.180 UKCOSA, the Council for 
International Education, also argued for the abolition of the minimum fee.181 
UKCOSA claimed that the removal of the minimum fee level “would be 
welcomed as a step towards removing the cost deterrent effect of the current 
fee structure”. Nonetheless, it claimed that ‘complete’ price competition would 
make it more difficult for potential international students to choose their HEI.
However, not all HEIs supported a reduction in the minimum fee level. As Mr 
Parker from UKCOSA acknowledged, “this particular question is one that 
does raise, certainly, a lot of anxiety amongst institutions about the possibility 
of competition for students on numbers as well as quality, whereas other 
institutions have a greater degree of enthusiasm”.182 In particular, the then 
umbrella body for the supervisory organisations for the non-university sector, 
the Council of Local Education Authorities (CLEA), was opposed to the 
abolition of the minimum fee. It argued that its removal could lead to 
destructive competition. As Dr Rickett from Middlesex Polytechnic noted, the
179 According to information collected by the CVCP and reported in THES, 1980f.
180 Noted by Mr Merritt with respect to his own institution (quoted in Foreign Affairs Committee (Overseas
Development Sub-Committee), 1983a: 66, para.218).
181 This organisation had been set up in 1968 by HEIs, student associations and other interested bodies, to 
coordinate international students’ welfare services across the UK.
182 Mr Townsend and Mr Parker, from UKCOSA, quoted in Foreign Affairs Committee (Overseas Development Sub­
committee), 1983b: 33-4.
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CLEA was less concerned about flexibility upwards than about flexibility 
downwards (Foreign Affairs Committee (Overseas Development Sub­
committee), 1983b: 56, para. 178). Abolishing the minima would distort 
international student enrolments. Firstly, LEAs might, they claimed, be unable 
to “stand the loss of fee income which would be a likely consequence of such 
a move into open competition” (Council of Local Education Authorities, 1983: 
70). Secondly, low fee levels might allow courses to remain open which 
should have been shown up as unviable. Finally, reducing fees might have no 
perceptible effect on enrolments, if international student enrolments were 
relatively price-inelastic, and only lead to a reduction in resource for LEAs and 
thus for polytechnics and higher education colleges.
The CLEA also argued against allowing HEIs to vary the fees they charged 
international students beyond the then current levels. They claimed that such 
a policy would contradict the CLEA’s policy of “rationalising and harmonising 
fee levels with minimal regional variations” in order to reduce price 
competition between LEAs (ibid.). In addition, the introduction of competition 
between HEIs for international students appeared, to the CLEA, to run against 
overall Government policy, with the British HE system generally “moving 
much more to central control and direction”. “Having set up the National 
Advisory Body183 and then saying to the institutions, ‘You can charge different 
fees’, it just is not in line with the present Government’s thinking”, claimed a 
CLEA representative.184
Overall, the question of the level and desirability of minimum fees attracted a 
range of views from British HEIs. A survey from the Overseas Student Trust 
maintained that 50% of HEIs contacted preferred a system for the setting of 
international students’ fees which relied on “minimum recommended 
guidelines”, but others preferred complete deregulation. Not all HEIs 
“universally welcomed” the idea that “institutions should be given total 
freedom to charge whatever rates they wished” (Fielden and Dalrymple, 1987:
183 See p.73.
184 Mrs Harrison, Council of Local Education Authorities, quoted in Foreign Affairs Committee (Overseas 
Development Sub-Committee), 1983a: 75, para.246.
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116). This was reflected in the lack of any coherent CVCP or CDP position on 
this matter.
6.c The classification of international students for fee purposes
In addition to altering the amounts of fees paid by international students for 
attending British HEIs, governments also attempted to change the scope of 
coverage of the new fees system, through classifying new groups of students 
as ‘international’, rather than domestic, for fees purposes.
A number of court cases were brought in the early 1980s by aspirant students 
attempting to have rescinded decisions made by local councils that they could 
not be held responsible for paying their fees. The complainants in question 
were not born in Britain, or were the children of diplomats.185 The cases were 
brought after a letter from the Universities Grants Council redefined “overseas 
students” in terms of their “ordinary residence”;186 any student was classified 
as “overseas” where she or he had not been “ordinarily resident” in Britain 
(Parker, 1980). However, the exact meaning of “ordinary residence” was 
unclear, and the Department of Education and Science (DES) was apparently 
unwilling itself to offer a definition of the term until after the court cases (THES, 
1980d; 1980b). During this period the DES came under heavy criticism by 
some academics, who asked the government to “make up its mind” (THES, 
1980c), although the CVCP did not appear to take up a position on the matter. 
It was two years before Lord Scarman definitively ruled that anyone who had 
lived permanently in Britain for the previous three years had been “ordinarily 
resident”.
However, in 1994, Westminster City Council was challenged in court by the 
World University Service,187 when fourteen refugees were refused grants on 
the ground that they had not been granted indefinite leave to remain for at 
least three years prior to the start of the course. Before this point, any stay of
185 See Hodges, 1982; The Times, 1981; 1982.
186 The concept was originally used for the determination of tax liability (THES, 1980b).
187 An organisation contracted by the then Government to offer educational opportunities to refugees, and often 
involved as an 'advocacy' organisation on issues concerning asylum seeker and refugee education.
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three years’ length in Britain had been sufficient to obtain a mandatory award, 
as codified in Scarman’s 1982 ruling. Westminster City Council justified its 
position by claiming it had lost significant sums through bogus claims (THES, 
1993b). Some local councils, however, adopted a contrasting approach, by 
drawing up an ‘educational entitlement’ for asylum seekers.188
Following the Westminster Council case the DES started to consider changes 
to student fees and awards, such that HEIs could charge asylum-seekers a 
higher rate for part-time courses (THES, 1994c). The DES’ consultation 
process aimed at the production of a new set of Fees and Awards 
Regulations. The way in which HEIs were consulted was criticised by some 
interest groups. The consultation document asked HEIs whether they would 
“be prepared to offer fee concessions to part-time overseas students who 
have applied for refugee status”. The World University Service claimed that 
because the consultation document avoided the term “asylum seeker”, it 
suggested that such students had come to study rather than to flee 
persecution (THES, 1994a; 1994b; 1995a). As a result, asylum-seeking 
students were henceforth classified as international students for fee purposes, 
although HEIs were, the government maintained, not “obliged to charge a 
higher fee, and would be free to use their discretion” (Davies, 1994).
7 Did the full-cost fees system lead to a liberalisation of international 
students’ policy?
The full-cost fees system led both to a commodification of international 
students, and to competition between HEIs for the recruitment of international 
students. The new financial institution can, therefore, be described as 
‘liberalising’ given the definition used in this thesis.
7.a Commodification
The new regime immediately ‘priced’ a number of potential international 
students, especially those from poorer countries, out of being able to access 
British higher education. As a result, the numbers of international students
188 Lewisham, Woolwich, Southwark and Lambeth (see THES, 1993c).
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from richer countries immediately increased compared to those from 
developing countries. HEIs were also required to market their programmes to 
potential international students if they were to use the new full-cost fees as a 
method of subsidising cuts in government funding.189 This resulted in 
international students becoming treated as customers and consumers of 
British higher education.
The largest initial drop in the number of international students occurred in the 
non-university sector, and was mainly attributed to its higher minimum fee 
level (Bethel, 1983: 128). Up to the mid-1980s, the numbers of international 
students at non-university HEIs dropped from 13,800 to 12,100 (Taylor, 1985: 
para. 2). The non-university sector was also subject to cuts in its funding for 
exceeding predicted international student levels. In contrast, the university 
sector was, at least in theory, able to compensate restrictions in domestic 
student levels by increasing numbers of international students, which were not 
restricted (National Union of Students, 1980: 188).
The full-cost fees decision also led to a decline in international students’ 
numbers in the university sector, albeit to a lesser extent (THES, 1979i, 
1979e). The World University Service noted a drop in the number of 
international students of approximately 30,000 between 1979-80 and 1982-3, 
affecting universities as well as higher education colleges and polytechnics. 
The British Council claimed that there had been a fall of 38% in the numbers 
of international students from 1978-9 to 1984-5 (British Council, 1987: 149).
However, following a dip in numbers or slow growth for most areas up to the 
mid-1980s, numbers then increased greatly especially from 1993 onwards. 
Interviewees noted that even some populations like Malaysia which had been 
most affected initially by the full-cost fees decision, picked up in later years 
(interview with Trade Partners UK employee; interview with former British 
Council employee).
189 For more information on the marketing of British and French higher education abroad, see chapters three and 
four which consider the creation and operation of promotional agencies in each country.
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One group which was not affected by this upturn was students from 
developing countries. The WUS claimed that the first year of full-cost fees, 
1980-1, saw a decline of 3,042 in students coming from poor countries, a 
more significant drop than that occurring in richer countries (Foreign Affairs 
Committee (Overseas Development Sub-Committee), 1983c). UKCOSA 
claimed that the decline in numbers “was sustained almost entirely by the 
developing countries which suffered a 40% drop” between 1979-80 and 1982- 
3 (UKCOSA, 1986: 145). Figures three and four in chapter two indicate 
graphically how this decline continued throughout the period examined.
Such a drop did not necessarily affect the poorest potential students, as most 
of these had already been screened out by the domestic education system 
and other processes. Hence, many students coming to Britain even through 
the “aid and development” programmes were “rich kids” (Interview with British 
Council employee). However, an interviewee maintained that “[a]t least before, 
you could base your selections on needs....[w]hereas now [i.e. following the 
full-cost fees decision], it’s all dictated by the market” (interview with British 
Council employee). From 1980 onwards, international students were able to 
attend British HEIs if they could afford the fees, rather than if they had been 
successful in scholarship competitions or were able to participate in joint 
educational programmes. This is especially clear in the relative decline of 
students coming from African countries (see p.88).
In addition to commodifying international students, through prioritising those 
students from countries seen as economically advantageous to Britain- away 
from developing nations and towards developed and emerging economy 
countries- the full-cost fees decision also led to a commodification of 
international students as customers and consumers of higher education. The 
introduction of full-cost fees led to a number of HEIs developing their own 
marketing strategies, in an attempt to limit the impact of government funding 
cuts through recruiting more full fee-paying international students.190 Initially,
190 It is not the case that such “professional commercialized marketing of UK higher education began” only in the 
run-up to the introduction of tuition fees in 1998, as appears to be suggested by Williams and Evans (Williams and 
Evans, 2005: 77).
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some commentators (particularly from the National Union of Students) 
described these strategies as rather “embarrassing”191 and as threatening 
academic standards.192 However, as successive cuts in the unit of resource 
further reduced institutional income, increasing numbers of HEIs attempted to 
increase their numbers of international students (as previously noted, 
international students did not count towards the Maximum Aggregate Student 
Number (the MASN)). Hence, the University of Stirling attempted to tackle a 
reduction in government funding by “increasing the number of overseas 
students, particularly through the provision of new courses attractive to the 
overseas student” (Education, Science and Arts Committee, 1982: 4), with the 
University “devoting a very considerable amount of effort to publicising the 
programmes we already have...” to potential international students.193 As one 
faculty leader interviewed by Williams and Evans rather bluntly put it, “[IJet’s 
be quite frank, we want the money, we want international students” (Williams, 
and Evans, 2005: 75). In line with such an perspective, the Education,
Science and Arts Committee proposed that “entrepreneurial” promotional 
efforts might be supported by the Export Credit Guarantee Department 
(Education, Science and Arts Committee, 1980d: 1, para. 140).
The full-cost fees decision also required HEIs to market their courses 
overseas in a manner which they would not otherwise have done.
As Professor John Ashworth, then Vice-Chancellor of Salford University, 
maintained, prior to 1981
‘the very idea of simply ‘marketing’ higher education would have 
struck most dons in Britain’s universities as demeaning and 
certainly conduct unbecoming to the scholars and gentlemen so 
many of them aspired to be... Now the universities are marketing 
themselves...with a vigour that reminds one of Johnson’s wry
191 Quote from Mr Phillips, NUS President, concerning the LSE’s policy to “tout for students in the United States 
which I frankly think any Government ought to find a bit embarassing” (Foreign Affairs Committee, 1979:72).
192 Mr Watson of the NUS claimed that "whilst the grades required of home students have increased the 
educational qualifications of overseas students have probably fallen’’ (Foreign Affairs Committee (Overseas 
Development Sub-Committee), 1983a: 24, para. 64).
193 Prof. Timms of Stirling University, quoted in Education, Science and Arts Committee, 1982.
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observation of the way in which the prospect of hanging 
concentrates the mind’ (reported in Shotnes, 1987: 101).
This was formally acknowledged in the Jarratt Report, which noted that 
international student recruitment could represent a “valuable source of 
income” in the context of “restricted funding [being likely] for some time” 
(CVCP, 1985: 16). From the first introduction of the full-cost fees, a number of 
HEIs developed revenue-raising programmes for international students (as at 
the LSE (Crequer and Hempel, 1980), and at Essex, Bath and Keele 
universities (Crequer, 1980b; THES,1980g; 1980j)). HEIs such as Manchester 
Business School began to target specific international students who would be 
able to afford the new fees, with the US being especially popular (Cookson, 
1979). As Cave etal. succinctly summarise, “[educating overseas 
students...became a more commercial activity as the exchequer subsidy was 
ended” (Cave etal., 1995: 93).
International students were thus increasingly being recruited for their 
contribution to HEIs’ revenue levels, rather than for pedagogical or 
development objectives, and were thus (according to the definition used here) 
increasingly commodified. As a result, the creation of the full-cost fees system 
aided the liberalisation of international students’ policy in Britain.
7.b Competition
Unlike the original differential fees system introduced in 1967, the full-cost 
fees system stimulated competition between HEIs, as the sums involved were 
sufficient to justify HEIs taking on additional international students to boost 
income, especially in a context of reduced government funding.
Many commentators have described the recruitment of international students 
as analogous to, or even directly constituting, a market, involving competition 
between HEIs as well as between countries.194 It is important, however, to 
specify the dimensions along which competition between HEIs occurred. 
Whether or not HEIs competed over price or over the numbers of international
194 See, for example, Williams, G.L., 1992: 66.
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students recruited is seldom made explicit, nor are the implications of such 
competition made clear. Hence, a recent White Paper on the Future of Higher 
Education in Britain notes that currently, HEIs charge “overseas 
students...market rates for fees” (Her Majesty’s Government, 2003: para.7.2), 
without specifying how such a ‘market rate’ might have been determined.
To consider whether the full-cost fees decision led to increased competition 
between HEIs, and what type of competition might have been induced, the fee 
levels and numbers of international students at forty-six pre-1992 universities 
were compared from 1980-1981 until 2001-2002. This covers the period since 
the introduction of full-cost fees in 1980-81, through the removal of the 
minimum on international students’ fees in 1993-4. These forty-six HEIs were 
chosen as the only universities and higher education colleges which had 
continued with a roughly similar structure and identity throughout the period, 
and for whom there were no significant data errors.195 This obviously excludes 
all previously non-university HEIs, many of which became universities soon 
after 1992. Unfortunately there is no adequate data set which includes these 
HEIs for the duration of the period studied.196 Data from UniversitiesUK’s 
annual survey on international students’ fees is also used to provide some 
additional contextual detail. As the Northern Ireland Office did not raise 
international fees to full-cost fees, but left the subsidies in place (McGill, 1979), 
Northern Irish HEIs are not considered in the analysis below.
7.b.i The numbers of international students recruited to different HEIs
195 Although there was considerable consolidation and reorganisation in the Welsh higher education sector over the 
period studied, it was possible to track most institutions even although some changed title. I adopted the following 
conventions: University College of Wales Aberystwyth was treated as equivalent to University of Wales, Aberystwyth; 
University College of Wales Cardiff was treated as equivalent to University of Wales Cardiff; Bangor University 
College was treated as equivalent to University College of North Wales- Bangor; University College of Swansea was 
treated as equivalent to University of Wales, Swansea. In addition, Loughborough Institute of Technology was treated 
as equivalent to Loughborough University. The University of London was initially treated as a single category in 
statistics on fee levels, before being differentiated into its component units. As a result, I was unable to treat 
institutions continuously and had to remove the University of London colleges from the analysis. Continuous data 
was also unavailable for the Manchester Business School. FinrJIy, London Business School was excluded due to an 
error in the collection of its fee data which HESA was unable to account for (and which LBS apparently does not hold 
in-house).
196 This is unfortunate since, as indicated above, the full-cost fees decision had a disproportionate effect on 
maintained sector HEIs.
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The numbers of international students attending particular HEIs changed 
greatly from 1979 to 2002. By examining the distribution of international 
students attending particular HEIs, it is possible to assess whether all HEIs 
gained equivalent levels of revenue from the new fees, or whether the 
increased revenue was concentrated amongst a small number of HEIs. Figure 
15 details the yearly changes in the distribution of HEIs concerning their 
numbers of international students paying fees classified as “other fees” (i.e., 
non-domestic fees)197 from 1980-1 to 2001-2198 for the forty-six HEIs 
examined.
The relative stratification of HEIs according to their numbers of international 
students can be shown by calculating the standard deviation of their 
distribution on this measure for succeeding years. Initially, the distribution of 
international students attending different HEIs appeared to converge slightly. 
However, by 1982-3 this convergence was replaced by increasing divergence 
between HEIs, with the difference between HEIs’ intakes of international 
students increasing year on year (with the exception of a small increase in 
convergence during 1986-8). By 2001, the HEIs in the sample ranged from St 
David’s university college with fifty-four international students to Nottingham 
University with 2651 international students.
197 It should be noted that the definition of 'other' fees changed during the period. Until 1998-9, fees for students of 
overseas domiciles were included within the category 'full-time fees- other rates’. This category included fees 
charged to UK students who were charged full-cost and other fees, but whose numbers were limited. Until 1998-9, 
the category of ‘full-time fees- other rates’ was the only HESA measure to approximate overseas fee income. From 
1998-9 onwards, however, HESA began to use a separate category for 'overseas domicile (non-EU) fee income’. 
This category has been used from this period onwards. It should be noted that there is thus the potential for 
discrepancy between the figures up to 1998-9 and those from this point onwards. In adopting this approach I follow 
that advocated by the University of Edinburgh’s Planning Department (University of Edinburgh, undated).
198 Data is compiled from published reports by the Higher Education Statistics Authority (HESA), from data the 
author ordered from the HESA, and from printed reports of the Universities Statistical service.
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Fig. 15: The distribution of forty-six pre-1992 HEIs according to their numbers of foreign students, 1980-1 to 2001-2
Total number of 
students paying 
‘other’ fees in...
1980-1 1981-2 1982-3 1983-4 1984-5 1985-6 1986-7 1987-8 1988-9 1989-90
Standard Deviation 311.7 273.7 263.0 275.4 293.2 327.8 342.7 339.8 358.2 358.9
Skewness .533 .547 .510 .563 .802 .599 .642 .639 .625 .506
Kurtosis -.641 -.553 -.584 -.578 .056 -.352 -.110 .213 .096 .075
Minimum 3 4 10 13 14 8 7 10 2 12
Maximum 1220 1059 1025 1088 1255 1323 1434 1513 1550 1590
Total
number of 
students 
paying 
‘other’ 
fees in...
1990-1 1991-2 1992-3 1993-4 1994-5 1995-6 1996-7 1997-8 1998-9 1999-00 2000-1 2001-
Standard
Deviation
402.5 433.6 453.1 504.7 513.0 530.7 542.9 564.5 584.0 563.5 608.1 685.8
Skewness .661 .650 .631 .696 .767 .832 .792 .926 .948 1.028 .918 .824
Kurtosis .179 -.073 -.239 -.286 i 0
0 CO -.174 -.118 .083 .198 .490 .188 -.042
Minimum
9 15 25 29 22 25 25 41 40 34 31 54
Maximum 1804 1850 1880 1983 2027 2053 2139 2263 2361 2347 2379 2651
Source: Data from the Higher Education Statistics Authority and from the Universities Statistical service.
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It is also possible to examine what the pattern of recruitment of international 
students was in consecutive years, following the introduction of the full-cost 
fees policy.
The shape of the distribution of HEIs according to their numbers of 
international students can be measured through considering skewness. 
Skewness is a measure of the extent to which distributions cluster around low 
or high values. In this case, it measures v/hether most HEIs had relatively low 
numbers of international students (with a few ‘high recruitment’ outlier HEIs 
pulling up the average number of international students per HEI), or 
alternatively, whether most HEIs had relatively high numbers of international 
students (with a few ‘low number’ outlier HEIs pushing down the average 
number of international students per HEI).
Most years’ distributions were positively skewed, and to an increasing extent,
i.e. there was a significant concentration in the ‘market’ for international 
students over time. Hence, increasing numbers of HEIs were to be found at 
the lower end of the distribution (such as Keele University, Stirling University 
and University College of Wales Aberystwyth), with relatively fewer 
international students attending their courses, whilst a decreasing number of 
HEIs were clustered at the higher end of the distribution (such as Cambridge, 
Oxford and Nottingham Universities), with relatively larger numbers of 
international students. Therefore, as the period advanced, there was an 
increasingly large proportion of HEIs which had relatively few international 
students. These HEIs were being balanced out by an increasingly smaller 
number of HEIs who were able to attract much larger numbers of international 
students than the average HEI.199
199 Another measure of the shape of the distribution of HEIs according to their international student numbers is 
provided by kurtosis. A leptokurtic distribution of HEIs according to their intake of international students would 
indicate that HEIs were more similar in the numbers of international students they recruited, than would a platykurtic 
distribution of HEIs. Unfortunately, the extent to which the distribution of HEIs is platykurtic as against leptokurtic 
fluctuates over time to the extent that it is difficult to draw firm conclusions as to whether HEIs' numbers of 
international students were increasingly or otherwise clustering around the mean. It is therefore difficult to draw any 
firm conclusions from this measure of distribution as to the pattern of competition that developed between HEIs and 
international students.
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The only clear distributive trend is that HEIs were becoming less similar over 
the period in terms of their numbers of international students. A limited 
number of HEIs were recruiting disproportionately large numbers of 
international students, with most attracting much lower numbers of these 
students. This might suggest that some HEIs proved more successful at 
developing an entrepreneurial approach than others, and that this trend 
intensified over time.
7.b.ii The fees international students were charged at different HEIs
An analogous stratification occurred in terms of the revenue accruing to 
different HEIs from international students’ fees, at least until the late 1990s. 
Again, trends in fee revenue from international students can be compared 
across the period studied for the sample of forty-six HEIs.
In every HEI examined, there was a marked increase in the extent of 
institutional income derived from international student fees of at least 4.27% 
over the period studied (see figure 16), controlling for inflation.200 The average 
fee per international student201 increased by at least £4270 in 2001-2 prices. 
Although the differences between fees paid per student per HEI increased 
over most of the period, there was a slight decrease in variation among 
institutions after 1997. It is difficult to discern any other enduring patterns of 
variation amongst HEIs across the period as a whole, in terms of the fees they 
were able to charge international students (Figure 17). However, a survey by 
the CVCP involving over one hundred HEIs showed that, from 1999 until 2003, 
the distribution of classroom-based fee levels per HEI was positively skewed,
i.e. most HEIs were clustered to the left of the mean fee per student, whilst 
there were a few high-charging outliers. A small number of HEIs were, 
therefore, able to charge considerably higher fees than the bulk of the higher
200 All monetary values used were discounted for inflation, using the levels reported for December of each year, 
rounded up from .5, in Office of National Statistics, 2004.
201 This has been calculated by dividing the amount of institutional income derived from ‘other’ fees by the number 
of 'overseas students' (as they were classified in the USS statistics) and ‘full-time equivalent overseas students' (from 
HESA statistics). Clearly, this is an inexact measure, which fails to capture differences in HEIs according to the 
proportions of postgraduate and laboratory-based international students they recruited. However, in the absence of 
any other way of measuring average fees, it has been adopted for the purposes of comparison over the time period.
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education sector. For example, the Universities of Leicester and Strathclyde 
charged relatively high average fees, compared with the Universities of 
Birmingham and St Andrews, who charged relatively low average fees.
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Fig. 16: change in income percent of fees and change in fee per student
Higher Education Institution Change Y% fees Chge FPS
University of Aston (Birmingham) 22.57 8.73
University of Bath 31.65 9.82
University of Birmingham 20.37 4.27
University of Bradford 24.19 6.14
University of Bristol 34.80 8.33
Brunei University 19.73 9.49
University of Cambridge 38.71 7.60
City University 16.41 7.44
University of Durham 24.97 9.53
University of East Anglia 26.22 7.92
University of Essex 39.70 6.16
University of Exeter 29.18 7.65
University of Hull 25.67 6.89
University of Keele 13.55 5.87
University of Kent at Canterbury 36.96 7.35
University of Lancaster 39.30 8.09
University of Leeds 28.06 8.52
University of Leicester 45.11 11.54
University of Liverpool 29.78 8.91
Loughbourgh Institute of Technology * 25.25 6.73
Manchester University 25.46 7.85
University of Manchester Inst of Tech. 47.06 7.91
University of Newcastle Upon Tyne 29.51 7.03
University of Nottingham 35.04 8.15
University of Oxford 32.92 5.77
University of Reading 30.61 7.21
Salford University 19.11 5.69
University of Sheffield 28.56 7.72
University of Southampton 17.96 8.00
University of Surrey 28.64 9.08
University of Sussex 32.02 7.50
University of Warwick 26.17 5.60
University of York 22.99 6.91
Uni. College of Wales Aberystwyth* 14.73 7.61
Uni. College of North Wales- Bangor* 4.27 5.66
University College of Wales Cardiff* 30.50 6.12
St David’s College* 25.41 7.73
University College Swansea* 11.93 7.16
University of Aberdeen 29.99 8.77
University of Dundee 17.14 7.72
University of Edinburgh 33.62 9.41
University of Glasgow 24.11 8.96
Herriot Watt University 42.38 9.93
University of St Andrews 43.22 5.44
University of Stirling 11.72 7.17
University of Strathclyde 21.44 10.42
* please see footnote 195 for an explanation of conventions used.
221
Fig.17: The distribution of average fee levels per foreign student, by HEI, for forty-six pre-1992 HEIs
Average fee per 
student during.... 1980-1 1981-2 1982-3 1983-4 1984-5 1985-6 1986-7 1987-8 1988-9 1989-90 1990-1
Standard Deviation .11833 .09856 .24791 .31782 .24252 .21594 .25765 .28010 .34585 .36836 .50544
Skewness -.138 .058 2.034 1.461 .287 .207 -.442 -.963 -.322 -.838 -.554
Kurtosis 2.512 .148 8.577 7.161 4.670 1.691 1.034 1.651 1.183 .615 .205
Minimum .25 .85 .72 .58 .96 1.41 1.37 1.38 1.68 2.01 2.18
Maximum .95 1.31 2.33 2.67 2.59 2.56 2.68 2.81 3.51 3.73 4.43
Average fee per 
student during.... 1991-2 1992-3 1993-4 1994-5 1995-6 1996-7 1997-8 1998-9 1999-2000 2000-1 2001-2
Standard Deviation 46 46 46 44 44 44 44 46 46 46 46
Skewness 20 20 20 22 22 22 22 20 20 20 20
Kurtosis .185 -.767 -.607 1.089 1.892 2.638 3.139 -1.304 .132 .470 .160
Minimum 2.561 .704 .269 2.258 5.533 9.747 13.670 6.819 -.392 .143 -.011
Maximum .688 .688 .688 .702 .702 .702 .702 .688 .688 .688 .688
Source: Data from the Higher Education Statistics Authority and from the Universities Statistical service.
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In addition, the distribution of HEIs here examined in relation to the fees they 
charged per international student became markedly platykurtic from 1999 
onwards. The distribution was thus more ‘spread out’, with fewer HEIs 
clustered around the mean value. This suggests that the extent of ‘clustering’ 
by HEIs was gradually decreasing over the period as a whole, and that HEIs 
were increasingly deciding to charge international students different fees than 
were their ‘peer’ HEIs.
This appears to be corroborated by the CVCP surveys of international student 
fees from 1999 to 2003.202 Most HEIs’ fees for classroom-based subjects 
were within £250 of each other. Even with clinical courses, where fees were 
generally higher than for other courses, most HEIs still clustered within £250 
of each other in the fees they charged international (mainly) medical students. 
In comparison with laboratory-based courses, there was only one major ‘peak’ 
for clinical-based subject fees, with only a very small number of HEIs using 
the same fee structure for clinical as for classroom-based subjects.
It therefore appears that despite the ending of government guidance to HEIs 
in the setting of fees, many HEIs continued to set their fees at least loosely in 
line with the previously-recommended minimum fees.203
One interviewee suggested that although HEIs might “reduce their fees for a 
year or two” if they were “feeling threatened”, most had little idea of the real 
“market value” of their courses (interview with HEI employee). Interviewees 
suggested that most HEIs set their fees in accordance with inflation-upgraded 
previous levels coupled with at least a rough awareness of other HEIs’ fees 
(interview with two HEI employees and with British Council employee). 
According to Fielden and Dalrymple, HEIs consciously avoided price-based 
competition, given that this would lead to a situation whereby “those with 
higher reputations could command higher fees, whilst others lost out, or
202 It should be noted that the sample of responses to the CVCP survey included post- as well as pre-1992 
institutions, and that the composition of respondents differed from year to year. The survey results should therefore 
be interpreted with caution.
203 This ‘clustering’ has also been noted in Back et al., 1997:4, 32.
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where price-cutting by some institutions could lead to lower overseas student 
enrolments elsewhere” (Fielden and Dalrymple, 1987: 115).
This tallies with Kinnell’s view that
“In setting fee levels each year universities undertake no detailed 
costing of students’ variable use of services, nor on the cost of 
administering overseas student recruitment, as a means of 
assessing realistic fees. Pricing is very much related to fees 
charged elsewhere and the perception that keeping the cost to the 
student down as far as possible will enhance recruitment” (Kinnell, 
1990: 40).
There was a general perception that, almost ‘despite’ HEIs’ lack of knowledge 
of the market, potential students were price-sensitive- HEIs would avoid 
charging ‘over the odds’ in relation to their peers.
However, one particular course fee departs from the previous generalisations, 
that for the MBA (see figure 18). Although most HEIs’ MBA fees were, as 
usual, generally around within £250 of each other, the distribution is markedly 
less normal than for other courses. Rather than being arrayed around one 
mean value, a variety of peaks are in evidence for the distribution of UK HEIs 
according to the fees they have charged international MBA students. The 
2002-3 CVCP survey suggests the existence of no fewer than five mini-peaks, 
indicating a very differentiated market.
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Fig. 18: MBA pricing structure, 2002-3
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Source: UniversitiesUK, 2003
This apparently greater differentiation by price, and thus greater scope for 
price competition, can be explained by two factors. Firstly, unlike other course 
fees, British MBA fees were generally cheaper than those charged by 
comparable HEIs in the US (Back et al., 1997: 32). This gave British HEIs an 
incentive to charge just below comparable US HEIs to gain market advantage. 
Secondly, the marketable value of MBAs appeared to be closely related to 
whether or not they were accredited by particular bodies. One interviewee 
noted that achieving AMBA accreditation would allow his/her HEI to add a 
quantifiable premium to the fees payable by international students for its MBA 
course. Such a process of external accreditation (i.e., aside from QAA quality 
assessments) is unique to MBAs and results in a highly-differentiated pricing 
structure.204 HEIs offering MBAs, especially those targeted at international 
students, may, therefore, be involved in a greater degree of competition than 
those which do not.
7.b.iii International students’ fees and HEIs’ income
Finally, as well as examining the distribution of HEIs according to the number 
of international students they recruited, and the average fees they charged 
international students, it is also possible to assess the relative importance of
204 Interview with HEI employee. See also chapter five for analysis of British non-governmental accreditation 
schemes.
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international student recruitment for individual HEIs, through comparing the 
percentages of their income which derived from international students’ fees. 
The initial losses and then gains from the full-cost fees policy were 
increasingly differentially distributed amongst HEIs. This helped to further 
weaken sectoral associations’ negotiating capacities on behalf of all their 
members, as whilst some HEIs were very successful in the recruitment of 
international students, others had proved less successful in the content of a 
highly competitive market.
The extent of variation between HEIs in terms of the importance of 
international student fees for their overall income levels increased greatly over 
time, especially between 1993-4 and 1994-5 (from a standard deviation of 
4.26 to one of 8.78) (see Figure 19). Initially, the ratio of international 
students’ fees to overall income was, for the majority of HEIs, less than the 
mean amount, with a relatively small number of HEIs receiving a relatively 
large income from international students’ fees in comparison with their overall 
income. However, this gradually altered such that, from 1997-8 onwards, a 
comparatively large number of HEIs had a relatively large income coming 
from international students’ fees (such as the University of Leicester and 
Heriot Watt University), with a smaller number of HEIs (such as University 
College of North Wales Bangor and Keele University) receiving comparatively 
little income from international students’ fees. Whilst, over most of the period, 
the majority of HEIs clustered around the mean, in terms of the ratio of their 
income from international students’ fees to their overall income, they became 
increasingly less clustered after 1994, this coinciding with fee deregulation. 
This suggests that whilst initially most HEIs received similar income from 
international students’ fees as a proportion of their overall budgets, by the end 
of the period the ratio of student fee income to overall income was varying 
widely across the higher education sector. The full-cost fees system thus led 
to an increasing differentiation between HEIs, following increased competition 
between them for international students.
This degree of intra-sectoral competition had an impact on HEIs’ future 
capacities to collectively organise resistance to liberalisation. The competitive
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relationships instilled by the full-cost fees decision further prevented HEIs 
from acting together and developing common policies towards international 
students. Competition between HEIs for international students “allows for very 
little collective consideration and deliberation of a way forward even when 
nearly all institutions are facing similar issues” (Journeaux, 2004). The 
CVCP’s own Long-Term Strategy Group acknowledged this problem, stating 
that “[c]ompetition between institutions has meant that co-operation and the 
pooling of resources are not well advanced....Yet without such co-operation it 
is difficult to see how the economies of scale can be generated to...compete 
in a global marketplace” (Brown, 1999). The full-cost fees decision thus 
‘locked-in’ competitive relationships between HEIs, with little possibility of 
HEIs individually or collectively challenging this. As Walker notes, there “has 
been no identifiable move since those days [of the introduction of full-cost 
fees] on the part of Vice-Chancellors to modify this policy” (Walker, 1997: 53).
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Fig. 19 : ‘Other’ fees as a percentage of income for forty-six pre-1992 HEIs, 1980-1 to 2001-2
‘Other’ fees as a 
percentage of income 
during....
1980-1 1981-2 1982-3 1983-4 1985-6 1986-7 1987-8 1988-9 1989-gO 1990-1 1991-2 1992-3
Standard Deviation 2.09572 2.65469 2.76563 3.01590 3.42559 3.15130 3.01263 2.96100 2.69300 2.76399 2.91207 3.96772
Skewness .784 1.032 1.146 1.198 1.068 .442 .485 .318 .193 .352 .603 3.460
Kurtosis .832 1.192 1.644 2.021 1.395 .429 .393 .747 .439 1.343 1.117 17.229
Minimum .10 .36 .58 .56 .97 .66 1.55 1.34 .99 .71 1.28 1.59
Maximum 10.38 13.62 14.55 16.02 18.19 16.90 15.72 16.32 13.76 14.83 15.36 28.04
‘Other’ fees as a 
percentage of income 
during....
1993-4 1994-5 1995-6 1996-7 1997-8 1998-9 1999-2000 2000-1 2001-2
Standard Deviation 47 46 45 45 44 47 46 47 47
Skewness 4.25732 8.78450 8.52523 13.99602 9.12018 10.29505 9.48751 9.43349 10.43617
Kurtosis .347 .350 .354 .354 .357 .347 .350 .347 .347
Minimum .681 .688 .695 .695 .702 .681 .688 .681 .681
Maximum 1.79 8.98 10.7510.43 2.52 3.51 9.97 8.61 1.87
Source: Data from the Higher Education Statistics Authority and from the Universities Statistical service
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As noted above, however, it would be illegitimate to claim that HEIs only 
competed against each other on the basis of price. In over three quarters of the 
HEIs considered (36 out of 46 HEIs), there was a positive and significant 
correlation for the relationship between the fee per student and the number of 
international students per HEI. As the cost of fees for international students 
increased, their numbers at the HEI in question also generally increased. This 
suggests that demand from international students for British higher education 
was inelastic, i.e. it did not diminish as prices rose. The most complete 
correlations were at the Universities of Oxford (correlation .985), Cambridge 
(correlation .969) and, perhaps surprisingly, Surrey (.969).205 The price elasticity 
for British higher education is, thus, very limited. When HEIs increased fees, the 
numbers of international students increased, often almost in line with the 
increases. However, whilst the extent of price competition was limited, there 
was an increase in competition between HEIs for international students along 
other dimensions such as quality (see chapter five).
8 Conclusion
The introduction of full-cost fees for international students has played an 
important role in British governments’ liberalisation of international students’ 
policy. The new system provided HEIs with incentives both to compete against 
each other for international students, and, obviously, to charge these students 
high fees, although competition appears to have occurred along dimensions 
other than price alone206.
The new fees system did not represent a natural outgrowth from existing 
practices in the higher education sector. It cannot be seen as a continuation of 
existing rules towards international students, which had involved the imposition 
of quotas and of differential fees. Nor does it easily fit with existing methods of 
government funding for the higher education sector. Instead, the full-cost fees
205 Increases in fees and international student number? were negatively related at only one HEI (the University of 
Aston), and in nine HEIs the (positive) correlation was not significant. Interestingly, most such HEIs (whose intake did 
not increase in a regular manner with increases in fee levels) were located in the ‘celtic fringe’, perhaps suggesting a 
more erratic demand from international students for non-English British Higher Education. In all other cases bar one (the 
University of Reading, with correlation .489), the pearson product moment correlation coefficient was above .5, 
indicating significant covariation between the amount of fees per student and the number of international students per 
HEI.
206 Except perhaps in the market for MBAs; see p.225.
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was consciously imposed by government as a means of fundamentally altering 
the higher education sector, through removing any public subsidy for 
international students, and also to promote an entrepreneurial approach to 
international student recruitment amongst HEIs. In addition to being responsible 
for the initial introduction of the fees, government continued to control the 
operation of the fees system, until deregulation in the mid-1990s.
Despite all HEIs’ sectoral associations opposing the new fees, this opposition 
had little effect. The manner in which each sectoral association attempted to 
prevent their introduction reflected their internal weaknesses. HEIs were also 
unable to have any significant effect on the implementation of the fees, where, 
again, their sectoral associations were unable to provide any clear leadership in 
order to challenge government policies. Once introduced, the full-cost fees 
system further entrenched divisions within the higher education sectoral 
associations, as it encouraged an extensive differentiation between HEIs, in 
terms of the numbers of international students they could recruit, the fees they 
could charge, and the proportion of institutional funding which they could raise 
from international students.
Overall, the full-cost fees system constituted a government-driven initiative, 
which was relatively easily implemented due to a lack of coordinated resistance 
amongst HEIs.
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Chapter 8: Financial institutions in France
1 Introduction
Unlike in Britain, international students were not charged differential fees, and 
the previous funding systems in higher education sector had not allocated funds 
specifically according to the numbers of international students attending HEIs.
In 1989, a new funding system was introduced by the then Education Minister, 
Lionel Jospin, which predicated substantial funds on the recruitment of 
additional international students. The new system, which involved a proportion 
of HEIs’ funding being delivered through contracts negotiated between central 
government and HEIs, marked a significant break with existing funding systems 
in French higher education. Most institutional funding had previously been 
allocated on the basis of formulae which took into account the numbers of 
students, the characteristics of institutional buildings, and other static features, 
but did not specifically allocate funds for the recruitment of international 
students.
Overall, the contractual funding system came to form an important element of 
overall funding levels.207 International relations, including the recruitment of 
international students, formed a particularly significant element of the 
contractual budget which reached €521,000 in 2000.208 In particular, the 
contracts supported HEIs which, amongst other goals, increased the 
‘attractiveness’ of their own courses for potential international students (Henart, 
2003). An analysis of a sample of the contracts is referred to throughout the 
chapter, which indicates that the new funding system provided HEIs with 
additional funds where they made commitments to recruiting more international 
students from developed and emerging economy countries.
The new system gave HEIs incentives to recruit more international students, 
and so are, on that dimension, comparable with the British introduction of full- 
cost fees, both constituting systems of financial incentives. However, although
207 Some ambiguity exists between different assessments of the magnitude of contribution of contractual funding. 
Whilst one report noted that on average, funding from quadrennial contracts amounted to 15% of HEIs' overall funding 
whose contracts covered the period 1998-2001 (H6nart, 2003), another suggested that funds from contracts covered 
“nearly a third of the total funds given to higher education institutions” (Claeys, 2001a: IIA1).
208 From information in table supplied in Claeys, 2001a: IIA2.
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the system led to a commodification of international students (through 
prioritising flows of international students from developed and emerging 
economy countries, rather than from developing countries; and through 
providing extra funds for the recruitment of international students), it had little 
effect on the extent of competition amongst HEIs for international students.
HEIs engaged collectively in attempts to shape the new funding process, and 
were particularly concerned to ensure that the new system would result in 
increased autonomy for individual institutions, and that it would not be used 
merely to encourage them to compete for restricted funds. HEIs also resisted 
attempts to use the evaluation of the contracts as a means of comparatively 
ranking them. Their coordinated resistance to the use of the contracts as a 
means to foment competition appears to have been highly successful.
2 The pre-existing situation
The existing governmental funding system for HEIs mainly rested on non­
hypothecated, formula-based grants. HEIs thus had a considerable degree of 
discretion in how they spent this funding. Existing systems failed to provide 
significant incentives for the recruitment of international students. Neither 
French nor international students were charged significant tuition fees in French 
universities. The charging of differential fees for international students is legally 
proscribed in France,209 with many interviewees seeing this as an important 
dividing line between the British and French approaches; “above all, all the 
international students in France do not have to pay different fees” (interview 
with DRIC employee).
Although increases in the costs of frais d’inscription (admissions fees) did 
sometimes elicit press comment (Le Monde, 1991c), the sums involved were 
negligible. In contrast, some grandes ecoles charged very substantial fees, from 
which they sometimes derived the bulk of their income. However, such fees 
were not differentiated between French and international students. Although 
there were some attempts to introduce contracts as a way of governing the 
financial relationship between governments and HEIs, few such attempts 
succeeded, and those which did were confined to the coordination of regional
209 With this prohibition on differential fees having been confirmed by the loi Savary of 1986 (H6nart, 2003).
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research programmes, or only involved departments rather than entire HEIs 
contracting with government. None had a perceptible impact on international 
students’ policy.
2.a Formula-based funding
The existing funding system for universities was based on formulae set by the 
Ministry of Education. These tied institutional allocations to features such as the 
existing number of students and the physical area of university facilities. The 
‘San Remo’ (Systeme Analytique de Repartition des Moyens) system, 
introduced in 1993 to replace the former “Garaces" model, was the latest 
attempt to codify this criteria-based approach, and intended to achieve a fairer 
allocation of resources among HEIs and to correct historical variations (Martin 
and Verdaguer, 1999). Even following the introduction of the contractual 
system, up to 90% of HEIs’ funding continued to follow per capita formulae like 
the San Remo system.
San Remo indirectly promoted attempts to recruit international students, to the 
extent that they were counted within student totals. However, given existing 
domestic student demand for higher education for most of the period studied, 
such systems did not privilege international over domestic recruitment. The 
prioritisation of international students as meriting additional funding did not 
occur until the introduction of quadrennial contracts in 1989.
2.b Previous use of contracts
Some French universities and grandes ecoles had used contracts as a method 
of codifying their relationships with public institutions (mainly research 
institutions) from the mid-1970s onwards (Minot et a/., 1984: 158). These 
contracts had not been used as a means of regulating public policy concerning 
international students until the adoption of the contractual funding system in 
1989. Nor, indeed, were they used as a means of connecting the central 
government to HEIs before 1989. The extent to which they can be seen as 
offering a precedent for Jospin’s contractualisation policy is, therefore, limited.
Contracts were seen as a means of coordinating government policies with HEIs’ 
priorities as early as the mid-1970s. Despite being supported by the Conference
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des Presidents dVniversite, the universities’ sectoral association (which gave 
its support to the proposal at its annual meeting), a contractual ‘experiment’ 
along these lines begun in 1975 was opposed, and stopped, by the then new 
Higher Education Minister, Alice Saunier-SeTte. Musselin notes that the 1975 
project could theoretically be “credited with disseminating ideas favourable to 
university-central administration contracting”. However, she maintains that the 
1975 experiment was never viewed as an example for the development of 
Jospin’s new system in 1989, nor, indeed, was it ever mentioned at all in 
discussions, meetings and publications concerning the new contractual policy 
(Musselin, 2004: 69).
Another contractual ‘experiment’, begun in 1983, was equally unsuccessful. 
This involved the use of contracts to direct the government funding of HEIs, 
based on four-year funding-need projections. This new contractual programme 
was given statutory recognition in the Higher Education Act of 26 January 1984 
(the loi Savary) (Abecassis, 1994: 13; Bernard and Lepagnot-Leca, 2002: 231).
However, rather than the contracts being used by HEIs as a way of developing 
their autonomy from central government, it was actually departments, rather 
than entire HEIs, which adopted the contractual system as a means of funding 
themselves. As a result, this contractual system could only be used to provide 
the funding for limited, departmental goals, rather than, for example, the 
definition of an institutional policy towards international students. Musselin 
maintains that this focus on component departments sharply divides the 1983 
programme from the 1988 contractualisation (Musselin, 2004: 69). The 1983 
system lacked the emphasis on HEIs as collective negotiating units which was 
one of the key novel elements of the 1989 system.
Overall, the existing funding systems, both in terms of formula funding and the 
limited use of contracts in higher education, failed to offer an institutional 
precedent for the introduction of quadrennial contracts in 1989.210
210 Whilst contracts have increasingly become a method of regulating relationships between governments and other 
bodies within higher education, all such developments post-dated the introduction of Jospin’s contractualisation, and 
hence cannot be seen as laying the institutional precedents for the 1989 initiative. For more analysis of the use of 
contracts outside Jospin’s quadrennial contracts system, see Lorrain, 1991; Sot, 2002:41-2; and Walsh, 1995:111.
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3 Government strategies
The idea of extending the use of contracts to cover the central executive’s 
relationship with HEIs was initially promoted by Lionel Jospin,211 who 
discovered in the contractual method a new policy initiative which could be 
announced to HEIs in time for the start of the new academic year (interview with 
former ARIES employee; see also Musselin, 2004: 72). In September 1988, he 
presented a quadrennial contract framework to the Conference des Presidents 
d’Universite (CPU). A wide-ranging reorganisation of the Higher Education 
administration within the Ministry of Education followed, which created a new 
department (the Direction for the programming and the development of 
universities) to implement the new contractual policy (Musselin, 1997: 52).
Although Jospin’s initiative cohered with general government policy on the 
modernisation of public services,212 it was not explicitly connected by Jospin to 
this more wide-ranging policy trend. Instead, Jospin maintained that the new 
funding system would enable a genuine engagement between government and 
HEIs, which would promote “autonomy and innovation” (Le Monde, 1989d).
Rewarding the recruitment of international students from developed and 
emerging economy countries (rather than from developing countries) was a key 
priority for government in its introduction of the contractual system. The 
‘Politique Contractuelle’ circular of March 1989 (Jospin, 1989) defined the 
parameters of the first contracts. This ‘circular of contractualisation’, a type of 
procedural guideline,213 from the Higher Education Ministry specified which 
elements the projet should cover. This first circular stated that “institutions’ 
international actions, where these constitute durable projects, fall very naturally 
into the domain of contractualisation”. The circular made clear the government’s 
view that proposals for items in the contracts which would “aid[...J personal 
mobility: exchange of students, teachers, and researchers, on the basis of
211 It should be noted that contracts were only used to mediate the relationship between government and HEI where 
government already funded the HEI in question. Hence, whilst a number of grandes 6coles were covered by the 
contractual policy, it did not extend to those funded entirely through private sources.
212 As codified in the circular on the Renewal of Public Service by the then Prime Minister Michel Rocard (Racine, 2002: 
2).
213 As one interviewee put it, “[t]he circular of contractualisation, it is a kind of ‘procedure book’, it’s a series of 
directives, of operations and requirements, for the universities, in order to help them provide their own strategic 
framework...” (interview with DRIC employee).
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principles of reciprocity and the spread of the French language” would be 
favoured, at least in relation to other industrialised countries (as opposed to 
developing countries).
There was a strict division within this first circular of contractualisation, between 
which policies were appropriate for students from developed and emerging 
economy countries and which (different) policies were appropriate for students 
from developing countries. This was consistent with the French government’s 
overall policy to promote a commodification of international students, by 
prioritising the recruitment of students from countries seen as immediately or 
indirectly economically beneficial to France. With regard to developing countries, 
the circular maintained that the “essential point to retain was the bringing of our 
scientific culture and technological know-how into the perspective of economic 
and cultural development”. Projects with developing countries should be 
conducted jointly with partner countries, and could include the training of 
teachers, and aid for economic, scientific, and technological development, with 
the diffusion of the French language “being the cement of this cooperation”. No 
mention was made of the recruitment of international students from developing 
countries. In contrast, student mobility from ‘industrialised’ countries was 
described as an important goal in the circular of contractualisation (ibid).
The distinction of developing from developed (and emerging economy) 
countries’ international students was thus a key element of the contractual 
policy from its initiation. This focus was maintained throughout successive 
circulars of contractualisation. Whilst proposed increases in international 
student enrolments from developed and emerging economy countries would be 
rewarded within the contracts, this did not apply to increases in international 
student numbers from developing countries.
4 HEIs’ strategies and coordination
The role of French HEIs in the creation of the contractual system was extensive 
and coordinated through the universities’ sectoral association. Although some 
HEIs were initially sceptical about the contractual process, the CPU used its 
negotiating capacity with the government to attempt to shape the nature of the 
new contracts, and especially to develop the contracts as a means of increasing
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HEIs’ autonomy from government. This action was successful in preventing the 
contracts from resulting in extensive competition between HEIs for funding. 
Overall, the extent of French HEIs’ coordination, especially through the CPU, 
had a significant effect on the creation of the contractual funding system, and 
could be described as moving this system away from a potentially liberalising 
model.
The French HEI sector had traditionally viewed governmental reform with 
suspicion. The first, failed, contractual experiment of 1975, although supported 
overall by the CPU (Abecassis, 1994: 13), elicited stringent criticism from some 
university presidents even before government abandoned support for it. Hence, 
the then president of Burgundy University maintained that the then contractual 
system was unlikely to lead to genuine institutional autonomy, and gave it as 
one of the reasons for her resignation (Bertrand, 1994: 45).
Concerns amongst HEIs about the genuine motives of government for 
introducing contracts motivated a distrust of the contractual system even during 
Jospin’s introduction of the quadrennial contracts in 1989. However, the 
emphasis of Jospin’s contractual policy on the role of HEI presidents was seen 
as a guarantee that government would not use the contracts simply as a 
method of ‘divide and rule’ between HEIs (ibid.: 45). The CPU had consistently 
favoured an augmentation in the role of the university president, as a means of 
increasing HEIs’ autonomy from government. As the major decision-making and 
coordinating role within the new contractual process was to be performed by 
university presidents, it was seen as furthering the CPU’s policy.
The CPU also attempted to gain assurances during its discussions with the 
Ministry of Education that the contractual system would not be used as a means 
of managing cuts in higher education funding. Furthermore, the CPU was also 
involved in negotiating the contents of the questionnaire which was sent out to 
HEIs by the ministry at the beginning of the process as a basis for the formation 
of institutional projets (interview with former ARIES employee). The CPU thus 
had a significant impact on which issues were chosen to be covered by the new 
contracts. In particular, the CPU lobbied for, and obtained, the inclusion of 
funding for new staff within the contracts. Funding for additional staff was
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viewed as especially important by the CPU, given the surge in student numbers 
which was forecast for 1989-1990, the next academic year after the beginning 
of the contractual process. As one interviewee noted, initially some University 
Presidents refused to participate in the contractual process, given their distrust 
of government, seeing it as akin to “signing a contract with the devil”. However, 
the interviewee recalled “saying I’m ready to sign with the devil! For ninety 
personnel [staff], anybody would sign this” (interview with former ARIES 
employee).
5. The operation of the contracts
5.a The contracts and international students
Governments continued to use the contracts throughout the period examined to 
further their policies towards international students, and especially to encourage 
the recruitment of more international students from developed and emerging 
economy countries. However, the manner in which they did this changed 
slightly throughout the period.
The section of the contracts dealing with international students and other 
international issues, the “volet internationaF’, constituted a crucial element for 
negotiation between the Ministry and HEIs (interview with DRIC employee).
Until 2001, HEIs were required to prepare a separate dossier concerning their 
international activities. Hence in 1993 it was stipulated that HEIs had to present 
three documents, the first presenting the medium-term objectives of their 
international policies, the second indicating the organisational resources 
intended to support such policies, and the third detailing those internationally- 
oriented projects upon which the HEI placed a particular priority (Prevos and 
Bardet, 1994: 2).
The “volet international’ was then isolated by an office of the Delegation aux 
relations internationales et a la cooperation (DRIC), part of the Ministry of 
Education, and disseminated to its different geographical region offices for 
comment. The comments made were generally informational only, for example, 
pointing out existing schemes or potential problems with proposals. The 
comments were then gathered and submitted to the HEI, with the document
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sometimes then undergoing a number of revisions (interview with DRIC 
employee).
However, the requirement for a separate “volet intemationar was removed 
when a new Director of the contracts division stated that international issues 
should be made “transversaux” in the contracts; that is, they should permeate 
all elements of the contracts. For instance, the section on the habilitation des 
dipldmes (the accreditation of degree programmes) should note whether current 
degrees were sufficiently accessible for international students; and the section 
on physical infrastructure should note whether there was an office for 
international students on campus (interview with two DRIC employees).
In theory, the new policy was designed to increase the importance of 
international issues, by ‘mainstreaming’ them in all aspects of the contracts. 
Some interviewees did maintain, however, that the lack of a separate section on 
internationalisation made it more difficult for the Education Ministry to track 
international activities. The change, according to some, resulted in a loss of 
information (interview with DRIC employee). Certainly, it considerably 
complicated the role of the Delegation aux relations internationales et a la 
cooperation during the contractual process. Elie Cohen, in a report for the Prime 
Minister on improving France’s ‘attractiveness’ for international students, 
maintained that the new approach resulted in a diminished “visibility of 
international policies and their overall coherence” (Cohen, 2001: 117).214 Cohen 
suggested that a separate report should be produced by all HEIs to increase the 
visibility of international issues. Whilst the “transversality” of international 
matters should be maintained in the contracts, he suggested that HEIs establish 
a “declaration of international policy” presenting their objectives, priorities, 
activities and provisions, as well as the resources they would use to reach the 
specified objectives” (ibid.).
5.b The evaluation of the contracts
By the time of Cohen’s recommendations, however, HEIs had already been 
obliged to set out their international policies in more concrete detail, by including
214 However, it should be noted that a small number of universities continued to prepare a separate dossier on such 
matters, effectively ignoring the new requirement.
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them in “indicators” annexed to the contracts, after the Comite National 
devaluation215 was asked by government to evaluate the contracts. This 
followed recommendations from the Mission devaluation et de controle in 1998, 
which suggested that increased monitoring of HEIs’ compliance with the 
contracts was required. As an interviewee from the CPU noted, this required a 
university to “do what it has said it will do” in the contract. Henceforth, 
representatives of the Inspection Generate de I’Administration de I’Education 
Nationale et de la Recherche would be “systematically involved in the 
contractual process” (see pp. 174-5); the general thrust of the contracts (in terms 
of actions put in place by HEIs, and financial undertakings by government) 
would be presented to the Conseil National de I’Enseignement Superieur et de 
la Recherche 216 the Comite National devaluation’s programme would be made 
to coincide with the calendar of contracts; and the contracts were required to 
include indicators such that compliance with them could be measured (Claeys, 
2001a: IIB2; Gerard, 2003a, 2003b). HEIs, under the leadership of the CPU, 
were willing to accept the evaluation of the contracts as an allegedly ‘necessary’ 
concomitant of the extra operational autonomy they were granted by the new 
contractual system.
5.c The contracts and HEIs
By December 1989, the first contracts had been signed, and most eligible HEIs 
had signed a contract with the government after four years of operation of the 
contractual system. By April 1993, one hundred contracts had been signed (Le 
Monde, 1993c). The new system was seen as resulting in a reduction in the 
number of circulars from the Education Ministry to HEIs, and an increase in 
informal as well as formal contacts between representatives of central 
government and university officials (Abecassis, 1994: 27-8). The contracts were 
consistently presented at the beginning of the period as a means to promote 
HEIs’ autonomy from government and the modernisation of their management 
(Le Monde, 1992b; 1992c).
When increased funds began to flow through the new system, resistance to 
Jospin’s contractual system declined further (interview with former ARIES
215 See chapter six.
216 See p. 180.
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employee). By 2001, 198 HEIs were taking part in the contractual process, 
which had been extended to cover engineering schools and regional grouping 
of HEIs, the ‘poles universitaires’ (Claeys, 2001a: IIA1).217 At least initially, the 
contractual system was seen as a means of reinforcing “universities’ 
independence”, with universities developing their own, collective, “strategies 
and action plans” (Abecassis, 1994: 25). As the then CPU Vice-President noted, 
the development of contractualisation had allowed “engagements to be 
maintained” and “institutional management to become perennial rather than 
constrained in yearly budgeting” (Saint-Girons, 1998).
Overall, the CPU supported the contractual process. The contracts constituted a 
“meeting ground” between “the state’s and the universities’ goals” (Abecassis, 
1994: 21). This view of contractualisation as increasing HEIs’ autonomy is 
supported by much research. The new, contractual system has been described 
as contributing to the development of institutional identity and of clearer lines of 
accountability through requiring “public establishments to negotiate as equal 
partners with the central state” (Friedberg and Musselin, 1992).218 In addition, 
given previous analyses of the French higher education system as 
characterised by a diffusion of authority (Cerych and Sabatier, 1985: 256),219 
the contractualisation process facilitated the integration of faculties within the 
university under the leadership of the university president. By making the latter 
the “sole legitimate institutional representatives of the university vis-a-vis the 
state”, the role of university presidents was considerably strengthened by the 
contractual process (Abecassis, 1994: 19,13), just as the CPU had hoped. 
Although, for Bellet et a/., some universities have failed to move beyond the 
“systeme facultaire”, the division of responsibilities by faculty rather than the 
adoption of a cross-university strategy, overall the contractual process has 
reinforced HEIs’ ‘corporate’ identities (Bellet et al., 2000: 44). For Minot et al., 
Jospin’s contractualisation offered a ‘realist’ approach to international issues, 
but one which “recognised the autonomy of universities” (Minot et al., 1984:
154).
217 The university ‘poles’ were groups of universities and grandes 6coles which were clustered in particular economic 
regions.
218 See also Champagne, 2001:493; Finance, 2003; Minot et al., 1984; and Musselin, 1995.
219 See also Champagne, 2001:489; and Neave, 1992.
241
Contractualisation has been presented by a previous Vice-President of the CPU 
as means to make “operational institutional plans, starting from the idea that the 
institution makes its own future with regard to its educational facilities, research 
development or management modernisation, and that these orientations are 
validated by the Minister who also helps to support their putting into practice” 
(Saint-Girons, 1998). He further maintained that contractualisation constituted 
the “spinal cord” of university autonomy, which facilitated internal debate and 
unity in HEIs in a process of coordination between the Ministry and individual 
HEIs (ibid). The creation of the projet d’etablissement in particular gave HEIs 
“an impulse to engage in a strategic process” and enhanced the “efficiency of 
systems of internal governance” (interview with DRIC employee). The process 
was described by an interviewee as reinforcing institutional identity, with the 
HEI’s President as the key figure in negotiations with the Ministry (interview with 
former ARIES employee).
In the mid-1990s, however, it appeared that such support from HEIs for the 
contractual system might diminish. In 1993, a change in administration led to 
budget cuts and the new Minister of Education refused to honour the parts of 
the contracts which referred to the creation of new posts (Musselin, 2004: 84). 
This led to resentment in many HEIs, which had initially supported the 
contractual policy because of its promise of additional staff to deal with a surge 
in student numbers (Abecassis, 1994: 13, 24; Musselin, 2004: 59, footnote), 
and who had resisted the contracts being used as a means for “negotiating 
restrictions” rather than providing extra funds (Le Monde, 1991a; 1994a). In 
February 1993, the CPU made clear in an official statement that it would only 
support the contractual system to the extent that government honoured its 
commitments; “the University Presidents confirm their support for the contract 
policy between the State and the universities, whose effectiveness they have 
observed in practice, provided that the two partners make an equal 
commitment” (Abecassis, 1994: 32). As Bertrand noted, failure by government 
to provide the resources allocated by the contract could also have a negative 
effect on HEIs’ internal management, as the fortunes of the contract were often 
identified with the university president (Bertrand, 1994: 49). HEIs especially 
resented the failure of governments to honour their commitments in the contract, 
since such behaviour was generally not replicated by HEIs, especially once the
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contracts included specification of measurable indicators which were to be 
evaluated by the IGAENR and the CNE (Abecassis, 1994: 31).
From this point onwards, however, the contracts’ contents and objectives 
became more formalised (Musselin, 2004: 64). Importantly, the contractual 
system was relaunched by central government in 1998, in an attempt to rebuild 
the confidence of HEIs in the process following their former criticism of it. 
Claude Allegre, the then Minister for National Education maintained that the 
contracts would, henceforth, give universities “autonomy rather than the hold of 
the yoke [carcan], responsibility rather than carelessness, initiative rather than 
standardisation, freedom to create rather than uniformity, and will rather than 
abandonment” (Allegre, 1998). As the Director of the contractual division, 
Francine Demichel stated, if less colourfully, the contractual system had “no 
meaning except within the framework of an increased level of autonomy for 
institutions: it is grounded upon the evaluation of results obtained by the 
institution and the quality of its project. It gives back some space to the 
contractual negotiations and bets on confidence.... [a]nd it leads to the putting 
into place of a negotiated management of our higher education system” 
(Demichel, 1998: 7).
6 Liberalisation
Unlike the introduction of full-cost fees in Britain, the use of contracts in France 
did not intensify competition between HEIs. However, it could be seen as 
having encouraged the commodification of international students, and to that 
extent, could be seen as a liberalising measure. Indeed, quantitative analysis of 
the correlation between different commitments made by HEIs in the contracts 
indicate that, with respect to international issues, a promised increase in 
international students’ numbers was the only commitment that was significantly 
correlated with increases in the government resources allocated to international 
issues through the contract.
6.a Competition
The use of a contractual device could be seen as an adoption of market 
methods, due to the frequent use of contracts to induce competition between 
providers. In this manner, the use of contracts in the public sector has often
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been linked to the expansion of market relations beyond their traditional role as 
defined by the post-war economic consensus.220 In a number of countries, 
contracts have been used to open “up to competition a set of economic 
activities which were previously immune from it”, thus involving “competition for 
the market as opposed to competition in i f  (i.e., involving ex ante competition) 
(Domberger and Jensen, 1997: 68). For many analysts, contractualisation 
involves, at least in theory, a move away from hierarchical management (Martin, 
1995: 37) to a “market-based approach”, whereby the roles of government as 
“principal” and service-provider as “agent” are “clearly separated and property 
rights more explicit” (Walsh, 1995: 110). In this way, contracts between HEIs 
and the French Ministry of Education might be seen as liberalising institutions.
However, the use of contracts here departed significantly from their common 
use in other countries, as a means of fostering competition. This was because 
the contracts were not used as a means of introducing alternative providers into 
higher education (as with the use of contracts to procure services from the 
private sector (Savas, 1982: 61)), but rather as a means of regulating central 
government’s relationship with pre-existing providers. Hence, the contractual 
system was not used to enable private HEIs to ‘contract’ for the recruitment of 
international students. Instead, existing, publicly-recognised HEIs tried to 
coordinate their policies on international student recruitment with those of the 
government, within the contractual system. This use of contracts was relational 
rather than classical, as contracts were used as a means of reconciling 
governmental and university priorities221 This case thus supports Kaiser and
220 The introduction of contracts as a method of mediating the relationship between government and service providers 
has been described as a key element of new public management by Hood (Hood, 1995: 95). Other authors have 
characterised the proliferation of contracts as leading to an “enabling state” which has withdrawn from its previous role 
in service provision in favour of private providers (Deakin and Walsh, 1996; Greve, 2000:153; see also Davis and 
Rhodes, 2000; Racine, 2002). Contracts have frequently used in the development of ‘quasi-markets' in the public sector 
(Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1999: 68), and whilst contracts can be used to further 
‘social’ objectives such as the securing of agreement, they are generally struck for ‘economic’ reasons, being 
understood as operating at “an intermediary level between the organization and the market” (Musselin, 2004: 74).
221 These ‘relational’ contracts rested on existing relationships between HEIs and central government (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, 1999: 47). Such ‘relational’ contracts (Martin, 1995: 39) depart from the more 
legalistic notion of contracts as spot or classical contracts (Atiyah, 1986). Relational contracts rely on the negotiation of 
goals between departments and service-providers (Greve, 2000:158), and could be used as a “means of quality 
improvement” rather than as a “bureaucratic instrument for keeping exact records” (ibid. : 159). Due to the supposed 
inefficiencies of punishment as a method of dealing with failure, and the tendency of classical contracts to inhibit 
information flows (Martin, 1995:40), a relational contract is “based on the assumption that there can be a degree of trust
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Neave’s contention, that the difference between the French and British attempts 
to implement ‘market forces’ lies in the fact that in France, “market forces are 
those defined as such by central administration and the ways in which they are 
linked into higher education are set down by that same source” (Kaiser and 
Neave, 1999: 123). However, it also highlights the importance of coordination 
between HEIs, given their involvement in the initial definition of the policy and its 
parameters through the universities’ sectoral association, the Conference des 
Presidents d’Universite.
The only element of the contracts which might be seen as likely to stimulate 
competition is the development of indicators for their evaluation. The 
requirement for such indicators could, conceivably, have facilitated competition 
between HEIs for international students, through enabling the ranking of HEIs 
according to the resources they provided for international students, and more 
general quality standards. However, as discussed in chapter six, within the 
context of an enhancement-based evaluation system, the indicators were used 
as a means of gathering information about HEIs, rather than as a means of 
ranking different HEIs against each other. In particular, the numbers of 
international students attending particular HEIs were not subject to extensive 
comment by the CNE, even when such numbers had been explicitly singled out 
within the contracts as an indicator of quality.
6.b Commodification
In contrast to the contracts’ lack of impact on HEIs’ relationships with each other, 
the contracts did lead to an increased commodification of international students, 
to the extent that they promoted the recruitment of international students from 
developed rather than from developing countries, and gave international 
students a direct monetary value (through rewarding HEIs which committed to 
expanding recruitment).
This section refers to an analysis of twenty-two contracts, comprising all those 
negotiated for the period 2003-6. These present a broad picture of the
between client [government] and contractor [service-provider]" (Walsh, 1995:114; see also Greve, 2000:163). To the 
extent that the contracts used by the French government in the higher education sector did not rely on the threat of legal 
sanction (by either side), they are therefore most usefully categorised as relational contracts. (For more analysis of the 
distinction between classical and relational contracts, see Boston, 1995).
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importance of international student recruitment within this new funding stream. 
These contracts represent the sum total that were available for inspection 
through the Delegation aux relations internationales et a la cooperation.222
As might be expected given the circular of contractualisation’s223 distinction 
between policies appropriate for students from developing as against from 
industrialised countries, there was virtually no mention within the contracts of 
cooperation with African HEIs or recruitment of African students unless within 
the context of economic development. Countries were generally divided into 
scientifically developed and non-developed categories, with attempts being 
made to increase the numbers of international students recruited from the 
former only.
The new contractual system commodified international students through the 
allocation of specific funds according to both proposed recruitment levels (from 
developed and emerging economy countries), and institutional commitments 
towards international students. Independent of the existence (or otherwise) of a 
specific ‘volet intemationar, the issue of HEIs’ activities in the international 
arena was a consistent and financially important element of most contracts. As 
the contracts increasingly included indicators against which their fulfilment could 
be measured, proposals concerning the numbers of international students to be 
recruited and concerning institutional policies towards them were increasingly 
prioritised as an feature of institutional performance.
A number of specific claims referring to international issues were made in the 
contracts. These included: the recruitment of more international students; the 
focusing/consolidation of incoming international student flows; the setting up of 
overseas collaborative programmes; and working with EduFrance.224 For 
example, the Universite Michel de Montaigne of Bordeaux stated that it wanted 
to recruit 1440 international students during the next four years, “if finances 
permitted”; the Ecole Normale Superieur indicated that it saw its recruitment of
222 As the contracts were introduced in 1989, a significant number have been excluded from this analysis. 
Unfortunately, the full set of contracts held at the Direction for the programming and the development of universities is 
not accessible to researchers.
223 See p.235.
224 For discussion of this agency, see chapter four.
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international students as a priority; and the Ecole National Superieur de Chimie, 
Lille, claimed that it would reduce admission fees and look for opportunities for 
corporate sponsorship, as a way of reducing the costs of mobility for 
international students, and thus increasing recruitment.
Other international policies included within the contracts less specifically related 
to the recruitment of international (as opposed to European) students included 
the adoption of the new degree structure of three, five and then eight years of 
study (the ECTS system); involvement in the so-called “European space of 
higher education”, the goal of the multilateral Bologna process of degree 
structure harmonisation; and the sending of more French students abroad.
The contracts themselves did not allocate specific funds for the recruitment of 
extra international students, but only for ‘international issues’ as a whole. It is, 
therefore, necessary to assess the impact of a commitment to the recruitment of 
extra international students, in terms of the funding provided for this through the 
contracts, in order to assess whether commodification occurred. For the sample 
of contracts analysed here, an institutional commitment to the recruitment of 
additional international students was the only commitment which had a 
significant correlation with increased funding.
Figure 20 indicates the spread of funding proportions from the contracts which 
were allocated to international issues. The minimum funding accorded for 
international matters per contract was 0.17%; the maximum was 5.71%, and the 
mean was 1.59%. In comparison, the minimum ratio of international student fee 
income to overall income for the British HEIs examined in the previous chapter 
was 0.681% in 2001-2, and the maximum ratio was 1.87% for the same period. 
The amount of funding for most French HEIs provided through the international 
element of the contracts was, therefore, proportionately lesser than that 
provided to many British HEIs from the receipt of international students’ fees. 
However, as virtually the only additional, and variable, source of funding 
available to many French HEIs, the possibility of securing extra funds through 
the contract constituted an important financial incentive to recruit additional 
international students.
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Fig.20: The percentage of funding per contract allocated to international issues 
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To test the importance of a commitment to international student recruitment, as 
against to other international matters, all the comments concerning international 
issues mentioned above225 were treated as independent variables to see 
whether specific commitments in the contracts affected the dependent variable, 
the percentage of contractual funds devoted to international issues. If funding 
resultant from the ‘volet internationaf was proportionally equivalent across HEIs, 
this would suggest that the contractual process was neutral towards different 
HEIs’ international policies. Hence, for example, if HEIs obtained the same 
funding for a commitment to sending more French students abroad as for 
recruiting international students, this would suggest that international student 
recruitment was not the most important international commitment. If the ratio of 
international to general contractual funding differed significantly across the 
sample, and this variation can be positively correlated with specific institutional 
commitments to recruit more international students, this would suggest that the 
contractual system was being used as a method of ‘rewarding’ those HEIs 
which were attempting to recruit more international students from developed 
and emerging economy countries.
Put together, the independent variables explained 63% of the difference in 
allocations between contracts. However, only three commitments had a
225 The recruitment of more international students; the focusing/consolidation of incoming international student flows; 
the setting up of overseas collaborative programmes; working with EduFrance; the adoption of the new degree structure 
of three, five and then eight years of study (the ECTS system); involvement in the so-called “European space of higher 
education”; and the sending of more French students abroad.
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significant effect in this conjunction. All three related directly to the 
encouragement of international student flows- the commitments to the 
recruitment of more international students, the focusing/consolidation of 
incoming international student flows, and the setting up of overseas 
collaborative provision.
Indeed, recruiting more international students was the only commitment to have 
an effect that was individually significant in predicting funding levels (at the 0.05 
level), with an r-squared of .224. This compares with the lack of correlation 
between international commitments such as mention of the European higher 
education space, and subsequent funding levels allocated through the contracts.
Overall, therefore, the contractual system can be seen as a method of 
incentivising HEIs to recruit more students from developed and emerging 
economy countries, and to that extent, can be seen as leading to a 
commodification of international students. It did not, however, have any 
significant impact on the extent of competition between HEIs.
7 Conclusion
As Musselin states, Jospin’s new “university-ministry contracts...were 
developed independently of experiments that preceded them” (Musselin, 2004: 
68). Through the development of the contractual system, “a new system was 
grafted onto the preceding one”, not in an “incremental” way, through a 
“succession of small touches or strokes”, but through a “forceful act” (ibid. : 123).
The recruitment of additional international students from the new catchment 
areas of the developed and emerging economy countries formed an important 
part of the contractual system from its beginnings in 1989. HEIs initially 
supported the contractual system, as a means of enhancing the role of the 
president within the institutional hierarchy, and of developing their own 
approaches to institutional development. This support wavered as government’s 
financial engagement with the contracts began to wane, but since a relaunch of 
the contractual system HEIs appear again to be broadly supportive of the new 
funding system.
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The contractual system can be seen as liberalising to the extent that it provided 
direct benefits for HEIs who committed to increasing their recruitment of 
students from developed and emerging economy countries. It has not, however, 
had any perceptible impact on the extent of competition between HEIs for the 
recruitment of international students.
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Chapter 9: Visa institutions in Britain
1 Introduction
In both countries, the period from 1979 to 2003 witnessed the creation of new 
visa institutions which were liberalising through the incentives they created for a 
commodification of international students.226 The new rules were introduced by 
successive governments, with little input or effective resistance from HEIs, 
which were often unable to coordinate a common response to new proposals. 
Visa rules led to liberalisation, when they created the incentives and constraints 
that led to sectoral actors adopting a view of international students as 
commodities. This can be seen most directly in the changes to visa rules which 
facilitated the charging of international students. However, it is also clear from 
policies to counter ‘overstaying’, and from the new positioning of visa rules as a 
part of the promotion of British higher education overseas.227
The new rules led to a commodification of international students in three ways. 
Firstly, access to visas was restricted to those who would immediately exit the 
national territory following the end of their course at a British HEI. In this way, 
international students were prevented from being ‘burdens’ on the public purse, 
with their presence being restricted to that time during which they were paying 
tuition fees to UK HEIs. As soon as international students had ceased to be fee- 
paying customers, they were denied the ability to stay in the national territory. 
Secondly, visa rules were changed to facilitate the extraction of extra charges 
from international students, both through permitting students to use wages as a 
means of paying their tuition fees, and through directly charging them for the 
administration of their visa requests. In this way, changes to visa rules 
compounded the commodifying effects of the new full-cost fees regime, which 
encouraged a view of international students as units of monetary value and
226 This view of 'liberalisation' as the commodification of international students departs from most previous analyses 
which have examined the liberalisation of visa policies, which have almost exclusively identified the liberalisation of 
visa/immigration policy with the opening of visa and immigration rules (Collinson, 1993:10; Knight, 1921: 77; Llosa, 
1996; Niessen, 2003). This prevalent view fails to acknowledge that whilst the liberalisation of capital, and hence its 
mobility, has proceeded apace, individuals’ legal access to different national territories, especially to western countries, 
has decreased (Collinson, 1993: 37).
227 Although new rules were also introduced to prevent international terrorists and criminals from using student status 
as a cover for illegal activity, these rules did not lead to a commodification of international students nor to an 
intensification of competition amongst HEIs, and so are not examined here (For a summary of these rules, see Dodds, 
2004 and Gibson, 2004).
251
hence as commodities. Thirdly, the visa rules were altered as a means of 
improving the image of British Higher Education overseas, and thus visa rules 
became an integral element of promotional programmes. Attempts were made 
both to highlight the streamlining of visa procedures for particular types of 
students, and to reduce the impact of visa rules on high profile groups who 
might have been expected to publicise any unfair treatment. Prospective 
students’ experience of the visa system was thus viewed as important, but only 
to the extent that this would result in a more or less favourable image of UK 
Higher Education amongst other prospective students.
The visa institution which developed out of these rules was ‘liberalising’ in the 
sense defined in the theoretical chapters, as, while it had little effect on the 
extent of competition between HEIs, it did result in an extensive 
commodification of international students.
HEIs attempted to lobby against a number of the new rules, especially against 
those which posited a link between the incidence of illegal immigration and the 
growth of international student numbers. However, it appears that British HEIs’ 
abilities to mount a coherent campaign against government proposals through 
their sectoral associations were diminished by a lack of coordination. This was 
mainly due to intra-sectoral suspicions, with some HEIs criticising fellow 
universities and colleges for allegedly failing to vet new students, and with some 
HEIs failing to report abuses.
UniversitiesUK (the new name for the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and 
Principals, the universities’ sectoral association) was, once, able to coordinate 
HEIs’ positions against government (against the introduction of new visa 
extension charges), representing a unique example of a unified campaign 
amongst British universities during the period examined. However, as the fees 
were introduced as a result of regulation rather than legislation, the HEIs were 
unable to lobby against them in Parliament, and as HEIs had no role in 
implementing the new rules they were unable to have any impact on them at 
that stage.
2 The situation before 1979
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2.a The 1971 Immigration Act
The Immigration Act of 1971 provided the basic institutional framework for the 
entry of international students into Britain. The Act had marked a sea-change in 
British entry and immigration procedures. It largely removed the more 
permissive arrangements that had been in effect for certain categories of 
entrants, and was seen as signifying an end to traditional British links with the 
Commonwealth (Shotnes, 1987: 99). The Act removed previous exceptions for 
Commonwealth citizens, by imposing a uniform requirement on all entrants to 
produce a valid passport or other recognised entry document on entry to Britain.
Whereas previously, Commonwealth citizens were treated separately from 
aliens for the purposes of entry control, the new Act combined the two systems. 
A new distinction was introduced, between those who had the 'right of abode' in 
the UK and those who did not. No aliens were given the right of abode, nor 
were most Commonwealth citizens (Bindman and Evans, 1971: 5). The 1971 
Act provided the framework for all subsequent rules governing the entry of 
international students into Britain (ibid) right up to the late 1990s. Henceforth, 
visas had to be produced by all foreign nationals, and entry certificates by all 
Commonwealth citizens, including international students, on entry to the UK 
(Layton-Henry, 1985: 105).
The 1971 Act represented the culmination of a number of attempts to unify the 
treatment of different entrants and immigrants, regardless of their nationality 
and the reason for their entry. This unification began as early as the 1950s, as 
British governments attempted to define entitlements to access more 
restrictively (ibid.: 102). Governments attempted, from this point onwards, to 
“divest [themselves] of remaining obligations to the imperial status of British 
subjects” (Collinson, 1994: 58), through alterations to the visa (and immigration) 
system.
Up to the period examined, international students were treated largely as any 
other type of entrant to the UK. They were not seen as posing a specific risk of 
illegal immigration, nor were they subject to different procedures for obtaining
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visas than other entrants. This was in line with the legal framework provided by 
the 1971 Act.228
Until 1979, the dependants of international students were freely able to work in 
Britain, unless their spouse or parent had been expressly forbidden from 
working his- or herself (Her Majesty’s Government, 1973a: para.22). British 
rules concerning employing international students allowed such students to 
work up to twenty hours a week without permission. International students were 
not allowed to work beyond this limit except where “the placement is a 
necessary part of their studies with the agreement of the education institution”.
In addition, they were barred from particular jobs such as sport or entertainment; 
from being self-employed; and from pursuing a career by working permanently 
and full-time (Home Office, undated). Finally, international students required 
permission from the local Jobcentre (initially, the Department of Employment) 
concerning the job they wished to undertake.
In order to obtain leave to remain, international students were only required to 
prove to Entry Clearance Officers (ECOs)229 that they had been accepted to a 
British HEI for a full-time course as a student, could maintain themselves during 
their stay, and would leave when their studies were completed (Her Majesty’s 
Government, 1973b: para. 12). International students were generally given entry 
visas only for twelve months, with extensions being granted if the student could 
produce verifiable evidence that he was enrolled for a full-time course, was 
giving regular attendance, and had adequate funds available for his 
maintenance and that of any dependants (ibid.: para. 13).
228 There have recently been some moves to differentiate the impact of visa rules according to the origins and status of 
entrants, which might indicate that the new rules for international students examined here were merely part of a wider 
movement of differentiation for visa purposes. However, most such changes occurred far later than those which 
differentiated international students from other entrants. Attempts to reduce the length of time international students 
could stay in Britain were instituted from as early as 1979. Yet it was only in 2001 that the Department for Education and 
Skills began advertising fast-track entry to Britain for those skilled in information and communications technologies, and 
other specialisms, and around this date that immigration rules for workers in under-staffed sectors such as nursing and 
teaching were loosened. These new arrangements were codified as late as January 2002, with the introduction of the 
Highly Skilled Migrant Programme (Geddes, 2003:43).
229 Those officers based in British embassies who assessed potential entrants to the British national territory for their 
likelihood to become illegal immigrants following entry.
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It should also be noted that, up to the time of the changes examined here, 
international students were not charged for the processing of their visas. 
Instead, students were frequently required to leave their passports with the 
Home Office for up to six months whilst their claims for visa extensions were 
processed (Grubb Institute, 1978: 129). As entry visas were generally only 
provided for twelve months, international students were frequently required to 
obtain such extensions. Students wishing to go abroad often had to apply for a 
renewal of their visa before they knew the results of their examinations from the 
current university year (ibid: 137).
3 Government strategies
Governments played a pivotal role in the creation of new visa rules which led to 
a commodification of international students from 1979 onwards. Governments 
attempted to institute new rules that restricted access to visas to those students 
who would leave the country following their courses (and thus relieve the state 
of any continuing financial responsibility for them), and who could be charged 
tuition and administration fees. Governments also attempted to change the visa 
rules in order to facilitate the recruitment of international students from 
developed and emerging economy countries, by treating the rules as part of 
promotional programmes for British HEIs overseas.
The first rule changes proposed by British governments constituted attempts to 
prevent ‘overstaying’ in Britain by former international students. The possibility 
of the higher education sector being used as a means to illegally enter the 
country was seen as particularly problematic in Britain compared with other 
countries. Overstaying accounted for the bulk of illegal immigration in Britain, as 
it was difficult to detect such an activity given an immigration control system 
which operated on the basis of checks on entry rather than on checks post­
entry using, for example, identity documents (as in France) (Collinson, 1994: 
59).230
230 In 1978, the then Government maintained that vigorous checks on entry, and selective checks on embarkation, 
were preferable to French-style post-entry control which would have “interfere[ed] with the liberties of the great majority 
of people who are lawfully in this country (Her Majesty’s Government, 1978:17).
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Compared with France, the growth in numbers of international students was 
infrequently linked with illegal immigration in the public arena. In particular, 
increases in international student numbers have not become a key issue for the 
parliamentary or the far -right in Britain, in contrast with the situation in France. 
Aside from localised problems relating to specific issues,231 international 
students were not generally associated with illegal immigration in popular or 
political discourse. In particular, government did not connect the two issues to 
the same extent, despite HEIs’ criticism of the (limited) linkages that were 
made.232 Nonetheless, from 1979 a number of new rules were instituted which 
did predicate a link between the entry of international students to the British 
territory, and the incidence of illegal immigration.
This tightening of entry controls was first proposed in the 1979 White Paper on 
immigration (THES, 1979n; Whitelaw, 1979). The White Paper offers an early 
example of new government thinking on the matter of international students’ 
visas, and was mostly implemented in the regulations that followed. The White 
Paper was published after claims by the then Home Secretary that individuals 
overstaying in Britain following registration on a different pretext comprised one 
“point” where “abuse” could occur (Her Majesty’s Government, 1980d: para.6, 
24). The White Paper proposed four new controls against overstaying by 
international students.
Firstly, it proposed to restrict the length of time for which international students 
could stay in Britain, taking a succession of different courses. International 
students were only able to extend their stay “for a succession of student 
courses” by a year (Her Majesty’s Government, 1979b: iii), with extensions of 
stay “not...granted to students who appear to be moving from one course to 
another without any intention of bringing their studies to a close”. It was
231 One such localised case concerned an alleged linkage between foreign students in Glamorgan and an increase in 
tuberculosis in South Wales, which was dismissed by the University of Glamorgan (THES, 1994d).
232 Nonetheless, it should be noted that some have maintained that there is a perceptible degree of hostility amongst 
the public towards international students. Roger King, then Vice-Chancellor of the University of Humberside, claimed in 
1996 that the “inflow of students from abroad is increasingly not well regarded by the general public. They may be 
associated with migrant issues or as somehow taking university places designated for domestic school leavers” (THES, 
1996e). Similarly, Parekh has claimed that attitudes towards international students reflect broader currents of racism in 
British society. He claimed that “[ejvery time there was talk about too many blacks in Britain, there was talk about too 
many overseas students as well" (Parekh, 1987: 82). Finally, Shotnes also maintained that some of the press were keen 
to present international students as “would-be illegal immigrants” (Shotnes, 1987: 99).
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expected that extensions of stay would be refused if they led overall to “more 
than four years being spent on student courses” (ibid.: para.99). Some 
exceptions were allowed where there was a demonstrable logical progression 
between the courses, but overall the measures considerably restricted 
international students’ abilities to undertake a succession of short courses 
(THES, 1980h).
Secondly, the new White Paper proposed to require Entry Clearance Officers 
(ECOs) to assess international students’ academic credentials for the first time. 
As previously, during the application procedure, prospective students were to 
be required to produce evidence which would satisfy the ECO that they had 
been accepted for a course at a bona fide HEI, that the course would occupy all 
or a substantial part of their time, and that they could, without working and 
without recourse to public funds, meet the cost of the course and of their own 
maintenance and accommodation and that of any dependants during the course 
(Her Majesty’s Government, 1979b: para.21). However, the White Paper also 
proposed the introduction of a new stipulation that an applicant was to be 
refused entry clearance as a student, if the ECO was not satisfied that the 
applicant was able, and intended, to “follow a full-time course of study and to 
leave the country on completion of it”. In “assessing the case”, the ECO would 
be required to “consider such points as whether the applicant’s qualifications 
[were] adequate for the course he propose[d] to follow, and whether there [was] 
any evidence of sponsorship by his home government or any other official body” 
(ibid.: para.22).
Thirdly, the proposed new rules would have prevented those who had been 
sponsored by governments or agencies from being allowed to pursue additional 
studies after their sponsorship ended (ibid.: para. 100).
Finally, the 1979 White Paper on immigration also recommended a new 
prohibition on the dependants of international students (at that time, 
overwhelmingly their wives) from working to support them (THES, 1980h). 
Hence, the White Paper stated that the “wife and children under eighteen... of a 
person admitted as a student....should be prohibited from taking employment 
(Her Majesty’s Government, 1979b: para.25).
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Although it appeared initially that pressure from parliamentarians to remove this 
last proposal from the White Paper had failed (THES, 1980h),233 the regulations 
which implemented the White Paper apparently abolished the prohibition on the 
employment of international students’ dependants (Her Majesty’s Government, 
1980c: 101). Aside from this change, the new regulations exactly followed the 
White Paper’s recommendations, with regards to procedures for the granting 
and renewal of international students’ visas.
From this point onwards, successive governments adopted a more restrictive 
approach towards international students’ visas, except where this could be 
perceived as leading to a negative image of British higher education abroad. 
New rules were introduced to ensure that international students left Britain as 
soon as possible after finishing their degrees, so that they could not become 
illegal immigrants and a burden on the public purse. Other rules were instituted 
which facilitated the charging of international students, and rules were changed 
in order to aid the promotion of British higher education abroad. Rather than 
arising from the experiences of HEIs, the new visa rules were largely driven by 
government, often in the face of considerable opposition from HEIs.234
4 HEIs’ strategies and coordination
4.a. HEIs against the introduction of the new rules
233 Parliamentarians claimed that the new rules would have little impact on unemployment but considerable impact on 
individual students (Rees, 1979), especially given the new full-cost fees payable by international students (Steel, 1979; 
Summerskill, 1979).
234 It should, however, be noted that on occasion, it was not government but the judiciary which defined how conflict 
over the exact implementation of rules should be resolved. On some occasions, government actually disagreed with 
individual ECOs’ interpretations of the rules, especially where the government felt that the latters’ actions had damaged 
the image of British higher education. Hence, in 1981, Rhodes Boyson, then Under-Secretary of State at the 
Department of Education and Science, took up the case of two international students who had entered Britain as visitors 
and been sent home by immigration officials. The courts supported Boyson’s claim that an ECO had misinterpreted the 
students’ comments during their entrance interview as constituting a denial or concealment of their intention to study 
(Hodges, 1981). This followed assurances from the Home Office to HEIs, which had maintained that the rules would be 
interpreted more liberally. On other occasions, the Home Office did not provide the courts with an explicit political steer 
and in the absence of this, the judiciary provided an alternative interpretation of the rules, going against the actions of 
ECOs. Hence, in Kharrazi v Chief Immigration Officer, Gatwick, an international student’s appeal was upheld, when it 
was found that the ECO had misunderstood the interrelationship between two parts of the relevant rules. Henceforth, 
applicants' claims that they were intending to follow a full-time course of study would be accepted, even if the ‘course’ 
was defined as not just one period at school (or university), but also involved undertaking different courses at different 
educational establishments (The Times, 1980).
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Overall, HEIs were critical of governments’ identification of international 
students as potential illegal immigrants, and especially of the increased entry 
controls imposed from 1979 onwards. However, this did not result in any 
significant change to the rules governing international students’ visas. HEIs 
failed to articulate a coordinated response to the new measures.
HEIs did not appear to have developed a common position concerning the 1979 
White Paper. Most criticism of this came not from HEIs, but from the National 
Union of Students and individual parliamentarians. When provisions of the 
White Paper were changed, as with its prohibition on the employment of 
international students’ wives, this appears to have been as a result of lobbying 
by the NUS and within parliament (THES, 1979d), rather than by HEIs. This 
may have been due to the inability of the HEIs collectively to engage in an 
additional campaign to that which they were running against the introduction of 
full-cost fees for international students.
To the extent that HEIs did engage with visa legislation which attempted to 
prevent overstaying, they generally attempted to prevent the introduction, and 
implementation, of the new rules. Most criticism by HEIs of the new rules was 
reactive, with the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals (CVCP), the 
universities’ sectoral association, and the Committee of Directors of 
Polytechnics (CDP), the polytechnics’ sectoral association, playing a minimal 
role in coordinating a coherent approach in this area. One exception to this 
general lack of coordination was the creation and operation of a training 
programme for ECOs, which appeared to have been supported by most HEIs. 
UKCOSA, the HEIs’ lobbying group on international students’ issues, attempted 
to get ECOs to adopt a more consistent and educationally-informed stance 
towards international students’ visa requests through offering them training.
This initiative was initially unsuccessful. However, a programme of training was 
successfully instituted in 1999 following discussions between the British Council 
and the Immigration Department of the Home Office (Humphrey, 1999: 109). 
The CVCP described the resultant training scheme for ECOs as “beneficial”, 
and one HEI representative interviewed described it as a “good example of 
joined-up working” between government departments and HEIs (interview with 
UniversitiesUK employee).
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Aside from the new training programme for ECOs, the lack of coordinated 
resistance to the new rules against overstaying amongst HEIs do not appear to 
be a function of a lack of concern by HEIs concerning this matter. A number of 
HEIs have criticised the extent to which concerns over illegal immigration were 
apparently dominating the administration of visa delivery. In 1999, a survey by 
the Association of Colleges235 indicated that HEIs and Further Education 
Institutions felt UK visa officials “in the home country [abroad] seem to be 
making judgements about the suitability of students for courses on which the 
colleges [in Britain] have already accepted them”, with the “worst offenders” 
located in India and China (THES, 1999b). A report from UKCOSA confirmed 
this, claiming that prospective students were frequently victims of an 
‘entrapment mentality’ amongst ECOs, and that as a result, 83% of universities, 
further and higher education colleges and English-language colleges claimed to 
have lost prospective students because of visa difficulties in 1998 (THES, 
1999g). Williams and Evans, in their examination of this matter, quote an HEI 
representative describing his opposition to the inflexibility of the visa system, 
with “the whole Immigration/Home Office one (sic.)” being described as 
“probably the biggest impediment” (Williams and Evans, 2005: 86) to 
recruitment. HEIs’ claims of overzealous actions by ECOs were often focused 
on their activities in developing countries. Hence, one HEI representative 
maintained that ECOs in Kenya and Nigeria were particularly assiduous in their 
attempts to block what they perceived were potential illegal immigrants. Rather 
than assuming ‘innocence’, he claimed the ECOs operated with the assumption 
that prospective international students had either forged financial documents 
and/or intended to stay illegally after graduation.236
This was confirmed in interviews with HEI employees, most of whom criticised 
the links which governments had drawn between international students and 
illegal immigration. One interviewee asked not to be identified when he claimed 
that “anything involving people is never going to be a hundred per cent secure... 
it’s a bit upsetting to see... publicity on those raids [of illegal immigrants who 
had entered Britain using student visas] when we know, you know, we’ve got a
235 The Association for Further Education Colleges in England and Wales.
236 Letter from Ian Grigg-Spall, Director of admissions and studies, Kent Law School, Canterbury (THES, 2000b).
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million students coming to the UK to study, and they find a few hundred that’s 
(sic.) been done as a bit of a scam”. Another interviewee maintained that it 
“doesn’t help us [HEIs] at all to be..., a route for clandestine...” immigration 
(interview with HEI employee), and that HEIs themselves had sufficient 
incentive to stop this without government tightening entry controls. In the same 
vein, the then chief executive of UKCOSA has noted that whilst some colleges 
may have “got greedy and lax about overseas students,...by now enough have 
got their fingers burnt to have wised up. No reputable college wants these 
students” (THES, 1999f).
On occasion such criticism was conducted through the universities’ sectoral 
associations. Hence, the CVCP, along with UKCOSA and the British Council, 
made a number of very critical claims concerning the tightening of visa 
restrictions in the late 1990s. The three organisations maintained in a 
memorandum to a Foreign Affairs Select Committee report that visa refusals 
were often motivated by the ECO not being persuaded that the student would 
leave the UK following studies, i.e. by concerns over illegal immigration; that the 
process was subject to delays; and that many student applicants felt ECOs had 
been insensitive and rude (Foreign Affairs Committee, 1998).
However, neither the CVCP nor the CDP appears to have developed its own 
policy on the issue of how governments should tackle the overstaying ‘problem’. 
Where the sectoral associations did comment on the matter, this was in a 
reactive manner, rather than the associations being able to articulate a 
coordinated, alternative policy.
4.b The lack of coordination amongst HEIs concerning the new rules
The lack of coordinated resistance to the introduction of new rules which 
explicitly linked international students with illegal immigration can be seen as 
resulting from a more general lack of coordination between HEIs concerning 
visa rules.
Although HEIs generally maintained that the extent of illegal immigration was 
minimal, and that their own institutions maintained rigorous controls, they often 
also claimed that other HEIs were less conscientious. More than one
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interviewee claimed that whilst some universities (including their own) employed 
rigorous vetting procedures, others undertook little surveillance of their activities 
(interviews with HEI employees). While one interviewee noted that it was in no 
HEI’s interest to be a route for clandestine immigration (interview with HEI 
employee), others claimed that in practice, a number of HEIs had failed to 
sufficiently vet potential international students.237
Indeed, press reports claimed that even large and prestigious HEIs such as 
Sheffield Hallam, Sunderland and the University of North London were 
experiencing problems with students who later absconded (THES, 2001a). It 
was, further, claimed that HEIs were unwilling to report illegal immigration to the 
authorities in case this resulted in ECOs adopting stricter controls over 
legitimate students, which would damage recruitment (ibid.). This reduced the 
capacity of HEIs to promote a more flexible approach to the implementation of 
visa rules.
Furthermore, it appears that some HEIs were prepared to attempt to work 
around the visa rules, in a manner which reduced the sector’s collective 
negotiating capacity. This is clear from the British higher education sector’s 
response to the regulation of immigration advisors.
The issue of unscrupulous immigration advisors first came under scrutiny when 
the Times Higher Education Supplement exposed the activities of a former head 
of the visa section at the British Embassy in Beijing. Mr S. I. Wall had been 
offering “a select few universities” a service to aid them in ensuring that their 
prospective students would gain entry to Britain. The matter was brought to the 
Times Higher’s attention by Leeds Metropolitan University following a 
communication from Mr Wall.
Although Wall was not directly working for the Foreign Office at the time, he was 
still technically an employee of the British government whilst working as a 
consultant in China, and was thus breaching diplomatic service regulations.
237 See also Williams and Evans' reporting of one HEI representative who claimed that in some universities, there were 
“those [illegal immigrants] who will pay half the fees up front because it is cheaper than getting into this country in any 
other way” (Williams and Evans, 2005: 86).
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These regulations stipulated that at least a three month period should elapse 
between leaving the Foreign Office and working in a related area, which had not 
been reached in Mr Wall’s case (THES, 1999a). The Foreign Office, however, 
claimed that Wall’s failure to follow guidelines for officials’ conduct was a 
genuine mistake (THES, 1999c).
Leeds Metropolitan University, on the contrary, maintained that Wall’s activities 
would indirectly lead to a more restrictive attitude towards visa delivery to 
international students by officials, and, hence, militated against a fair visa 
delivery system. However, no other university had alerted officials to Mr Walls’ 
activities up to the time of Leeds Met’s expose. It appears that the other 
universities were prepared to use Mr Wall’s insider knowledge as a means of 
guaranteeing an easy entry for their students, despite the fact that he was 
working illegally.
5 How the new rules were established and operated 
5.a Rules attempting to prevent overstaying
As noted above, the regulations following the 1979 White Paper on immigration 
restricted the length of time for which international students could stay in Britain; 
required ECOs to assess international students’ academic credentials for the 
first time; and prevented those who had been sponsored by governments or 
agencies from being allowed to pursue additional studies after their sponsorship 
ended. The proposals were vigorously opposed by a number of bodies, if not, 
apparently, by HEIs’ sectoral associations, as mentioned above.238
Following the introduction of legislation in 1980 implementing (almost all of) the 
White Paper’s recommendations, a number of additional rules were instituted 
which further tightened control over international students’ entry to the national 
territory.
In 1982, a requirement for prospective international students to satisfy entry 
control officers that they intended “to leave the country on completion o f their
238 The National Union of Students maintained that the new rules would "damage race relations” (THES,1979d; 1979n), 
with both the Union’s Scottish association and the Federation of Conservative Students (THES, 1979a) explicitly 
describing them as "racist”.
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studies was included in the general requirements for international students who 
had been granted restricted visas awaiting full entry clearance (Her Majesty’s 
Government, 1982: para.24). The interpretation of “recourse to public funds” 
was also tightened, such that students who had been receiving rent rebates or 
allowances were deemed not to have been able to meet the cost of their course 
and their maintenance without recourse to public funds, when they were 
applying for visa extensions (Tilley, 1982). In 1989, international students’ wives 
and children were to be prevented from working if their husband/father had 
already been prohibited from doing so himself (Her Majesty’s Government,
1989: para.31). Again in 1989, the wording of the stipulations for visa 
extensions was hardened. Rather than extensions of stay not normally being 
refused, if this would lead to “more than four years being spent on student 
courses”, henceforth extensions of stay would be refused if this was the case, 
thus allowing the ECO no possibility for discretion (ibid.: para.110). Finally, in 
1989 revisions to immigration rules also explicitly prevented any foreigner or 
Commonwealth citizen from being able to stay to study at a UK HEI, if their 
original visa was not for this purpose (aside from in the case of medical or 
dental training) (ibid.: para.111).
Following these progressive tightenings of rules to counter overstaying during 
the late 1970s and 1980s, two additional measures against overstaying were 
introduced in the 1990s.
Firstly, the Home Office developed a list of ‘legitimate HEIs’, with limited 
external involvement. Prospective students applying to HEIs not on the list 
would be treated with a greater degree of scepticism by ECOs. The list was 
prepared as a part of staff instructions, and was not published. It was based on 
information collated by the Immigration and Nationality Department concerning 
the previous actions of particular colleges. As no publicly recognised HEIs were 
excluded from the Home Office’s list of ‘legitimate’ HEIs, this government policy 
had limited effects on HEIs. Nonetheless, if was one of the few issues related to 
international students’ visas, following the 1979 changes, which was brought up 
in Parliament (Corbyn, 1991; Henderson, 1996).
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Secondly, in 2000 the then government also attempted to increase the controls 
placed on university immigration advisors, to prevent potential illegal immigrants 
from being aided by unsuspecting HEIs, to help detect unscrupulous 
immigration advisers, and more generally, to close up access to student visas 
for illegal immigrants. New rules regulating the conduct of immigration advisors 
had been introduced by the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act. The Act required 
all immigration and advice services providers to comply with a code of conduct 
to be imposed by a new Immigration Services Commissioner from April 2001 
(THES, 2000a). Student unions and HEIs were eventually exempted from some 
of the administrative aspects of the Act, but they were required to adopt special 
new procedures (Her Majesty’s Government, 2001). A new code for HEIs’ 
immigration advisors was instituted, which required assurances previously 
agreed informally and orally to be recorded, and the formal supervision of 
advisors (THES, 2001a; 2001c).239 Although some HEIs lobbied against the 
introduction of the new rules, it appears that previous problems with the 
implementation of existing controls240 may have reduced sectoral associations’ 
abilities to run a coherent campaign against the changes.
5.b Rules allowing charges to be levied on international students
New rules allowing the charging of international students can be divided into 
two types; those relating to charges for visa administration, and those 
concerning international students’ ability to pay full-cost fees.
British HEIs’ campaign against the introduction of visa extension charges 
represents the only occasion, in the period examined, where sectoral 
associations were able to effectively coordinate a position against government 
proposals. However, this coordination occurred too late to make any difference 
to the introduction of the new charges.
The Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 allowed the Home Office to charge 
international students for the costs of extending their visas for the first time. The 
new charges for visa extensions were entirely the responsibility of the Home
239 The Home Office also, allegedly, attempted to restrict the maximum length of time students could remain in the UK, 
in an attempt to prevent abuse. It is claimed that this was resisted by the CVCP and UKCOSA. However, I have not 
found any independent verification for this claim aside from interview evidence.
240 See pp.261-3.
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Office, and reflected its interpretation of the provisions of the new Act.241 Two 
reasons for the additional charge were given by the Home Office. Alan 
Underwood, the Home Office’s Head of Managed Migration, claimed that the 
new charges were required in order to improve the speed of delivery of visa 
extensions. This was corroborated by an interviewee’s claim that the fees had, 
according to the Home Office, “been predicted in the budget and the projected 
income from them would allow an improvement of the service” (Underwood, 
2003; interview with UKCOSA employee). On another occasion, Underwood 
maintained that the fees were also prompted by a desire to pass on to potential 
students the (existing) true administration costs of their visas (quoted in Saville, 
2003a: 1). As with the new rules preventing international students from 
overstaying, the visa extension charges further restricted the claims that 
international students could make on the public purse.
HEIs were completely opposed to the introduction of visa extension charges for 
international students. The visa extension charges were formally announced 
only three weeks before their introduction on the 1st August 2003, with no prior 
consultation with the HE sector or other interest groups (LSE Students’ Union, 
2003). This was despite the fact that HEIs’ sectoral associations were, by this 
point, represented on a project working group of the Prime Minister’s Initiative242 
which dealt specifically with visa matters, and was attended by UKVisas (a new 
agency set up to cover visa-delivery), and the Home Office, as well as the 
British Council and UKCOSA.
UniversitiesUK (the new name for the CVCP) lobbied with the NUS and 
UKCOSA against this new prerogative of the Home Office (Her Majesty’s 
Government, 1999b: 33.5.1) when it was first proposed in the Immigration and 
Asylum Bill (THES, 1999h). However, interviewees claimed that few HEIs 
expected the actual figure for the visa extension fee to be as high as was later 
decided by the Home Office. It had been suggested during the progress of the
241 It had been suggested in 1980 by some commentators that international students should be charged for visa 
extensions. However, this charge was to constitute an alternative, rather than a supplement, to the new full-cost fees. 
The proposal was rejected by HEIs as it would have reduced HEIs' control over international students’ policy. 
Government, in any case, preferred the new full-cost fees system, as it was less expensive for central government to 
administer and would help foster entrepreneurialism amongst HEIs in the recruitment of international students (THES, 
1980a; see also chapter seven).
242 See p.101.
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Bill preceding the Act that the charge might be £90 (Saville, 2003b), but the 
eventual figures were nearly twice this amount for a postal application and 
almost three times as much for an application made in person. Although EU 
legislation had required the introduction of a charge for EU residence permits, 
which came as a surprise for many HEIs (interview with British Council 
employee), the visa extension charges were exclusively the responsibility of the 
Home Office.243
Compared to its inability to coordinate resistance to many of the other 
liberalising institutions examined in this thesis, UniversitiesUK’s campaign 
against the new extension fee involved many of its members, with all factions 
(the Russell Group, 94 Group, Campaign for Mainstream Universities and non- 
aligned group) in support. However, despite a number of HEIs managing to gain 
the support of their local MPs to sign a UniversitiesUK-backed Early Day Motion 
on the matter, the Home Office ignored the protests. The Home Office did, 
nonetheless, claim it would alter its decision-making procedures following this 
criticism from UniversitiesUK. It pledged that the universities’ sectoral 
association would be more extensively involved in decision-making concerning 
international students’ visas in the future, and that it would be able to invoke 
judicial review should it be proposed that the charges be increased again. 
However, the visa extension charges remained (interview with UniversitiesUK 
employee). UniversitiesUK’s campaign had occurred too late to affect the 
substance of the rules. In addition, as the rules were implemented entirely by 
the Home Office and immigration services, with no role for HEIs, it was not 
possible for British HEIs to disrupt the rules through non-compliance.
As noted above, a second way in which visa rules were altered in order to 
facilitate the charging of international students, was through their impact on 
international students’ abilities to pay their tuition fees from wages earned in 
Britain.
243 It should, however, be noted that the impact of this measure has been slightly mitigated by the fact that in 1999 the 
Home Office instructed ECOs to give leave to remain for students for the full length of their course, unless there were 
specific reasons for this time to be shortened (interview with UKCOSA employee). This contrasted with the previous 
situation, whereby international students were only granted visas for twelve months at a time, subject to (frequent) 
renewal.
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From the 21st June 1999, the requirement for international students to receive 
Jobcentre clearance before taking vacation or out-of-study work was removed. 
Only around 6% of requests by international students were being rejected per 
year. The old rule was described by the government as ‘an unnecessary hurdle’ 
(Cabinet Office, 1999: paragraph D), and was seen as damaging the 
recruitment of international students. In addition, from 2000 a concession was 
granted, such that students who had already been guaranteed part-time work at 
a publicly funded further or higher education institution could take their expected 
earnings into consideration, when presenting their means to ECOs (Immigration 
Directorate, 2002: Ch.3, Sect.1, Anx.A). The student's prospective earnings in 
this type of job can now be taken into account when they apply for leave to 
enter and to remain in the UK. These proposals were both introduced as 
elements of the Prime Minister’s Initiative (PMI) for the recruitment of 
international students.244 The proposals led to a commodification of international 
students as, similar to the visa extension charges, they facilitated the charging 
of international students (in this case, the extraction of tuition fees from them).
Unlike their opposition to the visa extension charges, HEIs were generally in 
favour of the PMI’s proposals concerning changes to arrangements for 
international students’ work permits and for the assessment of their means 
when entering Britain. The new policy aided HEIs’ in expanding recruitment,245 
and thus helped individual HEIs to boost their incomes from full-cost fees and 
reduce expenditure on scholarships, enabling the recruitment of international 
students and the extraction of funds from them even when initially they lacked 
sufficient means to pay full-cost tuition fees. It also aided certain HEIs to fill 
gaps in their teaching staff with well-qualified international postgraduate 
students (THES, 1999e). However, HEIs’ sectoral associations do not appear to 
have played a major role in the definition of the new policy.
5.c Rules enabling the promotion of British higher education
244 See chapter three.
245 According to Brian Hipkine, dean of students at the Hendon campus of Middlesex University (THES, 1999e). Unlike 
in France, however, visa rules were not substantially changed to allow international students to stay on after their 
courses, apart from in Scotland (through its 'Fresh Talent’ initiative, which was introduced to reduce the impact of a 
falling national population).
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Government also altered visa rules as a means of aiding recruitment by British 
HEIs. A key element of the Prime Minister’s Initiative for increased international 
student recruitment was the attempt to “streamlin[e] processes for overseas 
students” both at visa delivery, where this was necessary for travel to the UK, 
and when requesting leave to enter and remain, when students first arrived in 
the UK (Cabinet Office, 1999: para. D). The new arrangements were publicised 
to certain groups of potential international students (ibid.), and were seen as a 
means of improving Britain’s image overseas. As the Prime Minister Tony Blair 
succinctly remarked in his speech launching the PMI, the new measures would 
make it “[e]asier to apply, easier to enter”, within the context of a situation where 
“British exports of education and training [were] worth some eight billion pounds 
a year” (Blair, 1999b).
In addition to this inclusion of visa rules within the PMI, British governments also 
attempted to remove particular rules which could be seen as unfair or petty, and 
which might have given British higher education a bad image.
This can be seen, for example, in the re-opening of a loophole for international 
students wishing to work as student union sabbaticals. Previous cases of 
student union sabbaticals being refused visa extensions had received extensive 
press coverage.246 The exemption for sabbatical students, which had originally 
been granted in 1974 but which had been progressively removed, was thus re­
instated in new rules guiding immigration officers’ conduct which followed the 
Prime Minister’s Initiative. Leave to enter/remain as a sabbatical officer was 
granted, provided the student could prove she or he qualified for leave to 
remain the previous year when still studying, and had plans for the future.
These requirements were very similar to those required by all other international 
students: extra leave to remain required that international students could prove 
they would be following the same or another course the next year, and returning 
to their country of origin afterwards (Immigration Directorate, 2001: 4.3).
Inability to complete a thesis due to visa restrictions was also seen as giving a 
negative picture of British higher education to potential international students 
(THES, 1996d). By 2000 the situation concerning international doctoral students
246 See, for example, THES, 1995b.
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had also been changed, with new rules introduced which provided a formal 
concession for an additional twelve months’ stay to write up, extendable to 
twenty-four months in exceptional circumstances (Immigration Directorate, 
2001).
6 To what extent did the new rules lead to a liberalisation of international 
students’ policy?
None of the new rules had any perceptible impact on the extent of competition 
between HEIs for the recruitment of new international students. They did, 
however, lead to a commodification of international students. This section 
provides more detail on how the new rules led to this outcome. It indicates that 
the commodification of international students was promoted in three ways by 
the new rules. Visas were restricted to students who would immediately leave 
the national territory following study, and who could be charged tuition and 
administration fees; and the visa system was seen as a tool for recruitment.
6.a The restriction of access to prevent ’overstaying’
As noted above, governments attempted to restrict access to international 
student visas to those who might use them as a means of immigration in three 
ways. Firstly, following the Secretary of State’s speech mentioned above, there 
was an intensification of border controls in place from 1978-9 onwards. As the 
then Home Secretary, William Whitelaw, maintained, the new rules were 
specifically intended to prevent what he described as “bogus students” from 
entering Britain (O’Leary, 1980a).
The new rules mainly rested on ECOs taking a more restrictive stance 
concerning individual prospective students’ applications for visas. In the early 
1990s, the Home Office also created a list of bona fide HEIs, which was kept 
confidential for legal reasons. The list included all publicly-funded HEIs, but 
excluded a number of private HEIs. Government instituted the regulation of 
immigration advisors, in an attempt to detect corrupt advisors and to prevent 
illegal immigrants from manipulating advisors.
Despite the variety of new legislative measures introduced by government, it 
continued to express concerns throughout the period that particular HEIs might
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be failing to take adequate precautions over the students they had recruited.
The Foreign Office, for example, maintained that the high rate of rejection of 
international student visa applications, double the rate of other visa applications 
at 12%, suggested a high rate of abuse (THES, 1999e; 2001a).247
These new rules commodified international students, as they were designed to 
reduce the burden of these students on the public purse, through requiring them 
to leave the national territory as soon as they had finished paying tuition fees.
6.b Changes in visa rules to facilitate charging
As noted above, visa rules were altered to facilitate the charging of fees to 
international students in two ways; through the introduction of visa processing 
fees, and the loosening of work permits to enable wages to be used to pay 
tuition fees.
According to the then Head of Managed Migration, Alan Underwood, the 
charges for visa processing had been introduced according to “...the clear 
principle that the users of a service should pay for it and not the general 
taxpayer” (Saville, 2003a: 1). The Act thus allowed the immigration services to 
recoup some of the resources used in processing international students’ legal 
administration.248
Some interviewees claimed the extension charges were likely to have an effect 
on students’ ability to continue studying (interview with HEI employee). However, 
others maintained that the actual problem was caused by the former practice of 
ECOs granting leave to remain which did not cover the full length of the course, 
and hoped that new Home Office instructions would abolish this practice 
(interview with British Council employee). The schedule for introduction of the 
charge was apparently too tight for a new payment system to have been 
introduced, incurring major problems (interview with UniversitiesUK employee).
247 It was further maintained in the press that HEIs were reluctant to report disappearances in case ECOs clamped 
down on legitimate students and damaged recruitment (THES, 2001a). It should however be remembered that ECOs 
were also criticised for rejecting legitimate visa requests out of hand.
248 But see also p.266 for evidence of some ambiguity over exactly why the new charges were introduced.
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The new rules led to a commodification of international students, through 
compounding the effects of the full-cost fees system; firstly, through enabling 
extra charges to be levied on them, and secondly, through enabling a greater 
amount of fees to be collected through the new funding system.
6.c Changes to visa rules to aid the promotion of British higher education
Finally, the visa system was seen as a means of increasing the recruitment of 
international students from developed and emerging economy countries into 
British HEIs. This was most evident in the inclusion of changes to the visa 
processing system within the Prime Minister’s Initiative, which was created to 
boost the recruitment of international students from developed and emerging 
economy countries. It was also evident in attempts to avoid an image of the 
immigration services as unfair or petty, which could have undermined 
recruitment. This is clear from the changes to rules affecting ‘high profile’ 
international students, such as student union sabbatical officers.
Unlike in France, no attempts were made to directly choke off demand for 
British higher education from students from developing countries. However, 
there is limited evidence which suggests that ECOs’ procedures fluctuated as 
government assessments of the economic utility of links with different 
geographical areas changed over time (interview with HEI employee). This may 
help to explain the extreme fluctuations in the numbers of students from China 
attending British HEIs. One interviewee (rather bluntly) described the visa 
processing regime in China as having “gone right down the toilet, in extremely 
melodramatic ways” (interview with HEI employee). Interviewees claimed that 
the rejection rate of prospective Chinese international students had almost 
doubled, including for those students attending articulated programmes, which 
were normally treated as ensuring the legitimacy of applications.249 It was 
suggested that this change in the treatment of Chinese applicants’ visas was 
prompted by a decision by the British government to restrict the numbers of
249 As the international students concerned had already demonstrated themselves to be of a sufficient intellectual level 
to participate in higher education, and to have some degree of commitment towards obtaining a higher education 
qualification.
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Chinese international students attending British HEIs, following a very large 
increase in their numbers (interview with HEI employee).250
7 Conclusion
To conclude, a number of changes have been made by governments to visa 
rules. These have, largely, facilitated a commodification of international 
students. They have aided the immigration services in preventing international 
students from staying on in the national territory, enabled international students 
to be charged visa extension fees, and enabled them to better pay tuition fees 
through taking wages into account; and, finally, have helped to promote British 
higher education abroad.
British HEIs have had little impact on either the creation or operation of these 
rules. Their attempts to develop common positions have been limited by both 
distrust amongst HEIs as to other HEIs’ probity in vetting international students, 
and by HEIs’ different approaches to issues such as the use of immigration 
advisors. In the one case where HEIs were able to coordinate their opposition 
to a government proposal (the introduction of visa extension charges), this 
occurred too late to affect the policy.
250 See also Crace, 2004.
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Chapter 10: Visa institutions in France
1 Introduction
French governments introduced a number of new visa rules from the late 1970s 
onwards specifically targeted at international students. These included, in 
chronological order, the Imbert decree (1979), the changes to this instituted by 
Alain Savary in 1981, the 1989 law concerning the delivery of cartes de sejour, 
the lois Pasqua (1993), the loi Reseda (1998), and circulars promoting the use 
of guichet uniques and of grouped visa requests (2000). As in Britain, such 
rules led to a commodification of international students. This is due to their 
effects on the reduction of international students from developing countries, the 
restriction of overstaying (and thus the prevention of ex-students from becoming 
burdens on the public purse), and their links with the promotion of French higher 
education abroad. HEIs were generally opposed to the introduction of these 
new rules, apart from those relating to improving the image of French higher 
education abroad. Where French HEIs were able to extensively coordinate their 
resistance, as with the Imbert measures, they were on occasion able to force a 
change in visa rules. Overall, however, governments’ control over the definition 
of the new rules was sustained throughout their operation.
2 The situation before 1979
Traditionally, prospective international students had been able to attend French 
HEIs even if they had entered France for another purpose. It was not unusual, 
for example, for students (especially of African origin in Paris) to wait for five 
years before starting a course at an HEI. No formal requirements were placed 
on students’ qualifications, with a survey of international students in Paris in 
1972 indicating that at least 20% lacked the baccalaureat or equivalent before 
entering a French HEI. International students were able to work, and, indeed, 
some lived off the proceeds, although in some cases they were unable to find 
employment either due to “unemployment, to racism (especially for students 
living in Paris), to the hours, or to [a] lack of qualifications” (Klineberg and Ben 
Brika, 1972: 24-6). Finally, international students did not have to pass a 
language test before obtaining a visa, with language problems preventing 
numerous international students from achieving academic success (ibid.: 54-5). 
Overall, therefore, the existing visa system for international students in France
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was relatively permissive. International students were not treated particularly 
differently to other types of entrants, and were able to stay in France for 
extended periods of time both before and after studying at an HEI. The new 
rules introduced from the late 1970s onwards marked a considerable rupture 
with this previous situation.
3 Government strategies
As with the creation of the new British visa rules, the French state played an 
important role throughout the period in the creation of the new French 
arrangements. The direction of government policy towards international 
students’ visas can be loosely divided into three periods of change. The first, 
from 1979-1980, covers the introduction of the Imbert measures, which were 
largely designed to choke off demand for French higher education from 
developing countries. The second, from 1989-1994, covers the introduction of 
the 1989 circular on cartes de sejour and the lois Pasqua, which aimed to 
reduce overstaying by international students, and thus to reduce the perceived 
burden on the public purse. The third period, from 1998-2000, covering the 
introduction of the loi Reseda, of the guichet uniques and of grouped visa 
requests, reflected attempts by government to alter visa legislation as a means 
of improving the image of French higher education abroad.
At the end of 1979, the French government, seeking “to maintain the quality of 
both the foreign students admitted and of the education and services provided 
for them in France”, but clearly also with a view to “stemming the rising tide of 
foreign students discerned over the past few years”, passed the so-called 
Imbert Decree (Smith et a/., 1981:171). This decree codified the requirements 
of a circular introduced in 1978, the Bonnet circular, and added some further 
restrictions (Coulon and Paivandi, 2003: 23; Neave, 1980e).
The new Imbert decree required all undergraduates251 to fulfil three conditions: 
they had to provide proof of ‘pre-inscription’ (previous acceptance) at a French 
HEI, having had their application accepted by the Imbert Commission; they had 
to prove possession of adequate resources to support themselves whilst 
engaged on the course; and they had to pass an examination in the French
251 Postgraduates were exempt from ‘pr6-inscription’ (Smith et al., 1981:178).
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language (Le Monde, 1978). The imposition of a language test as part of the 
requirements for obtention of a student visa represented a significantly novel 
step in a system which had traditionally resisted attempts to restrict access by 
language competency (and which continued to do so).252 The introduction of the 
new test coincided with new attempts not to renew the carte de sejour of 
students having to do re-sit examinations (Weil, 1991: 230).
The new ‘Imbert Commission’ which examined students applications (the 
National Commission on international students to give its formal title), was to 
divide the forms constituting the prospective student’s request to attend a 
French HEI (dossiers description) amongst HEIs and to oversee the French 
language examinations (Corbett, 1980; Le Monde, 1979a). The Commission 
was chaired by M. Imbert, the Director of the CNOUS (Centre national des 
oeuvres universitaires et scolaires), a government-sponsored agency charged 
with the provision of social aid for students (performing tasks such as the 
management of university restaurants, the provision of accommodation and the 
administration of certain student grants) (Smith et a/., 1981: 172). The 
Commission included representatives of the Higher Education, Foreign Affairs 
and Cooperation Ministries, and the CNOUS. Although HEIs’ ability to control 
international students’ admissions was limited, they were, in effect, able to 
exercise some discretion in choosing which international students should be 
accepted, given the requirement to exercise some control over entrants on the 
level of language and previous qualifications (Weil, 1991: 230). The Imbert 
decree removed this discretionary role from HEIs.
It has been claimed that the new measures were based on the findings from two 
reports. The first was produced by the Auditor-General, which despite only 
considering the matter of international students in a very limited way, was 
claimed to have increased government concerns about the numbers of 
international students from developing countries entering France. The other 
report was commissioned by the Prime Minister, and dealt specifically with the
252 The new Chirac government attempted in 1986 to introduce a new nationality code, which would have included 
knowledge of the French language as part of formal assimilation conditions. However, the proposals were resisted by 
the then President, Mitterand, and the parliamentary left, given the lack of a strong parliamentary majority for the right 
(Geddes, 2003: 61-2). A Comitd des Sages which was appointed to defuse the issue recommended the maintenance of 
existing practices, with relatively open naturalisation and no formal requirement concerning language competency.
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topic of international students. Unfortunately, neither report was published 
(Smith etal., 1981: 183).
The Imbert decree was heavily criticised by university presidents, both 
individually and within their sectoral association, the Conference des Presidents 
d’Universite (CPU). Despite the Interior Minister specifically meeting with the 
CPU to ask it to support the new measures (Le Figaro, 1980), HEIs continued to 
oppose the decree. This opposition was maintained until the advent of a new, 
Socialist government in 1981, which did not, however, significantly alter the 
Imbert measures, aside from by abolishing quotas.
4 HEIs’ strategies and coordination
French HEIs’ reactions to the creation of the new visa rules indicate the efficacy 
of coordinated resistance to liberalisation. As Weil notes, the measures had to 
be abandoned followed a “reaction of solidarity” during their implementation 
(Weil, 1991: 230). This section will briefly review HEIs’ involvement in the 
creation of the law, which was limited, as opposed to its operation, which was 
extensive.
The Imbert decrees concerning access to international student visas were 
debated and passed in the Conseil National de I'Enseignement Superieur et de 
la Recherche (CNESER), a consultative body comprised of education trade 
unions, student representatives and government officials (Decker, 1998: 220).
The new visa arrangements were adopted very narrowly by the Conseil, by 36 
votes against 33. Despite such (qualified) support from the CNESER, the 
government failed to obtain the support of university presidents for the new 
measures. This was despite organising the first meeting of the CPU with the 
Prime Minister for two years, to discuss the new arrangements (Le Monde, 
1980b).
The Imbert decree led to a considerable centralisation of the selection process 
for international students. Formerly a matter for individual HEIs, the Imbert 
Commission took over all responsibility for deciding whether or not a candidate
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from overseas should be accepted or rejected, and at which HEI he or she 
should be registered.
As Smith et al. note, the Imbert measures involved “almost the entire admission 
procedure and access policy on foreign students” being “altered at the wave of 
a ministerial wand without any...consultation process having taken place”
(Smith etai,  1981: 183). The then Prime Minister, Raymond Barre, did organise 
a meeting of University Presidents specifically to discuss the Imbert measures. 
However, at this meeting, the Prime Minister appeared rather to inform HEIs of 
his government’s position rather than to listen to their concerns. The Minister of 
Higher Education, Alice Saunier-SeTte, was unwilling to discuss this matter, or 
indeed any other matter, with HEIs (Bernard and Lepagnot-Leca, 2002: 221, 
footnote). Although HEIs, along with other bodies (Geddes, 2003: 56), were 
opposed to the new rules, this resulted in little initial change as they were being 
drawn up.
The government attempted to ignore the protests. Hence, the Interior Minister 
(M. Bonnet, who had introduced one of the decrees which was formalised by 
Imbert) described the protests as caused by agitationists and/or a minority (Le 
Monde, 1979h; 1979g). Eventually, the government actually attempted to justify 
the new rules on the basis of the protests which they had caused; hence, the 
government maintained that the new rules were not only justified on educational 
grounds, but also on security grounds, given the violent nature of recent 
protests (Neave, 1980b). Bonnet claimed that there was a lack of understanding 
of the real import of the new rules, and even maintained that his opponents 
were lying about the new arrangements (Le Monde, 1979h).
Nonetheless, increasing numbers of HEIs began to organise non-compliance 
with the measures, alongside student protests against the new decrees.253 The 
campaign was also support by the Confederation Frangaise Democratique du
253 involving hunger strikes (Le Monde, 1979c; 1979f; 1979h; 1979p; Neave, 1980a); disruption of examinations (Le 
Monde, 1979k; 1979s; Neave, 1980d); and clashes with the police involving 122 and then 86 arrests in Grenoble, and 
the death of one protestor at Jussieu in Paris (Le Monde, 1979g; 1979i; 1979j; 1979r) (For a review of the events, see 
Le Matin, 1983).
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Travail (CFDT) (Le Monde, 1979d) and elements of the prefecture.254 Most 
importantly, a number of HEIs decided not to administer, or to inadequately 
administer, the language tests required by the Imbert decree. This effectively 
rendered the new system unworkable in a large number of regions. For 
example, the rector of Grenoble university agreed to push back the date of the 
examination in French for incoming international students (Le Monde, 1979m), 
and later removed the requirement for international students to sit the test (Le 
Monde, 1979b). In addition, prominent academics launched a campaign against 
the Imbert measures (Le Monde, 1979e); the councils of the two universities in 
Rennes protested against the circular (Le Monde, 1979o); and a number of 
universities decided to admit international students who had failed the new 
criteria for entry, especially following hunger strikes (Le Monde, 1980c).255 
Whilst the CPU was unable to prevent the Imbert decree being passed in the 
first place, it appears that HEIs were able to coordinate resistance to the decree 
during its implementation, to the extent that the new measure became 
unworkable.
5 Additional rules introduced to control international students’ access to 
visas
5.a New rules following the Imbert decree
Following the legislative and presidential elections of 1981, the new Education 
Minister, Alain Savary, attempted to achieve a greater degree of communication 
with the universities’ sectoral association, CPU, and one of his first actions as 
Minister was to call the CPU for a meeting (Bernard and Lepagnot-Leca, 2002: 
221). Savary was also quick to consider how the rules concerning international 
students’ visas could be changed (ibid: 221, footnote).
Savary decided to allow international students to apply directly to French 
universities as well as through the cultural services in their own country (in
254 The prefecture (the regional representatives of the national government), were often unwilling to act in accordance 
with the new rules. Hence, the prefecture of the Isfere (Grenoble) did not refuse any international students following the 
introduction of the Bonnet circular (Le Monde, 1978); and the new legislation was described as illegal and effectively 
annulled by the Administrative tribunal of Rennes (as contrary to legislation passed in 1945-6) (Le Monde, 1979q; 19791), 
with the local prefect deciding to suspend its implementation until the end of the university year (Le Monde, 1979o).
255 See also Le Monde, 1979t; Revolution, 1980.
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effect retaining the pre-inscription process in a new guise, although the term 
‘pre-inscription’ was dropped). Henceforth, international students could express 
a preference over which HEI they attended, although one of the two they could 
suggest had to be situated outside Paris. The Imbert Commission was 
abolished (Woodhall, 1987: 27) and its activities devolved to the Minister of 
Education. The qualifications required were also changed from requiring 
potential students to have passed the exams necessary for university entry in 
their own country, towards requiring them to possess a baccalaureat or similar. 
Finally, the examination in French was retained, but its organisation was made 
more flexible (Le Monde, 1981). The examination could, following Savary’s 
reforms, be sat in different ways, and at different times, in different HEIs.
Overall, whilst Savary appeared to have followed HEIs’ requests to abolish the 
Imbert measures, the changes he made to actual procedures were limited. 
Although he abolished the Imbert Commission and its quotas, and largely 
decentralised the new arrangements, Savary did not abolish, for instance, the 
requirement of proof of means. Thus, although the most unpopular parts of the 
Imbert decree was removed, the general focus on restricting the numbers of 
international students from developing countries remained.
5.b New rules restricting illegal immigration
In line with Imbert’s emphasis on reducing the numbers of students from 
developing countries, from the late 1980s to mid-1990s a number of additional 
new rules were introduced in an attempt to reduce the perceived incidence of 
illegal immigration occurring through international students’ entry to the national 
territory.
In 1989, a new circular was introduced by the Minister of the Interior, 
concerning the conditions for stay and entry of foreigners in France 
(Gouvernement de France, 1989a). The 1989 legislation allowed immigration 
officials to judge whether international students were genuinely studying at an 
HEI or not (ibid.). A carte de sejour temporaire (the equivalent of the British 
‘leave to remain’) could be refused for an international student who could not 
demonstrate that she or he was genuinely studying at an HEI. This circular 
increased the discretion of the immigration services. In the past, decisions over
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international students’ motives for remaining at HEIs had been taken by the 
university or college administration; now this power had been allocated to the 
local prefectures. HEIs were concerned that legitimate educational reasons for 
international students’ failure to progress academically (such as where they 
were required to re-sit examinations, or to change course) would not be treated 
sympathetically by the authorities. HEIs claimed that the new 1989 legislation 
would involve prefectures substituting for university authorities and teachers, 
especially as the university card on its own would not be seen as sufficient proof 
of studies being undertaken (Brana, 1989; Destot, 1989). Despite their requests 
for the implications of the new circular to be made more precise (Bouquet, 1989) 
and/or for it to be modified (Sueur, 1990), the circular remained in place.
As with the Imbert measures, the 1989 changes to the regulations for obtaining 
a carte de sejour were introduced with a minimum of consultation. HEIs 
attempted to resist the passing of the new law through using their contacts in 
Parliament. Hence, much of the opposition to changes to visa rules in 1989 was 
led by deputies in the National Assembly raising the matter in written questions 
to the Education Minister. However, the new rules stayed in place.256
A second set of rules were introduced by the French government in 1993 as a 
further attempt to tighten up entry procedures and to prevent the international 
student visa system from being used as a means of illegal immigration. These 
followed the right's victory in the 1993 legislative elections, which had prompted 
a swift commitment to tighter immigration controls (Geddes, 2003: 62-3).257 
Charles Pasqua, who had formerly been Minister of the Interior in the 1980s 
and who resumed this post in 1993, quickly drafted a series of laws centered on 
combating illegal immigration, including laws concerning the delivery of the 
carte de sejour for international students. Pasqua had actually prepared many
256 Student protest groups had also attempted to link their extensive protests against the proposed Devaquet laws (on 
Higher Education funding) to international student and nationality issues (Desjardins, 1994: 361-2; Geddes, 2003: 61; 
Wayland, 1993). The Devaquet proposals were seen by a number of student groups as presaging selection to university 
and increases in university fees (Dmitrieff and Dabrowski, 2005:12). The connection made by student groups between 
the two issues was amplified by the death of a student of Algerian descent following police action at an anti-Devaquet 
protest (Desjardins, 1994: 363), and by the coincidence of this with hunger strikes against the exclusion of international 
students, as at the Universities of Paris VI and VII (L’Humanit6,1986). As with the criticism of the measures from HEIs, 
however, student protests appear to have had little impact.
257 As well as a restrictive amendment of the nationality code, for which it is better known.
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of these texts at the time of the first cohabitation in 1986-8. Because of 
problems with timing and also because of lack of a comfortable majority for the 
right in the Assemblee Nationale, Pasqua had not been able to impose the new 
restrictions on international students at that point. In 1993, the political 
circumstances were more propitious, and the new laws were passed with a 
minimum of effective opposition (Desjardins, 1994: 434).
The introduction of the so-called ‘Pasqua’ legislation caused a tightening of 
international student visa procedures by requiring the 1989 circular to be 
interpreted more narrowly, as preventing international students from being 
granted extension visas whenever they had previously failed or had changed 
subject.258 As Le Monde reported, the new legislation would have a significant 
effect on international students’ ability to stay in French HEIs, compared with 
the previous legal situation whereby they were generally able to stay in France 
for re-sit examinations (Le Monde, 1993b). In effect, international students had 
been able to claim residency for ten years as of right before the Pasqua laws 
were introduced (NaTr, 1997: 22). Following Pasqua, students whose 
scholarships had not been renewed, or who had failed their exams, would be 
required to leave the country (ibid.: 99-100).
Despite widespread protests, no changes were made to the new rules. Despite 
most HEIs opposing the rules, their effects were only felt gradually, and by 
different HEIs at different times, as particular international students were 
deported by the authorities. One such case was that of the Algerian student 
Rabah Bellil. Bellil had appealed against expulsion by maintaining that he was 
genuinely participating in a course of studies, but the authorities disputed this. 
Bellil was supported by his university as well as by a variety of public figures 
concerned about his lack of communication upon returning to Algeria, especially 
given his known opposition to the Algerian government. His university had 
previously appealed for him to be allowed to re-sit examinations, but was 
unable to persuade the authorities that his study for a law masters was genuine 
(THES, 1996a). The CPU was vocal in claiming that the decision over the reality 
of students’ studies should be made by HEIs only, rather than by the prefecture,
258 The Pasqua law of 1993 also required students to wait two years rather than one before family members could join 
them (Geddes, 2003: 62-3).
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as it rested on educational grounds (interview with CPU employee). However, 
because of the localised nature of the deportations, it appears that the 
prospects for the CPU to develop a national campaign were limited.
Individual attempts by HEIs to subvert the new rules, unlike their coordinated 
campaigns (as against Imbert) were mainly unsuccessful. One particularly 
prominent case where an HEI attempted to flout existing rules occurred at the 
University of Seine Saint Denis. The University had enrolled a number of 
international students, ignoring their lack of regular status (all had entered 
France on tourist visas). In March 2000, 167 of these illegal immigrant students 
went on strike in support of their claims for residency permits. The university’s 
president and some teachers and representatives supported the students’ 
attempts to seek asylum, but were concerned after violence broke out between 
some of the students and some staff. As the university was accepting people as 
students who lacked residence rights, it was acting illegally. However, this 
appeared to be accepted, de facto, by the authorities, with the matter only 
coming into the public spotlight following the alleged violent incidents (THES, 
2000d). The University’s policy did not elicit much sympathy from interviewees, 
appeared not to be supported by the HEIs’ sectoral associations, and did not 
provoke any changes to the existing rules.
HEIs’ ability to criticise the arrangements brought in by the lois Pasqua were 
also restricted by their position in relation to the authorities, created by the new 
legislation. Overall, the measures introduced in 1989 and 1993 complicated the 
universities’ relationship with government. HEIs had to maintain a respectful, 
businesslike relationship and to avoid overt criticism of prefectures' decisions. 
This was in order to allow them to negotiate with prefectures concerning 
particular students’ cases. As the Vice-President of Nanterre university put it, 
“[w]e have to try to maintain what leverage we have with the prefecture, 
because we regularly get cases where they ask us if a person is a genuine 
student and we send them proof....To keep that line open, I cannot say that 
what is happening is scandalous” (THES, 1996a).
French HEIs’ campaigns against government attempts to reduce overstaying 
were more coordinated than that of their British counterparts. In particular, there
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is no evidence of the type of internal criticism of other HEIs’ probity (or 
otherwise) that occurred in Britain, nor evidence of elite universities being able 
to subvert rules.259 However, in this case, governments were sometimes able to 
ignore HEIs’ criticisms, even when these were coordinated within sectoral 
associations. This was especially the case where the effects of new measures 
were not felt nationally but only in particular localities, at different times, as with 
deportations following the lois Pasqua.
5.c New rules to help promote French higher education abroad
A third trend in governments’ approaches towards international students’ visas 
can be discerned from the late 1990s onwards. These changes focused on 
altering the visa system as a means of improving the image of French higher 
education to potential international students. They comprised three new sets of 
rules; the loi Reseda, and those rules enabling the use of a guichet unique and 
grouped visa requests.
The loi Reseda (relative a 1’entree et sejour des etrangers en France) was 
passed following a report from the assembly of the Commission consultative 
des droits de I’homme which had maintained that students undertaking courses 
at officially-recognised HEIs should have their legal status improved (Nair, 1997: 
114-5). The loi Reseda can be seen as mainly a governmental project. Its 
overall structure followed the recommendations of the Weil report, Weil being a 
political scientist working on immigration policy who was commissioned by the 
then government to investigate how immigration and visa systems could be 
improved.260
The loi Reseda grouped together international students, scientists and artists 
who were henceforth to be treated differentially by the immigration system 
(Deprez, 1999c).261 As a result, international students were no longer to be 
treated “as a type of general immigrant” (interview with DRIC employee). The 
new rules thus continued the direction of rules since the Imbert decree which
259 See pp.262-3.
260 Although some claimed that taken as a whole, the Weil recommendations only ‘updated’ the previous system 
(Rodier, 1997).
261 The latter two categories were to be able to enter France with only one piece of identification, consisting in a 
contract with a regional employment or cultural authority (Chabert, 2000).
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had split international students off from ‘general’ immigrants, marking them out 
with “special status” (Verbunt, 1985: 130).
Although the amount of paperwork which students needed to present was 
greatly reduced by the loi Reseda, it still required prospective international 
students to provide proof of financial means, along with proof of acceptance at a 
French HEI (Estrosi, 2001). Those holding scholarships from the government 
were, however, removed from the responsibility of proving resources beyond 
those from their grant (Gilbert, 1999).262 The loi Reseda also created a new 
category of visa for students’ spouses and young children. Again, this “visitor” 
visa was conditional on proof of sufficient resources for the maintenance of the 
student’s family (Dupilet, 1999).
From 1998, the Employment Ministry also abandoned its former rule that 
international students from outside the EU wait until their second year of studies 
before taking paid employment.263 International students were henceforth able 
to work part time from their first year, although they were limited to three 
months’ consecutive full-time employment (THES, 1998a). As Weil notes, the 
previous system had become increasingly untenable and difficult to administer 
(Weil, 1991:231).
In addition, a previous ‘clearance’ procedure was removed, which had required 
employment offices to check that there was no suitable French candidate for a 
specific job, and had also allowed the Office of International Migrations to 
impose additional conditions such as medical checks. A new ‘declarative’ 
procedure was substituted for the previous system of authorisation (Cohen, 
2001: Mesure 38). International students wishing to work needed to register at 
the DDTE (Direction Departementale du Travail et de I’Equipement), but it was 
not necessary for them to obtain proof that the job could not have been taken by
262 In addition, the loi Reseda increased the power of the cultural services of French embassies abroad, to present 
requests for visas where this fitted with French "economic, cultural, and intellectual interests”. Cultural services were 
also, henceforth, to be consulted where embassies questioned the educational motivation behind particular student visa 
requests (Dupilet, 1999; Ren6, 1999). Decisions on educational grounds were thus excluded from the purview of 
embassies, except from their cultural departments. The new arrangements built on an enhanced level of cooperation 
between the prefectoral and consular services and the foreign affairs and interior ministries, through the development of 
new procedures to increase communication (Cohen, 2001; 93; interview with DRIC employee).
263 See Poujol, 1965: 244-5 for a description of the former system of work permits for international students.
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a French citizen as previously. The changes were proposed by the Ministers of 
Employment and Solidarity and the Minister of the Interior, in consultation with 
the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Education (THES, 1998a; 2001b; Vedrine, 
2002: 3).264
Finally, from 1998 onwards, international students were increasingly allowed to 
stay in France following their courses to work, and controls over which jobs they 
might take were reduced. The ability of the prefectoral services to impose 
conditions on employment had been seen as a significant barrier for former 
international students obtaining employment in France. The prefecture had 
been able to require particular working and renumeration conditions which 
employers were often reluctant to accept, leading to employers sometimes 
withdrawing the offer of a place to the former student (Bourdin, 1991). In reality 
most students had been refused employment following their studies, except 
where they possessed very good qualifications or had been accepted for very 
highly-paid jobs (Weil, 1991: 231). From the late 1990s, measures were put in 
place to facilitate former students’ change in visa status from ‘student’ to 
‘employee’, provided the employment sought was related to their previous 
studies (Vedrine, 2002). From January 2000, students could stay in France to 
work, if given government clearance (Tandonnet, 2004: 129).
The new procedures introduced by the loi Reseda were unique to international 
students. No other group benefited from such a system whereby visa 
applications could be examined collectively rather than individually, neither 
companies with respect to their employees nor families with respect to 
members from overseas.
A second initiative, following from the loi Resedat set up the ‘guichet unique’ 
policy. A circular from the Ministers of Education and of the Interior to 
prefectures and presidents of universities, signed in May 2000, required the 
establishment of single offices (guichets uniques) where students could place 
their requests for cartes de sejour (the document proving that they had been 
given leave to remain). Three weeks after the student’s papers had been 
passed from the office to the prefecture, the international student was invited to
264 For more on international students’ abilities or otherwise to work, see Na'i'r, 1997:111.
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the prefecture in order to receive his or her carte de sejour. The quicker delivery 
of these papers allowed students to more readily access financial and material 
resources which were conditional on having regular status.
Similarly, the government’s sanctioning of the grouped visa request system 
(Cohen, 2001: 27) followed the publication of a report it had commissioned from 
Elie Cohen, a former university president who had moved into the French 
Ministry of Education (Cohen, 2001). Agreements to allow grouped visa 
requests from universities and grandes ecoles by the prefectures had been 
developing in particular regions for some time (interview with Conference des 
Grandes Ecoles employee). It is difficult to discern whether the new system of 
visa processing resulted directly from HEIs’ proposals, as the CPU had 
supported the new systems for some time before they were introduced. It was 
not until 2001, following Cohen’s recommendation of this system, that they were 
extended to become common practice (Bourg-Broc, 2001).
Furthermore, previous attempts by HEIs to further decentralise visa delivery had 
been resisted by the state. For example, ARIES, the HEIs’ sectoral 
associations’ organisation working on international matters (see chapter four), 
had asked the Minister of Foreign Affairs for an extension of the contracting 
process already covering funding relationships with the Ministry of Education, to 
also cover visa arrangements. This would have allowed different, decentralised 
arrangements, beyond the guichet unique, to be created. However, this was 
rejected by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who claimed that the proposals were 
incompatible with its annual budget structure (interview with former ARIES 
employee).
Nonetheless, HEIs widely welcomed the new system, as removing the scope for 
arbitrary decision-making on the part of the immigration services (Claeys, 2000b; 
2001b). The loi Reseda’s requirement that visa refusals be justified by the 
immigration services was also welcomed. It should be noted that the 
submission of grouped visa requests by HEIs imposed “a particular 
responsibility on HEIs to ensure that their arrangements could not be abused” 
(Cohen, 2001: 28). HEIs were henceforth required in effect to undertake initial 
screening themselves. The development of agreements between HEIs and
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foreign universities to pre-screen potential international students also lessened 
the work of immigration services at a later stage. The majority of such 
agreements were between France and other industrialised countries.
6 To what extent did the new rules lead to a liberalisation of international 
students’ policy?
As in Britain, the new rules were liberalising as they led to a commodification of 
international students. This occurred through three routes. Firstly, unlike in 
Britain, the French government was explicit in manipulating the visa rules to 
directly exclude students from developing countries (rather than, as in Britain, 
using fees mechanisms which indirectly had this effect). Secondly, the scope of 
international student visas was restricted to prevent overstaying and thus 
potential claims on the public purse. Thirdly, changes to visa rules were seen 
as a means of promoting French higher education abroad.
6.a New rules against students from developing countries
The first way in which the new visa system helped commodify international 
students relates to its direct effects on the numbers of international students 
from developing countries attending French HEIs, as compared with those from 
developed and emerging economy countries. Overall, the numbers of 
international students receiving visas has increased over the period examined 
(Bapt, 1988). However, the numbers of visas delivered to international students 
from developing, as opposed to developed and emerging economy, countries 
has decreased precipitously. As NaTr notes, “this lowering concerns above all 
entrants from Africa and those originally from Arabic countries whilst student 
visas given to entrants from Asia...are increasing” (NaTr, 1997: 110; Quotidien 
de Paris, 1982). The new visa regimes had a particular impact on those 
students who had arrived in France on a tourist visa and then decided that they 
wanted to stay to study. Such prospective students were proportionately from 
developing rather than developed or emerging economy countries.
The French government was much more explicit about its desire to reduce the 
numbers of students from developing countries attending French HEIs 
(Liberation, 1980) than the British government. The government was not 
reticent when criticising international students, with the Prime Minister Raymond
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Barre himself stating that there shouldn’t be any ‘universites depotoirs' (roughly 
translated: “university dumping grounds”) for international students (Le Monde, 
1979), with the implication that such universities did exist. Alice Saunier-SeTte 
was an official spokesperson for the view that the French state was, through its 
policies towards international students, spending money on poor foreigners that 
should be reserved for the French. Saunier-SeTte, the longest serving Higher 
Education minister of the Fifth Republic, also frequently used the term 
‘universites depotoirs' to describe the French HE system.265
The Imbert decree was introduced in an attempt to directly tackle this issue. 
Pre-inscription and central registration had been introduced in 1974. However, it 
was not until 1979 when country-selective quotas were also introduced under 
Imbert (Overseas Student Trust, 1987: 11-12; Woodhall, 1987: 26). The Imbert 
Commission was created to oversee the implementation of the pre-inscription 
system and the country quota system (Overseas Student Trust, 1987: 81). 
Unsurprisingly, the quota system was explicitly designed to obtain a reduction in 
the number of students recruited from developing countries, and was successful 
in this aim.266
From the mid-1980s onwards, the French state in this way attempted to reduce 
the numbers of students from developing countries attending HEIs. In addition 
to tightening visa procedures in an attempt to achieve this, governments also 
promoted the use of partnership agreements and overseas collaborative 
partnerships as a means of preventing such international students from ever 
having to enter the French territory. This appears to have been increasingly the 
case concerning students from francophone Africa and some parts of Eastern 
Europe (interview with DRIC employee).267
265 This was seen by some as reinforcing a view of the government’s policies towards international students as ’racist’ 
(La Croix, 1980).
266 Despite this, once out of office Saunier-SeTte proposed that international students should also pay for the cost of 
their education (as in Britain), so that France could “finish with paying for its solidarity with the most deprived” (Le Figaro, 
1983). The use of such language in relation to international students from developing countries appears to have 
predated its widespread use later as a means of describing the French immigration system. Hence, it was not until 1980 
that Michel Rocard stated that “France cannot accommodate all the misery of the world” (see Rocard, 1996 for his own 
analysis of this), or until 1988 that Pierre Joxe maintained in front of the National Assembly that France lacked the 
means to welcome all the deprived populations of the world from developing countries (reported in NaTr, 1997: 39)
267 Although some nationalities of prospective students had, hence, clearly been treated differently from others for 
economic reasons, the state generally resisted differentiating international students' nationalities for political reasons,
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6.b New rules restricting illegal immigration
Both the introduction of legislation concerning leave to remain in 1989 and the 
Pasqua legislation of the mid-1990s were intended to prevent prospective illegal 
immigrants from obtaining student visas. The new system introduced in 1989 
increased the discretion of immigration officials, who could henceforth 
themselves make decisions on the basis of educational criteria, rather than 
relying on the assessments of HEIs as to the ‘genuine’ nature of international 
students’ studies.
The new legislation against overstaying reflected a greater concern over this 
issue amongst French than British policymakers. A number of right-wing 
politicians and publications hypothesised direct links between international 
students and immigration policies.268 These were echoed in Saunier-SeTte’s 
criticism of international students in the mid-1980s. By the mid-1990s, 
governments were less likely to accept claims being made by the right 
concerning the financial ‘burden’ of international students. However, they were 
keen to indicate approvingly that there had been a reduction in the relative 
numbers of students in France coming from developing countries. Hence, 
ministers claimed that apparent increases in numbers of international students 
from Africa could be explained by the fact that the statistics included those 
international students who were already living in France (who would not be 
classified as international students in Britain). As a result of this, the Direction 
de revaluation et de la prospective of the Education Ministry had included in the 
category ‘foreign students’ all students of foreign nationality, whether or not they 
were resident in France. The Direction noted with approval that the largest 
numbers of ‘student visas’ were now going not to African students but to
apart from through the introduction of special measures for Chinese students in 1989 (Le Monde, 1989a; 1989b but see 
the negative reaction to Martine Daugreilh's request that Chinese international students be granted extended stay if they 
so wished (Daugreilh, 1989))
268 Hence, some deputies drew attention to what they saw as the financial impact of international students on French 
universities within the general context of a perceived ‘burden’ of expenditure on immigrants. Claims were also frequently 
made that international students were taking places which ‘should’ have been reserved for French students. Hence, 
Jean-Pierre Schenardi criticised new international application arrangements for the Izcole Nationale d'Administration 
which required foreign applicants to sit different tests from those for French applicants (Schenardi, 1986); and the far- 
right publication Rivarol claimed that a particular faculty was reserving places for international students, and that a large 
proportion of international students, even where supported by government scholarships, constituted economic refugees 
rather than ‘genuine’ students (Rivarol, 1986).
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American, Japanese, Moroccan, Canadian and Korean students, in descending 
order of magnitude (Bernard, 1996).
The coupling of international student issues with the threat of illegal 
immigration remained a staple of French government discourse into the late 
1990s. Hence, in 1999 ministers qualified new arrangements for international 
students by stating that the mobility of international students would be 
promoted, but “at the same time, of course, care would be taken to control the 
procedures and to fight against illegal immigration” (Dupilet, 1999). 
Furthermore, a number of interviewees from the French government’s DRIC 
noted ways in which some international students had been able to stay in 
France beyond their period of studies. It was claimed that students who had 
paid for visas to be arranged for them by illegitimate syndicates, had to rely on 
the social security system to maintain themselves once in France; and that for 
some “African countries, francophone or otherwise, we have the feeling, that 
admission to a European university, it is a different way to emigrate” (interview 
with DRIC employee). Yet, despite interviewees’ apparent preconceptions, the 
bulk of “ddtoumements de procedure” come not from poorer students 
attempting to manipulate their student status, but from relatively well-off 
students who could afford to pay the entry fees for a course at a private HEI, 
and use this as a way to gain a titre de sejour; access to France and legitimate 
status. As Weil notes, even the number of these students, if increasing, is “still 
small” (Weil, 1991:231).
As in Britain, France also experienced problems with unregulated immigration 
advisors. In particular, advisors were charging international students 
considerable fees for their services (sometimes 15,000 euros), which the 
parents of former international students were attempting to claim back from the 
HEIs concerned, once their offspring had been found incapable of undertaking 
the course for reasons of language or intellectual capacity (interview with DRIC 
employee; interview with CPU employee). However, it appears that no attempts 
were made by central government to regulate such advisors formally during the 
period examined.
6.c New rules to help promote French higher education abroad
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The third way in which the visa system caused a commodification of 
international students was through the inclusion of visa rules within general 
efforts to promote French higher education. According to the then Minister of 
Education in 1999, the “delivery of visas to students was at the heart of 
France’s policy to train the elites of tomorrow” (Bourg-Broc, 2001; Gilbert, 1999; 
Godfrain, 2001; Perrut, 2001). This led to a variety of changes to the visa 
system, in an attempt to portray the French system as fair and to avoid high- 
profile cases which could impugn the reputation of French higher education as a 
whole.
Firstly, following the loi Reseda, the authorities were required to explain why 
they had refused visas, and thus “make clear their decisions to those implicated 
in them” (Deprez, 2000). Whilst letters refusing visas had generally given 
reasons for the refusal, these had often been seen as unsatisfactory. One such 
case was where a group of international students had been required to leave 
France for the apparently irrelevant reason that there was allegedly an 
insufficiency of hours for teaching in the evening (Sapin, 1988). The new rule 
was introduced in “the hope of greater transparency” (Dupilet, 1999; Rene,
1999; Vedrine, 1999).
Secondly, the loi Reseda also created new visas which would enable 
prospective students to visit France. These visas were targeted at high- 
achieving students who were hoping to gain admission to a grande ecole. The 
new short-stay visa, “etudiant-concours” (student competition), enabled 
international students to sit examinations or any other tests for entry without 
having to leave afterwards, should they be successful, to obtain a more 
permanent visa for the duration of their degree. Instead, such successful 
students could ask for a ‘long stay’ visa from the local prefecture (Dupilet, 1999; 
Gilbert, 1999).
Finally, the state’s sanctioning of the ‘grouped visa’ and ‘guichet unique’ (single 
office) systems was partly intended to prevent administrative problems and 
delays which had been heavily criticised by international students in the past. 
One problem apparently uniformly experienced by prospective international 
students upon entry to France had concerned procedures at the reception
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centre for international students in Paris. Although international students were 
able to obtain a visa from the French consulate in their home country, many 
preferred to seek it once in France, on arrival at the police prefecture (Poujol, 
1965: 244-5). Prospective students were required to attend the prefecture in 
order to obtain leave to remain. Parliamentary deputies complained of long 
queues which formed at the prefecture, with students often having to wait 
outside for consecutive days. The deputy Georges Hage claimed that it seemed 
as if the arrangements were designed to discourage international students, 
rather than to welcome them (Hage, 1987).269 The introduction of the grouped 
visa and guichet unique systems appear partly to have resolved this problem, 
as they have removed from the potential international student the responsibility 
of visiting the prefecture until a much later stage- once the prefect had already 
considered the prospective student’s visa request.270
Overall, therefore, a range of new rules were brought in by French governments 
from 1979 onwards which had the effect of commodifying international students, 
but which lacked any perceptible impact on the extent of competition between 
HEIs for the recruitment of such students.
7 Conclusion
The commodification of international students which resulted from the new rules 
examined here occurred in a variety of ways. Governments attempted to reduce 
the numbers of students attending French HEIs who came from developing 
countries (the Imbert decree), to restrict overstaying by former international 
students (the 1989 legislation and the lois Pasqua), and to improve the image of 
French higher education in target markets (the loi Reseda, guichet unique and 
grouped visa request system). These new rules marked a significant departure 
from the pre-existing situation, whereby international students had relatively 
easy access to French HEIs, and were not significantly differentiated from other 
entrants.
269 see also Brunhes, 1988.
270 However, even these new arrangements were criticised broadly for a number of reasons. Some critics claimed the 
visa mechanisms were still too complicated and longwinded. It was claimed that these 'tracasseries administratives’ 
(bureaucratic irritations) effectively discouraged potential students from applying to French HEIs, and treated 
international students as if they were taken for granted and a captive clientele (Haut Conseil de la Cooperation 
Internationale, 2002: 27, 68).
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As in Britain, French HEIs attempted to resist the creation and implementation 
of a number of these measures. French HEIs had relatively greater success 
than their British counterparts, especially where they were able to coordinate 
resistance, as with their refusal to implement the Imbert requirements 
concerning French language examinations. In some cases, however, they were 
unable to achieve change in the new rules, especially where their impact 
differed across the country, as with the deportations following the lois Pasqua. 
The French higher education system was not, however, internally fractured to 
the extent of the British, with few HEIs criticising other HEIs’ adherence (or lack 
of adherence) to visa legislation.
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Conclusion
1 Introduction
This thesis has examined how the process of liberalisation occurs, through a 
study of liberalisation within one area of the public sector across two countries.
It has indicated how liberalisation materialised to a greater extent in Britain than 
in France in the field of international students’ policy. The thesis has shown that, 
in both cases, governments attempted to create new institutions which would 
provide the incentives and constraints to encourage HEIs to compete against 
each other for the recruitment of international students, and to commodify 
international students. Differences in the extent of liberalisation were explained, 
in this case, through the greater extent of coordination amongst regulatees, as 
French sectoral associations were stronger than their British counterparts.
This chapter firstly offers a summary of recent theories of liberalisation, which 
have been tested by this research. It then re-states the research question, the 
reasons why this particular case study was chosen, and recaps the main 
arguments made. The wider implications of these findings are then considered, 
for their impact on debates about the role of governments, markets, and 
liberalisation. The main findings are summarised as: the need for new 
institutions to be created in order for liberalisation to occur; the role of 
governments in instituting liberalisation; and the role of coordinated resistance 
by regulatees in holding it back. Finally, the conclusion suggests some possible 
avenues for future research suggested by the thesis.
2 Recent theories of liberalisation
Theories which have posited different ‘varieties of capitalism’ have maintained 
that coordinated institutional arrangements may remain in the face of pressures 
towards liberalisation. However, recent years have witnessed a global trend of 
increasing liberalisation, both within the private and public sectors (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2000), and within both ‘coordinated’ and ‘liberal’ market economies.
Streeck and Thelen have attempted to explain why liberalisation has proceeded 
apace, whilst attempts to build coordinating institutions have proceeded much 
more slowly (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). They suggest that liberalisation will
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occur as a result of the defection of economic actors from collective 
arrangements into market-based ones. Most importantly, they maintain that 
“encouraging others to exit from a previously obligatory social relationship for 
self-regarding reasons may require no more than setting an example, while 
tightening normative controls would need collective rather than individual action 
followed, importantly, by collectively binding decisions” (Streeck and Thelen, 
2005: 33).
3 The research question re-stated
Governments in both Britain and France have, since 1979, promoted a 
liberalisation of international students’ policy. They have attempted to create 
institutions which would provide the incentives and constraints for HEIs to 
compete against each other for the recruitment of international students, and for 
HEIs and other sectoral actors to adopt a view of international students as 
commodities. However, French governments were less successful both in 
creating liberalising institutions, and in controlling the parameters of their 
operations. Although the new institutions did lead to a change in sectoral actors’ 
perspectives on international students, towards commodification, they did not, 
generally, have any impact on the extent of competition between HEIs. To that 
extent, the French institutions had less of a liberalising impact.
This thesis attempts to explain why this was the case; why liberalisation 
proceeded to a greater extent in Britain than in France, despite similar policies 
being promoted by governments in both countries. This enquiry has 
necessitated the identification of those actors pushing liberalisation, and those 
factors which have prevented the institutionalisation of liberalisation.
4 The case study chosen
This particular case study has been chosen, as it offers a ‘hard’ or ‘critical’ case 
for recent theories of liberalisation to explain. The case is ‘hard’ for three 
reasons. Firstly, as described above, both British and French governments 
adopted similar policies towards international students; they both promoted the 
commodification of international students, and competition between HEIs for 
their recruitment. In addition, both governments had adopted similar positions 
concerning international students in the past, seeing them as useful for foreign
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policy (especially, for maintaining links with the ex-colonies) and as desirable for 
international development purposes. Yet, liberalisation occurred to a greater 
extent in Britain than in France, in a way which cannot be explained by recent 
models.
Secondly, Streeck and Thelen have maintained that their analysis can be 
applied to explain liberalisation occurring in the public sector, and they and a 
number of authors writing within their perspective have attempted to use it for 
this purpose.271 The higher education sector offers a good case to test this 
claim, since higher education has, in both countries, traditionally been subject to 
extensive control by central governments. Furthermore, policies towards 
international students have, historically, constituted one area of higher 
education where governments have played a particularly important role (as 
discussed above).
Finally, it is also interesting to compare Britain and France as they have 
traditionally been contrasted with each other in comparative analyses of 
industrial policy. It has often been suggested that British governments are less 
powerful than their French counterparts, given the greater extent of government 
penetration into the economy (and the public sector) by French governments. 
Yet, in this case, the opposite has occurred; British governments have, 
apparently, been able to create and control liberalising institutions more easily 
than French governments.
These three elements lead to the liberalisation of international students’ policy 
in Britain and France constituting a ‘hard case’ for theories such as that 
propounded by Streeck and Thelen to explain.
5 The arguments made in the thesis
This thesis has indicated that Streeck and Thelen’s theoretical approach to 
liberalisation may not be adequate to explain liberalisation occurring within the 
public sector and, possibly, outside it. Although marking an important 
contribution to the debate over economic change in developed countries, their 
perspective misses an important element from any analysis of liberalisation: the
271 See p.28.
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creation of new, liberalised institutions. In the case examined here, liberalisation 
required not the adaptation or re-activation of existing institutions, but the 
creation of new ones. HEIs did not resurrect old institutions as part of a strategy 
to build an alternative to collective arrangements- precisely because none of the 
pre-existing institutions had provided the conditions for liberalisation. In 
particular, they had failed to provide HEIs with the incentives and constraints to 
engage in competition, nor had they encouraged the commodification of 
international students.
Contrary to Streeck and Thelen’s claims, liberalisation here required the 
creation of new institutions- and thus of an actor to propose and control their 
creation: central government. Governments played an important role in this 
case, and possibly in others, due to their unique capacity to define and 
implement binding rules on regulatees. Their ability to do so, however, was, 
often, conditioned by the extent of resistance by regulatees. Rather than 
regulatees defecting from existing institutions as described above, they 
contested the creation of these new institutions. Regulatees were more or less 
able to prevent the creation of these new institutions, to alter their 
characteristics during creation, or to affect the parameters of their operation, 
depending on the strength of their sectoral associations.
Liberalisation did not, therefore, occur through the defection of regulatees from 
existing collective arrangements, into existing or re-vitalised market-based 
institutions. Rather, it was pushed by both British and French governments, who 
had similar ambitions to liberalise international students’ policy. In a very limited 
number of cases, governments were able to push through liberalisation despite 
coordinated opposition. However, overall, governments’ ambitions were more or 
less realised depending on the extent of resistance from HEIs.
The thesis has thus set out to argue three points. Firstly, that liberalisation did 
not proceed automatically from defection into existing or revitalised institutions; 
secondly, that governments pushed liberalisation; and thirdly, that HEIs were 
able, in the French if not generally in the British case, to restrain governments’ 
abilities to institute liberalisation through the coordination of resistance.
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Concerning the first point, the thesis indicates that rather than regulatees simply 
adapting institutions which were already present in the higher education policy 
arena, new institutions had to be created for liberalisation to occur. Hence, in 
the case of the promotion of higher education abroad, the British Educational 
Counselling Service did not constitute a natural outgrowth from the British 
Council, Interdepartmental Group of Officials, Round Table or the Inter- 
University Council. Similarly, the French EduFrance marked a rupture with, 
rather than a continuation of, the existing organisations, the SFERE, CNOUS, 
Egide and ARIES.
In the field of evaluation, the assessment-based approach to evaluation 
adopted by the Quality Assessment Units, Higher Education Quality Council (in 
the case of audits of overseas collaborative provision) and Quality Assurance 
Agency differed substantially from the accreditation-based approach of the 
Council for National Academic Awards and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate, and 
from the enhancement-based approach of the Academic Audit Unit. Similarly, 
the enhancement-based approach of the French Comite National devaluation 
cannot be seen as a natural continuation of the then existing evaluation 
organisations, the Courdes Comptes, IGAENR and Conference des Grandes 
Ecoles, all of which rested on an accreditation-based approach.
The introduction of full-cost fees for international students in Britain marked a 
break both with previous financial policies towards international students (such 
as the use of differential fees and of quotas), and of general funding policies for 
higher education; and the French contractual system was neither modelled on 
previous contractual experiments, nor adopted the formula-based approach of 
existing funding systems.
Finally, in both Britain and France, the new rules concerning international 
students’ visas marked a departure from the existing legislative framework, 
given their emphasis on separating international students from other, general 
entrants, and their liberalising emphasis. To summarise, every institution 
examined was created anew, rather than developing from pre-existing 
prototypes.
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The second argument propounded in the thesis is the importance of 
government in promoting liberalisation, rather than this being caused by the 
defection of regulatees towards the market.
Hence, the British ECS was created following a government-commissioned 
report, the Pliatsky review, and following pressure from civil servants, whilst the 
French EduFrance was created as a personal project of the then Ministers of 
Education and of Foreign Affairs. The new assessment-based organisations 
governing British evaluation of HEIs were created following government 
pressure for evaluation to support discrimination in funding and to engender 
competition between HEIs, and the French CNE was created by Alain Savary 
as a means of balancing the other provisions within the loi Savary. The British 
full-cost fees were promoted exclusively by the Department of Education and 
Science, as a means of removing the public subsidy for higher education, and 
of fostering entrepreneurialism amongst HEIs, whilst the French contractual 
system was promoted personally by Lionel Jospin as a means of starting his 
ministerial term with a wide-ranging and popular policy change. Finally, 
successive rules changing the extent of control over international students’ 
visas were introduced by governments in Britain, initially as a means of 
controlling illegal immigration, and in France, initially as a means of reducing the 
numbers of students from developing countries. Government, rather than 
regulatees, thus played the key role in promoting the liberalisation of 
international students’ policy, through its ability to define new rules which might 
constrain regulatees’ behaviour.
Finally, the thesis has indicated that, despite governments in both countries 
having attempted to promote liberalisation, they were more successful in this 
aim in Britain than in France. It has shown how the greater extent of 
coordination between HEIs in France than in Britain was an important factor in 
this connection. Thus, the abilities of governments to institute markets in the 
first place, and subsequently to control them, here depended on the extent of 
coordination between regulatees.
Hence, British HEIs attempted to resist the incorporation of their international 
higher education organisation, the Inter-University Council, into the British
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Council, but were unsuccessful. They were unable to maintain a coherent 
position towards the creation and operation of the Education Counselling 
Service, with a select number of HEIs leaving the ECS at various points rather 
than coordinating opposition to its activities. In contract, French HEIs’ were able 
to coordinate their opposition to the first director general of EduFrance, who 
was particularly keen to promote the liberalisation of international students’ 
policy. Their activities have frequently been credited with responsibility for his 
dismissal, which reduced EduFrance’s liberalising impact.
In the case of the creation and operation of assessment-based evaluation, 
British HEIs’ response was fractured, compromised by concerns over the cost 
of running enhancement parallel to assessment, and by the differential impact 
of assessment on different HEIs. In contrast, French HEIs engaged collectively 
in the creation of the CNE, through their sectoral association, and have 
continued to promote coherent positions within the agency, as with the definition 
of quality indicators.
The introduction of full-cost fees in Britain was extensively resisted by HEIs. 
However, the CVCP (and then CDP) failed to articulate a coherent alternative 
position and were unable to provide leadership during the creation of the new 
system, nor to exert much influence on the parameters within which it 
subsequently operated. French HEIs, in contrast were able to exert greater 
influence during the creation of the new contractual funding system, and to 
prevent it from leading to increased competition within the higher education 
sector.
Finally, British HEIs’ responses to government proposals concerning 
international students’ visas were divided. British universities and colleges were 
keen to criticise each others’ alleged lack of controls concerning the recruitment 
of illegal immigrants, and were unable to develop a coherent position on matters 
such as the use of immigration advisors. Although they did manage to develop 
a coordinated position on one matter, visa extension charges, this was 
compromised by their previous lack of unity, and in any case came too late for 
any change in the rules to occur. In contrast, French HEIs were able to force 
significant changes in visa legislation through frustrating the implementation of
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the Imbert decree. It was more difficult for their sectoral associations to 
coordinate campaigns against other rules, as their effects were only felt in 
particular areas at particular times. As a result, coordinated action by French 
HEIs was less successful overall in the case of visa policy than in other areas 
where government attempted to liberalise international students’ policy.
6 The wider implications of these findings for the debate about the role of 
governments, markets, and liberalisation
As a ‘hard case’ for existing theories of liberalisation to explain, the liberalisation 
of international students’ policy may offer some insights for the examination of 
other cases of liberalisation in the public sector. The main findings from the 
thesis (the need for new liberalising institutions to be created, the role of 
governments in liberalisation, and the role of regulatees’ resistance in 
conditioning governments’ capacities to liberalise) suggest the relevance of 
existing theories which have highlighted the pertinence of these three elements 
in explaining liberalisation. This section reviews these works, before the final 
section analyses possibilities for further research.
6.a The creation of new institutions during processes of liberalisation
In the case examined here, liberalisation required not just the reactivation or 
rediscovery of existing institutions, but rather the creation of new ones. Such 
new institutions created the incentives and constraints for regulatees to engage 
in competition and commodification. Rather than liberalising institutions building 
on existing institutional frameworks, in every case the new institutions marked a 
significant departure from existing organisations or legislative frameworks. Such 
new institutions were comprised of new collections of rules created by 
governments.
This contradicts the common view in comparative political economy that 
liberalisation requires a lesser extent of institutionalisation (Goodin, 2003). 
According to this view, the market can be viewed as a “kind of natural, or 
normal, order, consisting of the aggregation of individual bargains, whereas 
non-market institutions are regarded as to some extent alien or unnatural” 
(Hodgson, 1988: 177). The problems with this position have actually been 
acknowledged by Thelen, who has expressed concern that liberal market
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economies become a “residual category... mostly characterized in negative 
terms, that is, in terms of what they lack...rather than analyzed in terms of the 
alternative logic that animates them”.272 As Hodgson noted, all “exchange, and 
particularly market exchange, takes place in, and interacts with, an institutional 
context” (ibid. : 178). Rather than constituting a naturally-occurring phenomenon, 
markets must be “politically and culturally constructed"273 (Gray, 1990:174); 
rather than necessary creations, they are contingent ones.
For Hay, “[institutional interactions are, then, no less significant in LMEs than 
they are in CMEs” (Hay, 2005: 115). Vogel has also noted that liberal market 
arrangements do not only require the dismantling of existing institutions, but 
also the creation of new ones (Vogel, 2005: 145). Rather than the structure of 
markets emerging automatically from interactions between individuals, “the 
entire apparatus of modern economies is, at least partially, an outcome o f ... 
social technologies of organization” (Fligstein, 2001: 28).
This case thus highlights the importance of Vogel’s contention that 
“liberalization requires re-regulation” (Vogel, 1996: 3).274 Dobbin (1994), Evans 
(1995), Evans and Rauch (1999), Fligstein (1996), Fligstein and Stone Sweet 
(2002), and North (1990), have all indicated the importance of new rules for 
market-making. Rules “establish” markets, and “structure how buying, selling 
and the very organization of production take place” (Zysman, 1994: 244). Over 
time, Fligstein maintains, such rules become constitutive of market institutions 
(Fligstein, 1996).
Such rules cannot be reduced to the ‘exigencies of the market’, or read-off from 
economic criteria. As Zysman maintains, the rules structuring markets often “do 
not have primarily economic origins and none have purely economic sources or 
explanations” (Zysman, 1994: 245). The rules structuring markets need not 
constitute efficiency-producing instruments. Rather than assuming that rules will 
reflect economic theories, rather a “political theory” of their creation is required.
272 Thelen quoted in Howell (Howell, 2003:107).
273 This does not invalidate Gray’s additional point that “[o]n the other hand markets do have a real existence, resist 
attempts to mould them in certain directions and even have a disconcerting habit of re-emerging in spheres where they 
are supposed to have been abolished" (Gray, 1990:174).
274 See also Moran, 1991 and Trachtman, 1993.
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This might help “account systematically for the variation in” the ways in which 
various markets are structured (ibid.: 245 footnote 4).
Overall, therefore, there is a need for more examination of how the rules 
structuring competition and commodification have been introduced and the 
contestation which may often have surrounded this process. Streeck and 
Thelen’s claim that liberalisation occurs when actors discover pre-existing or 
revitalised market-based institutions ignores the fact that in some cases there 
are no such institutions to draw on. Indeed, one can ask how these alternative, 
market-based institutions first emerged (rather than how they were revitalised or 
rediscovered), as Streeck and Thelen offer no account of how liberalising 
institutions can be created without institutional precedent.
6.b The role of government in liberalisation
The importance of governments for the creation of the institutions mentioned 
above echoes a number of studies which have drawn attention to the role of 
governments, as rule-makers, in creating market institutions. Streeck and 
Thelen have downplayed the role of governments in liberalisation, suggesting 
that their ability to introduce liberalisation is dependent on the discovery or 
reactivation of existing institutions, and on the defection of sectoral actors from 
collective institutions.
This contrasts with their insistence that the creation of collective institutions 
generally requires governments to play a major role. Hence, they maintain that 
“[njonliberal reforms in a market economy seem to require ‘political moments’ in 
which strong governments create and enforce rules that individual actors have 
to follow” (Streeck and Thelen, 2005: 33).
However, this thesis has indicated that governments also play a role in 
liberalisation, both in the creation of liberalising institutions and the maintenance 
of competition within them, as well as in the creation of non-liberal, collective, 
institutions. The role of governments in liberalisation has been highlighted by a 
number of authors. Karl Polanyi has, of course, attempted to offer an 
archaeology of the creation of modern markets, which often occurred with the
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support of government (Polanyi, 2001 ).275 For Fligstein and Stone Sweet, states 
can be indispensable to market development, under the right social conditions 
(Fligstein and Stone Sweet, 2002).276 Similarly, for Vogel, “states themselves, 
even more than private interest groups”, can drive market reforms (Vogel, 1996: 
4).277 Campbell and Lindberg have surveyed how governments have helped to 
“construct markets where there had never been commercial exchange to begin 
with..., or where alternative governance mechanisms had come to coordinate 
exchange” (Campbell and Lindberg, 1991: 349). Hay has also noted that the 
“commodification and marketisation that is often associated with (stylised) 
LMEs” is often not a result of a lack of involvement by the state, but rather “a 
product itself of the institutionalisation of market-like incentives and rationalities” 
which have been imposed by the state (Hay, 2005: 115). Finally, both Cerny 
and Evans have focused on the role of governments in institutionalising the 
conditions for the development of modern capitalism (Cerny, 1991:184; Evans, 
1995: 29).
Different indicators of liberalisation, such as increased competition, may appear 
to have been caused by endogenous factors (such as those that Streeck and 
Thelen might posit), including the reorganisation of firms already within the 
market (Fligstein, 2001: 12). However, Fligstein maintains that governments are 
frequently operating in the background. At the “very least, governments” will be 
active or inactive in ratifying “firms' abilities to use various structures that 
mediate competition and conflict”; and “[a]t the very most”, governments will 
“directly intervene in market practices to produce stability” (ibid.: 19). Even in 
‘black’ markets, which often operate according to elaborate institutionalised 
rules concerning the vetting of participants and the transportation of goods 
(Hodgson, 1988: 176-7), the need for these rules is imposed by government in 
the first place, through its prohibition on trading in the goods concerned.
Governments can attempt to institute, or deepen, markets in previously non- 
marketised sectors, as in the case examined here, or to enforce competition in 
existing, but monopolistic or monopsonistic markets. Government intervention
275 See also Blyth, 2002: 3 and Fligstein, 1985; and see also Thompson, 1991, for additional historical analysis of the 
development of modern markets.
276 See also Evans 1995 and Weiss, 1998.
277 See also Fligstein, 2001:6.
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can “permanently alter” the structure of markets or indeed, create markets out 
of a previously non- competitive context (Cerny, 1991: 184; Zysman and Tyson, 
1983: 24). Hence, King and Wood have noted that the US and UK 
government’s liberalising policies significantly decreased the extent of 
coordination and increased the extent of competition, within certain sectors 
(King and Wood: 396).278 Governments may, and indeed often have, attempted 
to extend or deepen liberalisation in the absence of societal pressures towards 
marketisation (Goodman and Pauly, 1993; Helleiner, 1994).
Governments may also attempt to arbitrate between economic actors, and thus 
enforce the rules that allow (relatively) ‘free’ competition. Rather than acting to 
mitigate the consequences of liberal competition (as through creating managed 
capitalist institutions), governments may, thus, also act to preserve or intensify 
liberal competition, through “providing framework legislation to locate decision­
making power in companies and limit the power of organized labour” (Schmidt, 
2002: 125; see also Wood, 2001). Hence, Schmidt has also noted how a 
number of governments have increased the extent of state regulation, with 
“agents of the state, in the form of regulatory agencies and courts ...now 
involved in determining activities which in the past were more the purview of 
business through private governments and/or accommodation by civil servants”. 
As she notes, these new actors, whilst formally under the aegis of the state, 
have their role restricted to arbitrating the rules of the market game, rather than 
directly intervening in the market (Schmidt, 2002: 161). Nonetheless, the 
original decisions concerning which rules should structure the game, and 
clarifying any ambiguities over their interpretation, leave governments with a 
considerable amount of discretion. Regulators of the liberal economy can still 
perform a key role in policy-making and in defining the nature of competition 
(Schmidt, 2002: 162).
A recognition of the role of governments in market-building and liberalisation 
more generally is particularly relevant in the case of higher education. For 
Neave, moves “towards a ‘market coordinated system’” in higher education 
have been “accompanied by a [significant] degree of ...state intervention”
278 For other analyses of the role of government in promoting and controlling competition, see Garrett, 1998; Rieger 
and Leibfried, 1998; Scharpf, 1991; Weiss, 1998; Evans, 1995; and Vogel, 1996.
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(Neave, 1993: 13).279 In the creation of a “higher education industry”, the 
“parameters of....markets are set directly by the state and its agencies” 
(Edwards and Miller, 1998: 49). Overall, therefore, governments can play a 
dominant, and sometimes the dominant, role in liberalisation, rather than 
governments only being involved in the creation of non-liberal institutions, as 
Streeck and Thelen appear to suggest.
6.c The role of coordinated resistance by regulatees in liberalisation
Finally, this thesis has indicated that rather than commodification and 
competition being seen as regulatees as automatically desirable routes of 
action, regulatees have, instead, debated the consequences of liberalisation 
and in some cases attempted to resist it. The creation of markets is, therefore, a 
conscious political process which is supported by some actors and resisted by 
others.
These findings cohere with the considerable amount of literature which has 
examined the relationship between sectoral structures and public policy. As 
Sharpf has noted, “some policies may be facilitated by tightly connected or 
highly centralized structures, [but] others may have better chances of success 
in loosely coupled decision systems” (Scharpf, 1978: 362-3). Similarly, Hall and 
Soskice have claimed that “economic policies will be effective only if they are 
incentive compatible, namely complementary to the coordinating capacities 
embedded in the existing political economy” (Hall and Soskice, 2001: 46).280
A lack of coordination within a sector can hold back government attempts to 
create managed (or coordinated) capitalist institutions, as Schmidt claims with 
respect to French governments’ activities concerning business and labour 
relations. Similarly, Ebbinghaus and Manow have maintained that the “relations 
between economic actors are crucial for their strategic capacity” in producing 
public policies, specifically to the extent that they “provide opportunities for 
coordination” (Ebbinghaus and Manow, 2001: 7). However, in this case, a lack 
of coordinated societal actors caused such attempts to lead to an
279 See also De Groof eta!., 1998: 79.
280 See also Peter Gourevitch’s work, which has described the recognition of the reflexivity of relationships between 
government and regulatees as 'the macropolitics of microinstitutional differences’ (Gourevitch, 1996: 241).
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institutionalisation of market, rather than managed, capitalism (Schmidt, 2002: 
126).
Therefore, extensive coordination may, as in this case, hold back attempts to 
institute liberalisation. Some coordinating organisations may support 
liberalisation, as occurred perhaps in the original creation of the market 
economy. As Crouch notes, “[w]hile in England and the USA [the] task [of 
creating the institutions of the market economy] was piecemeal, in almost all 
other industrial capitalist societies it was accomplished precisely by organised 
groups of business interests, in association with the state” (Crouch, 1983: 368-9, 
373). Other coordinating organisations may, however, act to block liberalisation, 
particularly where this is not perceived as being in their members’ interests. The 
strength or weakness of such organisations will determine whether their efforts 
at resistance will achieve real change or otherwise.
7 Future research
This thesis has examined why liberalisation has occurred to a greater extent in 
one country (Britain) than in another (France), in one particular sector 
(international higher education). It has attempted to explain this difference 
through the greater extent of coordination of resistance amongst French than 
amongst British HEIs, which was more effective in preventing government 
attempts to institute liberalisation.
The sector examined here, higher education, has traditionally been closely 
connected to governments in both countries. To that extent, this thesis has 
tested the ability of existing theories of liberalisation to explain liberalisation 
within one part of the public sector. It has suggested, in particular, that the 
explanatory relevance of Streeck and Thelen’s theory of liberalisation is limited.
This thesis therefore suggests the need for a greater examination of the 
mechanisms of public sector liberalisation within comparative political economy. 
There have been a number of previous studies which have focused on the 
liberalisation of the welfare state. However, they have generally examined the 
welfare state from the perspective of the constraints it places on the market, as 
a form of “politics against markets” (Boyer and Hollingsworth, 1997: 447-9;
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Esping-Andersen, 1993). Ebbinghaus and Manow have recognised that this 
approach fails to take into account the fact that the welfare state can covary 
“with other features of modern capitalism” (Ebbinghaus and Manow, 2001: 10). 
However, they have confined their analysis to examining how welfare state 
policies can be used to support particular models of economic activity (ibid.: 7). 
Such an approach fails to recognise that public services themselves have 
become increasingly liberalised, rather than merely acting as a support for a 
liberalised economy. In particular, educational services, such as those 
examined here, have themselves come to be subject to market competition, 
rather than as merely supporting this.
Whilst a number of works have examined the liberalisation of services that were 
previously supplied under the aegis of the state (Pollock, 2004; Thatcher, 1999), 
little systematic, cross-sectoral work has been undertaken on the question of 
whether there are substantial differences between the manner in which 
liberalisation occurs in the public sector compared with the private sector. Until 
such an analysis is produced, the liberalisation of the public sector, one of the 
most important politico-economic trends of the last twenty years, will continue to 
be under-theorised and insufficiently explained. It may well be the case that, as 
here, public sector liberalisation is generally promoted by governments, which 
have the capacity to create the rules and, cumulatively, the institutions which 
can lead to intra-sectoral competition and commodification. Furthermore, rather 
than regulatees encouraging this liberalisation, through defecting into market- 
based institutions away from collective ones, it might be found that regulatees 
often attempt to coordinate resistance against liberalisation, through 
mechanisms such as encompassing sectoral associations. The outcome of this 
process- the extent to which governments are able to push pro-liberalisation 
policies in the face of regulatees’ resistance- could have profound effects for the 
shape of different nations’ public sectors, and for their economies more 
generally.
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Glossary
ARIES French HEIs’ peak association for international relations staff
CDEFI Conference des Directeurs d’£coles et Formations d’lngenieurs
CDIUFM Conference des Directeurs d’lUFM
CDP..... Committee of Directors of Polytechnics
CGE Conference des Grandes Ecoles
CME......Coordinated market economy
CMU......Coalition of Modern Universities/ Campaign for Mainstream
Universities
CNOUS..... Centre National des CEuvres Universitaires et Scolaires
COREX......Commission for Exterior Relations (of the CPU)
CPU Conference des Presidents d’Universite
DES......Department for Education and Science
ECS......Education Counselling Service
FCO..... Foreign and Commonwealth Office
HEI Higher Education Institution
IDG Inter-Departmental Group of Officials
IUC Inter-University Council
LME......Liberal market economy
MBA.....Masters in Business Administration
OCP..... Overseas collaborative provision
ODA..... Overseas Development Administration
SCOP.......Standing Conference of Principals (of Higher Education Colleges)
SFERE........Societe Francaise pour 1’Exportation des Ressources Educatives
TETOC Technical Education and Training Overseas Corporation
THES Times Higher Education Supplement
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